Commit Graph

9 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
YYClaw
9eddcaff10 fix(chat): defer cancellation-time finalization until the task transcript is stable (#5246)
A quick Stop before the agent's first token no longer races a late reply. Started-but-empty cancellations defer the empty/non-empty judgment until the daemon acks its transcript flush (or a grace-period sweeper fires), then settle to a single outcome. Empty outcomes persist a durable, creator-authorized draft restore (fetched/consumed via a dedicated endpoint, reconnect-safe and at-most-once) instead of broadcasting the prompt over the workspace bus.

Closes #5219
2026-07-15 00:52:27 +08:00
Bohan Jiang
45ff984518 fix(labels): sweep resource-label junctions on bulk deletes (MUL-4479) (#5348)
* fix(labels): sweep resource-label junctions on bulk deletes (MUL-4479)

Runtime, runtime-profile, and workspace deletion hard-delete their agents
and skills without clearing agent_to_label / skill_to_label. Migration 173
dropped the junction foreign keys, so these rows are no longer cascade-cleaned;
once resource labels are enabled, every labelled agent/skill removed through one
of these bulk paths leaves a permanent, invisible orphan junction row.

Clear the junctions in the same transaction as the owner delete, before the
owning rows disappear:

- DeleteAgentRuntime / ArchiveAgentsAndDeleteRuntime / DeleteRuntimeProfile:
  DeleteAgentLabelAssignmentsByRuntime, ahead of the archived-agent hard-delete.
- DeleteWorkspace: DeleteAgentLabelAssignmentsByWorkspace +
  DeleteSkillLabelAssignmentsByWorkspace, ahead of the workspace cascade.

Adds regression tests for all four delete paths.

Follow-up to #5345 (Elon review). Resource labels must stay disabled until this
lands.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(labels): make workspace cleanup atomic

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: J <j@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local>
2026-07-13 20:07:24 +08:00
Bohan Jiang
ccacce60a1 fix(channels): auto-reclaim orphaned IM-bot installations + accurate rebind conflict copy (#4810) MUL-3937 (#5103)
* fix(channels): auto-reclaim orphaned bot installations + accurate rebind conflict copy

channel_installation has no FK to workspace/agent (MUL-3515 §4), so deleting a
workspace or hard-deleting an agent left the row behind, occupying the
(channel_type, app_id) routing slot forever — the bot could never be rebound and
the UI had no way to clear it (#4810). The 409 also always blamed "a different
Multica workspace" even when the real owner sat in the same workspace.

Auto-reclaim on delete:
- DeleteWorkspace and the runtime-teardown paths now sweep the workspace's /
  archived agents' channel installations and every dependent row in-tx.
- The shared install path (Feishu + Slack) reclaims a DEAD prior owner — a
  revoked placeholder or an orphan whose workspace/agent is gone — before the
  upsert, healing installations stranded before this fix. A live owner (active
  agent, including an archived one) is left in place, not stolen.

Accurate conflict copy:
- A rebind refused by a LIVE owner now distinguishes same-workspace / another
  agent, an archived agent, and a genuinely different workspace, for both Slack
  (typed sentinels) and Feishu (registration message).

MUL-3937

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(channels): reclaim cross-workspace revoked bots + sweep card/dedup/audit (#4810)

Address the #5103 review (yyclaw + Steve):

- Reclaim: a REVOKED installation in ANY workspace is now dead (except the
  caller's own row), not just same-workspace. Disconnect never hard-deletes the
  row and there is no release UI, so a cross-workspace revoked row would pin a
  bot's app_id slot forever, with the misleading "connected to another
  workspace" copy resurfacing. A new binder proves control by holding the app
  credentials, so reclaiming is safe. Live ACTIVE owners (incl. archived) are
  still refused.
- Sweep the two dependent tables the cleanups missed, in all three paths
  (reclaim / DeleteWorkspace / runtime teardown): channel_outbound_card_message
  (no reaper, so a permanent orphan otherwise) and channel_inbound_message_dedup
  (PurgeChannelInboundDedup has no caller).
- Audit rows: PURGE on the hard-delete paths instead of detaching them into
  permanently unattributable NULL rows; keep DETACH on reclaim, where the
  workspace survives and the row stays useful for triage.
- Tests: flip cross-ws revoked to reclaimed + add cross-ws active preserved;
  extend the reclaim and both delete-path cleanup tests for card/dedup and the
  audit purge/detach split; assert the channel sweep on the DeleteRuntimeProfile
  entry point.

MUL-3937

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: J <j@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-07-09 15:07:11 +08:00
Multica Eve
1de0c7d14c MUL-4158: allow deleting orphaned profile runtimes
Fixes MUL-4158
2026-07-07 12:01:14 +08:00
LinYushen
cb68669c73 feat(composio): gate MCP apps behind feature flag (#4876)
* feat(composio): server-side connect flow + connections REST (Notion MVP) (MUL-3720) (#4608)

* feat(composio): server-side connect flow + connections REST (Notion MVP) (MUL-3720)

Compose the merged server/pkg/composio SDK into a user-facing connection
manager: signed-state connect handshake, local user_composio_connection
mirror, idempotent disconnect, and a per-user MCP session helper (not yet
wired into task dispatch).

