diff --git a/src/net.cpp b/src/net.cpp
index a69d13436d5..4d7c181330a 100644
--- a/src/net.cpp
+++ b/src/net.cpp
@@ -908,16 +908,17 @@ void ProtectEvictionCandidatesByRatio(std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate>& evicti
     // Protect the half of the remaining nodes which have been connected the longest.
     // This replicates the non-eviction implicit behavior, and precludes attacks that start later.
     // To favorise the diversity of our peer connections, reserve up to half of these protected
-    // spots for Tor/onion and localhost peers, even if they're not longest uptime overall.
+    // spots for Tor/onion, localhost and I2P peers, even if they're not longest uptime overall.
     // This helps protect these higher-latency peers that tend to be otherwise
     // disadvantaged under our eviction criteria.
     const size_t initial_size = eviction_candidates.size();
     const size_t total_protect_size{initial_size / 2};
 
-    // Disadvantaged networks to protect: localhost and Tor/onion. In case of equal counts, earlier
+    // Disadvantaged networks to protect: I2P, localhost, Tor/onion. In case of equal counts, earlier
     // array members have first opportunity to recover unused slots from the previous iteration.
     struct Net { bool is_local; Network id; size_t count; };
-    std::array<Net, 3> networks{{{/* localhost */ true, NET_MAX, 0}, {false, NET_ONION, 0}}};
+    std::array<Net, 3> networks{
+        {{false, NET_I2P, 0}, {/* localhost */ true, NET_MAX, 0}, {false, NET_ONION, 0}}};
 
     // Count and store the number of eviction candidates per network.
     for (Net& n : networks) {
diff --git a/src/net.h b/src/net.h
index e308ac57144..01658e8973b 100644
--- a/src/net.h
+++ b/src/net.h
@@ -1236,6 +1236,8 @@ struct NodeEvictionCandidate
  * - localhost peers, as manually configured hidden services not using
  *   `-bind=addr[:port]=onion` will not be detected as inbound onion connections
  *
+ * - I2P peers
+ *
  * This helps protect these privacy network peers, which tend to be otherwise
  * disadvantaged under our eviction criteria for their higher min ping times
  * relative to IPv4/IPv6 peers, and favorise the diversity of peer connections.
diff --git a/src/test/net_peer_eviction_tests.cpp b/src/test/net_peer_eviction_tests.cpp
index ec4aa501738..bf56e1bea7c 100644
--- a/src/test/net_peer_eviction_tests.cpp
+++ b/src/test/net_peer_eviction_tests.cpp
@@ -109,10 +109,10 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(peer_protection_test)
         /* unprotected_peer_ids */ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
         random_context));
 
-    // Test protection of onion and localhost peers...
+    // Test protection of onion, localhost, and I2P peers...
 
     // Expect 1/4 onion peers to be protected from eviction,
-    // if no localhost peers.
+    // if no localhost or I2P peers.
     BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
         num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
             c.m_is_local = false;
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(peer_protection_test)
         random_context));
 
     // Expect 1/4 onion peers and 1/4 of the other peers to be protected,
-    // sorted by longest uptime (lowest nTimeConnected), if no localhost peers.
+    // sorted by longest uptime (lowest nTimeConnected), if no localhost or I2P peers.
     BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
         num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
             c.nTimeConnected = c.id;
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(peer_protection_test)
         random_context));
 
     // Expect 1/4 localhost peers to be protected from eviction,
-    // if no onion peers.
+    // if no onion or I2P peers.
     BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
         num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
             c.m_is_local = (c.id == 1 || c.id == 9 || c.id == 11);
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(peer_protection_test)
         random_context));
 
     // Expect 1/4 localhost peers and 1/4 of the other peers to be protected,
-    // sorted by longest uptime (lowest nTimeConnected), if no onion peers.
+    // sorted by longest uptime (lowest nTimeConnected), if no onion or I2P peers.
     BOOST_CHECK(IsProtected(
         num_peers, [](NodeEvictionCandidate& c) {
             c.nTimeConnected = c.id;