Follow-up to #1126 (which closed the HTML-injection vector in the Body).
The Subject line is not HTML-rendered, so html.EscapeString would leak
literal entities into recipient inboxes. Instead:
- Strip control characters from workspace/inviter names (defense in depth
even though Resend also filters CR/LF).
- Cap each field at 60 runes so an attacker can't stuff a full phishing
pitch into a workspace name that gets sent from noreply@multica.ai.
Also extracts buildInvitationParams to make the sanitization logic
testable without mocking the Resend SDK, and adds a test covering:
- HTML escape behavior for script/attribute/anchor injection payloads
- Subject stripping of \r\n\t and other unicode controls
- Subject NOT being HTML-escaped (so "Acme & Co." stays literal)
- Subject length bounds
- Benign inputs pass through unchanged
Adds a note on SendVerificationCode that its body uses only
server-generated content, to prevent the same pitfall from creeping in.
Refs #1117
* fix(email): HTML-escape workspace/inviter names in invitation email
SendInvitationEmail interpolated workspaceName and inviterName directly
into the HTML body via fmt.Sprintf with no escaping. A workspace owner
who sets a name like '</h2><a href="https://evil.example">Click</a>'
can break the email structure and inject attacker-controlled links that
appear as part of the official Multica invitation.
Escape both values with html.EscapeString before interpolation. The
Subject line also gets the escaped variants since some transports render
HTML-entity-like sequences.
Closes#1117
* fix(email): use raw names in Subject, keep HTML-escape for body only
Email Subject is a plain-text context — applying html.EscapeString
turns "A&B" into "A&B" and "O'Brien" into "O'Brien" in the
recipient's inbox. Keep the escape for the Html body where it prevents
injection, but use the original values in Subject.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: shaun0927 <shaun0927@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The email CTA now deep-links to /invite/{id} instead of the generic app
URL. If the user isn't logged in, they're redirected to login with a
?next= param that brings them back to the invite page.
Changes:
- Backend: GET /api/invitations/{id} endpoint (enriched with workspace/inviter names)
- Backend: Email template now links to /invite/{invitationId}
- Frontend: Shared InvitePage component (packages/views/invite/)
- Frontend: Web route at (auth)/invite/[id], Desktop route at invite/:id
- Frontend: /invite/ excluded from navigation history persistence
Uses the existing Resend email service to notify invitees.
Email includes inviter name, workspace name, and a link to the app.
Sent fire-and-forget in a goroutine to avoid blocking the API response.
* feat(auth): add email verification login flow with 401 auto-redirect
Replace the old OAuth-based login with email verification codes:
- Backend: send-code / verify-code endpoints, verification_codes table (migration 009), rate limiting, Resend email service
- Frontend: two-step login UI (email → 6-digit OTP), auth store with sendCode/verifyCode
- SDK: ApiClient gains onUnauthorized callback; 401 responses auto-clear token and redirect to /login
- Fix login button staying disabled due to global isLoading state
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): add brute-force protection, redirect loop guard, and expired code cleanup
- VerifyCode: increment attempts on wrong code, reject after 5 failed tries (migration 010)
- onUnauthorized: skip redirect if already on /login to prevent infinite loops
- SendCode: best-effort cleanup of expired verification codes older than 1 hour
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): add master verification code for non-production environments
Allow code "888888" to bypass email verification in non-production
environments to simplify development and testing workflows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): add personal access tokens for CLI and API authentication
Add full-stack PAT support: users create tokens in Settings, CLI authenticates
via `multica auth login`. Server stores SHA-256 hashes only. Auth middleware
extended to accept both JWTs and PATs (distinguished by `mul_` prefix).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