- migration 127_user_composio_connection (no FK/cascade, per DB rules)
- sqlc queries: upsert (idempotent on user_id+connected_account_id), list
  active, owner-scoped get, mark revoked
- internal/integrations/composio: signed HMAC-SHA256 state, BeginConnect,
  CompleteCallback (idempotent upsert), ListConnections, Disconnect
  (upstream 404 = idempotent success), CreateMCPSession (no-op when empty,
  pins connected_accounts per toolkit), CallbackRedirect
- REST handlers under /api/integrations/composio (user-scoped, 503 when
  COMPOSIO_API_KEY unset): connect/init, callback (302), connections list,
  delete
- router wiring gated by COMPOSIO_API_KEY; COMPOSIO_AUTH_CONFIGS_JSON maps
  toolkit->auth_config (MVP: notion); state secret from COMPOSIO_STATE_SECRET
  or derived from JWT_SECRET; callback base from COMPOSIO_CALLBACK_BASE_URL
  or MULTICA_PUBLIC_URL
- tests: state (expire/tamper/wrong-secret), service (mapping, callback
  idempotency, non-success, disconnect owner/404 idempotency, MCP pin),
  handlers (httptest), redact regression for Bearer mcp_ tokens

MVP scope: Notion only; no task-dispatch overlay, sharing, or webhook
event handling (later stages).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): bind callback account to user + idempotent revoked disconnect (MUL-3720)

Address PR 4608 review (CHANGES_REQUESTED):

- callback: verify connected_account_id with Composio before mirroring it.
  The signed state only proved user/toolkit/exp, so a valid state paired with
  a tampered connected_account_id would be written verbatim. CompleteCallback
  now calls ListConnectedAccounts and fails closed (ErrAccountVerification)
  unless the account belongs to the state's user (composio_user_id == multica
  user id) and was created under the toolkit's auth config. No row is written
  on mismatch / unknown account / upstream error.

- disconnect: short-circuit to a no-op when the local row is already revoked,
  before touching upstream. Previously a second DELETE re-hit Composio and a
  non-404 upstream error surfaced as a 502, breaking the 204-idempotent
  contract.

- CreateMCPSession: document the v1 single-active-connection-per-(user,toolkit)
  constraint and make duplicate selection deterministic (newest-wins, rows are
  connected_at DESC) instead of order-dependent map overwrite. Stage 3 owns the
  real single-account-enforcement vs multi-account-shape decision.

Tests: tampered/wrong-auth-config/unknown-account callback rejection, revoked-row
disconnect no-op (asserts upstream not re-hit). composio pkg 85% coverage; all
green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): list all toolkits + dynamic auth-config resolution (MUL-3720)

Yushen's follow-up to the Notion MVP: surface the full Composio toolkit
catalog, render it in Settings, and drop the static env mapping in favor of
dynamic auth-config discovery.

Config correctness (per Composio docs):
- Remove COMPOSIO_AUTH_CONFIGS_JSON entirely. The toolkit→auth_config mapping
  is now resolved at request time from the project's /auth_configs (cached,
  5-min TTL), so enabling a toolkit is a dashboard action, not a redeploy.
- Do NOT add COMPOSIO_PROJECT_ID. The project API key (x-api-key) authenticates
  to exactly one project; the project is resolved from the key. Only org-level
  endpoints use x-org-api-key, which this integration never calls.

Backend:
- SDK: server/pkg/composio/auth_configs.go — ListAuthConfigs (toolkit_slug,
  is_composio_managed, show_disabled, limit, cursor).
- service: dynamic resolver (authConfigMap cache; betterAuthConfig prefers a
  custom/white-label config over Composio-managed, newest wins); BeginConnect
  and CompleteCallback resolve via it; ListToolkits fetches the full catalog
  (paginated, capped) annotated with connectable = has an enabled auth config,
  connectable-first ordering.
- handler + route: GET /api/integrations/composio/toolkits (user-scoped, 503
  when COMPOSIO_API_KEY unset) returning slug/name/logo/category/connectable.

Frontend:
- core: ComposioToolkit/ComposioConnection types, api client methods, and
  composio query options (@multica/core/composio).
- views: Settings → Integrations now has a Composio section rendering every
  toolkit as a card with search. Connect is gated on `connectable`;
  non-connectable toolkits show a muted "not configured" hint instead of a
  dead button. Connected toolkits show a badge + Disconnect (with confirm).
- i18n: composio block added to en/zh-Hans/ja/ko settings.

Tests: SDK + service (dynamic resolution, custom-over-managed preference,
connectable flag, resolver-error soft-degrade) and handler toolkits endpoint;
composio pkg 85.7% coverage. go build/vet/gofmt clean; core+views typecheck,
core+views lint, and core tests (691) all green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): close cross-toolkit callback fail-open by signing auth_config_id into state (MUL-3720)

Re-review blocker: CompleteCallback resolved the toolkit's auth config at
callback time and ignored a resolve error/empty result, while
verifyAccountOwnership skipped the auth-config comparison when the expected
value was empty. A user could then pass another toolkit's connected_account_id
into this toolkit's callback — the owner check passed and it was written under
the wrong toolkit_slug/account binding.

Fix: the auth_config_id is already resolved in BeginConnect (before the state
is signed), so sign it into the state and compare it exactly at callback. No
re-resolve, no fail-open. verifyAccountOwnership now fails closed when the
expected auth config is empty (rejects instead of skipping) and requires an
exact match — closing the cross-toolkit binding gap.

Tests: state round-trips auth_config_id; BeginConnect signs it; callback
rejects wrong/cross-toolkit auth config and an empty (no-mapping) auth config
fails closed. composio pkg 85.2% coverage, all green.

Frontend (non-blocking): the Composio settings tab now surfaces an error when
the connections query fails instead of silently rendering everything as
unconnected.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): hide Settings section entirely when integration unconfigured (MUL-3720)

Decision (option 2, hide-then-merge): don't show a card that leaks the internal
COMPOSIO_API_KEY env-var name to every end user. IntegrationsTab now gates the
whole Composio section (heading + body) on the toolkits query — a 503 means the
key is unset, so the section is withheld instead of rendering the not-configured
card. Admin-only setup guidance is a later, role-gated affordance.

