Commit Graph

46 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Bohan Jiang
8c98940b79 Lark Bot integration MVP: migration + service boundary (MUL-2671) (#3277)
* feat(db): add Lark integration migration (MUL-2671)

Introduces seven tables for the 飞书 Bot integration MVP — per-agent
PersonalAgent installations, user/chat bindings, inbound dedup +
non-content drop audit, outbound card mapping, and short-lived
single-use member binding tokens.

Schema notes:
- chat_session schema unchanged; Lark routes through a separate
  binding table rather than adding a metadata JSONB column.
- Outbound card mapping is task/message scoped so multiple runs on
  the same session can't stomp each other's cards.
- lark_inbound_audit stores routing / identity / drop_reason ONLY,
  never message body — the audit channel for unbound users and group
  messages that don't address the Bot.
- app_secret stores ciphertext (encryption helper lands in a follow-up
  commit on this branch); DB never sees plaintext.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(util): add secretbox AES-256-GCM helper for at-rest secrets

First consumer is lark_installation.app_secret (MUL-2671 §4.4), but
the helper is intentionally generic — future per-tenant secrets that
must not appear in a DB dump can reuse it.

Construction: AES-256-GCM with a per-message random nonce, providing
authenticated encryption. Tampered ciphertext fails Open instead of
silently decrypting to garbage. Master key loaded from a base64 env
var via LoadKey; key rotation is not in scope yet.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* refactor(issues): extract IssueService.Create as single create entry (MUL-2671)

Establishes the service-layer boundary mandated by Elon's 二审 of
MUL-2671 §4.8: issue creation no longer lives inside the HTTP
handler. Both the HTTP POST /issues handler and the future Lark
/issue command call into service.IssueService.Create, so duplicate
guard, issue numbering, attachment linking, broadcast, analytics,
and agent/squad enqueue stay aligned.

Handler responsibilities shrink to parsing the HTTP request, doing
actor resolution / validation (transport-specific), and converting
service results into the IssueResponse + 201. The transaction-wrapped
core, attachment link, event publish, analytics capture, and
agent/squad enqueue all move into service.IssueService.Create.

A BroadcastPayload callback on the service keeps the WS broadcast
shape (the full IssueResponse) without forcing the service to
depend on handler-layer response types.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(integrations): add Lark package skeleton (MUL-2671)

Establishes the architectural boundaries Elon's 二审 mandated as
first-PR blockers without dragging in OAuth, WebSocket, or
card-patching code (those land in follow-up PRs):

- ChatSessionService interface — channel-aware chat-session entry
  point for Lark, deliberately separate from the HTTP SendChatMessage
  handler. The HTTP handler's single-creator guard (creator_id ==
  request user_id) is correct for the browser client but rejects
  group chat_sessions by construction; Lark needs its own service.
- AuditLogger interface — the only path for recording dropped events.
  Its signature deliberately omits message body, enforcing the
  drop-audit policy (MUL-2671 §4.7) at the type level: unbound users
  and non-addressed group messages can't accidentally end up in
  chat_session.
- Typed IDs (OpenID, ChatID) prevent UUIDs from being conflated with
  Lark-side identifiers at compile time.
- DropReason constants align dashboard/audit queries across callers.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* refactor(issues): move parent/project workspace check into IssueService (MUL-2671)

Parent existence and project workspace membership now live inside
IssueService.Create, inside the same transaction as the duplicate guard
and counter increment. The HTTP handler stops re-implementing the
lookup; every future create entry (Lark /issue, MCP, API keys) inherits
the same boundary without copy-pasting the SQL.

Adds two error sentinels (ErrParentIssueNotFound, ErrProjectNotFound)
so transports can translate to their own error shapes. Handler-level
cross-workspace tests guard the boundary against future regressions.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(db): harden Lark migration safety底座 — TTL cap + workspace FK (MUL-2671)

Two storage-layer hardenings that move the must-fix line off "the app
layer enforces it" and onto the schema itself, so future write paths or
hand-inserted rows cannot regress the invariants.

1) lark_binding_token TTL cap. The DB CHECK was 1 hour as
   defense-in-depth while the app constant was 15 minutes; the CHECK
   now matches the product cap (15 minutes). Application constant
   docstring updated to reflect that storage enforces the same bound.

2) lark_user_binding workspace membership. The table previously only
   FK'd to workspace / user / installation independently, so a binding
   could exist for a user no longer in the workspace, or claim a
   workspace different from its installation's. Two composite FKs
   close the gap structurally:

   * (installation_id, workspace_id) → lark_installation(id, workspace_id)
     — guarantees a binding's workspace_id always matches its
     installation's workspace_id. A new UNIQUE (id, workspace_id) on
     lark_installation is added as the FK target.

   * (workspace_id, multica_user_id) → member(workspace_id, user_id)
     with ON DELETE CASCADE — when a user is removed from the
     workspace, the binding cascades away in the same transaction.
     There is no longer a path where lark_user_binding outlives
     workspace membership.

These two FKs are the schema-level proof for §4.3's "unbound or
non-workspace members cannot leak content into chat_session" invariant.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(integrations/lark): inbound services + /issue dispatcher (MUL-2671)

Lands the inbound service layer for the Lark Bot MVP, sitting on top
of the migration + service-boundary scaffold from the previous commits.
What ships:

- sqlc queries for all seven lark_* tables (idempotent dedup insert,
  CAS WS-lease, single-use binding-token consume, etc.) plus
  GetMostRecentUserChatMessage for the /issue fallback.
- AuditLogger backed by lark_inbound_audit; signature deliberately
  body-free so callers cannot leak content into the drop log.
- ChatSessionService: find-or-create chat_session via the binding
  table (winner-takes-all on the UNIQUE race), append-with-dedup, /issue
  parser, "previous user message" fallback for bare `/issue` invocation.
- Dispatcher orchestrates the inbound pipeline in one place:
  installation routing → group-mention filter → identity check → ensure
  session → append+dedup → /issue → enqueue chat task. Group sessions
  use the installer as creator (stable workspace identity); p2p uses
  the sender. Agent-offline path falls through with OutcomeAgentOffline
  so the WS adapter can reply with the offline notice from §4.6.
- BindingTokenService: random URL-safe token, SHA-256 stored hash,
  15-min TTL pinned at the application AND the DB CHECK; Redeem
  returns the same opaque error for all rejection cases (no timing
  oracle on replay).
- Unit tests for the parser (13 cases), dispatcher (8 cases via fake
  Queries/Chat/Audit/IssueCreator/Enqueuer), and binding-token
  hash/entropy. Real-DB integration tests for OAuth + token redeem
  land alongside the HTTP handlers in the next commit.

Out of scope for this commit (next ones on the same feature branch):
OAuth callback, HTTP routes, WebSocket hub, outbound card patcher,
frontend.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(integrations/lark): installation HTTP surface + secretbox-gated wiring (MUL-2671)

Lands the HTTP boundary on top of the inbound services from the
previous commit. What ships:

- InstallationService.Upsert: the only path that writes
  lark_installation. Encrypts app_secret with the secretbox passed in
  at construction time; refuses to fall back to plaintext storage
  (returns an error from the constructor if no Box is supplied), so a
  misconfigured dev environment cannot accidentally land a row with
  cleartext credentials. Revoke flips status without DELETE so audit
  trail survives.

- HTTP handlers under /api/workspaces/{id}/lark/:
  * GET  /installations           — member-visible (Integrations tab
                                    renders for non-admins). Soft 200
                                    with empty list + configured:false
                                    when MULTICA_LARK_SECRET_KEY is
                                    unset, so the tab does not error
                                    on self-host that has not opted in.
  * POST /installations           — admin-only; 503 when not configured.
                                    Re-validates agent_id ∈ workspace
                                    before accepting credentials so a
                                    cross-workspace agent UUID is
                                    rejected.
  * DELETE /installations/{id}    — admin-only; workspace-scoped lookup
                                    so one workspace cannot revoke
                                    another's installation by UUID
                                    guess.

- POST /api/lark/binding/redeem (user-scoped, no workspace context):
  the only path that mints a lark_user_binding row from user action.
  Redeemer identity comes from the session, not the token, so a stolen
  link cannot bind an open_id to an attacker's Multica user. The
  composite FK on lark_user_binding cascades the binding away if the
  user is not (or no longer) a workspace member, so a non-member who
  steals the link gets 403 at the DB layer.

- Two new event-bus types in protocol.events:
  EventLarkInstallationCreated, EventLarkInstallationRevoked.

- Router wiring: MULTICA_LARK_SECRET_KEY drives a conditional
  initialization of h.LarkInstallations + h.LarkBindingTokens. When
  unset, the integration disables itself with an INFO log and the
  rest of the server boots normally.

- Handler tests cover all four not-configured short-circuits.
  Happy-path integration tests (real DB, full create→list→revoke
  cycle and token mint→redeem) ship alongside the WS hub PR.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): close binding-token rebind & typed task errors (MUL-2671)

Two must-fixes from PR review on HEAD 87ad15e1:

1. Binding-token redeem could be used to grab an already-bound Lark
   open_id. Two changes harden the path:
   - lark.sql `CreateLarkUserBinding` now gates ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE
     on `multica_user_id = EXCLUDED.multica_user_id`, so a cross-user
     rebind via a second valid token returns zero rows instead of
     silently switching ownership.
   - `BindingTokenService.RedeemAndBind` consumes the token and writes
     the binding row inside one transaction. A failed bind no longer
     burns the token; a successful bind never leaves a consumed-but-
     unused token. Distinct typed errors: ErrBindingTokenInvalid (410),
     ErrBindingAlreadyAssigned (409), ErrBindingNotWorkspaceMember
     (403). The handler maps each to its own status code.

2. Dispatcher collapsed every `EnqueueChatTask` error to
   `OutcomeAgentOffline`, hiding infra failure and misusing the
   "offline" label for cases (e.g. archived agent) where it doesn't
   fit. Now:
   - `service.EnqueueChatTask` returns `ErrChatTaskAgentNoRuntime` and
     `ErrChatTaskAgentArchived` as sentinel errors; DB / load / insert
     failures stay wrapped as ordinary errors.
   - Dispatcher uses `errors.Is` to map only the productizable cases
     (`OutcomeAgentOffline`, new `OutcomeAgentArchived`); any other
     error is returned to the WS adapter so it can retry or page
     instead of disguising the outage as an offline card.

A daemon that's merely disconnected is still NOT an error — as long
as `agent.runtime_id` is set the chat task enqueues and waits for the
daemon to claim it on next online (returns `OutcomeIngested`).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* ci: re-trigger workflow on lark MVP must-fix HEAD

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* ci: re-trigger workflow on lark MVP must-fix HEAD (retry)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* test(integrations/lark): guard binding-token sentinel contract (MUL-2671)

Two unit tests that document and protect the must-fix invariants
without requiring a DB:

1. TestRedeemAndBindRequiresTxStarter — if a future refactor wires
   up BindingTokenService without a TxStarter, RedeemAndBind must
   fail fast with a clear error rather than nil-panic on Begin.
   The atomicity contract (consume + bind commit together) depends
   on that transaction existing.

2. TestBindingErrorSentinelsAreDistinct — the HTTP handler maps
   ErrBindingTokenInvalid → 410, ErrBindingAlreadyAssigned → 409,
   ErrBindingNotWorkspaceMember → 403. Accidentally aliasing them
   (e.g. var ErrBindingAlreadyAssigned = ErrBindingTokenInvalid)
   would silently regress the response codes without any other
   test catching it.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(integrations/lark): WS hub orchestrator + outbound card patcher (MUL-2671)

The hub owns one supervisor goroutine per active installation. Each
supervisor acquires the WS lease via the existing CAS query, runs an
EventConnector (interface — real Lark wire protocol lands in a follow-up
behind it), renews the lease on a tighter cadence than the TTL, and
backs off (with jitter) on connector failure. Lease loss tears the
connector down cleanly; revocation is reaped on the next sweep. Per-
process node id satisfies §4.4 multi-replica safety: at most one Hub
globally holds the lease for any installation.

