Commit Graph

9 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jiayuan Zhang
3bd69bdaa2 MUL-4432: add DM button on agent detail page (#5289)
* feat(agents): add DM button on agent detail page

The header gains a DM action next to Assign work. It shares the MUL-3963
invocation gate with assignment: allowed users land on the Chat tab with a
fresh compose bound to the agent via a new one-shot ?agent=<id> deep link
(consumed once the permission-filtered agent list resolves, then stripped);
denied users get an explanatory toast instead of a hidden affordance.

Closes MUL-4432

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(chat): harden the ?agent= deep link against races and undetermined permissions

Review follow-up for the DM button (PR #5289):

- An explicit user action (thread select, archive, manual new chat) now
  supersedes a still-pending ?agent= intent, so an intent deferred by slow
  agent/member queries can no longer fire late and clobber that choice.
- The composingNew reset reads the live store value; under StrictMode's
  effect replay the render-captured snapshot re-closed the compose pane the
  intent had just opened (one-shot guard rightly refuses to re-fire).
- A settled miss (revoked access, archived agent, bad id) now toasts and
  strips the param instead of silently keeping a re-fireable intent; still-
  loading queries keep the intent pending. Query errors never settle.
- useAgentPermissions exposes isLoading: the detail page disables DM while
  membership resolves instead of toasting a false not_member deny at a
  legitimate member.

The chat store test mock is now reactive (useSyncExternalStore) — with a
plain mutable ref React bails out of committing post-effect re-renders and
the StrictMode regression cannot reproduce. Both new regression tests fail
against the pre-fix code.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Lambda <lambda@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-07-12 13:56:31 +08:00
Multica Eve
1ae0a1f5bf fix(agents): defend AccessPicker against undefined invocation_targets (GH #4915) (#4924)
Opening the agent detail page in v0.3.37 crashed the whole route with
"Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'some')" whenever the
cached agent record's `invocation_targets` was missing at runtime — even
though the TypeScript type declares it a required `AgentInvocationTarget[]`.

Root cause: `AccessPicker`'s `hasWorkspaceTarget` / `selectedMemberIds` /
`selectedTeamIds` helpers called `.some()` / `.filter()` directly on the
prop, and the same unguarded pattern was mirrored in `AgentMcpTab` and
the `canAssignAgentToIssue` permission gate. The field can legitimately
be undefined at runtime because:

- `packages/core/api/schemas.ts` declares `invocation_targets` as
  `.optional()`, and `MinimalAgentSchema` (used for the create-from-
  template response) also marks it optional.
- `api.listAgents` / `api.getAgent` return raw JSON without running
  through the schema, so an older self-host backend that predates
  MUL-3963 (permission_mode + invocation_targets) — the exact scenario
  in GH #4915 — yields an Agent with the field missing.

Fix (`?? []`) at every site that indexes into the list, matching the
already-established pattern in `create-agent-dialog.tsx`:

- `access-picker.tsx`: coerce inside the three helpers and widen the
  prop type to `AgentInvocationTarget[] | undefined` so the accepted
  runtime shape is documented.
- `agent-mcp-tab.tsx`: `(agent.invocation_targets ?? []).some(...)`.
- `permissions/rules.ts`: `agent.invocation_targets ?? []` before the
  workspace / member membership checks.

Adds three regression tests (AccessPicker owner + read-only paths,
AgentMcpTab shared-warning path, canAssignAgentToIssue) that pass
`undefined` for invocation_targets and assert the UI degrades to the
private / empty-allowlist state instead of throwing.

Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-07-04 18:07:03 +08:00
LinYushen
cb68669c73 feat(composio): gate MCP apps behind feature flag (#4876)
* feat(composio): server-side connect flow + connections REST (Notion MVP) (MUL-3720) (#4608)

* feat(composio): server-side connect flow + connections REST (Notion MVP) (MUL-3720)

Compose the merged server/pkg/composio SDK into a user-facing connection
manager: signed-state connect handshake, local user_composio_connection
mirror, idempotent disconnect, and a per-user MCP session helper (not yet
wired into task dispatch).

- migration 127_user_composio_connection (no FK/cascade, per DB rules)
- sqlc queries: upsert (idempotent on user_id+connected_account_id), list
  active, owner-scoped get, mark revoked
- internal/integrations/composio: signed HMAC-SHA256 state, BeginConnect,
  CompleteCallback (idempotent upsert), ListConnections, Disconnect
  (upstream 404 = idempotent success), CreateMCPSession (no-op when empty,
  pins connected_accounts per toolkit), CallbackRedirect
- REST handlers under /api/integrations/composio (user-scoped, 503 when
  COMPOSIO_API_KEY unset): connect/init, callback (302), connections list,
  delete
- router wiring gated by COMPOSIO_API_KEY; COMPOSIO_AUTH_CONFIGS_JSON maps
  toolkit->auth_config (MVP: notion); state secret from COMPOSIO_STATE_SECRET
  or derived from JWT_SECRET; callback base from COMPOSIO_CALLBACK_BASE_URL
  or MULTICA_PUBLIC_URL
- tests: state (expire/tamper/wrong-secret), service (mapping, callback
  idempotency, non-success, disconnect owner/404 idempotency, MCP pin),
  handlers (httptest), redact regression for Bearer mcp_ tokens

MVP scope: Notion only; no task-dispatch overlay, sharing, or webhook
event handling (later stages).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): bind callback account to user + idempotent revoked disconnect (MUL-3720)

Address PR 4608 review (CHANGES_REQUESTED):

- callback: verify connected_account_id with Composio before mirroring it.
  The signed state only proved user/toolkit/exp, so a valid state paired with
  a tampered connected_account_id would be written verbatim. CompleteCallback
  now calls ListConnectedAccounts and fails closed (ErrAccountVerification)
  unless the account belongs to the state's user (composio_user_id == multica
  user id) and was created under the toolkit's auth config. No row is written
  on mismatch / unknown account / upstream error.

