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agent/lambda/768b92e0
9 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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3bd69bdaa2 |
MUL-4432: add DM button on agent detail page (#5289)
* feat(agents): add DM button on agent detail page The header gains a DM action next to Assign work. It shares the MUL-3963 invocation gate with assignment: allowed users land on the Chat tab with a fresh compose bound to the agent via a new one-shot ?agent=<id> deep link (consumed once the permission-filtered agent list resolves, then stripped); denied users get an explanatory toast instead of a hidden affordance. Closes MUL-4432 Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> * fix(chat): harden the ?agent= deep link against races and undetermined permissions Review follow-up for the DM button (PR #5289): - An explicit user action (thread select, archive, manual new chat) now supersedes a still-pending ?agent= intent, so an intent deferred by slow agent/member queries can no longer fire late and clobber that choice. - The composingNew reset reads the live store value; under StrictMode's effect replay the render-captured snapshot re-closed the compose pane the intent had just opened (one-shot guard rightly refuses to re-fire). - A settled miss (revoked access, archived agent, bad id) now toasts and strips the param instead of silently keeping a re-fireable intent; still- loading queries keep the intent pending. Query errors never settle. - useAgentPermissions exposes isLoading: the detail page disables DM while membership resolves instead of toasting a false not_member deny at a legitimate member. The chat store test mock is now reactive (useSyncExternalStore) — with a plain mutable ref React bails out of committing post-effect re-renders and the StrictMode regression cannot reproduce. Both new regression tests fail against the pre-fix code. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> --------- Co-authored-by: Lambda <lambda@multica.ai> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> |
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1ae0a1f5bf |
fix(agents): defend AccessPicker against undefined invocation_targets (GH #4915) (#4924)
Opening the agent detail page in v0.3.37 crashed the whole route with "Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'some')" whenever the cached agent record's `invocation_targets` was missing at runtime — even though the TypeScript type declares it a required `AgentInvocationTarget[]`. Root cause: `AccessPicker`'s `hasWorkspaceTarget` / `selectedMemberIds` / `selectedTeamIds` helpers called `.some()` / `.filter()` directly on the prop, and the same unguarded pattern was mirrored in `AgentMcpTab` and the `canAssignAgentToIssue` permission gate. The field can legitimately be undefined at runtime because: - `packages/core/api/schemas.ts` declares `invocation_targets` as `.optional()`, and `MinimalAgentSchema` (used for the create-from- template response) also marks it optional. - `api.listAgents` / `api.getAgent` return raw JSON without running through the schema, so an older self-host backend that predates MUL-3963 (permission_mode + invocation_targets) — the exact scenario in GH #4915 — yields an Agent with the field missing. Fix (`?? []`) at every site that indexes into the list, matching the already-established pattern in `create-agent-dialog.tsx`: - `access-picker.tsx`: coerce inside the three helpers and widen the prop type to `AgentInvocationTarget[] | undefined` so the accepted runtime shape is documented. - `agent-mcp-tab.tsx`: `(agent.invocation_targets ?? []).some(...)`. - `permissions/rules.ts`: `agent.invocation_targets ?? []` before the workspace / member membership checks. Adds three regression tests (AccessPicker owner + read-only paths, AgentMcpTab shared-warning path, canAssignAgentToIssue) that pass `undefined` for invocation_targets and assert the UI degrades to the private / empty-allowlist state instead of throwing. Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> |
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cb68669c73 |
feat(composio): gate MCP apps behind feature flag (#4876)
* feat(composio): server-side connect flow + connections REST (Notion MVP) (MUL-3720) (#4608)
* feat(composio): server-side connect flow + connections REST (Notion MVP) (MUL-3720)
Compose the merged server/pkg/composio SDK into a user-facing connection
manager: signed-state connect handshake, local user_composio_connection
mirror, idempotent disconnect, and a per-user MCP session helper (not yet
wired into task dispatch).
- migration 127_user_composio_connection (no FK/cascade, per DB rules)
- sqlc queries: upsert (idempotent on user_id+connected_account_id), list
active, owner-scoped get, mark revoked
- internal/integrations/composio: signed HMAC-SHA256 state, BeginConnect,
CompleteCallback (idempotent upsert), ListConnections, Disconnect
(upstream 404 = idempotent success), CreateMCPSession (no-op when empty,
pins connected_accounts per toolkit), CallbackRedirect
- REST handlers under /api/integrations/composio (user-scoped, 503 when
COMPOSIO_API_KEY unset): connect/init, callback (302), connections list,
delete
- router wiring gated by COMPOSIO_API_KEY; COMPOSIO_AUTH_CONFIGS_JSON maps
toolkit->auth_config (MVP: notion); state secret from COMPOSIO_STATE_SECRET
or derived from JWT_SECRET; callback base from COMPOSIO_CALLBACK_BASE_URL
or MULTICA_PUBLIC_URL
- tests: state (expire/tamper/wrong-secret), service (mapping, callback
idempotency, non-success, disconnect owner/404 idempotency, MCP pin),
handlers (httptest), redact regression for Bearer mcp_ tokens
MVP scope: Notion only; no task-dispatch overlay, sharing, or webhook
event handling (later stages).