Removed the notConfigured card (and now-unused ApiError import) from
ComposioTab; it only mounts when configured. views typecheck + lint clean.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): Stage 2 frontend polish — callback toast, last_used & expired UI, e2e (MUL-3718) (#4688)

* feat(composio): callback toast + refresh, last_used & expired UI, e2e (MUL-3718)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): real callback redirect route + StrictMode-safe toast dedup (MUL-3718 review)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): callback endpoint should not require Multica auth (MUL-3843) (#4709)

* fix(composio): move OAuth callback out of the Auth group (MUL-3843)

Composio 302-redirects the browser to /api/integrations/composio/callback
at the end of the OAuth flow, but PR #4608 mounted it inside the cookie-auth
middleware group. When the session cookie is absent (expired session,
SameSite=Strict / Safari ITP, private window, self-hosted callback subdomain)
the Auth middleware returned a hard 401 and a JSON blob instead of the
settings redirect, breaking the flow.

Identity never came from the cookie anyway: it is carried by the HMAC-signed
state param that CompleteCallback verifies (signature, expiry, replay) and
cross-checked by verifyAccountOwnership; h.Composio == nil still 503s. So the
callback is registered alongside the other public OAuth/webhook routes; the
other four composio endpoints stay session-gated.

Refs MUL-3843, MUL-3715.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): correct stale callback routing comments (MUL-3843)

The package header and ComposioCallback doc comments still described the
callback as sitting under the Auth middleware group. After the route was
moved out (this PR), update both to state it is a public route whose identity
comes from the signed state — addressing review nit from 张大彪.

Refs MUL-3843.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): inject MCP overlay into agent runtime at task dispatch (MUL-3721) (#4704)

Stage 3 of the Composio epic. Wires the per-user Composio MCP session into
every agent task so the agent process sees the initiator's connected tools
without any prompt-time plumbing.

Server side
  - Migration 128 adds agent_task_queue.runtime_mcp_overlay JSONB plus a
    BEFORE-UPDATE trigger that wipes the column on any transition into a
    terminal status (completed / failed / cancelled). A trigger is the single
    source of truth — future queries that flip status cannot bypass it.
  - composio.Service.BuildTaskOverlay(userID) reuses CreateMCPSession and
    emits the Claude-style { mcpServers: { composio: { type: http, url,
    headers } } } shape the daemon's existing sidecar generators consume.
    Returns (nil, nil) on zero active connections so we never burn a
    Composio session for a user with nothing to call.
  - TaskService grows a Composio ComposioOverlayBuilder seam, wired in
    router.go after composiointeg.NewService succeeds. Five enqueue paths
    (issue / mention / quick-create / chat / auto-retry) attach the overlay
    after CreateAgentTask returns and before the daemon is notified — so
    every claim reads a settled row, with no second daemon hop. Best-effort:
    a builder failure logs and proceeds with no overlay.
  - resolveInitiatorFromTriggerComment derives the initiator user from the
    trigger comment when it was authored by a member. Agent-authored
    triggers are not treated as initiators (their connected-apps view is
    empty by construction).

Daemon side
  - handler/daemon.go claim path merges task.runtime_mcp_overlay onto
    agent.mcp_config via mergeMCPOverlay before populating
    TaskAgentData.McpConfig. Overlay wins on server-name collisions
    because it carries the live user-scoped session URL. Errors fall back
    to the agent config unchanged — a bad overlay must not surprise-disable
    saved MCP tools. The existing execenv sidecar generators (cursor /
    codex / openclaw / opencode / hermes-kiro) need no changes: they keep
    consuming the merged result through TaskAgentData.McpConfig.

Tests
  - 9 merge cases (mcp_overlay_test): both-nil short-circuit, agent-only
    pass-through, overlay-only canonicalization, two-side merge, name
    collision (overlay wins), top-level key preservation, malformed agent
    fallback, malformed overlay fallback, non-object server rejection.
  - 4 dispatch cases (composio): zero-connections returns nil without
    CreateSession, happy-path emits the right shape with the right user
    id, empty-URL defensive branch, SDK error surfacing.
  - 4 TaskService helper cases: nil Composio is a no-op (Queries-safe),
    invalid initiator does not call the builder, nil overlay skips the
    UPDATE, builder error swallowed without panic.
  - Migration 128 verified to roll up + down + up cleanly against the test
    database.

Out of scope (deferred): assignment-triggered enqueue paths with no
trigger comment get no overlay attached today (no initiator UUID flows
through enqueueIssueTask in that case). Retry paths recompute the overlay
fresh from the parent's initiator_user_id instead of inheriting the bearer
from the parent row, so a stale token can never resurface on a retry.

Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): per-agent allowlist + originator-scoped MCP overlay (MUL-3869) (#4736)

* feat(composio): per-agent allowlist + originator-scoped MCP overlay (MUL-3869)

Stage 3.1 of the Composio epic (MUL-3721 parent). PR #4704 wired in the
runtime_mcp_overlay column and a per-task dispatch hook; this change
inverts the default from "all-on" to opt-in and locks the overlay to the
agent owner's own connected apps:

- Agents carry composio_toolkit_allowlist TEXT[]. NULL or [] => no MCP.
  Owner-only read/write; non-owner GET/PUT silently redacts/drops the
  field (same shape as mcp_config).
- agent_task_queue carries originator_user_id UUID. Set from the
  top-of-chain HUMAN at every enqueue path:
    * issue/mention comment by member  -> author_id
    * issue/mention comment by agent   -> inherit via comment.source_task_id
                                          -> parent task originator_user_id
    * quick-create                     -> requester_id
    * chat                             -> initiator_user_id
    * retry                            -> SQL-inherited from parent row
    * autopilot                        -> NULL (system-driven)
- BuildTaskOverlay (composio dispatch) now takes (ctx, originatorUserID,
  agent) and short-circuits on five gates: invalid originator,
  originator != agent.owner_id, empty allowlist, empty intersection of
  allowlist ∩ active connections, defensive empty session URL. Composio
  CreateSession is called with BOTH `toolkits.slugs` (the intersection)
  AND `connected_accounts` (the pinned account ids), narrowing the
  tool-router twice.
- The originator-vs-owner gate closes the agent-fanout privacy hole: any
  workspace member who can @-mention a public agent used to project the
  owner's connected apps into their run. Now the overlay only mounts
  when the human at the top of the chain IS the agent owner.

Tests:
- dispatch_test.go covers all 5 gates plus uppercase/whitespace slug
  normalisation.
- task_runtime_mcp_overlay_test.go covers the no-op gates of the new
  applyRuntimeMCPOverlay signature.
- agent_composio_allowlist_test.go (handler): owner roundtrip
  (list/empty/null), workspace-admin silent-drop, owner-only GET
  visibility, pure normaliseComposioToolkitAllowlist.
- resolve_originator_test.go (service, DB-backed): member-authored,
  agent-authored inherits via comment.source_task_id, invalid id.

Migration 129 up/down/up verified against docker postgres.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* chore(composio): gofmt + regenerate sqlc with v1.31.1 (MUL-3869 review nits)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): accept nested connected account auth config

* feat(views): creator-only MCP tab for per-agent Composio allowlist (MUL-3870) (#4743)

Stage 3.2 frontend on top of the Stage 3.1 backend (MUL-3869, 4708dba97).
Adds an agent-detail tab that lets the agent owner pick which of their own
active Composio connections this agent may mount as MCP servers, writing the
selection to agent.composio_toolkit_allowlist via the existing PUT /api/agents.

- core/types: composio_toolkit_allowlist (+ _redacted) on Agent; tri-state
  composio_toolkit_allowlist on UpdateAgentRequest (omit/no-change, null/clear,
  array/replace), matching the backend contract.
- core/agents: useUpdateAgentAllowlist - optimistic mutation hook (patches the
  cached workspace agent list, rolls back on error, invalidates on settle).
- views: AgentMcpTab renders the owner's active connections as checkboxes;
  empty state links to Settings -> Integrations; defensive redacted state.
- views: wired into AgentOverviewPane as tab "composio_mcp", labeled "MCP Apps"
  to disambiguate from the existing raw-JSON "MCP" (mcp_config) tab. The entry
  is gated to the creator (currentUserId === agent.owner_id), matching the
  backend's owner-only read/write of the allowlist.
- i18n: tabs.composio_mcp + tab_body.composio_mcp.* in en/ja/ko/zh-Hans.
- tests: agent-mcp-tab.test.tsx (gating, toggle->allowlist body, active-only,
  empty, redacted); e2e/agent-mcp.spec.ts (creator sees tab + PUT body,
  non-creator hidden) with Composio + agent endpoints mocked at the boundary.

Note: the product spec says "creator"; the schema has no creator_id - the
backend gate and redaction are keyed on owner_id, so the tab uses owner_id.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): mount remote MCP for codex

* feat(agents): agent invocation permission system (MUL-3963) (#4844)

* feat(agents): agent invocation permission system (permission_mode + invocation targets)

MUL-3963: split who may INVOKE an agent out of the overloaded visibility
column into an explicit, extensible model on feature/composio-integration.

- DB: agent.permission_mode (private|public_to) + agent_invocation_target
  table (workspace/member/team targets) + lossless backfill from visibility
  (migration 130).
- canInvokeAgent: owner-only for private (NO admin bypass, NO A2A bypass);
  public_to honours the allow-list; A2A judged by the top-of-chain originator.
- All trigger paths rewired: issue assign, comment @agent/@squad, chat,
  quick-create, autopilot, squad leader, child-done.
- Agent API: permission_mode + invocation_targets on responses and
  create/update (owner-only writes); legacy visibility kept as a derived field
  so old clients never see a permission widening.
- Composio: BuildTaskOverlay now FOLLOWS invocation permission and uses the
  agent OWNER connection (removed the originator==owner gate); front-end warns
  when a shared agent enables Composio apps.
- CLI: --permission-mode / --public-to-workspace / --public-to-member (legacy
  --visibility still mapped).
- Frontend: AccessPicker (Private / workspace / specific people / team soon),
  permission rules mirror canInvokeAgent, Composio warning banner.
- Tests: migration backfill, admin cannot invoke others private, public_to
  workspace/member whitelist, A2A by originator, Composio overlay uses owner
  connection.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(agents): stackable, mixed public_to invocation targets (MUL-3963)

Follow-up on PR #4844: public_to now supports selecting MULTIPLE, MIXED
targets on one agent (e.g. Public to workspace + specific people + team),
with canInvokeAgent admitting on ANY matching target (OR).