The patcher subscribes to task / chat-done events on the existing
events.Bus and keeps the per-task Lark interactive card in sync
(thinking → streaming → final | error). Card binding is per-task as
required by §4.5; throttled patches via an in-memory last-patched map;
final / error transitions bypass the throttle so the user always sees
the terminal state. The Renderer is plug-replaceable so the product
card template can evolve without touching transport.

The APIClient interface centralizes the Lark Open Platform surface
this package needs (send card, patch card, send binding prompt,
exchange OAuth code). The default stubAPIClient returns
ErrAPIClientNotConfigured for every transport call so a misconfigured
deployment fails loudly instead of dropping cards silently. Real
implementation lands in a follow-up; OAuth callback + frontend entries
land in the next commits on this branch.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(integrations/lark): OAuth install start / callback (MUL-2671)

OAuthService builds a signed-state Lark authorization URL the frontend
can render as a QR (or open directly), then on callback verifies the
HMAC-protected state, exchanges the OAuth code for installation
credentials via APIClient.ExchangeOAuthCode, and persists the row via
InstallationService.Upsert (which keeps app_secret encryption inside a
single chokepoint).

State token format: workspaceID.agentID.initiatorID.expiresUnix.nonce.sig
— HMAC-SHA256 over the first five fields with a deployment-level
secret. TTL defaults to 10 minutes (covered by tests). Three failure
modes (invalid state / expired state / missing code) map to typed
errors so the HTTP handler can emit a single lark_error= query param
the frontend uses to pick copy.

Both endpoints degrade cleanly: the at-rest key gate (already in place)
returns 503 from /install/start when the InstallationService is nil,
and the OAuth gate (MULTICA_LARK_OAUTH_APP_ID / _SECRET / _REDIRECT_URI
/ _STATE_SECRET) returns configured:false from /install/start so the
frontend can render "configure manually instead" without an error
banner. /install/callback always finishes with a redirect to
/settings?tab=lark carrying either lark_installed=1 or lark_error=<code>.

Tests cover signed-URL shape, missing-config rejection, tampered state,
expired state, propagated exchange error, and the no-config redirect
path on the HTTP handler.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(views/lark): settings tab + agent bind button + /lark/bind redemption page (MUL-2671)

Adds the user-facing Lark surface across the shared packages:

- packages/core/types/lark.ts — wire shapes that mirror server/internal/
  handler/lark.go. Optional fields default to undefined so older desktop
  builds keep parsing if the server adds new keys (CLAUDE.md → API
  Response Compatibility).
- packages/core/lark/{queries,index}.ts — Tanstack Query options keyed
  by workspace id; realtime sync invalidates `installations(wsId)` on
  `lark_installation:*` events.
- packages/core/api/client.ts — listLarkInstallations,
  getLarkInstallURL, deleteLarkInstallation, redeemLarkBindingToken.
- packages/views/settings/components/lark-tab.tsx — Settings → Lark
  panel. Listing is member-visible (matches backend); disconnect is
  admin-only. Empty state points users at the per-Agent bind entry,
  matching the (workspace_id, agent_id) UNIQUE: there is no
  "pick an agent" UI here because the bind URL is per-agent.
- LarkAgentBindButton (same file) is the per-Agent CTA the Agent
  detail page imports. Opens the OAuth URL in a new tab; the callback
  bounces back to /settings?tab=lark with a query param the panel
  reads for inline confirmation copy.
- packages/views/lark/bind-page.tsx — the Bot's "you need to bind"
  destination. Requires session before redeeming, distinguishes the
  410/409/403 backend responses into distinct copy.
- apps/web/app/lark/bind/page.tsx — Next.js route wrapping the shared
  bind page in a Suspense boundary (Next 15 useSearchParams rule).

i18n: all user-facing strings land in en/zh-Hans, settings tab nav
includes a Sparkles-iconed Lark entry, bind-page copy lives under
common.lark_bind so it works pre-workspace-context too. typecheck +
lint clean.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* chore(integrations/lark): wire outbound Patcher into server bootstrap (MUL-2671)

Constructs the Patcher next to the existing Installation/BindingToken
wiring in router.go and Register()s it on the event bus. With the stub
APIClient any actual transport call surfaces ErrAPIClientNotConfigured;
once the real Lark client lands, swap NewStubAPIClient for the real
implementation here without touching the Patcher's subscription logic.

doc.go updated to reflect everything the package now contains (Hub,
Patcher, OAuthService, APIClient interface). The Hub itself is NOT
booted here yet — it needs an EventConnector implementation for the
Lark long-connection wire protocol, which lands in a follow-up; the
orchestrator code and its unit tests are in place so that follow-up
can focus on the WS protocol rather than lifecycle plumbing.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): address Elon 二审 5 must-fix items (MUL-2671)

- Hub: renewer cancels run ctx on lease loss so the connector exits
  even if its wire I/O is blocked, keeping the §4.4 ownership
  invariant intact under lease theft.
- Hub: EventEmitter returns (DispatchResult, error) so the real
  connector can post the matching Lark-side card (needs_binding,
  agent_offline, agent_archived) and react to infra failures instead
  of silently logging at the seam.
- Dispatcher: top-level message_id dedup runs before group filter
  and identity check, so a reconnect storm cannot re-fire binding
  prompts or re-spam not_addressed_in_group audit rows; the in-
  AppendUserMessage dedup is removed since the table-level UNIQUE
  is the ultimate backstop.
- OAuth: HandleCallback auto-binds the installer via the new
  InstallerBinder seam (BindingTokenService implements it), so the
  §2.1 "scan to bind, you're done" promise holds end-to-end.
  validateExchangeResult now requires installer open_id; new error
  reason codes wired through the callback redirect.
- Frontend / handler: install_supported listing field + StartLark-
  Install short-circuit on stub APIClient hide install entry points
  (Settings tab + per-agent button) while no real Lark HTTP client
  is wired, so users do not land in an OAuth flow that fails at
  exchange.

Includes tests for each fix (lease-loss cancel, emit error
propagation, dedup ordering, OAuth installer-bind contract, stub-
client install gate) and i18n strings for the new preview state.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): two-phase dedup so infra failures do not swallow messages (MUL-2671)

The pre-fix top-level dedup wrote the lark_inbound_message_dedup row before
EnsureChatSession / AppendUserMessage. An infra error in either step left
the row in place and a WS-adapter retry was mis-classified as a duplicate,
so the user's Lark message was permanently lost without ever landing in
chat_session.

Make dedup two-phase:

  - ClaimLarkInboundDedup acquires an in-flight claim (processed_at NULL).
    Stale claims older than 60 s are re-takeable so a process crash does
    not strand the message_id.
  - MarkLarkInboundDedupProcessed flips processed_at on durable success
    (audit row OR chat_message + session touch).
  - ReleaseLarkInboundDedup deletes the in-flight row on infra failure
    before any durable side effect, so the retry can re-claim immediately.

Dispatcher.Handle now finalizes the claim exactly once based on whether
the inner pipeline reached a durable outcome — chat_message commit being
the transition point (errors past it Mark, errors before it Release).

Regression tests cover the two failure variants Elon flagged plus the
inverse invariants (durable-error Marks, drops Mark, in-flight replays
drop, stale claims re-claim).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): owner-fence dedup claim to close the double-write windows (MUL-2671)

The two-phase Claim/Mark/Release fix from the previous commit closed the
"infra error swallows a replay" gap but left two windows that could still
write a chat_message twice for the same Lark message_id:

  1. Stale-reclaim race. Worker A claims at t=0, runs slowly past the
     60 s staleness TTL but is still alive. Worker B sees the row as
     stale and re-takes the claim. A reaches AppendUserMessage and
     commits a second chat_message.

  2. Mark window. Worker A commits chat_message but the post-pipeline
     MarkLarkInboundDedupProcessed fails (DB hiccup) or the process
     crashes before it runs. 60 s later a retry treats the in-flight
     row as stale, re-claims it, and writes a second chat_message.

Close both with owner fencing + same-tx Mark:

  - lark_inbound_message_dedup now carries a `claim_token` UUID;
    ClaimLarkInboundDedup mints a fresh one on insert and on stale
    re-take, so a reclaim ROTATES the token.

  - MarkLarkInboundDedupProcessed and ReleaseLarkInboundDedup are
    fenced on (message_id, claim_token, processed_at IS NULL) and
    return rowsAffected. Zero means our token is no longer live, and
    the caller treats it as a no-op (not an error).

  - AppendUserMessage invokes MarkLarkInboundDedupProcessed INSIDE its
    chat_message+session tx (qtx). If the token has been rotated by a
    concurrent reclaim, the Mark matches zero rows and the method
    returns ErrClaimLost; the deferred Rollback unwinds the
    chat_message insert, so the other holder is the sole writer. The
    durable write and the Mark therefore commit (or roll back)
    atomically — there is no "committed but not yet Marked" window
    for a crash or retry to exploit.

Dispatcher.processClaimed now returns a tri-state dedupFinalize directive
(none / mark / release): finalizeNone for the in-tx Mark path (and
ErrClaimLost), finalizeMark for audit-drop branches and the defensive
post-Append-success fallback, finalizeRelease for pre-durable infra
errors. ErrClaimLost is translated into OutcomeDropped + DropReason-
Duplicate at the Handle boundary, matching what the WS adapter expects
for a "another worker is the writer" outcome.

Regression tests:

  - TestDispatcher_StaleReclaimRaceDoesNotDoubleWrite injects worker
    B's reclaim via a beforeAppend hook so the claim_token rotates
    between Claim and AppendUserMessage. Asserts worker A's
    AppendUserMessage returns ErrClaimLost (no chat_message
    committed), the dispatcher surfaces a duplicate drop, the token
    rotated to a value distinct from A's original, and a follow-up
    replay still duplicate-drops.

  - TestDispatcher_InTxMarkPreventsPostCommitReclaim verifies the
    "Mark window" case is unreachable: a successful in-tx Mark
    produces exactly one Mark call (no post-finalize duplicate), the
    row is terminal, and a retry with dedupReclaim=true still
    duplicate-drops without re-rotating the token.

  - TestDispatcher_InTxMarkSucceedsAndSkipsPostFinalize pins the
    positive contract: DedupMarked=true must make applyFinalize a
    no-op (no extra Mark, no Release).

fakeQueries gains a fakeDedupRow model carrying (processed, token,
rotations) so the test seam matches production's UPDATE-with-WHERE
semantics; fakeChat gains a beforeAppend hook to inject race timing.

go test ./... and go vet ./... pass.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(integrations/lark): real Lark HTTP APIClient for IM v1 send/patch (MUL-2671)

Lands the production Lark Open Platform HTTP APIClient that replaces
the stub for outbound transport. The patcher's "thinking → streaming
→ final | error" card lifecycle and the dispatcher's binding-prompt
card both now reach Lark for real once MULTICA_LARK_HTTP_ENABLED=true.