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(composio): bind callback account to user + idempotent revoked disconnect (MUL-3720)
Address PR 4608 review (CHANGES_REQUESTED):
- callback: verify connected_account_id with Composio before mirroring it.
The signed state only proved user/toolkit/exp, so a valid state paired with
a tampered connected_account_id would be written verbatim. CompleteCallback
now calls ListConnectedAccounts and fails closed (ErrAccountVerification)
unless the account belongs to the state's user (composio_user_id == multica
user id) and was created under the toolkit's auth config. No row is written
on mismatch / unknown account / upstream error.
- disconnect: short-circuit to a no-op when the local row is already revoked,
before touching upstream. Previously a second DELETE re-hit Composio and a
non-404 upstream error surfaced as a 502, breaking the 204-idempotent
contract.
- CreateMCPSession: document the v1 single-active-connection-per-(user,toolkit)
constraint and make duplicate selection deterministic (newest-wins, rows are
connected_at DESC) instead of order-dependent map overwrite. Stage 3 owns the
real single-account-enforcement vs multi-account-shape decision.
Tests: tampered/wrong-auth-config/unknown-account callback rejection, revoked-row
disconnect no-op (asserts upstream not re-hit). composio pkg 85% coverage; all
green.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* feat(composio): list all toolkits + dynamic auth-config resolution (MUL-3720)
Yushen's follow-up to the Notion MVP: surface the full Composio toolkit
catalog, render it in Settings, and drop the static env mapping in favor of
dynamic auth-config discovery.
Config correctness (per Composio docs):
- Remove COMPOSIO_AUTH_CONFIGS_JSON entirely. The toolkit→auth_config mapping
is now resolved at request time from the project's /auth_configs (cached,
5-min TTL), so enabling a toolkit is a dashboard action, not a redeploy.
- Do NOT add COMPOSIO_PROJECT_ID. The project API key (x-api-key) authenticates
to exactly one project; the project is resolved from the key. Only org-level
endpoints use x-org-api-key, which this integration never calls.
Backend:
- SDK: server/pkg/composio/auth_configs.go — ListAuthConfigs (toolkit_slug,
is_composio_managed, show_disabled, limit, cursor).
- service: dynamic resolver (authConfigMap cache; betterAuthConfig prefers a
custom/white-label config over Composio-managed, newest wins); BeginConnect
and CompleteCallback resolve via it; ListToolkits fetches the full catalog
(paginated, capped) annotated with connectable = has an enabled auth config,
connectable-first ordering.
- handler + route: GET /api/integrations/composio/toolkits (user-scoped, 503
when COMPOSIO_API_KEY unset) returning slug/name/logo/category/connectable.
Frontend:
- core: ComposioToolkit/ComposioConnection types, api client methods, and
composio query options (@multica/core/composio).
- views: Settings → Integrations now has a Composio section rendering every
toolkit as a card with search. Connect is gated on `connectable`;
non-connectable toolkits show a muted "not configured" hint instead of a
dead button. Connected toolkits show a badge + Disconnect (with confirm).
- i18n: composio block added to en/zh-Hans/ja/ko settings.
Tests: SDK + service (dynamic resolution, custom-over-managed preference,
connectable flag, resolver-error soft-degrade) and handler toolkits endpoint;
composio pkg 85.7% coverage. go build/vet/gofmt clean; core+views typecheck,
core+views lint, and core tests (691) all green.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(composio): close cross-toolkit callback fail-open by signing auth_config_id into state (MUL-3720)
Re-review blocker: CompleteCallback resolved the toolkit's auth config at
callback time and ignored a resolve error/empty result, while
verifyAccountOwnership skipped the auth-config comparison when the expected
value was empty. A user could then pass another toolkit's connected_account_id
into this toolkit's callback — the owner check passed and it was written under
the wrong toolkit_slug/account binding.
Fix: the auth_config_id is already resolved in BeginConnect (before the state
is signed), so sign it into the state and compare it exactly at callback. No
re-resolve, no fail-open. verifyAccountOwnership now fails closed when the
expected auth config is empty (rejects instead of skipping) and requires an
exact match — closing the cross-toolkit binding gap.