- disconnect: short-circuit to a no-op when the local row is already revoked,
  before touching upstream. Previously a second DELETE re-hit Composio and a
  non-404 upstream error surfaced as a 502, breaking the 204-idempotent
  contract.

- CreateMCPSession: document the v1 single-active-connection-per-(user,toolkit)
  constraint and make duplicate selection deterministic (newest-wins, rows are
  connected_at DESC) instead of order-dependent map overwrite. Stage 3 owns the
  real single-account-enforcement vs multi-account-shape decision.

Tests: tampered/wrong-auth-config/unknown-account callback rejection, revoked-row
disconnect no-op (asserts upstream not re-hit). composio pkg 85% coverage; all
green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): list all toolkits + dynamic auth-config resolution (MUL-3720)

Yushen's follow-up to the Notion MVP: surface the full Composio toolkit
catalog, render it in Settings, and drop the static env mapping in favor of
dynamic auth-config discovery.

Config correctness (per Composio docs):
- Remove COMPOSIO_AUTH_CONFIGS_JSON entirely. The toolkit→auth_config mapping
  is now resolved at request time from the project's /auth_configs (cached,
  5-min TTL), so enabling a toolkit is a dashboard action, not a redeploy.
- Do NOT add COMPOSIO_PROJECT_ID. The project API key (x-api-key) authenticates
  to exactly one project; the project is resolved from the key. Only org-level
  endpoints use x-org-api-key, which this integration never calls.

Backend:
- SDK: server/pkg/composio/auth_configs.go — ListAuthConfigs (toolkit_slug,
  is_composio_managed, show_disabled, limit, cursor).
- service: dynamic resolver (authConfigMap cache; betterAuthConfig prefers a
  custom/white-label config over Composio-managed, newest wins); BeginConnect
  and CompleteCallback resolve via it; ListToolkits fetches the full catalog
  (paginated, capped) annotated with connectable = has an enabled auth config,
  connectable-first ordering.
- handler + route: GET /api/integrations/composio/toolkits (user-scoped, 503
  when COMPOSIO_API_KEY unset) returning slug/name/logo/category/connectable.

Frontend:
- core: ComposioToolkit/ComposioConnection types, api client methods, and
  composio query options (@multica/core/composio).
- views: Settings → Integrations now has a Composio section rendering every
  toolkit as a card with search. Connect is gated on `connectable`;
  non-connectable toolkits show a muted "not configured" hint instead of a
  dead button. Connected toolkits show a badge + Disconnect (with confirm).
- i18n: composio block added to en/zh-Hans/ja/ko settings.

Tests: SDK + service (dynamic resolution, custom-over-managed preference,
connectable flag, resolver-error soft-degrade) and handler toolkits endpoint;
composio pkg 85.7% coverage. go build/vet/gofmt clean; core+views typecheck,
core+views lint, and core tests (691) all green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): close cross-toolkit callback fail-open by signing auth_config_id into state (MUL-3720)

Re-review blocker: CompleteCallback resolved the toolkit's auth config at
callback time and ignored a resolve error/empty result, while
verifyAccountOwnership skipped the auth-config comparison when the expected
value was empty. A user could then pass another toolkit's connected_account_id
into this toolkit's callback — the owner check passed and it was written under
the wrong toolkit_slug/account binding.

Fix: the auth_config_id is already resolved in BeginConnect (before the state
is signed), so sign it into the state and compare it exactly at callback. No
re-resolve, no fail-open. verifyAccountOwnership now fails closed when the
expected auth config is empty (rejects instead of skipping) and requires an
exact match — closing the cross-toolkit binding gap.

Tests: state round-trips auth_config_id; BeginConnect signs it; callback
rejects wrong/cross-toolkit auth config and an empty (no-mapping) auth config
fails closed. composio pkg 85.2% coverage, all green.

Frontend (non-blocking): the Composio settings tab now surfaces an error when
the connections query fails instead of silently rendering everything as
unconnected.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): hide Settings section entirely when integration unconfigured (MUL-3720)

Decision (option 2, hide-then-merge): don't show a card that leaks the internal
COMPOSIO_API_KEY env-var name to every end user. IntegrationsTab now gates the
whole Composio section (heading + body) on the toolkits query — a 503 means the
key is unset, so the section is withheld instead of rendering the not-configured
card. Admin-only setup guidance is a later, role-gated affordance.

Removed the notConfigured card (and now-unused ApiError import) from
ComposioTab; it only mounts when configured. views typecheck + lint clean.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): Stage 2 frontend polish — callback toast, last_used & expired UI, e2e (MUL-3718) (#4688)

* feat(composio): callback toast + refresh, last_used & expired UI, e2e (MUL-3718)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): real callback redirect route + StrictMode-safe toast dedup (MUL-3718 review)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): callback endpoint should not require Multica auth (MUL-3843) (#4709)

* fix(composio): move OAuth callback out of the Auth group (MUL-3843)

Composio 302-redirects the browser to /api/integrations/composio/callback
at the end of the OAuth flow, but PR #4608 mounted it inside the cookie-auth
middleware group. When the session cookie is absent (expired session,
SameSite=Strict / Safari ITP, private window, self-hosted callback subdomain)
the Auth middleware returned a hard 401 and a JSON blob instead of the
settings redirect, breaking the flow.

Identity never came from the cookie anyway: it is carried by the HMAC-signed
state param that CompleteCallback verifies (signature, expiry, replay) and
cross-checked by verifyAccountOwnership; h.Composio == nil still 503s. So the
callback is registered alongside the other public OAuth/webhook routes; the
other four composio endpoints stay session-gated.

Refs MUL-3843, MUL-3715.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): correct stale callback routing comments (MUL-3843)

The package header and ComposioCallback doc comments still described the
callback as sitting under the Auth middleware group. After the route was
moved out (this PR), update both to state it is a public route whose identity
comes from the signed state — addressing review nit from 张大彪.

Refs MUL-3843.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): inject MCP overlay into agent runtime at task dispatch (MUL-3721) (#4704)

Stage 3 of the Composio epic. Wires the per-user Composio MCP session into
every agent task so the agent process sees the initiator's connected tools
without any prompt-time plumbing.