Scope of this stage:

  - tenant_access_token retrieval via /open-apis/auth/v3/
    tenant_access_token/internal, cached in-process per app_id with a
    60s safety margin against Lark's `expire` value. Sub-2-minute
    expires are clamped to 120s so we never cache an entry that's
    already past its safe window.
  - SendInteractiveCard: POST /open-apis/im/v1/messages?receive_id_type=chat_id
    returning the Lark message_id the Patcher persists in
    lark_outbound_card_message for later patches.
  - PatchInteractiveCard: PATCH /open-apis/im/v1/messages/:id with
    the full re-rendered card body (Lark's update endpoint replaces,
    not deep-merges).
  - SendBindingPromptCard: open_id-targeted interactive card with a
    primary "去绑定" CTA pointing at the redemption URL. Template is
    co-located with the transport so the dispatcher never has to know
    about Lark's card schema.
  - Token-error invalidation: Lark codes 99991663 (expired) /
    99991664 (invalid) drop the cached token so the next call
    refreshes from /tenant_access_token/internal instead of looping
    on a stale entry.

Out of scope (deferred to follow-up stages):

  - ExchangeOAuthCode stays unimplemented behind
    ErrAPIClientNotConfigured. The PersonalAgent install handshake's
    response shape (returning per-installation app credentials in a
    single call) is not yet verified against the production endpoint,
    and a silent mis-fill of OAuthExchangeResult would corrupt
    lark_installation rows past validateExchangeResult. Operators
    continue to use the manual-paste InstallationService path until
    the OAuth stage lands.
  - Inbound WS EventConnector — Hub's ConnectorFactory still needs a
    real wire-protocol implementation.

Wiring:

  - MULTICA_LARK_HTTP_ENABLED=true switches router.go from the stub
    to the real client. MULTICA_LARK_HTTP_BASE_URL overrides the
    default open.feishu.cn host (set to open.larksuite.com for the
    Lark international tenant, or to an httptest URL for integration
    tests).
  - The OAuth handler now also receives the real client (its
    ExchangeOAuthCode still surfaces ErrAPIClientNotConfigured, so
    callback behavior is unchanged until that stage lands).

Tests (19 new cases against an httptest.Server fake):

  - happy path send/patch/binding-prompt round trips, asserting URL
    query params, body shape, Authorization header
  - token cache: 3 sends share one /tenant_access_token/internal hit
  - token refresh after clock-driven expiry
  - sub-margin expire clamping (10s expire → cached for >= safety
    margin of wall-clock)
  - Lark error code surfacing (230001 send, 230002 patch, 10003 auth)
  - token-expired (99991663) invalidates the cache; caller's retry
    re-fetches and succeeds
  - non-2xx HTTP status surfaces "http 500: …"
  - input validation: missing chat_id short-circuits BEFORE auth
    round-trip, missing card json / open_id / bind url all fail
    pre-flight without hitting Lark
  - ExchangeOAuthCode still returns ErrAPIClientNotConfigured
  - binding-prompt template carries the BindURL and the localized
    "去绑定" CTA in valid JSON

go build ./..., go vet ./..., and go test ./internal/integrations/lark/...
pass. Pre-existing handler/router integration tests that require a
real Postgres connection are unaffected by this change.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): split outbound vs OAuth-install capability + card update_multi (MUL-2671)

Address Elon's two must-fix items from the HEAD a09993b1 review:

1. HTTP outbound and OAuth-install are now distinct APIClient
   capabilities. The new SupportsOAuthInstall() reports whether the
   install flow can succeed end-to-end (i.e. ExchangeOAuthCode is
   implemented); the real httpAPIClient still returns IsConfigured()
   = true (send / patch / binding prompt work) but
   SupportsOAuthInstall() = false until the PersonalAgent install-time
   response shape is pinned. Handler-side `install_supported` and
   StartLarkInstall now gate on SupportsOAuthInstall, so a half-wired
   client never reveals the scan-to-bind UI. larkOAuthErrorReason also
   maps ErrAPIClientNotConfigured to a dedicated
   `oauth_exchange_unimplemented` reason so a raw callback hit no
   longer masquerades as `internal_error`.

2. defaultRenderer now emits config.update_multi=true on every Kind.
   Lark refuses to apply PatchInteractiveCard to a card whose initial
   config doesn't declare it shared/updatable, so the absent flag
   would make every patch after the first send silently no-op on the
   wire while the local outbound status row still flipped to
   streaming/final.

Tests cover both halves of each fix:
- TestHTTPClient_SupportsOAuthInstall_FalseUntilExchangeLands +
  TestHTTPClient_StubReportsBothCapabilitiesFalse pin the new
  capability surface.
- TestStartLarkInstall_TransportOnlyClientReportsNotConfigured +
  TestListLarkInstallations_TransportOnlyClientReportsInstallNotSupported
  pin the handler gate at exactly the half-wired state.
- TestLarkOAuthErrorReason_APIClientNotConfigured pins the mapping
  for both the bare sentinel and the fmt.Errorf-wrapped form
  HandleCallback produces.
- TestDefaultRendererConfigCarriesUpdateMulti covers every CardKind.
- TestHTTPClient_(Send|Patch)InteractiveCard_DefaultRendererBodyHasUpdateMulti
  verify the wire body Lark actually receives carries update_multi
  through both send and patch transport paths.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(integrations/lark): real OAuth code exchange + agent-detail bind entry (MUL-2671)

Stages the install side of the MVP critical path on top of the real
HTTP outbound work:

- httpAPIClient.ExchangeOAuthCode runs the production Lark v2 OAuth
  flow: POST /authen/v2/oauth/token to swap the authorization code
  for the installer's open_id, then GET /bot/v3/info under the parent
  app's tenant_access_token to fetch bot_open_id. Result feeds
  InstallationParams unchanged so OAuthService.HandleCallback's
  auto-bind step lights up automatically.

- HTTPClientConfig gains OAuthAppID/OAuthAppSecret, read from the same
  MULTICA_LARK_OAUTH_APP_ID/_APP_SECRET env vars the OAuthConfig
  consumes. SupportsOAuthInstall now mirrors that pair so the install
  capability gate is honest: outbound transport without OAuth creds
  reports configured-but-not-install-supported, exactly like before.

- Agent detail inspector wires the LarkAgentBindButton in a new
  Integrations section, viewer-hidden by canEdit. The button still
  self-hides when SupportsOAuthInstall is false, so a deployment
  without OAuth creds renders the section empty rather than CTA-broken.

- Capability wording cleaned across handler / router / lark-tab to say
  "OAuth-install capability" instead of "real APIClient wired", and
  the misleading TransportOnly... test was renamed/refocused on the
  early-return branch it actually exercises (Elon non-blocking note).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): identity-only OAuth + atomic bind (MUL-2671)

Addresses Elon's round-4 must-fix items on PR #3277:

1. OAuth v2 token → user_info chain now matches Lark's official
   user-OAuth shape. `httpAPIClient.ExchangeOAuthCode` POSTs
   /open-apis/authen/v2/oauth/token (RFC 6749: top-level
   access_token, NO open_id), then GETs /open-apis/authen/v1/user_info
   with the user_access_token as Bearer to obtain the installer's
   open_id / union_id. The test fixture now reflects the real
   wire shape (separate user_info handler; no synthetic open_id in
   the token response).

2. `OAuthExchangeResult` is identity-only — drops the synthesized
   shared-parent AppID / AppSecret / BotOpenID return that broke
   the UNIQUE(app_id) constraint and the dispatcher's per-app_id
   routing. `OAuthService.HandleCallback` no longer Upserts an
   installation row: it looks up the lark_installation already
   provisioned via the manual-paste POST /lark/installations route
   and binds the installer onto it. Two new typed errors —
   ErrInstallationNotProvisioned and ErrInstallationRevoked — map
   to `installation_not_provisioned` / `installation_revoked`
   reasons at the HTTP boundary so the UI can guide the admin.
   The PersonalAgent install API (which would deliver
   per-installation bot credentials at scan time) remains a
   follow-up; until it lands the OAuth flow is identity-binding
   only and the agent-detail bind button stays hidden on
   deployments without OAuth env (capability gate unchanged).

3. The installation lookup + installer bind run inside a single
   DB transaction so a concurrent revoke / re-provision between
   the read and the binding insert cannot leak a half-applied
   state. `InstallerBinder.BindInstaller` is renamed to
   `BindInstallerTx` and accepts the OAuth-service-owned
   transaction's qtx; the binding_token redemption path is
   unchanged.

4. `validateExchangeResult` is simplified to require only the
   installer's open_id; the obsolete ErrExchangeMissingAppID /
   AppSecret / BotOpenID sentinels are removed (no caller can
   trip them now). The oauth_test suite is rewritten to use a
   stub failTxStarter so tests covering state-token verification
   and exchange-error propagation remain DB-free, while a new
   TestOAuthCallbackOpensTxAfterValidExchange pins the post-must-fix
   order (state ok + exchange ok ⇒ Begin runs before any lookup
   or bind, and a Begin failure aborts cleanly with no bind).

Verified locally:
  - go build ./... / go vet ./... clean
  - go test ./internal/integrations/lark/... ✓
  - go test ./internal/handler -run 'Lark|Binding|OAuth' ✓
  - go test ./internal/util/secretbox/... ./internal/service/... ✓

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(integrations/lark): device-flow scan-to-install (MUL-2671)

Replaces the manual paste-credentials install path + identity-only
OAuth callback (rejected in product review: too many steps before a
user sees value) with a true single-step scan-to-install built on
Lark's RFC 8628 device-flow registration endpoint
(POST accounts.feishu.cn/oauth/v1/app/registration) — the same
protocol the official larksuite/oapi-sdk-go/scene/registration
package and zarazhangrui/feishu-claude-code-bridge use.

User journey: admin clicks "Bind to Lark" on the Agent detail page
→ QR dialog opens → admin scans in the Lark app on their phone →
authorizes the new PersonalAgent → dialog auto-closes with the new
installation visible. No app_id / app_secret to copy, no Lark
developer console visit, no Multica-side OAuth env to configure.

Backend (server/internal/integrations/lark):
- registration.go — inline ~280-line RFC 8628 client. Begin posts
  archetype=PersonalAgent / auth_method=client_secret /
  request_user_info=open_id; Poll follows the upstream SDK's
  state machine including the tenant-brand mid-stream domain swap
  to accounts.larksuite.com when a Lark-international account
  authorizes. SDK is NOT vendored — one endpoint isn't worth
  dragging the full oapi-sdk-go + transitive deps.
- registration_service.go — owns the in-process session store
  + background polling goroutine. On success calls APIClient.GetBotInfo
  (the new IM-side endpoint added below) and writes
  lark_installation + the installer's lark_user_binding inside
  one DB transaction so a half-applied install can never land.
  Stable error_reason codes (expired / access_denied /
  lark_protocol_error / bot_info_failed / installation_conflict /
  installer_bind_failed / internal_error) drive the UI copy
  without parsing prose.
- client.go / http_client.go — drops ExchangeOAuthCode and
  SupportsOAuthInstall (no longer applicable: device-flow returns
  identity alongside credentials in one response); adds GetBotInfo
  which mints a tenant_access_token from the freshly-minted
  client_id / client_secret and calls /open-apis/bot/v3/info for
  the bot_open_id. install_supported now gates on IsConfigured()
  (real HTTP client wired) instead of a separate OAuth capability.
- binding_token.go — absorbs InstallerBindParams / InstallerBinder
  (previously in oauth.go), retargets the doc-comment from the
  OAuth caller to the device-flow caller.
- Deletes oauth.go + oauth_test.go entirely.