Tests: state round-trips auth_config_id; BeginConnect signs it; callback
rejects wrong/cross-toolkit auth config and an empty (no-mapping) auth config
fails closed. composio pkg 85.2% coverage, all green.
Frontend (non-blocking): the Composio settings tab now surfaces an error when
the connections query fails instead of silently rendering everything as
unconnected.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(composio): hide Settings section entirely when integration unconfigured (MUL-3720)
Decision (option 2, hide-then-merge): don't show a card that leaks the internal
COMPOSIO_API_KEY env-var name to every end user. IntegrationsTab now gates the
whole Composio section (heading + body) on the toolkits query — a 503 means the
key is unset, so the section is withheld instead of rendering the not-configured
card. Admin-only setup guidance is a later, role-gated affordance.
Removed the notConfigured card (and now-unused ApiError import) from
ComposioTab; it only mounts when configured. views typecheck + lint clean.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
---------
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* feat(composio): Stage 2 frontend polish — callback toast, last_used & expired UI, e2e (MUL-3718) (#4688)
* feat(composio): callback toast + refresh, last_used & expired UI, e2e (MUL-3718)
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(composio): real callback redirect route + StrictMode-safe toast dedup (MUL-3718 review)
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
---------
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(composio): callback endpoint should not require Multica auth (MUL-3843) (#4709)
* fix(composio): move OAuth callback out of the Auth group (MUL-3843)
Composio 302-redirects the browser to /api/integrations/composio/callback
at the end of the OAuth flow, but PR #4608 mounted it inside the cookie-auth
middleware group. When the session cookie is absent (expired session,
SameSite=Strict / Safari ITP, private window, self-hosted callback subdomain)
the Auth middleware returned a hard 401 and a JSON blob instead of the
settings redirect, breaking the flow.
Identity never came from the cookie anyway: it is carried by the HMAC-signed
state param that CompleteCallback verifies (signature, expiry, replay) and
cross-checked by verifyAccountOwnership; h.Composio == nil still 503s. So the
callback is registered alongside the other public OAuth/webhook routes; the
other four composio endpoints stay session-gated.
Refs MUL-3843, MUL-3715.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(composio): correct stale callback routing comments (MUL-3843)
The package header and ComposioCallback doc comments still described the
callback as sitting under the Auth middleware group. After the route was
moved out (this PR), update both to state it is a public route whose identity
comes from the signed state — addressing review nit from 张大彪.
Refs MUL-3843.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
---------
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* feat(composio): inject MCP overlay into agent runtime at task dispatch (MUL-3721) (#4704)
Stage 3 of the Composio epic. Wires the per-user Composio MCP session into
every agent task so the agent process sees the initiator's connected tools
without any prompt-time plumbing.
Server side
- Migration 128 adds agent_task_queue.runtime_mcp_overlay JSONB plus a
BEFORE-UPDATE trigger that wipes the column on any transition into a
terminal status (completed / failed / cancelled). A trigger is the single
source of truth — future queries that flip status cannot bypass it.
- composio.Service.BuildTaskOverlay(userID) reuses CreateMCPSession and
emits the Claude-style { mcpServers: { composio: { type: http, url,
headers } } } shape the daemon's existing sidecar generators consume.
Returns (nil, nil) on zero active connections so we never burn a
Composio session for a user with nothing to call.
- TaskService grows a Composio ComposioOverlayBuilder seam, wired in
router.go after composiointeg.NewService succeeds. Five enqueue paths
(issue / mention / quick-create / chat / auto-retry) attach the overlay
after CreateAgentTask returns and before the daemon is notified — so
every claim reads a settled row, with no second daemon hop. Best-effort:
a builder failure logs and proceeds with no overlay.
- resolveInitiatorFromTriggerComment derives the initiator user from the
trigger comment when it was authored by a member. Agent-authored
triggers are not treated as initiators (their connected-apps view is
empty by construction).
Daemon side
- handler/daemon.go claim path merges task.runtime_mcp_overlay onto
agent.mcp_config via mergeMCPOverlay before populating
TaskAgentData.McpConfig. Overlay wins on server-name collisions
because it carries the live user-scoped session URL. Errors fall back
to the agent config unchanged — a bad overlay must not surprise-disable
saved MCP tools. The existing execenv sidecar generators (cursor /
codex / openclaw / opencode / hermes-kiro) need no changes: they keep
consuming the merged result through TaskAgentData.McpConfig.
Tests
- 9 merge cases (mcp_overlay_test): both-nil short-circuit, agent-only
pass-through, overlay-only canonicalization, two-side merge, name
collision (overlay wins), top-level key preservation, malformed agent
fallback, malformed overlay fallback, non-object server rejection.
