Remediates two pgx security advisories in a single bump:
- CVE-2026-33816 (fixed in 5.9.0) — pgproto3 memory-safety DoS from
malformed messages sent by a malicious server.
- GHSA-j88v-2chj-qfwx / CVE-2026-41889 (fixed in 5.9.2) — SQL injection
via placeholder confusion with dollar-quoted literals under
QueryExecModeSimpleProtocol. Not reachable in this codebase (no
simple-protocol callers), but pinned to clear future scanner runs.
No source changes needed: pgx 5.9.x adds no breaking APIs over 5.8.x
(adds PG protocol 3.2 support, SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS, OAuth, plus
pgtype/pgconn bug fixes). Minimum Go bumped to 1.25 in 5.9.0; repo
already on 1.26.1.
MUL-2597
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(execenv): default-disable Codex native multi-agent in per-task config
Recent Codex app-server releases enable features.multi_agent by default,
exposing spawn_agent / wait / close_agent tools that let a parent thread
spawn nested subagents. The daemon currently models only the parent thread,
so the parent's turn/completed is treated as task completion even when
spawned children are still running — leading to premature task completion
and dropped child output.
Disable features.multi_agent by default in the per-task CODEX_HOME/config.toml
so Multica's task lifecycle is the only orchestration layer in play. Strip
both the dotted-key form (features.multi_agent) at TOML root and the
multi_agent key inside a [features] table; siblings and unrelated tables
are preserved. Honor MULTICA_CODEX_MULTI_AGENT=1 as an opt-out for users
who explicitly want Codex native subagents inside a Multica task.
The user's global ~/.codex/config.toml is never modified — only the daemon's
isolated per-task copy.
Also widen managedBlockRe to consume `\n*` rather than `\n?` so reruns
don't accumulate blank lines when both the sandbox and multi-agent managed
blocks coexist.
* fix(execenv): inject managed multi_agent inside existing [features] table
Per PR review (codex_multi_agent.go:77-83 vs :112-115): when the user's
config.toml already has a top-level `[features]` table, writing
`features.multi_agent = false` at the TOML root implicitly redefines the
same `features` table. The strict TOML parser used by Codex (`toml-rs`)
rejects that with `table 'features' already exists`, so Codex would fail
to load the per-task config and refuse to start the thread. Verified the
strict-parser failure with pelletier/go-toml/v2; the previous
BurntSushi/toml-based regression test was permissive enough to miss it.
Detect a root-level `[features]` header and place the managed block
inside that table (`multi_agent = false` with marker comments). When no
such header exists, keep the existing root-level dotted-key form. The
managed-block regex matches both layouts so reruns and layout
transitions stay idempotent. A `[features.experimental]` sub-table
without a bare `[features]` header still uses the root dotted-key form,
which is spec-valid (no explicit redefinition).
Tests now use pelletier/go-toml/v2 to actually parse the output and
assert features.multi_agent decodes to false; the regression case from
the PR review is covered explicitly.
* fix(execenv): recognize feature table header variants
---------
Co-authored-by: Devv <devv@Devvs-Mac-mini.local>
* feat(realtime): phase 0 — extract Broadcaster interface + add metrics
Phase 0 of the WebSocket horizontal-scaling plan tracked in MUL-1138.
This change is intentionally behavior-preserving: it sets up the seams
needed for later phases (subscribe/unsubscribe protocol, scope-level
fanout, Redis Streams relay) without altering any wire protocol or
producer call sites.
What changed
- New realtime.Broadcaster interface covering the three fanout methods
producers already use on *Hub (BroadcastToWorkspace, SendToUser,
Broadcast). *Hub continues to satisfy it; a future Redis-backed
implementation can be dropped in without touching listeners.
- registerListeners now depends on realtime.Broadcaster instead of
*realtime.Hub, isolating the bus → realtime fanout layer behind an
interface.
- New realtime.Metrics singleton with atomic counters: connects,
disconnects, active connections, slow-client evictions, total
messages sent/dropped, and per-event-type send counters. Wired into
Hub register/unregister/broadcast paths and into every listener.
- New GET /health/realtime endpoint returning a JSON snapshot of the
metrics so we can observe baseline fanout pressure before phase 1.
Why phase 0 first
GPT-Boy's only-Redis plan and CC-Girl's review both call out the same
prerequisite: get a Broadcaster seam and visibility in place before
introducing scope-level subscriptions or a Redis relay. Doing this as
a standalone step keeps each later PR focused and trivially revertable.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(realtime): only-Redis fanout — scopes, subscribe protocol, Redis Streams relay (MUL-1138)
Implements the final-version plan agreed in MUL-1138 on top of phase 0:
* Hub: 4 scope types (workspace/user/task/chat), per-client subscription
set, subscribe/unsubscribe WS frames, ScopeAuthorizer hook for
task/chat scope auth, first/last-subscriber callbacks for the relay,
workspace+user auto-subscribe on connect.