Server side
  - Migration 128 adds agent_task_queue.runtime_mcp_overlay JSONB plus a
    BEFORE-UPDATE trigger that wipes the column on any transition into a
    terminal status (completed / failed / cancelled). A trigger is the single
    source of truth — future queries that flip status cannot bypass it.
  - composio.Service.BuildTaskOverlay(userID) reuses CreateMCPSession and
    emits the Claude-style { mcpServers: { composio: { type: http, url,
    headers } } } shape the daemon's existing sidecar generators consume.
    Returns (nil, nil) on zero active connections so we never burn a
    Composio session for a user with nothing to call.
  - TaskService grows a Composio ComposioOverlayBuilder seam, wired in
    router.go after composiointeg.NewService succeeds. Five enqueue paths
    (issue / mention / quick-create / chat / auto-retry) attach the overlay
    after CreateAgentTask returns and before the daemon is notified — so
    every claim reads a settled row, with no second daemon hop. Best-effort:
    a builder failure logs and proceeds with no overlay.
  - resolveInitiatorFromTriggerComment derives the initiator user from the
    trigger comment when it was authored by a member. Agent-authored
    triggers are not treated as initiators (their connected-apps view is
    empty by construction).

Daemon side
  - handler/daemon.go claim path merges task.runtime_mcp_overlay onto
    agent.mcp_config via mergeMCPOverlay before populating
    TaskAgentData.McpConfig. Overlay wins on server-name collisions
    because it carries the live user-scoped session URL. Errors fall back
    to the agent config unchanged — a bad overlay must not surprise-disable
    saved MCP tools. The existing execenv sidecar generators (cursor /
    codex / openclaw / opencode / hermes-kiro) need no changes: they keep
    consuming the merged result through TaskAgentData.McpConfig.

Tests
  - 9 merge cases (mcp_overlay_test): both-nil short-circuit, agent-only
    pass-through, overlay-only canonicalization, two-side merge, name
    collision (overlay wins), top-level key preservation, malformed agent
    fallback, malformed overlay fallback, non-object server rejection.
  - 4 dispatch cases (composio): zero-connections returns nil without
    CreateSession, happy-path emits the right shape with the right user
    id, empty-URL defensive branch, SDK error surfacing.
  - 4 TaskService helper cases: nil Composio is a no-op (Queries-safe),
    invalid initiator does not call the builder, nil overlay skips the
    UPDATE, builder error swallowed without panic.
  - Migration 128 verified to roll up + down + up cleanly against the test
    database.

Out of scope (deferred): assignment-triggered enqueue paths with no
trigger comment get no overlay attached today (no initiator UUID flows
through enqueueIssueTask in that case). Retry paths recompute the overlay
fresh from the parent's initiator_user_id instead of inheriting the bearer
from the parent row, so a stale token can never resurface on a retry.

Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): per-agent allowlist + originator-scoped MCP overlay (MUL-3869) (#4736)

* feat(composio): per-agent allowlist + originator-scoped MCP overlay (MUL-3869)

Stage 3.1 of the Composio epic (MUL-3721 parent). PR #4704 wired in the
runtime_mcp_overlay column and a per-task dispatch hook; this change
inverts the default from "all-on" to opt-in and locks the overlay to the
agent owner's own connected apps:

- Agents carry composio_toolkit_allowlist TEXT[]. NULL or [] => no MCP.
  Owner-only read/write; non-owner GET/PUT silently redacts/drops the
  field (same shape as mcp_config).
- agent_task_queue carries originator_user_id UUID. Set from the
  top-of-chain HUMAN at every enqueue path:
    * issue/mention comment by member  -> author_id
    * issue/mention comment by agent   -> inherit via comment.source_task_id
                                          -> parent task originator_user_id
    * quick-create                     -> requester_id
    * chat                             -> initiator_user_id
    * retry                            -> SQL-inherited from parent row
    * autopilot                        -> NULL (system-driven)
- BuildTaskOverlay (composio dispatch) now takes (ctx, originatorUserID,
  agent) and short-circuits on five gates: invalid originator,
  originator != agent.owner_id, empty allowlist, empty intersection of
  allowlist ∩ active connections, defensive empty session URL. Composio
  CreateSession is called with BOTH `toolkits.slugs` (the intersection)
  AND `connected_accounts` (the pinned account ids), narrowing the
  tool-router twice.
- The originator-vs-owner gate closes the agent-fanout privacy hole: any
  workspace member who can @-mention a public agent used to project the
  owner's connected apps into their run. Now the overlay only mounts
  when the human at the top of the chain IS the agent owner.

Tests:
- dispatch_test.go covers all 5 gates plus uppercase/whitespace slug
  normalisation.
- task_runtime_mcp_overlay_test.go covers the no-op gates of the new
  applyRuntimeMCPOverlay signature.
- agent_composio_allowlist_test.go (handler): owner roundtrip
  (list/empty/null), workspace-admin silent-drop, owner-only GET
  visibility, pure normaliseComposioToolkitAllowlist.
- resolve_originator_test.go (service, DB-backed): member-authored,
  agent-authored inherits via comment.source_task_id, invalid id.

Migration 129 up/down/up verified against docker postgres.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* chore(composio): gofmt + regenerate sqlc with v1.31.1 (MUL-3869 review nits)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): accept nested connected account auth config

* feat(views): creator-only MCP tab for per-agent Composio allowlist (MUL-3870) (#4743)

Stage 3.2 frontend on top of the Stage 3.1 backend (MUL-3869, 4708dba97).
Adds an agent-detail tab that lets the agent owner pick which of their own
active Composio connections this agent may mount as MCP servers, writing the
selection to agent.composio_toolkit_allowlist via the existing PUT /api/agents.