- 4 dispatch cases (composio): zero-connections returns nil without
CreateSession, happy-path emits the right shape with the right user
id, empty-URL defensive branch, SDK error surfacing.
- 4 TaskService helper cases: nil Composio is a no-op (Queries-safe),
invalid initiator does not call the builder, nil overlay skips the
UPDATE, builder error swallowed without panic.
- Migration 128 verified to roll up + down + up cleanly against the test
database.
Out of scope (deferred): assignment-triggered enqueue paths with no
trigger comment get no overlay attached today (no initiator UUID flows
through enqueueIssueTask in that case). Retry paths recompute the overlay
fresh from the parent's initiator_user_id instead of inheriting the bearer
from the parent row, so a stale token can never resurface on a retry.
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* feat(composio): per-agent allowlist + originator-scoped MCP overlay (MUL-3869) (#4736)
* feat(composio): per-agent allowlist + originator-scoped MCP overlay (MUL-3869)
Stage 3.1 of the Composio epic (MUL-3721 parent). PR #4704 wired in the
runtime_mcp_overlay column and a per-task dispatch hook; this change
inverts the default from "all-on" to opt-in and locks the overlay to the
agent owner's own connected apps:
- Agents carry composio_toolkit_allowlist TEXT[]. NULL or [] => no MCP.
Owner-only read/write; non-owner GET/PUT silently redacts/drops the
field (same shape as mcp_config).
- agent_task_queue carries originator_user_id UUID. Set from the
top-of-chain HUMAN at every enqueue path:
* issue/mention comment by member -> author_id
* issue/mention comment by agent -> inherit via comment.source_task_id
-> parent task originator_user_id
* quick-create -> requester_id
* chat -> initiator_user_id
* retry -> SQL-inherited from parent row
* autopilot -> NULL (system-driven)
- BuildTaskOverlay (composio dispatch) now takes (ctx, originatorUserID,
agent) and short-circuits on five gates: invalid originator,
originator != agent.owner_id, empty allowlist, empty intersection of
allowlist ∩ active connections, defensive empty session URL. Composio
CreateSession is called with BOTH `toolkits.slugs` (the intersection)
AND `connected_accounts` (the pinned account ids), narrowing the
tool-router twice.
- The originator-vs-owner gate closes the agent-fanout privacy hole: any
workspace member who can @-mention a public agent used to project the
owner's connected apps into their run. Now the overlay only mounts
when the human at the top of the chain IS the agent owner.
Tests:
- dispatch_test.go covers all 5 gates plus uppercase/whitespace slug
normalisation.
- task_runtime_mcp_overlay_test.go covers the no-op gates of the new
applyRuntimeMCPOverlay signature.
- agent_composio_allowlist_test.go (handler): owner roundtrip
(list/empty/null), workspace-admin silent-drop, owner-only GET
visibility, pure normaliseComposioToolkitAllowlist.
- resolve_originator_test.go (service, DB-backed): member-authored,
agent-authored inherits via comment.source_task_id, invalid id.
Migration 129 up/down/up verified against docker postgres.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* chore(composio): gofmt + regenerate sqlc with v1.31.1 (MUL-3869 review nits)
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
---------
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(composio): accept nested connected account auth config
* feat(views): creator-only MCP tab for per-agent Composio allowlist (MUL-3870) (#4743)
Stage 3.2 frontend on top of the Stage 3.1 backend (MUL-3869,
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13f74e651a |
feat(agents): remove custom_env from agent resources, add audited env endpoint (MUL-2600) (#3209)
* feat(agents): remove custom_env from agent resources, add audited env endpoint (MUL-2600)
The agent resource shape (list / get / create / update / archive /
restore responses + WebSocket events) no longer carries `custom_env`
values. Reads/writes of env now flow exclusively through a dedicated
`/api/agents/{id}/env` endpoint that is owner/admin-only, rejects
agent-actor sessions, applies a "****" sentinel preserve guard on
PUT, and writes a persistent audit row per reveal/update.
Why
- `multica agent list --output json` historically returned plaintext
`custom_env` for owner/admin callers (the redaction gate gave only
members the masked map). Any agent token running on the workspace
inherits its owner's role and could read every other agent's
secrets just by listing.
- Patching list/get redaction alone (PR #3175 direction) left
symmetric leaks via mutation responses, WS events, the "reveal"
path itself (no actor-aware auth), and a `****` overwrite footgun
on UpdateAgent.