Handler & router (server/internal/handler, server/cmd/server):
- POST /api/workspaces/{id}/lark/install/begin — opens a new
  registration session, returns {session_id, qr_code_url,
  expires_in_seconds, poll_interval_seconds}. Admin-only.
- GET /api/workspaces/{id}/lark/install/{sessionId}/status —
  polling endpoint, returns {status, installation_id?, error_reason?,
  error_message?}. Workspace-scoped lookup so a stolen session_id
  cannot be polled from another workspace. Admin-only.
- Removes POST /lark/installations (paste form),
  GET /lark/install/start (OAuth-redirect entry), and
  GET /api/lark/install/callback (OAuth redirect target).
- Removes MULTICA_LARK_OAUTH_APP_ID / _APP_SECRET / _REDIRECT_URI /
  _STATE_SECRET / _AUTHORIZE_URL / _SUCCESS_URL env vars. Self-host
  operators no longer need a parent Lark app at all.

Frontend (packages/core, packages/views):
- New types BeginLarkInstallResponse / LarkInstallStatusResponse
  + matching API methods (beginLarkInstall / getLarkInstallStatus);
  drops getLarkInstallURL.
- LarkAgentBindButton opens LarkInstallDialog instead of a
  window.open() to Lark's authorize page. The dialog uses
  react-qr-code (catalog) to render the verification_uri_complete
  inline as SVG (no external CDN image), polls status at the
  server-supplied cadence, auto-closes on success, offers
  "scan again" on terminal failure. Per CLAUDE.md "Enum drift
  downgrades, not crashes", error_reason switch has a default
  fallback so an older desktop build on a newer server still
  renders the generic failure copy.
- Adds the device-flow strings to en + zh-Hans settings.json;
  removes the obsolete OAuth-not-configured copy.

Verified locally:
  - go build ./... / go vet ./... clean
  - go test ./internal/integrations/lark/... — all green
    (existing tests + 15 new registration / GetBotInfo tests)
  - go test ./internal/handler -run 'Lark|Binding' — all green
  - pnpm typecheck — all 6 packages clean
  - pnpm lint — 0 errors (15 pre-existing warnings, none in changed files)
  - pnpm --filter @multica/views test — 859/859 pass

Pre-existing failures in server/internal/middleware (column
"profile_description" missing from local test DB) reproduce against
the parent commit and are unrelated to this change.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): gate bind CTA to workspace admins, terminate QR polling on 4xx (MUL-2671)

Two frontend must-fixes from the PR #3277 二审:

1. LarkAgentBindButton now self-hides for non-admin viewers in addition
   to the existing install_supported check. The agent-detail page mounts
   the button under `canEdit`, which canEditAgent lets agent owners
   through even when they are not workspace admins — but the backend
   gates POST /lark/install/begin and the status poll on owner/admin
   (router.go:478-487), so the previous behavior shipped a CTA that was
   guaranteed to 403. The new gate reads workspace role from the same
   member list the settings tab already uses.

2. The status polling loop now terminates on 404 (session gone — server
   restarted, multi-instance routing, or in-process GC swept it) and
   403/401 (permission revoked mid-session). Previously every error
   path scheduled another setTimeout, which trapped the user on a stale
   QR forever. ApiError gives us the HTTP status verbatim; terminal
   responses set status=error with stable error_reason codes
   (session_lost, forbidden) that flow through the existing dialog
   switch + retry/close affordances. 5xx + network blips still retry.

i18n: new install_error_session_lost / install_error_forbidden in en
and zh-Hans, with default fallback preserved per the enum-drift rule.

Coverage: 6 new vitest cases — admin/owner allow, member deny,
unsupported-install deny, and the two terminal-error polling paths
using fake timers to assert the loop stops scheduling.

Also clears a handful of stale OAuth/manual-install doc comments
flagged in the review (non-blocker cleanup): doc.go's §10 now points
at RegistrationService, installation.go's input-shape doc loses the
OAuth-callback half, and client.go's stubAPIClient comments no longer
reference OAuth callbacks.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* docs(integrations/lark): describe gate as device-flow install in agent-detail integrations comment (MUL-2671)

The comment block above the agent-detail Integrations section still
described the capability gate as 'server-side OAuth-install'. The
OAuth path is gone — install is now device-flow per RFC 8628 — so the
comment now reads 'server-side device-flow install capability gate'.

Pure comment change; behavior is unchanged. Cleans up the nit Elon
called out in PR #3277 二审 (MUL-2671).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(integrations/lark): wire inbound pipeline + WS Hub at boot (MUL-2671)

Stage 3.a of MUL-2671. Hub class, Dispatcher, ChatSessionService and
AuditLogger have all been implemented and tested in prior PRs but
none of them was constructed at boot, so the in-process plumbing
was never exercised end-to-end. This change wires them together
behind the same `MULTICA_LARK_SECRET_KEY` gate that already gates
InstallationService / RegistrationService, and starts the Hub under
the existing `sweepCtx` so it winds down alongside the other
long-running workers after HTTP drain.

The real long-conn EventConnector is still pending; the factory
hands every supervisor a shared NoopConnector that holds the lease
and emits nothing. That lets staging exercise the lease /
supervisor / shutdown lifecycle against real DB rows without
committing to the Lark wire protocol implementation. Swapping in
the real connector is a single line change in the same router
block; the Dispatcher / ChatSessionService / Hub seams stay frozen.

## Why a noop placeholder, not a stub-or-skip

The Hub's value is mostly its lifecycle: §4.4 ownership lease,
LeaseRenewInterval / LeaseTTL, supervisor reap on revoke, clean
release on shutdown. None of that runs unless the Hub is actually
started. Holding off until the real connector lands means the next
PR has to debut both pieces simultaneously; wiring the supervisor
loop first lets the real connector PR be a focused, reviewable
swap.

## Changes

- `internal/integrations/lark/noop_connector.go` — `NoopConnector`
  implementing `EventConnector`: blocks on ctx until the Hub
  cancels (lease loss / shutdown / revoke), emits no events, logs
  on enter/exit so operators see exactly which installation the
  supervisor is holding the lease for.
- `internal/integrations/lark/noop_connector_test.go` — verifies
  the connector blocks until ctx cancel, returns nil on clean exit,
  never invokes the emit callback, and the factory shares a single
  connector instance across installations.
- `internal/handler/handler.go` — new `LarkHub *lark.Hub` field on
  `Handler`. Nil when the Lark integration is disabled.
- `cmd/server/router.go` — inside the existing Lark wiring block,
  construct `AuditLogger`, `ChatSessionService` (with `*pgxpool.Pool`
  for the in-tx dedup Mark), `Dispatcher` (wiring `h.IssueService`
  and `h.TaskService` so `/issue`-created issues share counter /
  duplicate guard / project boundary / broadcast / analytics with
  the rest of the product), and the `Hub` with the
  `NoopConnectorFactory`. `NewRouterWithOptions` now returns
  `(chi.Router, *handler.Handler)` so main.go can drive Hub
  lifecycle; `NewRouter` discards the handler.
- `cmd/server/main.go` — start the Hub under `sweepCtx` after the
  other background workers, and `Wait` on it after HTTP drain +
  sweep cancel so the lease renewer can issue a final release
  before exit. Skipped entirely when `h.LarkHub == nil`.

## Test plan

- [x] `go build ./...` clean
- [x] `go vet ./...` clean
- [x] `go test ./internal/integrations/lark/...` (new noop tests +
      existing hub / dispatcher / chat_service / registration /
      binding_token / outbound / issue_command suites) — all pass
- [x] `go test ./internal/handler -run 'TestLark|TestRedeemLarkBinding'`
      pass — handler-side Lark surfaces unchanged
- [x] `go test ./internal/service/... ./internal/util/secretbox/...`
      pass
- [x] `pnpm --filter @multica/views exec vitest run settings/components/lark-tab`
      pass (6/6) — frontend lark surfaces unchanged
- [ ] Local broad `go test ./internal/handler/...` still blocked by
      the pre-existing test DB schema drift Elon flagged in the
      previous round (`column "metadata" does not exist`,
      unrelated to this change); CI is the authoritative check.
- [ ] Manual end-to-end deferred until the real long-conn
      EventConnector lands (next stage).

MUL-2671

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): bound Hub lease release + shutdown wait (MUL-2671)

Lease release used context.Background(); a stalled DB pool could pin
shutdown indefinitely. Add LeaseReleaseTimeout (5s default) and
ShutdownTimeout (15s default) to HubConfig, route releaseLease through
a bounded context, and expose WaitWithTimeout for main.go so a wedged
supervisor degrades to LeaseTTL expiry on the next replica instead of
blocking process exit. Also correct the LarkHub field comment in
handler.go: the Hub is wired whenever the at-rest secret key is set,
independent of whether the outbound HTTP APIClient is configured.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(integrations/lark): real WS long-conn connector + ctx-cancel-breaks-read (MUL-2671)

Replaces NoopConnectorFactory with a production EventConnector that
opens Lark's event-subscription WebSocket. Gated behind
MULTICA_LARK_WS_ENABLED so staging boots stay on the noop path until
operators opt in, and falls back to noop with a warning when the WS
flag is set without MULTICA_LARK_HTTP_ENABLED (the real connector
needs the cached tenant_access_token).

Why this connector exists separately from the Hub: gorilla/websocket
ReadMessage blocks on the underlying TCP socket and does not observe
context. The watchdog goroutine inside WSLongConnConnector.Run closes
the conn the moment ctx fires, so lease loss / shutdown breaks the
blocking read in bounded time — exactly the invariant Hub
renewLeaseUntil's runCancel depends on for the "at most one active WS
per installation across replicas" guarantee. Tests cover this
explicitly (TestWSConnectorRunReturnsOnCtxCancelEvenWhenReadIsBlocked).

The Lark wire surface is split into three swappable seams so the
transport layer stays tested in isolation:

  - EndpointFetcher (POST /event-subscription/v1/connection_token)
    resolves a one-shot wss URL per Run. No caching — replaying a
    one-shot token would look like a Lark outage.
  - FrameDecoder turns one raw JSON envelope into an InboundMessage
    or a "control / heartbeat / drop" verdict. Decoder errors log
    + drop the frame; they do NOT tear down the connection.
  - CredentialsProvider wraps InstallationService.DecryptAppSecret
    so plaintext app_secret lives in memory only during a Run.

Also fixes the handler.go LarkHub comment: it still said "joins on
Wait during graceful shutdown" but main.go has used WaitWithTimeout
(bounded wait) for several commits. Comment now matches.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(integrations/lark): align WS to official binary Frame protocol + DispatchResult outbound replies (MUL-2671)

Two must-fix items from Elon's review of PR #3277:

1. WS protocol layer rewritten to match the official Lark Go SDK
   (`larksuite/oapi-sdk-go/v3/ws`):
   - Bootstrap is `POST /callback/ws/endpoint` with AppID/AppSecret
     in the body (no tenant_access_token bearer). Response carries
     wss URL + ClientConfig (PingInterval / ReconnectInterval /
     ReconnectNonce / ReconnectCount).
   - `service_id` is parsed from the wss URL query and used as
     Frame.Service on every outbound frame.
   - Wire envelope is the binary protobuf `pbbp2.Frame` (hand-rolled
     via protowire to avoid pulling the whole SDK in, byte-identical
     field tags). JSON payloads are nested inside Frame.Payload.
   - Inbound data frames are ACKed with a `Response{code:200,...}`
     JSON payload that reuses the inbound headers; infra failures
     produce code=500 so Lark retries.
   - Ping is the app-layer binary `NewPingFrame(serviceID)` at the
     server-supplied cadence; WebSocket protocol PING is removed
     (Lark ignores it). Server-initiated pings get a pong reply.
   - ctx-cancel-breaks-read invariant preserved via the watchdog
     goroutine that closes the conn on ctx.Done; the read loop and
     ping goroutine serialize their writes through a single mutex.