- core/types: composio_toolkit_allowlist (+ _redacted) on Agent; tri-state
  composio_toolkit_allowlist on UpdateAgentRequest (omit/no-change, null/clear,
  array/replace), matching the backend contract.
- core/agents: useUpdateAgentAllowlist - optimistic mutation hook (patches the
  cached workspace agent list, rolls back on error, invalidates on settle).
- views: AgentMcpTab renders the owner's active connections as checkboxes;
  empty state links to Settings -> Integrations; defensive redacted state.
- views: wired into AgentOverviewPane as tab "composio_mcp", labeled "MCP Apps"
  to disambiguate from the existing raw-JSON "MCP" (mcp_config) tab. The entry
  is gated to the creator (currentUserId === agent.owner_id), matching the
  backend's owner-only read/write of the allowlist.
- i18n: tabs.composio_mcp + tab_body.composio_mcp.* in en/ja/ko/zh-Hans.
- tests: agent-mcp-tab.test.tsx (gating, toggle->allowlist body, active-only,
  empty, redacted); e2e/agent-mcp.spec.ts (creator sees tab + PUT body,
  non-creator hidden) with Composio + agent endpoints mocked at the boundary.

Note: the product spec says "creator"; the schema has no creator_id - the
backend gate and redaction are keyed on owner_id, so the tab uses owner_id.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): mount remote MCP for codex

* feat(agents): agent invocation permission system (MUL-3963) (#4844)

* feat(agents): agent invocation permission system (permission_mode + invocation targets)

MUL-3963: split who may INVOKE an agent out of the overloaded visibility
column into an explicit, extensible model on feature/composio-integration.

- DB: agent.permission_mode (private|public_to) + agent_invocation_target
  table (workspace/member/team targets) + lossless backfill from visibility
  (migration 130).
- canInvokeAgent: owner-only for private (NO admin bypass, NO A2A bypass);
  public_to honours the allow-list; A2A judged by the top-of-chain originator.
- All trigger paths rewired: issue assign, comment @agent/@squad, chat,
  quick-create, autopilot, squad leader, child-done.
- Agent API: permission_mode + invocation_targets on responses and
  create/update (owner-only writes); legacy visibility kept as a derived field
  so old clients never see a permission widening.
- Composio: BuildTaskOverlay now FOLLOWS invocation permission and uses the
  agent OWNER connection (removed the originator==owner gate); front-end warns
  when a shared agent enables Composio apps.
- CLI: --permission-mode / --public-to-workspace / --public-to-member (legacy
  --visibility still mapped).
- Frontend: AccessPicker (Private / workspace / specific people / team soon),
  permission rules mirror canInvokeAgent, Composio warning banner.
- Tests: migration backfill, admin cannot invoke others private, public_to
  workspace/member whitelist, A2A by originator, Composio overlay uses owner
  connection.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(agents): stackable, mixed public_to invocation targets (MUL-3963)

Follow-up on PR #4844: public_to now supports selecting MULTIPLE, MIXED
targets on one agent (e.g. Public to workspace + specific people + team),
with canInvokeAgent admitting on ANY matching target (OR).

- Frontend AccessPicker: reworked from a single exclusive kind into a
  stackable multi-select — an "Everyone in workspace" toggle, a member
  multi-select checklist, and a (disabled, v1) team placeholder can be
  combined freely. Emits the full union of selected targets; empty union
  collapses to Private. Existing team targets are preserved across saves.
  Added the access.public_group locale string (en/zh-Hans/ja/ko).
- Backend already supported this (agent_invocation_target is multi-row per
  agent; create/update take a target ARRAY and batch-replace the whole
  allow-list; canInvokeAgent OR-matches). Added tests to lock it in:
  mixed member+team targets, overlapping-member batch replace, and
  workspace+member stacking then narrowing.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): address review on invocation permission (MUL-3963)

张大彪 review on PR #4844 — three blockers + product ruling + nits:

1. Migration 130: drop the FK/cascade on agent_invocation_target
   (agent_id, created_by) per the Multica no-FK rule; relationships are now
   maintained in the app layer (matching MUL-3515 §4). Added
   DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByArchivedRuntimeAgents and call it before
   DeleteArchivedAgentsByRuntime in all three runtime-delete paths
   (runtime.go x2, runtime_profile.go) so hard-deleting agents can't orphan
   target rows.
2. revokeAndRemoveMember: prune the leaving member's member-target grants
   (DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByMember) in the same tx as the member-row
   delete, so a re-invited user can't reclaim a stale invocation grant.
3. Empty public_to is a phantom — parsePermissionInput now normalises a
   public_to with no resolvable targets to a single workspace target, so
   `--permission-mode public_to` alone (and any empty target array) means
   "public to workspace" instead of "shared but nobody can run it".

Product ruling: the system/no-human-originator → workspace-target path in
canInvokeAgent is a deliberate, documented exception (webhook/system/
workspace-wide automation); member/team targets still fail closed without a
resolved originator. Documented in code + locked with a test.

Nits: refreshed the stale "originator must be owner" comments — models.go
(via migration 130 COMMENT ON COLUMN + sqlc regen for composio_toolkit_allowlist
and originator_user_id) and agent-mcp-tab.tsx — to the owner-connection +
invocation-permission rules.

Tests: member remove/re-add regression, system workspace exception + member
fail-closed, empty public_to → workspace (plus the earlier mixed/overlap/
batch-replace suite). Migration 130 applied to the test DB; Go handler/service/
composio suites green; views typecheck clean.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): scope member invocation-target cleanup to one workspace (MUL-3963)

张大彪 3rd review — cross-workspace permission bug + comment nits:

- DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByMember was a GLOBAL delete by user id, so
  removing a user from workspace A also wiped their member-target grants on
  agents in workspace B. Scoped it to a single workspace by joining through
  agent.workspace_id; revokeAndRemoveMember now passes (workspaceID, userID).
- Regression test TestRevokeMember_InvocationTargetCleanupIsWorkspaceScoped:
  same user allow-listed by agents in two workspaces; removal from one leaves
  the other workspace's target intact.
- Nits: refreshed the remaining stale "originator == agent.owner_id" /
  "owner-vs-originator" comments — CreateRetryTask (agent.sql, regenerated),
  and the AgentResponse allowlist doc + ListAgents/UpdateAgent redaction
  rationale in agent.go — to the owner-connection + invocation-permission rule.