What changed
- Backend: drop `custom_env` from AgentResponse; add coarse
`has_custom_env` + `custom_env_key_count`. Strip env handling from
UpdateAgent (silently ignored if sent). Keep CreateAgent's
custom_env acceptance.
- Backend: new GET/PUT `/api/agents/{id}/env` handlers in
`internal/handler/agent_env.go`:
- resolveActor → 403 for agent actors (closes the lateral-movement
path).
- Owner/admin role gate via existing helper.
- PUT honours value == "****" as "preserve existing value".
- Both write to `activity_log` with `agent_env_revealed` /
`agent_env_updated` actions. Audit details record key names only,
never values.
- Daemon claim path (`ClaimAgentTask`) unchanged — `TaskAgentData`
still carries plaintext env for runtime injection.
- SQL: new `UpdateAgentCustomEnv` query; sqlc regenerated (v1.31.1).
- CLI: new `multica agent env get|set` subcommands. `--custom-env*`
flags removed from `multica agent update`; the no-fields error
now points to the new path.
- Frontend: drop env fields from `Agent` + `UpdateAgentRequest`; add
`getAgentEnv` / `updateAgentEnv` client methods; rewrite env-tab
to show "N variables configured" + explicit "Reveal & edit"
button, fetching values only on intentional reveal.
- Locales: parity-safe additions to en + zh-Hans.
- Docs: agents-create.{mdx,zh.mdx} reflect the new threat model and
endpoint.
- Mobile: schema drops `custom_env` / `custom_env_redacted`, adds
metadata fields.
Tests
- Handler tests pinned the new invariants: no env in list/get
responses, owner reveal happy-path + audit row, agent-actor 403,
`****` sentinel preserves real values, UpdateAgent silently
ignores `custom_env`, pure `mergeAgentEnv` cases.
- CLI tests pivot to the new flag surface: `agent update` MUST NOT
expose the env flags; `agent env set` MUST expose
--custom-env-stdin/--custom-env-file.
- Frontend test fixtures updated; pnpm typecheck / test / lint
pass cleanly.
This is a breaking API change. Scripts that read `custom_env` from
`/api/agents` must migrate to `GET /api/agents/{id}/env`.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(agents): close actor-spoofing + audit fail-closed in env endpoints (MUL-2600)
Addresses Elon's review of #3209:
* Mint a task-scoped `mat_` token per claim, bound to (agent, task,
workspace, owner). Daemon injects it into the agent process in place
of its own credential. Auth middleware authoritatively rebuilds
X-User-ID / X-Agent-ID / X-Task-ID from the token row and sets
X-Actor-Source=task_token; that header is server-set only — incoming
values are stripped before any auth branch runs. resolveActor honors
the header so an agent that strips X-Agent-ID / X-Task-ID still
resolves as actor=agent.
* GetAgentEnv / UpdateAgentEnv are now fail-closed on audit-log
failures: GET refuses to return plaintext, PUT persists inside the
same tx as the audit row so they commit/roll back together.
* PUT /api/agents/{id} returns 400 when the body carries custom_env
instead of silently dropping it — directs callers to the audited env
endpoint.
* Agent actors never see mcp_config, even when the underlying member
is owner/admin; mutation broadcasts go through a redaction shim so
WS subscribers don't pick it up either.
* Fix backend test that asserted dense JSON (jsonb::text renders
whitespace) and frontend test that assumed a unique "Test User"
match.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(agents): close residual MUL-2600 gaps from review (MUL-2600)
Migration 108 FK now correctly references agent_task_queue(id) instead
of the non-existent agent_task table; the previous name blocked CI
backend migrations.
Task-token-authenticated requests can no longer be re-routed at a
different workspace by passing workspace_slug / workspace_id /
?workspace_id / a URL workspace param. ResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest
and resolveWorkspaceUUID both short-circuit on X-Actor-Source=task_token
and return only the token-bound X-Workspace-ID; buildMiddleware adds a
defence-in-depth 403 if any URL-resolved workspace disagrees with the
token binding.
mcp_config no longer leaks back to agent actors through UpdateAgent /
CreateAgent / ArchiveAgent / RestoreAgent HTTP responses — the same
redactAgentResponseForActor helper that GetAgent/ListAgents use is now
applied to mutation responses too. WS broadcasts were already redacted
via broadcastAgentResponse.
FailTask and every TaskService cancel path (CancelTask /
CancelTasksForIssue / CancelTasksForAgent / CancelTasksByTriggerComment
/ BroadcastCancelledTasks) now eagerly DeleteTaskTokensByTask so the
mat_ token's 24h window doesn't outlive a terminated task. Failure is
non-fatal — the FK cascade and expiry remain durable guards.