2. `DispatchResult` outbound replies wired via a new `OutcomeReplier`:
   - `OutcomeNeedsBinding` mints a one-shot binding token and sends
     the binding prompt card to the sender's open_id.
   - `OutcomeAgentOffline` / `OutcomeAgentArchived` push a notice
     card into the chat with the agent name + Chinese copy matching
     §4.6.
   - `OutcomeIngested` stays owned by the Patcher; `OutcomeDropped`
     is silent.
   - The replier is best-effort: outbound failures are logged and
     swallowed so a Lark outage cannot stall the inbound pipeline.
   - Hub installs the noop replier by default; router wires the
     production `LarkOutcomeReplier` when APIClient.IsConfigured().

PersonalAgent long-conn risk surfaced (open per Feishu docs:
`长连接模式仅支持企业自建应用`). The implementation works for any
app archetype; the open question is whether `/callback/ws/endpoint`
accepts PersonalAgent credentials in practice. Surfacing the Lark
code+msg verbatim from the bootstrap response so an operator running
the smoke test sees the exact failure rather than a generic timeout.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): byte-compat Frame marshal, chunk reassembly, ACK off reply critical path (MUL-2671)

Three protocol blockers from Elon's review of 9540008a:

1. Frame.Marshal is now byte-identical to oapi-sdk-go/v3/ws/pbbp2.Frame:
   - SeqID/LogID/Service/Method (proto2 req) emit unconditionally even at zero
   - PayloadEncoding/PayloadType/LogIDNew emit unconditionally per gogo
     generated MarshalToSizedBuffer (no zero-guard)
   - Payload uses the SDK's `!= nil` guard (nil omits, []byte{} emits 0-length)
   - ACK payload JSON matches SDK's NewResponseByCode + json.Marshal output
     ({"code":N,"headers":null,"data":null})

   Golden tests pin exact byte sequences for ping/pong/ACK/full/zero
   frames; verified against the real SDK pbbp2.pb.go MarshalToSizedBuffer
   producing identical bytes.

2. Multi-frame events (sum>1) are reassembled via the new chunkAssembler:
   - 5s sliding TTL (matches SDK combine() cache TTL)
   - Lazy GC on admit (no separate sweeper goroutine)
   - Out-of-order seq + duplicate seq idempotent
   - Partial chunks are NOT ACKed (SDK behaviour: only the final chunk's
     ACK confirms the whole event so Lark can retry on partial loss)
   - Connector wires assembler per-Run; state dies with the session

3. OutcomeReplier detached from ACK critical path:
   - HubConfig.ReplyTimeout default 2.5s, strictly under Lark's 3s ACK deadline
   - handleEvent dispatches synchronously (fast DB path), then spawns the
     replier under a fresh background ctx with WithTimeout(ReplyTimeout)
   - Hub.replyWg tracks in-flight replies; Hub.Wait / WaitWithTimeout
     drain them so shutdown is bounded
   - Noop replier short-circuits inline (no goroutine cost when outbound
     APIClient isn't configured)

   Proof tests:
   - TestHubScheduleReplyReturnsImmediately: scheduleReply with a 10s
     slow replier returns in <50ms
   - TestHubReplyTimeoutCancelsHungReplier: hung replier ctx fires at
     ReplyTimeout
   - TestHubWaitDrainsInFlightReplies: Wait blocks until replies finish
   - TestHubACKNotBlockedByOutboundReply: end-to-end through the
     connector — data-frame ACK lands within 500ms even when the
     replier hangs 5s

PersonalAgent real-env smoke remains Bohan's decision; this PR closes
the technical blockers Elon flagged.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* docs(service/issue): narrow position concurrency claim to create-create (MUL-2671)

Elon's review of the merge resolution flagged that the comment on the
new NextTopPosition call promised more than the code guarantees:
concurrent manual reorder via UpdateIssue(position) does NOT take the
workspace row lock that IncrementIssueCounter holds, so a create
racing a reorder can still land on the same position. Rewrite the
comment to only claim create-create serialization, which is the
behaviour the lock actually delivers. No code change.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): keep device-flow polling on RFC 8628 HTTP 400 (MUL-2671)

Lark's device-flow polling endpoint returns HTTP 400 with the JSON
body `{"error":"authorization_pending"}` while the user hasn't scanned
the QR yet — this is the RFC 8628 spec, and the upstream oapi-sdk-go
implements the same handling. Our previous doForm treated ANY non-2xx
as a terminal protocol error, so every install session was killed by
the first poll (~5s after begin) and the install dialog appeared
silently empty: the frontend received status=error +
lark_protocol_error before the user could even read the description.

Fix: doForm now decodes the JSON body first; if it parses, the caller
(Begin / Poll) routes on the body's `error` field, where the existing
switch correctly maps authorization_pending / slow_down to "keep
polling" and access_denied / expired_token to terminal failure. Only
unparseable bodies (5xx HTML proxy pages, gateway timeouts) still
surface as a typed http_NNN RegistrationError.

Three regression tests pin the new behaviour:
- HTTP 400 + authorization_pending → res.Status="authorization_pending"
- HTTP 400 + access_denied → res.Err.Code="access_denied" (terminal)
- HTTP 502 + HTML body → http_502 RegistrationError

Verified against the live local env: install/begin -> 200, status
stays "pending" through the first poll cycle, no longer flips to
"error" within seconds.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(views/lark): reset closedRef on every mount so StrictMode double-mount renders QR (MUL-2671)

Empty QR dialog body in the dev env: Bohan opened the bind dialog and
got an empty white area where the QR should have been — no QR, no
"starting" placeholder, no error text. Backend was returning the QR
URL correctly; the bug was on the frontend.

Root cause: React 19 / Next.js dev StrictMode mounts every component
twice (mount → cleanup → mount). The component instance is REUSED
across the simulated remount, which means useRef objects are
preserved. The dialog's `closedRef` lifecycle:

  1. Mount #1: closedRef={current:false}, beginSession() kicked off
     (HTTP request still in flight)
  2. Cleanup runs: closedRef.current=true
  3. Mount #2: beginSession() kicked off again, BUT the ref still
     reads {current:true} from step 2
  4. Both promises resolve. Both hit the post-await guard
     `if (closedRef.current) return;` and bail out before setSession().
  5. Result: session stays null forever. Every conditional in the
     dialog body (beginning/session-pending/success/error) is false →
     empty body.

Fix: reset closedRef.current=false at the START of the effect, not
just at component construction. The cleanup-then-mount pair now
re-arms the guard so subsequent setSession calls actually land.

Regression test wraps the dialog in <StrictMode> and asserts the
QR appears within 2s with the correct value — fails closed if anyone
removes the reset.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): drop EventTaskCompleted subscription so the chat reply doesn't get overwritten by "Done." (MUL-2671)

Bohan reproduced on the live dev env: agent replies show only a card
saying "Done." in Lark, even though Multica's own chat panel has the
real "Hello! I'm cc…" reply. Tasks succeed end-to-end, but the user
loses the reply on the Lark side.

Root cause: TaskService.CompleteTask publishes two events for every
chat task IN ORDER:

  1. broadcastChatDone(...)       → ChatDonePayload{Content: "Hello!..."}
  2. broadcastTaskEvent(Completed) → map[string]any{task_id, agent_id,...}
                                     (no `content` key)

The Patcher subscribed to BOTH and routed each to finalize(). The
first patch correctly rendered the reply text, the second
patched the same card with an empty payload — chatDoneContent()
returned "" and the renderer fell back to "Done." (default empty-body
copy). The second patch wins because Lark stores whatever was last
applied.

Fix: stop subscribing to EventTaskCompleted in the Patcher and remove
the corresponding switch arm. EventChatDone is the canonical "agent
finished replying" signal for the Lark card path; EventTaskCompleted
is still emitted to the bus for other listeners (web UI, analytics,
task usage) where the lack of content doesn't matter.

Regression test TestPatcherIgnoresEventTaskCompletedForChatTasks
emits ChatDone followed by TaskCompleted on a streaming card and
asserts: exactly one patch, body contains the agent reply, body does
NOT contain "Done.". If anyone re-adds the EventTaskCompleted
subscription, this fails immediately.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(integrations/lark): chat replies as plain text IM messages, not card chrome (MUL-2671)

Bohan reported on the live dev env that even with the agent's reply
shown correctly, every message is wrapped in an interactive card with
the agent name as the header — it feels like a system notification,
not a normal chat reply. He wants the reply to land as a regular Lark
text bubble.

Changes:

- Add APIClient.SendTextMessage backed by Lark's
  /open-apis/im/v1/messages with msg_type=text. JSON-encodes the
  {"text": ...} envelope Lark requires so callers pass raw strings.
- Patcher.Register no longer subscribes to EventTaskQueued /
  EventTaskRunning. There is no more thinking → running → final
  card lifecycle on the success path: it added card chrome without
  buying anything for free-form chat.
- On EventChatDone, the new sendChatReply path posts the assistant
  message content as plain text. Empty content is silently dropped
  rather than rendered as "Done." (the prior fallback that
  confused Bohan).
- Failure path keeps a one-shot error card on EventTaskFailed —
  the visual distinction from a normal reply is genuinely useful,
  and failures are rare enough that the chrome isn't noisy.
- Throttle / lastPatched map / MinPatchInterval / shouldPatch /
  markPatched / loadCardOrSkip are all removed; nothing in the new
  flow patches.

Tests:

- TestPatcherSendsPlainTextOnChatDone pins the new contract: exactly
  one SendTextMessage call, no card sends or patches, content
  matches the ChatDonePayload.
- TestPatcherDropsEmptyChatReply pins the "no more Done. fallback"
  decision — empty content drops, period.
- TestPatcherFailEventSendsErrorCard pins the failure path still
  uses a card (one-shot, no patching).
- TestPatcherIgnoresEventTaskCompletedForChatTasks rewritten for
  text path: ChatDone then TaskCompleted yields exactly one text
  send, no duplicate.
- TestPatcherSkipsWhenNoChatSessionBinding and
  TestPatcherSwallowsInstallationLoadErrors rewritten to drive
  EventChatDone (the new entry point) instead of TaskQueued.
- TestPatcherSendsThinkingCardOnTaskQueued deleted (no more
  thinking card).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(integrations/lark): pre-fill PersonalAgent bot name as "<agent> - Multica" (MUL-2823) (#3520)

The device-flow install left the bot at Lark's auto-generated
"{用户姓名}的智能助手". Lark's registration scene supports pre-filling the
name via a `name` query param on the verification/QR URL (mirrors the
upstream SDK's AppPreset.Name) — a user-editable default that rides on
the QR URL, not the begin POST body (which has no name field).

BeginInstall already loads the agent for its ownership check, so we keep
it and thread `<agent.Name> - Multica` through Begin → decorateQRCodeURL.
A blank name degrades to plain "Multica".

There is no post-install rename API (bot/v3 is read-only; no
bot/v3/update), so the install-time pre-fill is the only programmatic
lever; the user can still edit the name on the creation form.

Co-authored-by: J <j@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): restore /issue confirmation + pin SendTextMessage wire (MUL-2671)

Two recovered/added contracts off Trump's review of HEAD fe381a07:

1) /issue confirmation in Lark was a casualty of the plain-text
   refactor. The pre-refactor `RenderInput.IssueNumber` field was
   declared but never actually rendered into the card body, so even
   in the original card-based flow the user never saw a "Created
   [MUL-42]" confirmation. Now the OutcomeReplier handles
   OutcomeIngested + IssueID.Valid by sending a plain text message:

     Created MUL-42 — fix login bug
     https://multica.example/issues/MUL-42

   Composed from a new DispatchResult.IssueIdentifier +
   IssueTitle, populated by the Dispatcher from
   workspace.IssuePrefix + issue.Number / issue.Title. Workspace
   lookup is best-effort: a Postgres blip on workspace gets a "#42"
   fallback rather than silently dropping the confirmation.