- Frontend AccessPicker: reworked from a single exclusive kind into a
  stackable multi-select — an "Everyone in workspace" toggle, a member
  multi-select checklist, and a (disabled, v1) team placeholder can be
  combined freely. Emits the full union of selected targets; empty union
  collapses to Private. Existing team targets are preserved across saves.
  Added the access.public_group locale string (en/zh-Hans/ja/ko).
- Backend already supported this (agent_invocation_target is multi-row per
  agent; create/update take a target ARRAY and batch-replace the whole
  allow-list; canInvokeAgent OR-matches). Added tests to lock it in:
  mixed member+team targets, overlapping-member batch replace, and
  workspace+member stacking then narrowing.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): address review on invocation permission (MUL-3963)

张大彪 review on PR #4844 — three blockers + product ruling + nits:

1. Migration 130: drop the FK/cascade on agent_invocation_target
   (agent_id, created_by) per the Multica no-FK rule; relationships are now
   maintained in the app layer (matching MUL-3515 §4). Added
   DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByArchivedRuntimeAgents and call it before
   DeleteArchivedAgentsByRuntime in all three runtime-delete paths
   (runtime.go x2, runtime_profile.go) so hard-deleting agents can't orphan
   target rows.
2. revokeAndRemoveMember: prune the leaving member's member-target grants
   (DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByMember) in the same tx as the member-row
   delete, so a re-invited user can't reclaim a stale invocation grant.
3. Empty public_to is a phantom — parsePermissionInput now normalises a
   public_to with no resolvable targets to a single workspace target, so
   `--permission-mode public_to` alone (and any empty target array) means
   "public to workspace" instead of "shared but nobody can run it".

Product ruling: the system/no-human-originator → workspace-target path in
canInvokeAgent is a deliberate, documented exception (webhook/system/
workspace-wide automation); member/team targets still fail closed without a
resolved originator. Documented in code + locked with a test.

Nits: refreshed the stale "originator must be owner" comments — models.go
(via migration 130 COMMENT ON COLUMN + sqlc regen for composio_toolkit_allowlist
and originator_user_id) and agent-mcp-tab.tsx — to the owner-connection +
invocation-permission rules.

Tests: member remove/re-add regression, system workspace exception + member
fail-closed, empty public_to → workspace (plus the earlier mixed/overlap/
batch-replace suite). Migration 130 applied to the test DB; Go handler/service/
composio suites green; views typecheck clean.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): scope member invocation-target cleanup to one workspace (MUL-3963)

张大彪 3rd review — cross-workspace permission bug + comment nits:

- DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByMember was a GLOBAL delete by user id, so
  removing a user from workspace A also wiped their member-target grants on
  agents in workspace B. Scoped it to a single workspace by joining through
  agent.workspace_id; revokeAndRemoveMember now passes (workspaceID, userID).
- Regression test TestRevokeMember_InvocationTargetCleanupIsWorkspaceScoped:
  same user allow-listed by agents in two workspaces; removal from one leaves
  the other workspace's target intact.
- Nits: refreshed the remaining stale "originator == agent.owner_id" /
  "owner-vs-originator" comments — CreateRetryTask (agent.sql, regenerated),
  and the AgentResponse allowlist doc + ListAgents/UpdateAgent redaction
  rationale in agent.go — to the owner-connection + invocation-permission rule.

Migration 130 applied to the test DB; Go handler/service/composio suites green;
go vet clean.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): agent access owner-only editable, read-only for others (MUL-3963) (#4853)

* fix(agents): make agent access owner-only editable, read-only for others (MUL-3963)

Interaction bug: a non-owner (incl. workspace admin) could open the AccessPicker
and set an agent public — the backend silently ignored it and the UI bounced
back to private. Access is owner-only, so non-owners must see a read-only state
and the backend must reject real changes explicitly.

Frontend:
- AccessPicker renders a static, non-interactive read-only state when the
  viewer is not the owner: the current access value + a lock affordance + a
  tooltip "Only the agent owner can change who can run this agent." No clickable
  trigger is rendered, so a non-owner can never open a control the backend would
  reject (the GitHub/Notion pattern for permission settings you can see but not
  edit). The editable multi-select picker is unchanged for the owner.
- agent-detail-inspector gates the picker on ownership specifically
  (currentUserId === agent.owner_id), NOT the general canEdit (which also admits
  admins, who may edit other fields but not access).
- New locale key access.owner_only_readonly (en/zh-Hans/ja/ko).

Backend:
- UpdateAgent now returns an explicit 403 when a non-owner submits a REAL
  permission change (permissionInputChangesAgent compares requested mode +
  target set against the persisted state); a no-op resubmit (admin PATCH-as-PUT
  echoing unchanged permission) is still tolerated so admin edits of other
  fields keep working. Replaces the previous silent-drop that caused the bounce.

Tests:
- access-picker.test.tsx: non-owner gets a non-interactive read-only display
  with the owner-only tooltip; owner gets an interactive picker; owner can pick
  a member and stack workspace + member.
- TestUpdateAgent_AccessChangeIsOwnerOnly: admin real change → 403; admin no-op
  resubmit → 200; admin editing other fields → 200; owner change → 200.

Incidental: fixed a pre-existing base typecheck break in
slash-command-suggestion.test.tsx (stray `signal` arg not in the suggestion
items type) that otherwise fails the whole @multica/views typecheck.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): compare legacy visibility, not expanded permission, for no-op detection (MUL-3963)

PR #4853 review: permissionInputChangesAgent expanded a legacy-only
visibility:"private" into a real private permission and compared it against the
agent's actual permission. A member-only public_to agent derives legacy
visibility "private", so an admin PATCH-as-PUT echoing visibility:"private"
while editing another field was misread as a public_to→private downgrade and
rejected with 403 — contradicting the "unchanged permission no-op is allowed"
contract.