Doc-only: clarify that PUT /api/agents/{id} now hard-rejects bodies
that carry custom_env (was previously "silently ignores").
Tests:
- middleware: TestResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest gains a task_token
case asserting client-supplied slug/id/query cannot override the
bound workspace.
- handler: TestUpdateAgent_RedactsMcpConfigForAgentActor and
TestUpdateAgent_KeepsMcpConfigForMemberActor pin the mutation-
response redaction contract per actor type.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(agents): match redacted mcp_config as JSON null, not Go nil (MUL-2600)
`AgentResponse.McpConfig` is `json.RawMessage` without `omitempty`, so
the redacted response serialises as `"mcp_config": null`. On decode,
`json.RawMessage` keeps the literal bytes `null` rather than collapsing
to Go nil, which made the assertion fire on a non-leak.
The product contract (field always present, distinguished from "no
config" via `mcp_config_redacted`) is intentional, so adjust the test
to check for "no secret-bearing content" instead of weakening the
contract via `omitempty`.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
---------
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
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614dfae884 |
MUL-2488 feat(timezone): Scheduling / Viewing two-layer timezone architecture (#2968)
* docs(timezone): add scheduling/viewing timezone architecture RFC * feat(db): replace daily rollups with task_usage_hourly, add user.timezone Migrations 100-104: add "user".timezone (Viewing tz), build the UTC hourly task_usage_hourly rollup with its pipeline, drop the legacy task_usage_daily / task_usage_dashboard_daily pipelines, and drop the agent_runtime.timezone column. Report queries now slice day boundaries at read time by the caller-supplied @tz instead of materialising in a fixed tz. Regenerate sqlc. * feat(server): add task_usage_hourly backfill command Replace the two legacy backfill commands (daily / dashboard_daily) with a single backfill_task_usage_hourly that loads historical task_usage into the new UTC hourly rollup, sliced per workspace. * refactor(server): resolve viewing timezone in report handlers Report handlers resolve the Viewing tz per request (?tz query param, then user.timezone, then UTC) and pass it to the hourly-rollup queries. Drop the UseDailyRollup feature flags and the old raw-scan/daily-rollup dual paths, remove the /api/usage endpoints, and stop the daemon from reporting and the runtime handler from accepting host timezone. * refactor(core): switch report queries to viewing timezone API client and dashboard/runtime queries send ?tz with each report request, the user schema/types carry the new timezone field, and the runtime timezone field/mutation is removed. * feat(views): add viewing timezone preference and UI Add the useViewingTimezone hook and a Timezone setting in Preferences; report charts and the dashboard week boundary follow the viewer tz. Remove the runtime detail timezone editor and its locale strings. * fix(test): update fixtures and stabilize tests for timezone refactor The timezone architecture refactor changed several types without updating dependent test code: - RuntimeDevice no longer has a timezone field — drop it from the create-agent-dialog runtime fixture. - User now requires a timezone field — add it to the apps/web mockUser fixture. - The PreferencesTab timezone tests asserted on the async save handler (PATCH then store update) with a bare expect, racing the mutation's settle callback, and timed out querying the Select's ~600-option IANA list on a loaded CI runner. Wrap the assertions in waitFor and extend the timeout for those three tests. * docs(timezone): document self-host migration order and trigger invariant Add a SELF-HOST UPGRADE ORDER runbook to the backfill command's package comment: applying migrations 100-104 in a single migrate-up drops the legacy daily rollups before the hourly backfill runs, leaving dashboards empty until cron catches up. Add an INVARIANT comment on trg_atq_dirty_hourly noting that agent_id must be added to the trigger's OF list if it ever becomes mutable, otherwise dirty buckets for the old agent_id are silently missed. * style(runtimes): drop trailing blank line in runtime-detail |
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63d215e1c3 |
feat(runtime): visibility (public/private) gate on CreateAgent / UpdateAgent (#2419)
* feat(runtime): visibility (public/private) gate on CreateAgent / UpdateAgent Closes the hole where a plain workspace member could pick another member's runtime in the Create Agent dialog and bind an agent to it — the backend wasn't checking runtime ownership, so the agent ran on someone else's hardware / tokens. Reported on GH #1804. Schema - Migration 083 adds agent_runtime.visibility ('private' default, 'public') with a CHECK constraint. Existing rows default to private — same ownership semantics as before, no behavior change for legacy data. Backend - canUseRuntimeForAgent predicate: allow when caller is workspace owner/admin, the runtime owner, or the runtime is public. - CreateAgent and UpdateAgent both gate on it: UpdateAgent matters because a plain member could otherwise create on their own