package handler import ( "encoding/json" "errors" "net/http" "strings" "time" "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5" "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5" "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype" "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/auth" db "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/db/generated" ) // PATRenewThreshold is the remaining-lifetime window at which a PAT becomes // eligible for an in-place renewal. The daemon polls every ~3 days, so a 7-day // threshold guarantees at least one renewal attempt while the token still has // ≥ 4 days of validity left — enough margin to absorb a transient network // failure before the user actually has to re-run `multica login`. const PATRenewThreshold = 7 * 24 * time.Hour // PATRenewExtension is how far into the future a renewed PAT's expires_at is // pushed. Matches the initial issuance window in CreatePersonalAccessToken // (90 days) so renewed tokens converge on the same lifetime as freshly minted // ones — no second-class renewed tokens. const PATRenewExtension = 90 * 24 * time.Hour type PersonalAccessTokenResponse struct { ID string `json:"id"` Name string `json:"name"` Prefix string `json:"token_prefix"` ExpiresAt *string `json:"expires_at"` LastUsedAt *string `json:"last_used_at"` CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"` } type CreatePATResponse struct { PersonalAccessTokenResponse Token string `json:"token"` } func patToResponse(pat db.PersonalAccessToken) PersonalAccessTokenResponse { return PersonalAccessTokenResponse{ ID: uuidToString(pat.ID), Name: pat.Name, Prefix: pat.TokenPrefix, ExpiresAt: timestampToPtr(pat.ExpiresAt), LastUsedAt: timestampToPtr(pat.LastUsedAt), CreatedAt: timestampToString(pat.CreatedAt), } } type CreatePATRequest struct { Name string `json:"name"` ExpiresInDays *int `json:"expires_in_days"` } func (h *Handler) CreatePersonalAccessToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r) if !ok { return } var req CreatePATRequest if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil { writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body") return } if req.Name == "" { writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "name is required") return } rawToken, err := auth.GeneratePATToken() if err != nil { writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to generate token") return } var expiresAt pgtype.Timestamptz if req.ExpiresInDays != nil && *req.ExpiresInDays > 0 { expiresAt = pgtype.Timestamptz{ Time: time.Now().Add(time.Duration(*req.ExpiresInDays) * 24 * time.Hour), Valid: true, } } prefix := rawToken if len(prefix) > 12 { prefix = prefix[:12] } pat, err := h.Queries.CreatePersonalAccessToken(r.Context(), db.CreatePersonalAccessTokenParams{ UserID: parseUUID(userID), Name: req.Name, TokenHash: auth.HashToken(rawToken), TokenPrefix: prefix, ExpiresAt: expiresAt, }) if err != nil { writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to create token") return } writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, CreatePATResponse{ PersonalAccessTokenResponse: patToResponse(pat), Token: rawToken, }) } func (h *Handler) ListPersonalAccessTokens(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r) if !ok { return } pats, err := h.Queries.ListPersonalAccessTokensByUser(r.Context(), parseUUID(userID)) if err != nil { writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list tokens") return } resp := make([]PersonalAccessTokenResponse, len(pats)) for i, pat := range pats { resp[i] = patToResponse(pat) } writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp) } // RenewPATResponse is the body returned by RenewCurrentPersonalAccessToken. // // Renewed=false is a no-op, not an error — it just means the caller polled // before the token entered the renewal window. Callers should always read // ExpiresAt for the authoritative expiry rather than assuming the old value // is still current. type RenewPATResponse struct { ExpiresAt string `json:"expires_at"` Renewed bool `json:"renewed"` } // RenewCurrentPersonalAccessToken extends the expires_at of the PAT used to // authenticate this request, in-place, when it is inside the renewal window. // // The endpoint deliberately does NOT mint a new token — that would require // either rotating the raw secret (breaks the CLI/daemon multi-process model, // where a single PAT is shared by every process started from the same CLI // config) or returning the raw token over the wire on every poll (a needless // exposure since the daemon already holds it). Instead we extend the row's // expires_at atomically; the cached PAT entry's TTL is short enough // (auth.AuthCacheTTL ≤ 10m) that the cache catches up to the new expiry on // the next cache miss without an explicit invalidation. // // Only mul_ PATs may be renewed: a cookie/JWT session has no PAT row to // extend, and an mat_ task token is single-purpose and short-lived. mcn_ // cloud-node PATs are owned by Multica Cloud Fleet, not us — we don't even // see the expiry locally. func (h *Handler) RenewCurrentPersonalAccessToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r) if !ok { return } // Re-read the raw token from the Authorization header — the upstream Auth // middleware resolves it to a userID but doesn't pass the hash forward, // and we need the row, not just the user. authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization") rawToken := strings.TrimPrefix(authHeader, "Bearer ") if rawToken == "" || rawToken == authHeader || !strings.HasPrefix(rawToken, "mul_") { writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "only personal access tokens can be renewed") return } hash := auth.HashToken(rawToken) pat, err := h.Queries.GetPersonalAccessTokenByHash(r.Context(), hash) if err != nil { // The Auth middleware already validated the token, so reaching here // with no row means the PAT was revoked or expired in the gap between // the middleware's cache hit and this DB read. Surface a 401 so the // daemon's 401 branch fires the same "please re-login" message it // would for any other auth failure, instead of a generic 500. if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) { writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "token is no longer valid") return } writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to look up token") return } // Defense in depth: the middleware already set X-User-ID from the same // PAT row, so this mismatch should be impossible. If it ever fires, it // means a header was forged past the middleware and we MUST refuse to // renew on someone else's behalf — fail loudly. if uuidToString(pat.UserID) != userID { writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "token does not belong to caller") return } // PATs minted before this code existed may have a NULL expires_at (the // "never expires" case). There is nothing to extend — return the current // (absent) expiry and let the caller treat this as a permanent token. if !pat.ExpiresAt.Valid { writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, RenewPATResponse{ExpiresAt: "", Renewed: false}) return } now := time.Now() remaining := pat.ExpiresAt.Time.Sub(now) if remaining > PATRenewThreshold { writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, RenewPATResponse{ ExpiresAt: timestampToString(pat.ExpiresAt), Renewed: false, }) return } newExpiresAt := pgtype.Timestamptz{Time: now.Add(PATRenewExtension), Valid: true} // Pass the renewal threshold as the CAS predicate: only update if the // row's existing expires_at is still inside this window. After the // first writer succeeds the row sits at now+90d, which is well past // now+7d, so any concurrent renewer hits the WHERE and sees ErrNoRows. renewThreshold := pgtype.Timestamptz{Time: now.Add(PATRenewThreshold), Valid: true} updated, err := h.Queries.ExtendPersonalAccessTokenExpiry(r.Context(), db.ExtendPersonalAccessTokenExpiryParams{ ID: pat.ID, NewExpiresAt: newExpiresAt, RenewThresholdAt: renewThreshold, }) switch { case err == nil: writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, RenewPATResponse{ ExpiresAt: timestampToString(updated), Renewed: true, }) case errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows): // A concurrent renew (or revoke) won the race. Re-read the current // row and report what's there now — the daemon's only correctness // guarantee is "after a successful call, expires_at is fresh enough // to last until the next poll", and a parallel writer already // satisfied that, so this is success from the caller's POV. current, getErr := h.Queries.GetPersonalAccessTokenByHash(r.Context(), hash) if getErr != nil { writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "token is no longer valid") return } writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, RenewPATResponse{ ExpiresAt: timestampToString(current.ExpiresAt), Renewed: false, }) default: writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to renew token") } } func (h *Handler) RevokePersonalAccessToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r) if !ok { return } id := chi.URLParam(r, "id") idUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, id, "token id") if !ok { return } hash, err := h.Queries.RevokePersonalAccessToken(r.Context(), db.RevokePersonalAccessTokenParams{ ID: idUUID, UserID: parseUUID(userID), }) switch { case err == nil: // Drop the cache entry immediately so the revocation takes effect // before the TTL would otherwise expire the cached lookup. h.PATCache.Invalidate(r.Context(), hash) case errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows): // Token doesn't exist or doesn't belong to this user. Preserve the // pre-existing idempotent 204 behavior — no cache entry to clear. default: writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to revoke token") return } w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent) }