Migration 130 applied to the test DB; Go handler/service/composio suites green;
go vet clean.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): agent access owner-only editable, read-only for others (MUL-3963) (#4853)

* fix(agents): make agent access owner-only editable, read-only for others (MUL-3963)

Interaction bug: a non-owner (incl. workspace admin) could open the AccessPicker
and set an agent public — the backend silently ignored it and the UI bounced
back to private. Access is owner-only, so non-owners must see a read-only state
and the backend must reject real changes explicitly.

Frontend:
- AccessPicker renders a static, non-interactive read-only state when the
  viewer is not the owner: the current access value + a lock affordance + a
  tooltip "Only the agent owner can change who can run this agent." No clickable
  trigger is rendered, so a non-owner can never open a control the backend would
  reject (the GitHub/Notion pattern for permission settings you can see but not
  edit). The editable multi-select picker is unchanged for the owner.
- agent-detail-inspector gates the picker on ownership specifically
  (currentUserId === agent.owner_id), NOT the general canEdit (which also admits
  admins, who may edit other fields but not access).
- New locale key access.owner_only_readonly (en/zh-Hans/ja/ko).

Backend:
- UpdateAgent now returns an explicit 403 when a non-owner submits a REAL
  permission change (permissionInputChangesAgent compares requested mode +
  target set against the persisted state); a no-op resubmit (admin PATCH-as-PUT
  echoing unchanged permission) is still tolerated so admin edits of other
  fields keep working. Replaces the previous silent-drop that caused the bounce.

Tests:
- access-picker.test.tsx: non-owner gets a non-interactive read-only display
  with the owner-only tooltip; owner gets an interactive picker; owner can pick
  a member and stack workspace + member.
- TestUpdateAgent_AccessChangeIsOwnerOnly: admin real change → 403; admin no-op
  resubmit → 200; admin editing other fields → 200; owner change → 200.

Incidental: fixed a pre-existing base typecheck break in
slash-command-suggestion.test.tsx (stray `signal` arg not in the suggestion
items type) that otherwise fails the whole @multica/views typecheck.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): compare legacy visibility, not expanded permission, for no-op detection (MUL-3963)

PR #4853 review: permissionInputChangesAgent expanded a legacy-only
visibility:"private" into a real private permission and compared it against the
agent's actual permission. A member-only public_to agent derives legacy
visibility "private", so an admin PATCH-as-PUT echoing visibility:"private"
while editing another field was misread as a public_to→private downgrade and
rejected with 403 — contradicting the "unchanged permission no-op is allowed"
contract.

Fix (per review): when a request carries ONLY legacy `visibility` (no
permission_mode / invocation_targets), derive the agent's CURRENT legacy
visibility from its real targets and compare the legacy string values. Equal =
no-op (allowed); a real legacy change (e.g. "workspace") still returns 403.
Requests that carry permission_mode / invocation_targets keep the precise
mode+target comparison.

Regression test TestUpdateAgent_LegacyVisibilityNoOpForMemberOnlyPublicTo:
member-only public_to agent — admin submitting visibility:"private" + a
non-permission field → 200 with targets unchanged; admin submitting
visibility:"workspace" → 403.

Go handler/composio suites green; migration 130 applied; go vet clean.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): brief agents on connected apps

* feat(composio): gate MCP apps behind feature flag

* fix(mobile): parse agent invocation permissions

* fix(tests): update agent fixtures for access fields

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: Multica Eve <eve@devv.ai>
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local>
2026-07-03 14:18:43 +08:00
Bohan Jiang
13f74e651a feat(agents): remove custom_env from agent resources, add audited env endpoint (MUL-2600) (#3209)
* feat(agents): remove custom_env from agent resources, add audited env endpoint (MUL-2600)

The agent resource shape (list / get / create / update / archive /
restore responses + WebSocket events) no longer carries `custom_env`
values. Reads/writes of env now flow exclusively through a dedicated
`/api/agents/{id}/env` endpoint that is owner/admin-only, rejects
agent-actor sessions, applies a "****" sentinel preserve guard on
PUT, and writes a persistent audit row per reveal/update.

Why
- `multica agent list --output json` historically returned plaintext
  `custom_env` for owner/admin callers (the redaction gate gave only
  members the masked map). Any agent token running on the workspace
  inherits its owner's role and could read every other agent's
  secrets just by listing.
- Patching list/get redaction alone (PR #3175 direction) left
  symmetric leaks via mutation responses, WS events, the "reveal"
  path itself (no actor-aware auth), and a `****` overwrite footgun
  on UpdateAgent.

What changed
- Backend: drop `custom_env` from AgentResponse; add coarse
  `has_custom_env` + `custom_env_key_count`. Strip env handling from
  UpdateAgent (silently ignored if sent). Keep CreateAgent's
  custom_env acceptance.
- Backend: new GET/PUT `/api/agents/{id}/env` handlers in
  `internal/handler/agent_env.go`:
  - resolveActor → 403 for agent actors (closes the lateral-movement
    path).
  - Owner/admin role gate via existing helper.
  - PUT honours value == "****" as "preserve existing value".
  - Both write to `activity_log` with `agent_env_revealed` /
    `agent_env_updated` actions. Audit details record key names only,
    never values.
- Daemon claim path (`ClaimAgentTask`) unchanged — `TaskAgentData`
  still carries plaintext env for runtime injection.
- SQL: new `UpdateAgentCustomEnv` query; sqlc regenerated (v1.31.1).
- CLI: new `multica agent env get|set` subcommands. `--custom-env*`
  flags removed from `multica agent update`; the no-fields error
  now points to the new path.
- Frontend: drop env fields from `Agent` + `UpdateAgentRequest`; add
  `getAgentEnv` / `updateAgentEnv` client methods; rewrite env-tab
  to show "N variables configured" + explicit "Reveal & edit"
  button, fetching values only on intentional reveal.
- Locales: parity-safe additions to en + zh-Hans.
- Docs: agents-create.{mdx,zh.mdx} reflect the new threat model and
  endpoint.
- Mobile: schema drops `custom_env` / `custom_env_redacted`, adds
  metadata fields.