* RedisRelay: Broadcaster impl that XADDs every event into
ws:scope:{type}:{id}:stream and XREADGROUPs only the scopes for which
this node has live subscribers. Per-node consumer group, heartbeat,
stale-consumer sweeper, MAXLEN cap, lag/disconnect metrics.
* Listeners: route task:* events to ScopeTask, chat:* events to
ScopeChat; workspace remains the default for everything else.
* events.Event: optional TaskID / ChatSessionID hints so the listener
layer can pick the right scope without re-parsing payloads.
* Handler: publishTask / publishChat helpers; chat + task message
publishers updated to use them.
* main.go: when REDIS_URL is set, wrap the hub with NewRedisRelay and
pass the relay (instead of the hub) to registerListeners. A
db-backed ScopeAuthorizer enforces that task/chat subscribes belong
to the caller's workspace.
* Metrics: per-scope subscribe/deny counters, redis connect state, node
id, lag/dropped counters surfaced via /health/realtime.
Behavior in single-node mode (REDIS_URL unset) is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(realtime): address PR #1429 review must-fix items (MUL-1138)
- listeners: keep task/chat events on workspace fanout until the WS
client supports scope-subscribe + reconnect-replay. Routing them
through BroadcastToScope today (without any client subscriber) would
silently drop every chat / task message and break the live timeline,
chat unread badges, and pending-task UI. The server-side scope infra
(Hub subscribe/unsubscribe, ScopeAuthorizer, Redis Streams relay)
stays in place so flipping the switch in the client follow-up PR is
a one-line change.
- scope_authorizer: ScopeChat now enforces CreatorID == userID, mirroring
the HTTP layer (handler/chat.go: GetChatSession / SendChatMessage /
MarkChatSessionRead). Without this, any workspace member who learned a
session_id could subscribe to chat:message / chat:done /
chat:session_read for a peer's private chat. The same creator-only
check is applied to ScopeTask when the task is a chat task
(task.ChatSessionID set). Issue tasks remain workspace-scoped.
- Refactor scope authorizer to depend on a narrow scopeAuthQuerier
interface so its decisions can be unit-tested without a live DB.
- Add tests:
* listeners_scope_test.go pins the workspace-fanout fallback for
task:message / task:progress / chat:message / chat:done /
chat:session_read.
* scope_authorizer_test.go covers chat creator-only access, chat-task
creator-only access, and issue-task workspace-only access (creator
allowed, peer denied, cross-workspace denied, missing session
denied, empty userID denied).
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: CC-Girl <cc-girl@multica.ai>
The bluemonday HTML sanitizer applied to comment content (added in #679)
treats Markdown source as HTML, entity-encoding syntactically meaningful
characters and normalizing whitespace. This corrupts user input:
- "> quote" -> "> quote" (blockquote lost, see #1303)
- '"foo"' -> '"foo"' (literal entities visible)
- "\n\n2." -> " 2." (ordered list items merged into prose)
Comment content is stored as Markdown source. XSS is already handled at
two layers:
- Render: rehype-sanitize in packages/ui/markdown and
packages/views/editor/readonly-content (mention:// allowlist,
data-href restricted to http(s), class restricted to
code/div/span/pre).
- Edit: @tiptap/markdown is configured with html:false, so Markdown
source containing raw HTML tags is treated as plain text.
Removing the server-side sanitizer therefore does not lower the security
boundary, and restores faithful Markdown round-tripping.
The PR #1342 workaround in the editor serializer can be dropped once
this lands.
Co-authored-by: devv-eve <eve@devv.ai>
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
The bluemonday HTML sanitizer applied to comment content (added in #679)
treats Markdown source as HTML, entity-encoding syntactically meaningful
characters and normalizing whitespace. This corrupts user input:
- "> quote" -> "> quote" (blockquote lost, see #1303)
- '"foo"' -> '"foo"' (literal entities visible)
- "\n\n2." -> " 2." (ordered list items merged into prose)
Comment content is stored as Markdown source. XSS is already handled at
two layers:
- Render: rehype-sanitize in packages/ui/markdown and
packages/views/editor/readonly-content (mention:// allowlist,
data-href restricted to http(s), class restricted to
code/div/span/pre).
- Edit: @tiptap/markdown is configured with html:false, so Markdown
source containing raw HTML tags is treated as plain text.
Removing the server-side sanitizer therefore does not lower the security
boundary, and restores faithful Markdown round-tripping.
The PR #1342 workaround in the editor serializer can be dropped once
this lands.
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(autopilot): add scheduled/triggered automation for AI agents
Introduce the Autopilot feature — recurring automations that assign work
to AI agents on a schedule or manual trigger. Supports two execution
modes: create_issue (creates an issue for the agent to work on) and
run_only (directly enqueues an agent task without issue pollution).
Backend: migration (3 tables + 2 columns), sqlc queries, AutopilotService
with concurrency policies (skip/queue/replace), HTTP CRUD + trigger
endpoints, background cron scheduler (30s tick), event listeners for
issue→run and task→run status sync.