runtime, then re-bind to a private one. - PATCH /api/runtimes/:id accepts { visibility } — owner/admin only, validated against the same private/public allow-list. Frontend - Create-agent dialog renders other-owned private runtimes disabled with a Lock badge + tooltip explaining who to ask. - Inspector runtime-picker disables the same set so re-binding fails the same way at the UI layer. - Runtime detail diagnostics gains a Visibility editor (owner/admin) or read-only chip (everyone else). - Runtime list shows a private/public chip next to the name. Tests - Go: canUseRuntimeForAgent truth table; CreateAgent / UpdateAgent end-to-end gate tests (admin / runtime owner / plain member); PATCH visibility owner / admin / member / invalid-value coverage. - Vitest: create-agent dialog disabled state on private/public runtimes, default-runtime selection skips locked rows; runtime detail visibility editor → mutation, read-only fallback. Migrating runtimes: existing rows default to private to preserve the "owner only" status quo. Owners switch to public via the detail page diagnostics card. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> * fix(runtime): apply timezone+visibility atomically; don't seed locked template runtime Two issues surfaced in review of MUL-2062: 1. PATCH /api/runtimes/:id ran the timezone branch first, which: - returned early on a tz no-op, silently dropping a concurrent `visibility` patch in the same body; - committed the timezone mutation (+ usage rollup rebuild) before validating visibility, so an invalid visibility left the row half-updated. Validate every field first, then run the mutations in order. The no-op short-circuit now only triggers when nothing else is requested. 2. The Create Agent dialog in duplicate mode unconditionally seeded `template.runtime_id` as the selected runtime, even when that runtime is now private and owned by someone else — the user saw a selected row they couldn't submit (Create → backend 403). Fall back to the first usable runtime when the template's runtime is locked, and gate the Create button on `selectedRuntimeLocked` as defense in depth. Tests: - Go: TestUpdateAgentRuntime_CombinedPatchAppliesBoth (tz no-op + visibility flip), TestUpdateAgentRuntime_InvalidVisibilityDoesNotMutateTimezone (atomic-fail invariant). - Vitest: duplicate template pointing at a locked runtime now seeds the first usable one; Create button stays disabled when no usable alternative exists. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> --------- Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> |
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d6349c16ec |
feat(runtime): per-runtime timezone for token-usage aggregation (MUL-1950) (#2394)
* feat: per-runtime timezone for token usage aggregation The runtime token-usage charts (daily and hourly tabs on the runtime-detail page) bucketed every event by the Postgres session timezone, which is UTC in production. For an operator in UTC+8 that meant a Tuesday afternoon's tasks landed in Tuesday early-morning's bar — the chart was always one off. Fix: store an IANA timezone on agent_runtime and aggregate under it. * migrations 081 / 082 add agent_runtime.timezone (TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'UTC') and rebuild the rollup pipeline (window function and both trigger functions) to compute bucket_date with AT TIME ZONE rt.timezone instead of bare DATE(). * No historical backfill — task_usage_daily rows already on disk keep their UTC bucket_date; only future writes / re-touches recompute under the new tz. (Product call from MUL-1950: 'guarantee future correctness'.) * runtime_usage.sql gains a @tz parameter on ListRuntimeUsage and GetRuntimeUsageByHour and threads tz through GetRuntimeTaskHourly Activity. ListRuntimeUsageDaily reads bucket_date as-is since the rollup already wrote it in tz. * parseSinceParamInTZ replaces the raw N×24h cutoff with start-of- day-N in the runtime's tz so 'last 7 days' lines up with bucket boundaries. * Daemon registration sends the host's IANA tz (TZ env, then time.Local), and UpsertAgentRuntime preserves any user override via a CASE-on-existing-value pattern so a daemon reconnect can't silently revert the operator's setting. * New PATCH /api/runtimes/:id endpoint (UpdateAgentRuntime) lets the runtime detail page edit the tz; the editor seeds with the browser tz on first interaction. Refs: MUL-1950 Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> * fix: harden runtime timezone rollups Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> * fix: address runtime timezone review nits Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> --------- Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai> Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local> |
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3b3be9d7bd |
feat(comments): resolve threads with collapsible bar (MUL-1895) (#2300)
* feat(comments): resolve threads with collapsible bar (MUL-1895)
Adds a Linear-style resolve action on comment thread roots. Resolved
threads collapse to a single "N resolved comments from X" bar in the
activity feed; clicking expands the thread inline (per-session, not
persisted). Replying inside a resolved thread auto-unresolves it.