Tests
- Handler tests pinned the new invariants: no env in list/get
  responses, owner reveal happy-path + audit row, agent-actor 403,
  `****` sentinel preserves real values, UpdateAgent silently
  ignores `custom_env`, pure `mergeAgentEnv` cases.
- CLI tests pivot to the new flag surface: `agent update` MUST NOT
  expose the env flags; `agent env set` MUST expose
  --custom-env-stdin/--custom-env-file.
- Frontend test fixtures updated; pnpm typecheck / test / lint
  pass cleanly.

This is a breaking API change. Scripts that read `custom_env` from
`/api/agents` must migrate to `GET /api/agents/{id}/env`.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): close actor-spoofing + audit fail-closed in env endpoints (MUL-2600)

Addresses Elon's review of #3209:

* Mint a task-scoped `mat_` token per claim, bound to (agent, task,
  workspace, owner). Daemon injects it into the agent process in place
  of its own credential. Auth middleware authoritatively rebuilds
  X-User-ID / X-Agent-ID / X-Task-ID from the token row and sets
  X-Actor-Source=task_token; that header is server-set only — incoming
  values are stripped before any auth branch runs. resolveActor honors
  the header so an agent that strips X-Agent-ID / X-Task-ID still
  resolves as actor=agent.
* GetAgentEnv / UpdateAgentEnv are now fail-closed on audit-log
  failures: GET refuses to return plaintext, PUT persists inside the
  same tx as the audit row so they commit/roll back together.
* PUT /api/agents/{id} returns 400 when the body carries custom_env
  instead of silently dropping it — directs callers to the audited env
  endpoint.
* Agent actors never see mcp_config, even when the underlying member
  is owner/admin; mutation broadcasts go through a redaction shim so
  WS subscribers don't pick it up either.
* Fix backend test that asserted dense JSON (jsonb::text renders
  whitespace) and frontend test that assumed a unique "Test User"
  match.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): close residual MUL-2600 gaps from review (MUL-2600)

Migration 108 FK now correctly references agent_task_queue(id) instead
of the non-existent agent_task table; the previous name blocked CI
backend migrations.

Task-token-authenticated requests can no longer be re-routed at a
different workspace by passing workspace_slug / workspace_id /
?workspace_id / a URL workspace param. ResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest
and resolveWorkspaceUUID both short-circuit on X-Actor-Source=task_token
and return only the token-bound X-Workspace-ID; buildMiddleware adds a
defence-in-depth 403 if any URL-resolved workspace disagrees with the
token binding.

mcp_config no longer leaks back to agent actors through UpdateAgent /
CreateAgent / ArchiveAgent / RestoreAgent HTTP responses — the same
redactAgentResponseForActor helper that GetAgent/ListAgents use is now
applied to mutation responses too. WS broadcasts were already redacted
via broadcastAgentResponse.

FailTask and every TaskService cancel path (CancelTask /
CancelTasksForIssue / CancelTasksForAgent / CancelTasksByTriggerComment
/ BroadcastCancelledTasks) now eagerly DeleteTaskTokensByTask so the
mat_ token's 24h window doesn't outlive a terminated task. Failure is
non-fatal — the FK cascade and expiry remain durable guards.

Doc-only: clarify that PUT /api/agents/{id} now hard-rejects bodies
that carry custom_env (was previously "silently ignores").

Tests:
- middleware: TestResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest gains a task_token
  case asserting client-supplied slug/id/query cannot override the
  bound workspace.
- handler: TestUpdateAgent_RedactsMcpConfigForAgentActor and
  TestUpdateAgent_KeepsMcpConfigForMemberActor pin the mutation-
  response redaction contract per actor type.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): match redacted mcp_config as JSON null, not Go nil (MUL-2600)

`AgentResponse.McpConfig` is `json.RawMessage` without `omitempty`, so
the redacted response serialises as `"mcp_config": null`. On decode,
`json.RawMessage` keeps the literal bytes `null` rather than collapsing
to Go nil, which made the assertion fire on a non-leak.

The product contract (field always present, distinguished from "no
config" via `mcp_config_redacted`) is intentional, so adjust the test
to check for "no secret-bearing content" instead of weakening the
contract via `omitempty`.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-05-25 18:42:48 +08:00
YYClaw
614dfae884 MUL-2488 feat(timezone): Scheduling / Viewing two-layer timezone architecture (#2968)
* docs(timezone): add scheduling/viewing timezone architecture RFC

* feat(db): replace daily rollups with task_usage_hourly, add user.timezone

Migrations 100-104: add "user".timezone (Viewing tz), build the UTC
hourly task_usage_hourly rollup with its pipeline, drop the legacy
task_usage_daily / task_usage_dashboard_daily pipelines, and drop the
agent_runtime.timezone column. Report queries now slice day boundaries
at read time by the caller-supplied @tz instead of materialising in a
fixed tz. Regenerate sqlc.

* feat(server): add task_usage_hourly backfill command

Replace the two legacy backfill commands (daily / dashboard_daily) with
a single backfill_task_usage_hourly that loads historical task_usage
into the new UTC hourly rollup, sliced per workspace.

* refactor(server): resolve viewing timezone in report handlers

Report handlers resolve the Viewing tz per request (?tz query param,
then user.timezone, then UTC) and pass it to the hourly-rollup queries.
Drop the UseDailyRollup feature flags and the old raw-scan/daily-rollup
dual paths, remove the /api/usage endpoints, and stop the daemon from
reporting and the runtime handler from accepting host timezone.

* refactor(core): switch report queries to viewing timezone

API client and dashboard/runtime queries send ?tz with each report
request, the user schema/types carry the new timezone field, and the
runtime timezone field/mutation is removed.