Fix (per review): when a request carries ONLY legacy `visibility` (no
permission_mode / invocation_targets), derive the agent's CURRENT legacy
visibility from its real targets and compare the legacy string values. Equal =
no-op (allowed); a real legacy change (e.g. "workspace") still returns 403.
Requests that carry permission_mode / invocation_targets keep the precise
mode+target comparison.

Regression test TestUpdateAgent_LegacyVisibilityNoOpForMemberOnlyPublicTo:
member-only public_to agent — admin submitting visibility:"private" + a
non-permission field → 200 with targets unchanged; admin submitting
visibility:"workspace" → 403.

Go handler/composio suites green; migration 130 applied; go vet clean.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): brief agents on connected apps

* feat(composio): gate MCP apps behind feature flag

* fix(mobile): parse agent invocation permissions

* fix(tests): update agent fixtures for access fields

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: Multica Eve <eve@devv.ai>
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local>
2026-07-03 14:18:43 +08:00
Multica Eve
12ea1f6a8c MUL-3495: support custom runtime args and registration errors (#4408)
* feat: support custom runtime args

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix: address custom runtime review nits

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-06-23 14:20:18 +08:00
LinYushen
77ac17ef49 Make custom runtimes appear immediately (#4234)
* Make custom runtimes appear immediately

* Scope daemon profile refresh by authorized runtimes

* Relay runtime profile refresh hints

* Localize runtime profile close label
2026-06-17 16:00:22 +08:00
LinYushen
1f5cb51d4e MUL-3284: Web UI + CLI (custom runtime PR3) (#4177)
* MUL-3284 PR3 (CLI): multica runtime profile subcommands + local path override

- cmd_runtime_profile.go: `multica runtime profile` group — list / create /
  update / delete against /api/workspaces/{id}/runtime-profiles, plus set-path
  / unset-path for a per-machine command override. protocol-family validated
  client-side via agent.IsSupportedType / agent.SupportedTypes; visibility
  validated; update only sends changed flags (protocol_family immutable);
  delete surfaces the server 409 body when agents are still bound.
- internal/cli/config.go: ProfileCommandOverrides map[string]string on
  CLIConfig (omitempty), through the existing marshal/unmarshal so set/unset
  round-trips without dropping other fields.
- internal/daemon: Config.ProfileCommandOverrides, loaded from CLIConfig;
  appendProfileRuntimes now prefers an override path when set AND executable,
  else falls back to exec.LookPath(command_name), else skips+logs as before.
- Tests: cmd_runtime_profile_test.go (registration, create/update/delete incl.
  bad-family + missing-flag + 409 surfacing, set/unset path round-trip,
  relative-path rejection, config preservation); cli/config round-trip;
  daemon prefers-override / falls-back-when-not-executable.

Verified: go build ./..., go vet, go test ./cmd/multica/... ./internal/daemon/...
./internal/cli/... all pass.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* MUL-3284 PR3 (Web): custom runtime profiles in the Runtime page

Single-list integration — no new page, no tabs/grouping. Built-in protocol
families and custom profiles render mixed in one catalog, each row badged
built-in vs custom (progressive disclosure).

- packages/core: RUNTIME_PROFILE_PROTOCOL_FAMILIES (single-source 13-family
  whitelist, matches server agent.SupportedTypes + migration 120 CHECK) and
  RuntimeProtocolFamily / RuntimeProfile types; api client
  list/get/create/update/deleteRuntimeProfile against
  /api/workspaces/{id}/runtime-profiles; runtimes/profiles.ts query +
  mutation hooks and a 409 "agents still bound" conflict parser.
- packages/views/runtimes: runtime-profile-catalog (mixed built-in+custom
  rows), runtime-profiles-dialog (header "+ Add runtime" → step 1 pick
  protocol family → step 2 display_name/command_name/description; edit form
  for custom; admin-gated), delete-runtime-profile-dialog (confirm + graceful
  409), runtimes-page / runtime-list integration.
- i18n: new strings added to all four locales (en, zh-Hans, ja, ko).
- a11y: dialogs are focus-trapped, Esc-closable, labelled; full
  create/edit/delete flow is keyboard + screen-reader operable.

Iron rule honored: no generic per-agent args UI here (those stay on Agent
config). fixed_args is not surfaced as a general args field.

Verified: turbo typecheck + lint + test pass for @multica/core, @multica/views,
@multica/web; the @multica/web production build succeeds.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* MUL-3284 PR3: hide fixed_args from Web + CLI (not yet wired to launch)

Review fix. fixed_args was surfaced as a working feature, but the daemon does
not splice it into the agent launch command — exposing it promised admins a
no-op. Per the call, remove it from every user-facing surface while keeping the
underlying column/struct "carried but not exposed".

- Web (runtime-profiles-dialog.tsx + runtime-profile-catalog.ts): drop the
  detail row, the create body field, the update patch field, and the form
  textarea; remove the parseFixedArgs/fixedArgsToText helpers and the
  fixedArgs form value. Left a NOTE pointing at the daemon TODO.
- i18n: removed the fixed_args strings from all four locales (en/zh-Hans/ja/ko).
- CLI (cmd_runtime_profile.go): removed the `--fixed-arg` flag from create and
  update and stopped sending `fixed_args`; updated the "no fields" message.
  Test now asserts the CLI never sends fixed_args.

Untouched (the carried-but-not-exposed layer): the runtime_profile.fixed_args
column, the server handler's accept/return, and the daemon's RuntimeProfile
field — all keep the existing TODO(MUL-3284) to wire it into the launch path
(with a test proving args reach the backend) before any UI/CLI re-exposes it.