Frontend: types, API client methods, TanStack Query hooks with optimistic
mutations, realtime cache invalidation, list page with create dialog,
detail page with trigger management and run history, sidebar nav + routes
for both web and desktop apps.
* feat(autopilot): improve UX — trigger config, edit dialog, template gallery
- Replace raw cron input with friendly frequency tabs (Hourly/Daily/Weekdays/Weekly/Custom), time picker, and timezone dropdown defaulting to user's local timezone
- Fix Select components showing UUIDs instead of names (Base UI render function pattern)
- Add Edit button on detail page opening a unified edit dialog
- Remove project/concurrency/issue-title-template from create/edit (simplify for users)
- Add trigger configuration inline during autopilot creation
- Add template gallery on empty state (6 step-by-step workflow templates)
- Rename "Description" to "Prompt" throughout UI
- Inject autopilot run timestamp into issue description for agent date awareness
- Treat issue status "in_review" as run completion (fixes skip on next trigger)
- Make migration idempotent with IF NOT EXISTS clauses
* fix: sanitize markdown rendering in comments and shared renderers
Add rehype-sanitize to both ReadonlyContent and Markdown components so
that raw HTML parsed by rehype-raw is sanitized against a strict
allowlist before reaching the DOM. On the backend, add a bluemonday
sanitization pass when creating and updating comments to strip
dangerous tags as defense-in-depth.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: add mention:// protocol to sanitize allowlist and validate file card URLs
- Add mention:// to rehype-sanitize protocols.href in both ReadonlyContent
and Markdown so @mention links survive sanitization
- Validate data-href on file cards to only allow http(s) URLs, blocking
javascript: and data: schemes in both frontend click handler and backend
bluemonday policy
- Narrow class attribute allowlist to specific elements (code, div, span, pre)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Use google/uuid NewV7() for attachment ID and S3 file key instead of
random hex, so the S3 object name matches the attachment record ID
- Add LinkAttachmentsToIssue query to associate orphaned attachments
with a newly created issue
- Pass attachment_ids in CreateIssue request so uploads during issue
creation (before the issue exists) get linked after commit
- Collect and pass attachment IDs in comment-input and reply-input
so comment creation properly links uploaded files
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add POST /api/upload-file endpoint that uploads files to S3 and returns
CDN URLs protected by CloudFront signed cookies (same pattern as Linear).
Infrastructure:
- Two private S3 buckets (static.multica.ai, static-staging.multica.ai)
- Two CloudFront distributions with OAC and Trusted Key Groups
- ACM wildcard cert in us-east-1, DNS records in Route 53
- RSA signing key stored in AWS Secrets Manager
Backend:
- S3 storage service with CloudFront CDN domain support
- CloudFront signed cookie generation (RSA-SHA1)
- Private key loaded from Secrets Manager (env var fallback for local dev)
- Cookies set on login (VerifyCode) with 72h expiry matching JWT
- Upload handler: multipart form → S3 → CloudFront URL response
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): add email verification login flow with 401 auto-redirect
Replace the old OAuth-based login with email verification codes:
- Backend: send-code / verify-code endpoints, verification_codes table (migration 009), rate limiting, Resend email service
- Frontend: two-step login UI (email → 6-digit OTP), auth store with sendCode/verifyCode
- SDK: ApiClient gains onUnauthorized callback; 401 responses auto-clear token and redirect to /login
- Fix login button staying disabled due to global isLoading state
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): add brute-force protection, redirect loop guard, and expired code cleanup
- VerifyCode: increment attempts on wrong code, reject after 5 failed tries (migration 010)
- onUnauthorized: skip redirect if already on /login to prevent infinite loops
- SendCode: best-effort cleanup of expired verification codes older than 1 hour
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): add master verification code for non-production environments
Allow code "888888" to bypass email verification in non-production
environments to simplify development and testing workflows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(auth): add personal access tokens for CLI and API authentication
Add full-stack PAT support: users create tokens in Settings, CLI authenticates
via `multica auth login`. Server stores SHA-256 hashes only. Auth middleware
extended to accept both JWTs and PATs (distinguished by `mul_` prefix).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace raw fmt/log calls with structured slog logger (Go) and
console-based logger (TypeScript). Add request logging middleware.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extract daemon logic from cmd/daemon/ into internal/daemon/ package and
create a new unified CLI entry point at cmd/multica/ using cobra. The CLI
supports `daemon` as a long-running subcommand plus ctrl subcommands for
agent/runtime management, config, status, and version.
Server, migrate, and seed binaries remain unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add HTTP handlers for issues, comments, agents, workspaces, inbox, members, and activity
- Implement JWT authentication middleware with Bearer token validation
- Add sqlc queries for all entities (CRUD operations)
- Extract router into reusable NewRouter() for testability
- Expand SDK with full API client methods (CRUD for all resources)
- Add updateWorkspace to SDK, add Member type to shared types
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