* feat(views): add viewing timezone preference and UI

Add the useViewingTimezone hook and a Timezone setting in Preferences;
report charts and the dashboard week boundary follow the viewer tz.
Remove the runtime detail timezone editor and its locale strings.

* fix(test): update fixtures and stabilize tests for timezone refactor

The timezone architecture refactor changed several types without
updating dependent test code:

- RuntimeDevice no longer has a timezone field — drop it from the
  create-agent-dialog runtime fixture.
- User now requires a timezone field — add it to the apps/web mockUser
  fixture.
- The PreferencesTab timezone tests asserted on the async save handler
  (PATCH then store update) with a bare expect, racing the mutation's
  settle callback, and timed out querying the Select's ~600-option IANA
  list on a loaded CI runner. Wrap the assertions in waitFor and extend
  the timeout for those three tests.

* docs(timezone): document self-host migration order and trigger invariant

Add a SELF-HOST UPGRADE ORDER runbook to the backfill command's package
comment: applying migrations 100-104 in a single migrate-up drops the
legacy daily rollups before the hourly backfill runs, leaving dashboards
empty until cron catches up.

Add an INVARIANT comment on trg_atq_dirty_hourly noting that agent_id
must be added to the trigger's OF list if it ever becomes mutable,
otherwise dirty buckets for the old agent_id are silently missed.

* style(runtimes): drop trailing blank line in runtime-detail
2026-05-21 15:33:47 +08:00
Bohan Jiang
63d215e1c3 feat(runtime): visibility (public/private) gate on CreateAgent / UpdateAgent (#2419)
* feat(runtime): visibility (public/private) gate on CreateAgent / UpdateAgent

Closes the hole where a plain workspace member could pick another member's
runtime in the Create Agent dialog and bind an agent to it — the backend
wasn't checking runtime ownership, so the agent ran on someone else's
hardware / tokens. Reported on GH #1804.

Schema
- Migration 083 adds agent_runtime.visibility ('private' default, 'public')
  with a CHECK constraint. Existing rows default to private — same
  ownership semantics as before, no behavior change for legacy data.

Backend
- canUseRuntimeForAgent predicate: allow when caller is workspace
  owner/admin, the runtime owner, or the runtime is public.
- CreateAgent and UpdateAgent both gate on it: UpdateAgent matters because
  a plain member could otherwise create on their own runtime, then re-bind
  to a private one.
- PATCH /api/runtimes/:id accepts { visibility } — owner/admin only,
  validated against the same private/public allow-list.

Frontend
- Create-agent dialog renders other-owned private runtimes disabled with a
  Lock badge + tooltip explaining who to ask.
- Inspector runtime-picker disables the same set so re-binding fails
  the same way at the UI layer.
- Runtime detail diagnostics gains a Visibility editor (owner/admin) or
  read-only chip (everyone else).
- Runtime list shows a private/public chip next to the name.

Tests
- Go: canUseRuntimeForAgent truth table; CreateAgent / UpdateAgent
  end-to-end gate tests (admin / runtime owner / plain member);
  PATCH visibility owner / admin / member / invalid-value coverage.
- Vitest: create-agent dialog disabled state on private/public runtimes,
  default-runtime selection skips locked rows; runtime detail visibility
  editor → mutation, read-only fallback.

Migrating runtimes: existing rows default to private to preserve the
"owner only" status quo. Owners switch to public via the detail page
diagnostics card.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(runtime): apply timezone+visibility atomically; don't seed locked template runtime

Two issues surfaced in review of MUL-2062:

1. PATCH /api/runtimes/:id ran the timezone branch first, which:
   - returned early on a tz no-op, silently dropping a concurrent
     `visibility` patch in the same body;
   - committed the timezone mutation (+ usage rollup rebuild) before
     validating visibility, so an invalid visibility left the row
     half-updated.

   Validate every field first, then run the mutations in order. The
   no-op short-circuit now only triggers when nothing else is requested.

2. The Create Agent dialog in duplicate mode unconditionally seeded
   `template.runtime_id` as the selected runtime, even when that runtime
   is now private and owned by someone else — the user saw a selected
   row they couldn't submit (Create → backend 403). Fall back to the
   first usable runtime when the template's runtime is locked, and gate
   the Create button on `selectedRuntimeLocked` as defense in depth.

Tests:
- Go: TestUpdateAgentRuntime_CombinedPatchAppliesBoth (tz no-op +
  visibility flip), TestUpdateAgentRuntime_InvalidVisibilityDoesNotMutateTimezone
  (atomic-fail invariant).
- Vitest: duplicate template pointing at a locked runtime now seeds
  the first usable one; Create button stays disabled when no usable
  alternative exists.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-05-11 22:53:07 +08:00
Multica Eve
d6349c16ec feat(runtime): per-runtime timezone for token-usage aggregation (MUL-1950) (#2394)
* feat: per-runtime timezone for token usage aggregation

The runtime token-usage charts (daily and hourly tabs on the
runtime-detail page) bucketed every event by the Postgres session
timezone, which is UTC in production. For an operator in UTC+8 that
meant a Tuesday afternoon's tasks landed in Tuesday early-morning's
bar — the chart was always one off.

Fix: store an IANA timezone on agent_runtime and aggregate under it.

* migrations 081 / 082 add agent_runtime.timezone (TEXT NOT NULL
  DEFAULT 'UTC') and rebuild the rollup pipeline (window function
  and both trigger functions) to compute bucket_date with
  AT TIME ZONE rt.timezone instead of bare DATE().
* No historical backfill — task_usage_daily rows already on disk
  keep their UTC bucket_date; only future writes / re-touches
  recompute under the new tz. (Product call from MUL-1950: 'guarantee
  future correctness'.)
* runtime_usage.sql gains a @tz parameter on ListRuntimeUsage and
  GetRuntimeUsageByHour and threads tz through GetRuntimeTaskHourly  Activity. ListRuntimeUsageDaily reads bucket_date as-is since the
  rollup already wrote it in tz.
* parseSinceParamInTZ replaces the raw N×24h cutoff with start-of-
  day-N in the runtime's tz so 'last 7 days' lines up with bucket
  boundaries.
* Daemon registration sends the host's IANA tz (TZ env, then
  time.Local), and UpsertAgentRuntime preserves any user override
  via a CASE-on-existing-value pattern so a daemon reconnect can't
  silently revert the operator's setting.
* New PATCH /api/runtimes/:id endpoint (UpdateAgentRuntime) lets
  the runtime detail page edit the tz; the editor seeds with the
  browser tz on first interaction.