   The agent's own chat reply (if any) continues to land separately
   via the Patcher on EventChatDone — these are two semantically
   distinct messages and the user benefits from seeing both.

2) SendTextMessage is the wire layer Trump flagged for missing
   coverage. Three new wire tests pin:
   - happy path: POST /open-apis/im/v1/messages?receive_id_type=chat_id,
     msg_type=text, Bearer <tenant_access_token>, double-JSON
     content envelope
   - special-character round trip: newlines, double quotes,
     backslashes, tabs, Chinese + emoji, JSON-lookalike strings.
     The inner {"text": ...} is encoded once at JSON.Marshal time
     and once again when the outer body serializes; losing either
     pass corrupts the message and the bug is invisible without a
     contract pin.
   - Lark error path: non-zero `code` surfaces as a wrapped error
     with the code embedded.

Tests:
- TestDispatcher_IssueCreationFromCommand asserts IssueIdentifier
  ("MUL-42") and IssueTitle propagate through DispatchResult.
- TestDispatcher_IssueIdentifierFallsBackToNumberOnWorkspaceLookupErr
  pins the "#7" degrade-graceful fallback.
- TestLarkOutcomeReplierIssueCreatedSendsConfirmation pins the
  text body (identifier + title + deep link) and asserts no card
  send on this path.
- TestLarkOutcomeReplierOutcomeIngestedSilentWithoutIssue pins
  the silent-on-plain-chat default so we don't accidentally start
  emitting a confirmation for every message.
- TestHTTPClient_SendTextMessage_* covers the wire contract.

Frontend locale parity (en + zh-Hans, 53 tests) is currently green
on this HEAD; no changes needed.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(views/locales): add missing ko keys for Lark MVP (MUL-2671)

Trump flagged on PR #3277 review that the ko bundle was missing the
Lark-MVP-only keys that en + zh-Hans both carry. The parity test
caught it cleanly after main was merged in (Korean PR landed on main
between the prior review and this one):

  common.lark_bind.*                       (13 keys)
  settings.page.tabs.lark                  (1 key)
  settings.lark.*                          (45 keys)
  agents.inspector.section_integrations    (1 key)

Korean translations are professional/concise — "Lark" stays as the
brand name (matches how en keeps "Lark" + "(飞书)" parenthetically;
ko/users searching for the product expect "Lark"), and product copy
follows the zh-Hans tone where Multica nouns ("에이전트", "워크스페이스")
are romanized loan words consistent with the rest of the ko bundle.

Slot ordering preserved against EN:
  - page.tabs.lark sits between github and integrations
  - inspector.section_integrations sits right after section_skills

Verified: pnpm exec vitest run locales/parity → 105/105 pass.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): /issue origin_type CHECK + Hub restart on credentials rotation (MUL-2671)

Two live-env bugs Bohan reproduced:

1) /issue command crashed the WS connector. Dispatcher writes
   origin_type='lark_chat' on issues born from `/issue`, but the
   issue_origin_type_check CHECK constraint was last extended in
   migration 060 for quick_create — it doesn't list lark_chat, so
   every Lark /issue tripped SQLSTATE 23514 and bubbled up as an
   infra error. The infra error tore down the WS connector, Lark
   retried the same message, the new connector tripped the same
   constraint and crashed again. Repro in the live env: three
   crashes from the same /issue event over ~40s, each leaving the
   user with no confirmation in Lark.

   Migration 111 extends the CHECK list:
     CHECK (origin_type IN ('autopilot', 'quick_create', 'lark_chat'))

2) Re-scanning an already-bound agent silenced the bot. The device
   flow re-registers with Lark, which mints a brand-new bot (fresh
   app_id + app_secret); RegistrationService.finishSuccess upserts
   into lark_installation by agent_id, so the row's credentials
   rotate in place. But the running supervisor held the OLD inst
   struct by value and kept a WS open against the OLD bot's app_id —
   so all events to the NEW bot went nowhere. Bohan's "claude code
   现在不能在飞书里回复了" symptom maps exactly to this:

      log timeline:
      16:29:57  cc connector connected with app_id=cli_aa9398dd...  (OLD)
      16:34:07  lark registration: install complete                  (rotation)
      → row.app_id is now cli_aa93f36f...                            (NEW)
      → old WS still subscribed to OLD app_id; new app_id receives nothing

   Fix: Hub.sweep now compares each installation row's credentials
   fingerprint (app_id + bot_open_id + sha256(app_secret_encrypted))
   against the snapshot the running supervisor was started with. On
   diff, cancel the old supervisor and start a fresh one inline. A
   monotonic gen counter on the supervisor entry disambiguates the
   old goroutine's deferred cleanup from the new entry the rotation
   path already swapped in.

Tests:
- TestHubRestartsSupervisorOnCredentialsRotation pins the new path:
  starts hub on app_one, rotates the row to app_two, asserts the
  connector factory is called again with the fresh AppID.
- TestHubDoesNotRestartSupervisorOnUnchangedRow pins the negative
  case so an unchanged row doesn't degenerate into a per-sweep
  busy-loop.
- Existing hub tests (lease, supervise, shutdown, ACK timing,
  noop replier) all green.

Verification:
- go test ./internal/integrations/lark/... -race -count=1   ok
- go build ./... clean
- migration applied locally; \d+ issue confirms lark_chat in CHECK

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): per-supervisor lease token to fence rotation handoff (MUL-2671)

Elon flagged a race in HEAD be8d4cef's rotation path: both the old
and the new supervisors of the same Hub used the hub-wide nodeID as
their WS lease token, so an old supervisor's post-cancel
releaseLease(nodeID) would CAS-match the lease row the successor had
just acquired with the SAME token and DELETE it. Symptom would be a
silently empty lease row a few hundred ms after every device-flow
re-scan — no replica owning the install, no events delivered, the
"bot goes quiet" pattern Bohan hit the first time but now from the
fencing side rather than the credentials side.

Fix: leaseToken(nodeID, gen) composes "<nodeID>-g<gen>", where gen is
the monotonic counter already attached to each supervisorEntry. The
nodeID prefix keeps cross-replica observability (an operator
inspecting lark_installation.ws_lease_token can still map back to a
process) while the -g suffix makes the OLD supervisor's release
target the OLD row state. Once the rotation path swaps in the new
supervisor, the row's CurrentToken is the new -g(N+1) token, so the
old -gN release's WHERE clause no-ops instead of clobbering.

acquireLease / renewLeaseUntil / releaseLease now take an explicit
token argument; supervise threads its leaseToken through. The
plumbing isn't pretty, but having an explicit argument at every call
site is the only way the rotation invariant survives subsequent
refactors — without it, a future caller could quietly reintroduce
"just use h.nodeID" and the race is back.

Two regression tests:

- TestHubRotationStaleReleaseDoesNotClearSuccessorLease drives the
  fake lease state machine directly:
    1. old acquires(tokenA)
    2. rotation lands; new acquires(tokenB)
    3. old's stale release(tokenA) fires
  Asserts owner ends up still tokenB. Hub-wide-nodeID code would fail
  step 3 by clearing the entry.

- TestHubRotationEndToEndKeepsSuccessorLeased runs the same scenario
  through the live supervise loop: starts hub, rotates the row, waits
  for sup2 to take over with a distinct token, sleeps past sup1's
  unwind, asserts the row is still held by a non-sup1 token. Catches
  the bug even when the goroutine timing is non-deterministic.

Verification: go test ./internal/integrations/lark/... -race -count=1   ok
  go build ./...                                            clean
  go vet ./...                                              clean
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): route group @-mentions via union_id, not open_id (MUL-2671)

In a Lark group with multiple Multica bots installed, the bot whose WS
received the event sometimes failed to recognize that it was the @-target
while the OTHER bot's supervisor falsely fired. Bohan's controlled three-
message test (only @A, only @B, @both) hit this: @A and @B alone went
unanswered, @both got picked up by A only.

Root cause: the `mentions[].id.open_id` field Lark puts on the WS event
is structurally INVERSE to `/bot/v3/info`'s `bot.open_id` across the two
WSes. From A's WS perspective, the wire-form open_id for "A was @-ed"
is NOT equal to A's API-side open_id, but IS equal to what B's WS sees
on its side, and vice versa. The decoder's `mention.open_id ==
inst.BotOpenID` match therefore fires on the wrong bot in multi-bot
groups. Only `union_id` (the Lark-tenant-scoped stable identifier) is
consistent across both WSes.

Changes:
- migration 112 adds nullable `lark_installation.bot_union_id`
- sqlc query exposes UpsertLarkInstallation/CreateLarkInstallation
  with bot_union_id, plus a focused SetLarkInstallationBotUnionID for
  the backfill path
- httpAPIClient.GetBotInfo now follows /bot/v3/info with /contact/v3/
  users/{open_id}?user_id_type=open_id and returns both identifiers
  on BotInfo. Soft-fails on contact-scope denial: install still
  succeeds with an empty UnionID, and the decoder falls back to the
  legacy open_id match for single-bot deployments.
- RegistrationService.finishSuccess persists union_id alongside
  open_id during the device-flow finalize.
- ws_frame_decoder.containsMention prefers union_id and only walks
  open_id when the installation row has not been backfilled yet.
- BackfillBotUnionIDs runs once at server boot for installations
  created before migration 112; bounded per-row 10s timeout and a
  pure soft-fail policy so a slow Lark round-trip cannot block
  startup.
- regression tests cover the three decoder paths: union_id match
  wins over open_id mismatch, union_id mismatch overrides open_id
  match, and open_id fallback when union_id is unknown.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* chore: drop trailing blank lines at EOF on four files (MUL-2671)

git diff --check origin/main..origin/pr-3277 flagged these as new
blank lines at EOF; clearing so the diff stays clean for review.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(views/locales): add missing ja keys for Lark MVP + section_integrations (MUL-2671)

CI frontend job tripped on the ja locale parity check: ja is missing
the lark_bind block in common.json, the lark block + page.tabs.lark
in settings.json, and inspector.section_integrations in agents.json.
The ko fix earlier covered Korean; ja was added separately on main
and the merge surfaced these gaps. Translations mirror the en source
and follow the same voice as the existing ja bundle.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): rewrite @_user_N placeholders into clean body (MUL-2671)

When Lark dispatches a group `im.message.receive_v1`, the message
text contains opaque `@_user_1`, `@_user_2`, … placeholders and the
real identity is in `mentions[]`. We were forwarding the raw text to
the agent, so a Bohan-typed "@Bot ping test" arrived as "@_user_1
ping test" — neither human-readable nor useful as LLM context, and
the agent was paying tokens to figure out which `@_user_N` was even
itself.

The new resolveMentions pass:
  * strips the bot's own mention entirely (the dispatcher already
    routes the event on AddressedToBot; re-emitting @<self> in front
    of every message adds zero signal and pollutes context),
  * substitutes other participants with `@<displayName>` so a
    follow-up "@Alice" reads naturally,
  * collapses horizontal whitespace introduced by the strip while
    preserving original newlines.