Backend
- migration 069: resolved_at, resolved_by_type, resolved_by_id on comment
- sqlc ResolveComment / UnresolveComment queries (idempotent via COALESCE)
- POST/DELETE /api/comments/{id}/resolve handlers, root-only validation
- CreateComment auto-clears resolved_at when a reply lands in a resolved
thread, publishing comment:unresolved
- comment:resolved / comment:unresolved events; CommentResponse and
TimelineEntry both surface the new fields
Frontend
- Comment + TimelineEntry types extended; payloads typed; WS sync wired
- useResolveComment optimistic mutation with rollback
- ResolvedThreadBar component for the collapsed view
- Resolve / Unresolve menu items on root comments; Collapse strip on the
expanded resolved card
- en + zh-Hans locale strings
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(comments): cover agent reply path, expand-state hygiene, nested counts (MUL-1895)
Addresses three review issues from Emacs on PR #2300:
1. TaskService.createAgentComment bypasses Handler.CreateComment, so the
auto-unresolve wired into the handler did not fire when an agent replied
in a resolved thread (task / mention / on_comment paths). Extracted the
logic to TaskService.AutoUnresolveThreadOnReply so both reply paths share
it; rewired Handler.CreateComment to call the new method.
2. Resolving an already-expanded thread no longer collapses it back to the
bar because expandedResolved still contained the id. Added
clearResolvedExpand + handleResolveToggle wrapper so resolve / unresolve
always wipe the session expand entry.
3. ResolvedThreadBar received only direct children, while CommentCard's
expanded view recurses through descendants. Extracted the recursive
walk into thread-utils.collectThreadReplies and called from both —
counts and author lists now match.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* test(comments): mock useResolveComment + add zh-Hans plural key
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
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Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
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949dffdf7e |
feat: permission-aware UI across agent/comment/runtime/skill surfaces (#1915)
* feat(permissions): add core permission module and shared UI primitives
Foundation for permission-aware UI: pure rules that mirror the Go backend
permission gates, lightweight per-resource hooks, and two reusable display
components used across agent/skill/runtime detail pages.
- packages/core/permissions: types, rules, hooks (Decision-shaped — carries
reason + message so UI can render disabled state, tooltip, and banner
copy from one source)
- packages/core/agents/visibility-label: VISIBILITY_LABEL/DESCRIPTION/TOOLTIP
constants ("Personal" / "Workspace") to replace scattered hard-coded copy
- packages/views/agents/visibility-badge: read-only visibility chip used on
hover cards, list rows, and inspector when not editable
- packages/ui/components/common/capability-banner: "View only — only X and
admins can edit Y" banner shown on agent / skill detail when current user
lacks edit permission
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(views): permission-aware UI across agent/comment/runtime/skill surfaces
Apply the new permission rules to every surface where the UI was either
lying about who can do what or letting users hit 403s by clicking buttons
the backend would reject.
Agent detail
- Hide archive/restore actions for non-owner non-admin
- Replace inline editors (avatar, name, description, runtime/model/visibility/
concurrency picker, skill-attach) with read-only display when canEdit is
false — value is information, the editor is the action
- Show CapabilityBanner under the header explaining who can edit
Visibility surfaces
- visibility-picker / create-agent-dialog: replace "only you can assign"
(false) with "Only you and workspace admins can assign" via shared
VISIBILITY_DESCRIPTION constants
- agent-columns: truthful tooltip + "You" badge on agents the current user
owns
Comments
- Restore admin override on comment edit/delete (backend already permits
it via comment.go:507-512; the frontend was incorrectly hiding the menu).
canModerate is computed once in issue-detail and threaded down.
Other
- Members tab: disable "demote" options for the last owner with tooltip
- Assignee picker: tooltip on disabled personal agents the user can't assign
- Runtime delete: tooltip and dialog explain the gate; owner column gains
a name label next to the avatar in All scope
- Skill detail: page-level CapabilityBanner alongside the existing lock chip
- Issue delete (single + batch): note that any workspace member can delete
issues — by-design semantics, made transparent
Backend is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(agents): hide personal agents from list and @mention for non-owners
Until now an agent's "Personal" visibility only narrowed the assign-to-issue
gate — every workspace member still saw every personal agent in the list
and the @mention dropdown. Members would see, click, and fail.
This filters those surfaces with the canonical canAssignAgentToIssue rule:
regular members only see workspace-visibility agents and the personal
agents they own; workspace owners and admins continue to see everything
(admin override path is intact).
- agents-page: visibleInView layer between active/archived and Mine/All
scope so segment counts also reflect the filter
- mention-suggestion: filter agentItems before they enter the recency-
ranked list; expand the test mock to cover the auth + visibility paths
and add two assertions (member hides others' personal agents; admin
still sees them)
Backend keeps returning every agent — admin tools and direct API access
are unaffected. This is a UI-only filter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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