Refs: MUL-1950

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix: harden runtime timezone rollups

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix: address runtime timezone review nits

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local>
2026-05-11 14:39:35 +08:00
Jiayuan Zhang
3b3be9d7bd feat(comments): resolve threads with collapsible bar (MUL-1895) (#2300)
* feat(comments): resolve threads with collapsible bar (MUL-1895)

Adds a Linear-style resolve action on comment thread roots. Resolved
threads collapse to a single "N resolved comments from X" bar in the
activity feed; clicking expands the thread inline (per-session, not
persisted). Replying inside a resolved thread auto-unresolves it.

Backend
- migration 069: resolved_at, resolved_by_type, resolved_by_id on comment
- sqlc ResolveComment / UnresolveComment queries (idempotent via COALESCE)
- POST/DELETE /api/comments/{id}/resolve handlers, root-only validation
- CreateComment auto-clears resolved_at when a reply lands in a resolved
  thread, publishing comment:unresolved
- comment:resolved / comment:unresolved events; CommentResponse and
  TimelineEntry both surface the new fields

Frontend
- Comment + TimelineEntry types extended; payloads typed; WS sync wired
- useResolveComment optimistic mutation with rollback
- ResolvedThreadBar component for the collapsed view
- Resolve / Unresolve menu items on root comments; Collapse strip on the
  expanded resolved card
- en + zh-Hans locale strings

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(comments): cover agent reply path, expand-state hygiene, nested counts (MUL-1895)

Addresses three review issues from Emacs on PR #2300:

1. TaskService.createAgentComment bypasses Handler.CreateComment, so the
   auto-unresolve wired into the handler did not fire when an agent replied
   in a resolved thread (task / mention / on_comment paths). Extracted the
   logic to TaskService.AutoUnresolveThreadOnReply so both reply paths share
   it; rewired Handler.CreateComment to call the new method.

2. Resolving an already-expanded thread no longer collapses it back to the
   bar because expandedResolved still contained the id. Added
   clearResolvedExpand + handleResolveToggle wrapper so resolve / unresolve
   always wipe the session expand entry.

3. ResolvedThreadBar received only direct children, while CommentCard's
   expanded view recurses through descendants. Extracted the recursive
   walk into thread-utils.collectThreadReplies and called from both —
   counts and author lists now match.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* test(comments): mock useResolveComment + add zh-Hans plural key

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-05-09 05:49:33 +02:00
Naiyuan Qing
949dffdf7e feat: permission-aware UI across agent/comment/runtime/skill surfaces (#1915)
* feat(permissions): add core permission module and shared UI primitives

Foundation for permission-aware UI: pure rules that mirror the Go backend
permission gates, lightweight per-resource hooks, and two reusable display
components used across agent/skill/runtime detail pages.

- packages/core/permissions: types, rules, hooks (Decision-shaped — carries
  reason + message so UI can render disabled state, tooltip, and banner
  copy from one source)
- packages/core/agents/visibility-label: VISIBILITY_LABEL/DESCRIPTION/TOOLTIP
  constants ("Personal" / "Workspace") to replace scattered hard-coded copy
- packages/views/agents/visibility-badge: read-only visibility chip used on
  hover cards, list rows, and inspector when not editable
- packages/ui/components/common/capability-banner: "View only — only X and
  admins can edit Y" banner shown on agent / skill detail when current user
  lacks edit permission

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(views): permission-aware UI across agent/comment/runtime/skill surfaces

Apply the new permission rules to every surface where the UI was either
lying about who can do what or letting users hit 403s by clicking buttons
the backend would reject.

Agent detail
- Hide archive/restore actions for non-owner non-admin
- Replace inline editors (avatar, name, description, runtime/model/visibility/
  concurrency picker, skill-attach) with read-only display when canEdit is
  false — value is information, the editor is the action
- Show CapabilityBanner under the header explaining who can edit

Visibility surfaces
- visibility-picker / create-agent-dialog: replace "only you can assign"
  (false) with "Only you and workspace admins can assign" via shared
  VISIBILITY_DESCRIPTION constants
- agent-columns: truthful tooltip + "You" badge on agents the current user
  owns

Comments
- Restore admin override on comment edit/delete (backend already permits
  it via comment.go:507-512; the frontend was incorrectly hiding the menu).
  canModerate is computed once in issue-detail and threaded down.

Other
- Members tab: disable "demote" options for the last owner with tooltip
- Assignee picker: tooltip on disabled personal agents the user can't assign
- Runtime delete: tooltip and dialog explain the gate; owner column gains
  a name label next to the avatar in All scope
- Skill detail: page-level CapabilityBanner alongside the existing lock chip
- Issue delete (single + batch): note that any workspace member can delete
  issues — by-design semantics, made transparent

Backend is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(agents): hide personal agents from list and @mention for non-owners

Until now an agent's "Personal" visibility only narrowed the assign-to-issue
gate — every workspace member still saw every personal agent in the list
and the @mention dropdown. Members would see, click, and fail.

This filters those surfaces with the canonical canAssignAgentToIssue rule:
regular members only see workspace-visibility agents and the personal
agents they own; workspace owners and admins continue to see everything
(admin override path is intact).

- agents-page: visibleInView layer between active/archived and Mine/All
  scope so segment counts also reflect the filter
- mention-suggestion: filter agentItems before they enter the recency-
  ranked list; expand the test mock to cover the auth + visibility paths
  and add two assertions (member hides others' personal agents; admin
  still sees them)

Backend keeps returning every agent — admin tools and direct API access
are unaffected. This is a UI-only filter.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-30 09:31:19 +08:00