Bot identity check uses the same union_id-preferred + open_id
fallback as containsMention, so the rewrite stays consistent with
the routing path. Tests cover the four shapes: bot self-mention,
mixed bot + other-user mention, multi-line body with stripped
mention, and a no-mention body that should be left untouched.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): union_id-first self mention strip + token-aware scan + local whitespace cleanup (MUL-2671)

Three review blockers on the mention rewrite from PR review:

1. isBotMention now mirrors containsMention's union_id-first policy.
   When the installation row knows our union_id, we trust it
   exclusively (open_id is structurally inverted in multi-bot
   groups — matching on it would re-introduce the routing bug we
   fixed two commits ago). open_id fallback fires only when
   union_id is absent. New tests: @-ing both bots in one message
   correctly strips only self and renders the sibling as @<name>;
   open_id-matches-but-union_id-differs does NOT strip.

2. resolveMentions no longer collapses or trims whitespace globally.
   Indentation, tabs, code blocks, tables — all preserved verbatim.
   When the self mention is removed we eat exactly one adjacent
   horizontal space (the one after the placeholder, or, when the
   mention sits at end-of-input, a single space already emitted
   right before it). New test exercises a multi-line indented +
   tabbed body and asserts the whole shape survives.

3. Prefix-collision-safe replacement. A chat with 11+ participants
   exposes both `@_user_1` and `@_user_10`; naive ReplaceAll for
   `@_user_1` would mangle the substring of `@_user_10`. The
   resolver now does a single-pass token scan with the mention
   list sorted longest-key-first, so the longer placeholder always
   wins at any scan position. New test covers the @_user_1 /
   @_user_10 case explicitly.

Also drops the temporary INFO-level diag logging the previous
commit added — root cause was confirmed (union_id swap in the
manual backfill; not a decoder bug).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(integrations/lark): scope inbound dedup per (installation_id, message_id) (MUL-2671)

Root cause of the residual "@Cc gets dropped as not_addressed_in_group"
even after the union_id swap landed: lark_inbound_message_dedup was
keyed on `message_id` alone. In a Lark group chat where the workspace
has multiple Multica bots installed, Lark delivers the SAME message_id
to every bot's WS supervisor. Whichever WS claimed first then ran its
own AddressedToBot check; the bot that was actually @-ed lost the dedup
race, found the row already terminal (`processed_at IS NOT NULL`), and
was dropped as `duplicate` BEFORE it could evaluate its own mention.
Net: every @ silently disappeared if Lark happened to route the OTHER
bot's WS first.

The dedup gate's original purpose (idempotency against WS reconnect
replay) is per-installation by definition, so the right key is
composite (installation_id, message_id).

Changes:
- migration 113 drops + recreates lark_inbound_message_dedup with
  installation_id NOT NULL REFERENCES lark_installation(id) ON DELETE
  CASCADE and PRIMARY KEY (installation_id, message_id). The table is
  a 24h transient cache, so dropping existing rows is safe.
- sqlc queries: ClaimLarkInboundDedup / MarkLarkInboundDedupProcessed /
  ReleaseLarkInboundDedup all now take installation_id.
- AppendUserMessageParams carries InstallationID through to the
  in-tx Mark call so the chat_message+dedup atomicity stays intact.
- Dispatcher passes inst.ID to claim + applyFinalize + AppendUserMessage.
- Test fakes key dedup state on (installation_id, message_id) via a
  composite map key; all existing pre-seeded rows use a seedDedupKey
  helper bound to the default activeInstallation fixture so the prior
  staleness / token-rotation / in-tx mark tests still exercise the
  same regression they did before.
- New regression TestDispatcher_DedupIsScopedPerInstallation pins the
  multi-bot invariant: a row pre-seeded for installation A does NOT
  block installation B's first delivery of the same message_id; B
  runs through its own group-filter / identity / ingest pipeline.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(integrations/lark): render markdown chat replies via schema-2.0 card (MUL-2671)

The agent's chat replies were going out as msg_type=text, so every
`**bold**`, fenced code block, list, table, and link in the body
showed up as literal markdown characters in Lark — the user saw raw
asterisks, hashes, pipes instead of formatted text. Bohan reported
this and pointed at zarazhangrui/lark-coding-agent-bridge as the
shape to emulate.

The bridge repo uses Lark interactive cards with the schema-2.0
envelope and a `tag: "markdown"` body element; Lark's client
renders that to formatted text (GFM-ish: bold/italic, headings,
lists, links, fenced code blocks, tables, blockquotes). They expose
multiple reply modes (card / markdown-as-post / text) gated by user
config; we go a step simpler — auto-detect markdown syntax in the
agent's body and route accordingly:

- containsMarkdown(): cheap substring + regex pass for fenced code
  blocks, headings, list markers, bold/italic, tables, links,
  blockquotes, horizontal rules, inline code. Biases toward false-
  positive — wrapping prose in a card still renders fine, but
  missing a real markdown block leaves raw characters visible.

- APIClient gains SendMarkdownCard / SendMarkdownCardParams.
  Implementation marshals the schema-2.0 envelope verbatim:
  {schema:"2.0", body:{elements:[{tag:"markdown", content: md}]}}.
  Stub returns ErrAPIClientNotConfigured.

- Patcher.sendChatReply now branches on containsMarkdown:
  markdown → SendMarkdownCard, plain prose → SendTextMessage. A
  one-liner "sure, on it" stays as a normal IM bubble (no card
  chrome); anything with markdown gets the rendered card.

Tests: TestContainsMarkdown pins the heuristic across plain prose
and ten markdown shapes; TestPatcherRoutesMarkdownReplyToCard and
TestPatcherRoutesPlainReplyToText cover the router; new HTTP wire
test TestHTTPClient_SendMarkdownCard_HappyPath contract-pins the
card envelope (msg_type=interactive, schema 2.0, markdown tag,
verbatim body). Full lark suite passes.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(service/issue): route analytics.IssueCreated through obsmetrics.RecordEvent (MUL-2671)

CI's TestNoNakedAnalyticsCaptureInHandlersOrServices guard caught the
post-merge analytics call in IssueService.captureCreatedAnalytics
that still used s.Analytics.Capture(...) directly. Main added that
lint to prevent the Prometheus and PostHog sides from drifting — any
new analytics.* event must go through obsmetrics.RecordEvent so the
business-metrics collector and the PostHog client fire from the same
call site.

Fix mirrors how TaskService handles it: IssueService gains a
Metrics *obsmetrics.BusinessMetrics field (router wires it via
h.IssueService.Metrics = opts.BusinessMetrics next to the existing
TaskService line), and the in-service Capture call becomes
obsmetrics.RecordEvent(s.Analytics, s.Metrics, ...). nil-safe by
construction — RecordEvent treats a nil Metrics as PostHog-only.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(views/lark): swap Bind CTA for Connected+Manage link when agent already has an installation (MUL-2671)

Bohan reported the agent-detail Bind button keeps inviting the user to
re-scan the QR even when the agent already has an active Lark
PersonalAgent connected — and re-scanning silently upserts the
installation row, leaving the previously-created Lark bot dangling
as a zombie. Frustrating UX and an actual product footgun.

Anti-zombie guard at the only entry point: LarkAgentBindButton now
checks the cached installations listing for an active row pinned to
this agent_id. When one exists, the install CTA is gone — replaced
by a small Connected pill + an "Manage in Lark" link that opens the
Bot's app page in Lark's developer console (open.feishu.cn/app/<app_id>)
in a new tab. That's where scopes, display name, and additional
permission requests actually live; re-scanning never was the right
answer for managing an existing bot.

Scoping is per-agent: an active installation on a DIFFERENT agent
in the same workspace doesn't affect this agent's button, and a
revoked installation falls back to the bind CTA so the user can
re-create. Tests cover all four states (own-active / own-revoked /
other-agent-active / no-installation) and pin the Manage link's
href + target=_blank + noopener.

i18n: three new keys in settings.json (en / zh-Hans / ja / ko):
agent_bot_connected_label, agent_bot_manage_link,
agent_bot_manage_tooltip. Locale parity test still 157/157.

The dev console host is hardcoded to open.feishu.cn — operators
on the Lark international tenant currently get the wrong host;
future-proof fix wants the backend to surface a per-installation
dev_console_url on the listings response, called out in a code
comment.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(views/settings): collapse Lark into Integrations + render agent identity (MUL-2671)

Lark was its own top-level workspace settings tab while Integrations sat
empty next to it. As more integrations land, the sidebar would balloon
with one tab per provider. Move the Lark surface into Integrations as
the first hosted integration; the old ?tab=lark URL redirects through
LEGACY_WORKSPACE_TAB_REDIRECTS so bookmarks still resolve.

The Connected bots list was leaking the raw Lark app_id (cli_…) as the
row title with bot_open_id (ou_…) underneath — meaningless to product
users. Since the binding is 1:1 with a Multica Agent, join on agent_id
and render the agent's avatar + name via the workspace-standard
ActorAvatar + useActorName.getAgentName. Deleted agents fall back to
"Unknown Agent" so the row is still actionable for cleanup.

Tests: stub useActorName + ActorAvatar in lark-tab.test.tsx and add
LarkTab connected-bot tests covering the agent identity render and the
deleted-agent fallback. Drop the now-dead integrations.* + page.tabs.lark
+ lark.bot_open_id_label keys across all four locales — parity still
157/157, views suite 1141/1141.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(views/settings): wrap Lark in a named section inside Integrations (MUL-2671)

Integrations is meant to host multiple providers (Slack, Linear etc. as
they land), so the Lark content should sit under a Lark heading rather
than fill the tab directly — otherwise the first additional integration
would feel like it broke the IA. Add a "Lark" / "飞书" section heading
above LarkTab using the same h2 chrome the other settings tabs use, and
pin lark.section_title across all four locales (parity 169/169).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: J <j@multica.ai>
2026-06-03 19:12:14 +08:00
MSandro
996eb07dc5 fix(daemon): skip duplicate SKILL.md in supporting files to prevent task prep failures (#3526)
Fixes #3489

MUL-2928
2026-06-02 17:53:20 +08:00
Naiyuan Qing
e36f874c86 feat: add additive agent skill assignment (#3642)
* feat: add additive agent skill assignment

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* test: cover cross-workspace agent skill add

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-06-02 15:02:24 +08:00
Naiyuan Qing
4ae4722ef0 fix(comments): preserve direct parent on replies (#3579)
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-06-01 08:28:15 +08:00
Bohan Jiang
77c7267105 fix(server): trigger assignee on agent-driven backlog→active (MUL-2670) (#3270)
* fix(server): trigger assignee on agent-driven backlog→active (MUL-2670)

The backlog→active transition was gated on `actorType == "member"`, which
silently dropped agent-driven promotions and broke the documented serial
sub-task workflow — a parent agent finishing Step 1 and promoting Step 2
from backlog→todo would never fire Step 2's assignee.

Replace the member-only gate with a self-promotion guard. Agent actors
now fire the same enqueue path as members; the only excluded case is an
agent promoting an issue assigned to itself (which would self-loop on
every run). Applied to both UpdateIssue and BatchUpdateIssues.

Adds two integration tests covering the documented serial-chain case and
the self-loop guard.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(server): scope backlog→active self-loop guard to the calling task's issue

The previous agent-id-only guard over-blocked same-agent serial chains:
if Agent A finished a task on issue I1 and promoted issue I2 from
backlog→todo, the promotion was silently dropped whenever I2 was also
assigned to A. Only the cross-agent handoff worked.

Replace the actor-vs-assignee check with a task-vs-issue check:
isAgentRunningOnIssue looks up the calling X-Task-ID and only blocks
when that task's issue_id matches the issue being promoted (the true
self-loop). Member actors and same-agent cross-issue promotions now
fire, including via BatchUpdateIssues.