Verified: turbo typecheck+lint+test pass for @multica/core and @multica/views;
go build/vet/test pass for ./cmd/multica/.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* MUL-3284 PR3: stop exposing profile visibility=private (server forces workspace)

Double-review (Eve) caught a fixed_args-shaped hole: visibility=private was a
user-facing toggle (Web form + detail + CLI), but the three server read paths
(ListRuntimeProfiles, daemon ListEnabledRuntimeProfilesForWorkspace,
DaemonRegister) never enforce it — so a "private" profile's name/command would
leak to other members and could be registered by other machines' daemons
(lateral data leak). Same "don't paint a pie" fix as fixed_args: hide the
control everywhere and force the stored value.

- Server (runtime_profile.go): drop `visibility` from the create + update
  request structs; CreateRuntimeProfile always stores 'workspace'
  (runtimeProfileDefaultVisibility); UpdateRuntimeProfile no longer accepts it;
  removed validRuntimeProfileVisibility. The column + response field stay
  (always 'workspace') as the carried-but-not-exposed layer.
- Web (runtime-profiles-dialog.tsx): removed the visibility form fieldset,
  the VisibilityOption component, the detail row, the visibility state, and the
  create/update submit fields.
- i18n: removed the profile visibility strings from all four locales
  (profiles.detail.visibility, profiles.visibility.*, profiles.form.visibility_*).
  Top-level runtime/agent visibility strings are untouched.
- CLI (cmd_runtime_profile.go): removed `--visibility` from create/update and
  the VISIBILITY list column; removed validateVisibility; stopped sending the
  field.
- Tests: new TestCreateRuntimeProfile_ForcesWorkspaceVisibility (POST
  visibility:"private" -> response and DB row are 'workspace'); CLI create test
  now asserts visibility is never sent.

Follow-up MUL-3308 tracks implementing real creator-visibility (and wiring
fixed_args to the launch path); TODOs left in server/Web/CLI point to it.

Verified: turbo typecheck+lint+test pass (@multica/core, @multica/views);
go build/vet pass; go test ./cmd/multica/... and the full ./internal/handler/
suite pass against a migrated Postgres 17.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-06-17 11:38:17 +08:00
LinYushen
52e76e7b23 MUL-3284: server API + daemon (custom runtime PR2) (#4149)
* MUL-3284: add runtime_profile schema (custom runtime PR1)

Schema-only foundation for custom runtimes. Additive migration 120:

- New workspace-level `runtime_profile` table: the shared, team-visible
  definition of a custom runtime (e.g. an in-house Codex wrapper).
  protocol_family is CHECK-constrained to the exact backend list in
  agent.New() (server/pkg/agent/agent.go). The only args column is
  `fixed_args` (args every agent on the runtime must inherit); there is
  deliberately no generic per-agent args field — those stay on
  agent.custom_args.
- `agent_runtime.profile_id` (nullable, FK -> runtime_profile ON DELETE
  CASCADE): NULL = built-in runtime, non-NULL = a registered instance of
  a custom profile.
- Partial unique index agent_runtime_workspace_daemon_profile_key on
  (workspace_id, daemon_id, profile_id) WHERE profile_id IS NOT NULL.

The legacy UNIQUE (workspace_id, daemon_id, provider) constraint is left
INTACT so the existing registration upsert
(ON CONFLICT (workspace_id, daemon_id, provider) in runtime.sql) keeps
resolving its arbiter and the server stays green. Converting that key to
a partial (WHERE profile_id IS NULL) index and making the upsert
profile-aware is PR2's registration work, not this migration.

Verified up + down against Postgres 17: full `migrate up` applies 120;
schema shows the table, column, partial index and intact legacy
constraint; functional checks pass (partial index blocks dup
(ws,daemon,profile), allows same profile on another daemon; CHECK and
display_name uniqueness reject bad input; legacy ON CONFLICT still
resolves; profile delete cascades to instances); down/up round-trip is
clean.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* MUL-3284: drop DB FKs/cascade from runtime_profile migration (review fix)

Per review (house rule: no new database foreign keys / cascades; relational
integrity lives in the application layer):

- runtime_profile.workspace_id: drop REFERENCES workspace ON DELETE CASCADE
  -> plain UUID NOT NULL.
- runtime_profile.created_by: drop REFERENCES "user" ON DELETE SET NULL
  -> plain UUID.
- agent_runtime.profile_id: drop REFERENCES runtime_profile ON DELETE CASCADE
  -> plain UUID.

CHECK constraints, UNIQUE (workspace_id, display_name), the workspace index,
and the partial unique index agent_runtime_workspace_daemon_profile_key are
unchanged. The legacy UNIQUE (workspace_id, daemon_id, provider) constraint
remains untouched.

Behavioral consequence: the database no longer auto-removes a profile's
agent_runtime instance rows on profile delete. That cleanup moves into PR2's
profile-delete path. Up-migration comments document this; down-migration
comment no longer references FKs/cascade.

Re-verified on Postgres 17: migrate up applies 120; no FK constraints exist on
the new columns; partial index still blocks dup (ws,daemon,profile_id); CHECK
and display_name uniqueness still reject bad input; deleting a profile now
leaves the runtime row orphaned (proving cascade is gone); down/up round-trip
clean with the legacy constraint intact.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* MUL-3284 PR2 (server): runtime_profile CRUD + profile-aware registration

Server/DB half of the custom-runtime feature.

- Migration 121: convert the legacy UNIQUE (workspace_id, daemon_id, provider)
  constraint on agent_runtime into a partial unique index scoped to built-in
  rows (WHERE profile_id IS NULL). With 120's partial index on profile_id this
  lets one daemon host the built-in provider AND custom profiles of the same
  protocol family without collision.
- Queries: runtime_profile CRUD; ListEnabledRuntimeProfilesForWorkspace
  (daemon-facing); CountAgentsByProfile + DeleteAgentRuntimesByProfile for the
  app-layer cascade; profile-aware UpsertAgentRuntimeWithProfile; the built-in
  UpsertAgentRuntime ON CONFLICT now spells out WHERE profile_id IS NULL so it
  targets the right partial index. sqlc regenerated.
- agent.SupportedTypes / IsSupportedType: single-source protocol_family
  whitelist, in lockstep with agent.New and the migration 120 CHECK.
- Handlers + routes: runtime_profile CRUD (member-read, admin-write) with
  protocol_family whitelist validation, display_name uniqueness (409), and
  fixed_args validation (no generic per-agent args — iron rule); a
  daemon-token endpoint GET /api/daemon/workspaces/{id}/runtime-profiles;
  DeleteRuntimeProfile does the app-layer cascade (delete instance rows then
  profile, in one tx) and refuses (409) while active agents are bound.
- DaemonRegister accepts an optional per-runtime profile_id: validates the
  profile belongs to the workspace and is enabled, registers via the
  profile-aware upsert, and skips legacy hostname merge for custom rows.
  AgentRuntimeResponse now carries profile_id.

Verified on Postgres 17: migrate up through 121; built-in + custom codex
coexist on one daemon; both upsert arbiters are idempotent; delete-by-profile
cascade removes only the custom instance; migrate down reverses 121 then 120
and replays clean. go build ./... and go vet pass; handler test package
compiles.

Daemon-side wiring (fetch profiles, PATH-resolve command_name, register with
profile_id, exec uses command_name) lands in a follow-up commit on this branch.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* MUL-3284 PR2 (daemon): pull profiles, PATH-resolve, register, exec command

Daemon-side half of custom runtime profiles, against the server contract on
this branch.

- client.go: GetRuntimeProfiles(workspaceID) -> GET
  /api/daemon/workspaces/{id}/runtime-profiles (mirrors GetWorkspaceRepos);
  RuntimeProfile / RuntimeProfilesResponse types.
- types.go: Runtime gains profile_id (parsed from the register response so
  runtimeIndex carries it).
- daemon.go:
  * appendProfileRuntimes — called inside registerRuntimesForWorkspace before
    the empty-runtimes guard. Best-effort fetch (older server 404s are logged
    and swallowed; never fails registration). Per enabled profile: resolve
    command_name via PATH (exec.LookPath, behind a `lookPath` test hook),
    skip+log when absent, best-effort version probe, record the resolved
    absolute path keyed by profile_id, and append a registration entry
    {name, type=protocol_family, version, status:online, profile_id}. A
    custom-only host (no built-in agents) still registers.
  * profileCommandPaths map (guarded by d.mu) + recordProfileCommandPath /
    customCommandPathForRuntime helpers.
  * runTask: looks up the claimed task's RuntimeID -> profile command path and
    overrides the executable path, synthesizing an AgentEntry so a custom
    runtime runs even when the host has no built-in agent of the same
    provider. provider (=protocol_family) is unchanged so agent.New still
    selects the right backend.
- Tests: GetRuntimeProfiles request shape; profile runtime appended + path
  recorded (custom-only host); profile skipped when command not on PATH;
  profiles-fetch-404 is best-effort; customCommandPathForRuntime bookkeeping.
- agent: lockstep test pinning SupportedTypes to agent.New and the migration
  120 protocol_family CHECK.

Iron rule honored: profile carries no generic per-agent args. fixed_args are
parsed and carried but intentionally NOT wired into the launch command yet
(optional/best-effort; explicit TODO(MUL-3284) in appendProfileRuntimes).

Verified: go build ./... clean; go vet ./internal/daemon/... clean;
go test ./internal/daemon/... pass (existing + 5 new); full
go test ./internal/handler/ suite passes against a migrated Postgres 17;
agent lockstep test passes.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* MUL-3284 PR2: profile delete runs full archived-agent cascade (fix 500)

Review fix. DeleteRuntimeProfile previously guarded only on ACTIVE agents, but
agent.runtime_id is ON DELETE RESTRICT — a profile whose runtimes had only
ARCHIVED agents passed the guard, then DeleteAgentRuntimesByProfile hit the FK
and the handler 500'd.

Now it mirrors the mature runtime-delete cascade (DeleteAgentRuntime): in one
transaction it enumerates the profile's runtime rows, refuses (409) any with
active agents or active squads led by archived agents, then for each runtime
pauses autopilots pinned to its archived agents, drops archived squads led by
them, and hard-deletes the archived agents before removing the runtime rows
and the profile. No code path can now fall through to a raw FK error.

- queries: ListAgentRuntimeIDsByProfile (sqlc regen). Reuses the existing
  per-runtime teardown queries (CountActiveSquadsWithArchivedLeadersByRuntime,
  ListArchivedAgentIDsByRuntime, PauseAutopilotsByAgentAssignees,
  DeleteSquadsByArchivedAgentsOnRuntime, DeleteArchivedAgentsByRuntime).
- tests: TestDeleteRuntimeProfile_ArchivedAgentCascade (archived-only profile
  deletes cleanly: 204, runtime + archived agent + profile gone) and
  TestDeleteRuntimeProfile_ActiveAgentBlocks (active agent → 409, survives).

Verified against Postgres 17: both new tests pass; full handler suite, daemon
tests, and agent lockstep test pass; go vet clean.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-06-17 11:33:09 +08:00