Tests:
- TestBacklogToTodoByAgentSameIssueDoesNotSelfTrigger (true self-loop)
- TestBacklogToTodoByAgentSameAgentDifferentIssue (serial chain works)
- TestBatchBacklogToTodoByAgentTriggersAssignee (batch path)
- TestBacklogToTodoByAgentTriggersSquadLeader (squad branch)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* test(server): seed running task in handler test helper to avoid collisions

createHandlerTestTaskForAgentOnIssue inserted with status='queued',
which broke two tests added by the same-issue self-loop guard:

- TestBacklogToTodoByAgentSameIssueDoesNotSelfTrigger asserted
  `count(*) WHERE status='queued'` was 0, but the seeded task itself
  showed up in the count → got 1.
- TestBacklogToTodoByAgentSameAgentDifferentIssue seeded a task for
  the same (issue_id, agent_id) as step1's auto-enqueued queued task,
  tripping idx_one_pending_task_per_issue_agent.

X-Task-ID semantically belongs to a currently-running task. Inserting
the seed with status='running' (and started_at=now()) keeps it outside
both the unique index and the queued-count assertions, so the tests
verify only what the handler does in response to the agent-driven
backlog→active promotion.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-05-26 15:20:08 +08:00
Angular
1f978bf1ec feat(autopilot): link created issues to projects (#2908)
* feat(autopilot): link created issues to projects

* test(autopilot): cover project flag
2026-05-20 15:37:23 +08:00
Jiayuan Zhang
591e47842d refactor(onboarding): remove starter-content kit; unify install-runtime issue across mark-onboarded paths (MUL-2438) (#2884)
* refactor(onboarding): remove starter-content kit, unify install-runtime issue across mark-onboarded paths (MUL-2438)

Drops the post-onboarding ImportStarterContent / DismissStarterContent
flow (handler + routes + StarterContentPrompt + templates + locale
strings + analytics event). The bug — web onboarding seeding 6+ starter
issues without a runtime — only existed through that path; with it gone
the source disappears.

The "install a runtime" issue from BootstrapOnboardingNoRuntime is now
the canonical no-runtime onboarding seed. The title/description and a
LockAndFindActiveDuplicate-deduped seeder move to
handler/no_runtime_issue.go, and CompleteOnboarding / CreateWorkspace /
AcceptInvitation seed it whenever the workspace has no runtime yet, so
every mark-onboarded entry point lands the user on a concrete next
step.

starter_content_state column is kept and continues to be claimed as
'imported' in all five entry points so older desktop builds (which
still render the legacy dialog on NULL) don't surface it to accounts
created after this change.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(onboarding): backfill starter_content_state for in-window NULL users (MUL-2438)

054 only covered pre-feature users. Anyone onboarded between then and the
starter-content kit removal could still sit at NULL, and old desktop
clients gate the legacy StarterContentPrompt on `starter_content_state
IS NULL`. The import/dismiss routes are gone, so leaving these rows NULL
would surface a dialog whose buttons 404. Mark them 'imported' to match
the new helper's claim semantics.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Lambda <lambda@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-05-19 18:37:48 +02:00
Multica Eve
dfe2a57361 fix(autopilots): allow duplicate create_issue runs (#2789)
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-05-18 16:05:54 +08:00
Bohan Jiang
2323b72710 feat(autopilots): webhook delivery layer + idempotency/signature/replay (MUL-2334) [PR1] (#2774)
* feat(autopilots): webhook delivery layer + idempotency / signature / replay (MUL-2334)

Splits "inbound webhook receipt" from "autopilot run creation" so we can
record duplicate attempts, signature outcomes, and ignored/skipped
deliveries — and replay a delivery on demand. v1 ingress wrote straight
into autopilot_run.trigger_payload, which collapsed the two concerns and
left run_only autopilots vulnerable to provider retry storms.

Backend only (PR1). UI Deliveries tab follows in PR2.

Schema (migration 093):
  - autopilot_trigger.provider: 'generic' | 'github' (default 'generic').
  - autopilot_trigger.signing_secret: nullable plaintext (HMAC needs it
    cleartext; mirrors how webhook_token is stored).
  - webhook_delivery: one row per inbound POST. Carries raw_body,
    selected_headers, dedupe_key/source, signature_status,
    autopilot_run_id, replayed_from_delivery_id, response_status / body.
  - Partial unique index on (trigger_id, dedupe_key) excludes NULL and
    'rejected' rows, so a wrong-secret 401 does NOT permanently block a
    future retry with the same X-GitHub-Delivery once the operator fixes
    the secret.

Ingress flow (autopilot_webhook.go), persist-first + sync dispatch:
  1. IP rate limit -> 2. token lookup -> 3. token rate limit ->
  4. read raw body -> 5. autopilot/workspace cross-check ->
  6. normalize JSON (400 without persistence on parse failure) ->
  7. compute dedupe key + signature status ->
  8. INSERT delivery (status=queued). On (trigger_id, dedupe_key)
     unique-violation: bump attempt_count on existing row and return
     the original delivery_id + autopilot_run_id with 200 ->
  9. invalid/missing signature: UPDATE -> rejected, return 401 with
     delivery_id (no dispatch, not replayable) ->
 10. trigger disabled / autopilot paused/archived: UPDATE -> ignored,
     return 200 ->
 11. DispatchAutopilot synchronously, UPDATE -> dispatched/skipped/failed
     with autopilot_run_id and the response body we returned ->
 12. TouchAutopilotTriggerFiredAt and return 200.

No new long-running worker. A stale 'queued' row only happens if the
process dies between INSERT and UPDATE; that's a follow-up sweeper, not
this PR.

Authenticated API:
  - GET    /api/autopilots/{id}/deliveries (slim list)
  - GET    /api/autopilots/{id}/deliveries/{deliveryId} (with raw_body)
  - POST   /api/autopilots/{id}/deliveries/{deliveryId}/replay -> creates
    a new delivery row (replayed_from_delivery_id set), dispatches a
    new run, never collapses onto the original via dedupe.
  - PUT    /api/autopilots/{id}/triggers/{triggerId}/signing-secret
    Write-only; trigger response surfaces has_signing_secret +
    signing_secret_hint (last 4 chars), never the secret itself.

Signature verification reuses the GitHub-compatible
X-Hub-Signature-256: sha256=<hex(hmac(body, secret))> scheme; the
HMAC helper is constant-time. Invalid/missing signatures still count
against per-IP and per-token rate limits.

autopilot_run.trigger_payload is intentionally preserved — delivery
records the HTTP receipt; run records the normalized envelope handed
to the agent. They are two different views.

Tests (Postgres-backed):
  - delivery persistence on accept
  - dedupe via Idempotency-Key and X-GitHub-Delivery; run_only retry
    storm pin (3 retries -> 1 run)
  - invalid signature: 401 + rejected row + no run linkage
  - missing signature when secret configured: 401 + 'missing' state
  - valid signature dispatches
  - signing secret never echoed in trigger responses; hint shows last 4
  - min-length and clear-by-empty for signing secret PUT
  - replay creates a NEW delivery + new run; rejected deliveries cannot
    be replayed
  - list omits raw_body; detail includes it; cross-autopilot ID returns
    404 (workspace isolation defense in depth)
  - provider validation: unknown -> 400, github -> 201 round-trips
  - bad-signature stream still counts against per-token rate limit

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(autopilots): address PR review on webhook delivery layer (MUL-2334)

- Exclude `failed` from the (trigger_id, dedupe_key) partial unique index
  alongside `rejected`, so a transient ingress failure does not strand the
  provider's stable X-GitHub-Delivery / Idempotency-Key retry. Update the
  dedupe lookup to prefer non-terminal rows under the same predicate.
- Tighten delivery status enum: drop `skipped` from the CHECK constraint
  and from the handler. A run that was admission-skipped (e.g. runtime
  offline) is now recorded as delivery=`dispatched` linked to the
  skipped run, with the response payload carrying status=`skipped`.
  Source of truth for skipped-ness is autopilot_run.status, not the
  delivery row — keeps the Deliveries UI enum unambiguous.
- On dispatch error, link the (possibly non-nil) autopilot_run returned
  by DispatchAutopilot to the failed delivery so Deliveries UI can
  navigate to the run row for debugging.
- Slim list projection: ListWebhookDeliveriesByAutopilot no longer pulls
  raw_body / selected_headers / response_body — a 100-row page × 256 KiB
  would otherwise round-trip ~25 MiB from Postgres per Deliveries reload.
  Detail endpoint continues to return the full row.
- Fix backend CI: TestGetDelivery_ReturnsFullPayload now decodes the
  response and asserts on the parsed raw_body instead of substring-
  matching against an escaped JSON string; raise the test-suite default
  webhook rate limits in TestMain so the shared 192.0.2.1 IP bucket
  doesn't fill across the suite and leak 429s into unrelated tests.
- Add regression coverage for the dedupe-after-failure path.

cd server && go test ./... is green locally.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-05-18 14:59:40 +08:00
Jiayuan Zhang
4c7a990a25 fix(autopilot): attribute autopilot-created issue to assignee agent (MUL-2293) (#2719)
Before: dispatchCreateIssue copied autopilot.created_by_type/id onto the
new issue's creator_type/creator_id, and the same fields were used as the
ActorType/ActorID of the issue:created event. Result: any issue spawned by
an autopilot was reported as created by the human who first configured
the autopilot, not by the agent that actually owns the work. Downstream
subscriber/activity/notification listeners inherited the same wrong actor.

After: creator and actor are both the autopilot's assignee agent
(creator_type=agent, creator_id=ap.assignee_id). The human owner is still
recoverable via origin_type=autopilot + origin_id.

Audited the other ap.created_by_* usages: analytics attribution
(autopilotActorID, task.go user-id), and the private-agent visibility
gate in shouldSkipDispatch — all correctly read the autopilot's owner,
not the executor, so they stay as-is.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-05-16 09:32:15 +02:00
iYuan
d8635ad580 fix(issues): prevent duplicate active issue creation (MUL-2225) (#2602)
* fix: prevent duplicate active issue creation

* fix(issues): address duplicate guard review

* fix(autopilot): skip duplicate issue admissions

* fix(issueguard): tighten duplicate lookup edge cases

* test(issues): cover duplicate guard autopilot skips

* feat(autopilots): group skipped runs in history
2026-05-15 18:27:56 +08:00
Bohan Jiang
b26f850d4e feat(agents): gate private-agent surfaces with allowed_principals predicate (#2359)
* feat(agents): gate private-agent surfaces with allowed_principals predicate

Tighten chat/@-mention, history, edit, and delete entry points so private
agents are only reachable by their owner or workspace owner/admin. Agent-to-
agent traffic still bypasses the gate so A2A collaboration keeps working.

- New canAccessPrivateAgent predicate in handler/agent_access.go; used by
  comment.enqueueMentionedAgentTasks (replacing the inline check), GetAgent,
  ListAgents (filter), ListAgentTasks, GetWorkspaceAgentRunCounts /
  Activity30d / TaskSnapshot (workspace-wide aggregations no longer leak
  private-agent existence + counts), chat.CreateChatSession,
  chat.SendChatMessage (re-checks on every send so role changes can't leave
  a stale session as a back-door), and autopilot.shouldSkipDispatch
  (caller = autopilot creator).
- allowed_principals is computed inline as {agent.owner_id} ∪ workspace
  owner/admin members. No new table — manual config is intentionally not
  exposed in v1; the predicate is the extension seam.
- Front-end agent detail page distinguishes 403 (private agent the caller
  can't access) from 404 (deleted/missing) and renders a "no access"
  placeholder with a back-to-agents button.
- Go tests cover the pure predicate matrix + the four protected surfaces;
  vitest passes for the affected views.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(agents): gate issue assignment with the private-agent predicate

Refactor validateAssigneePair to call the shared canAccessPrivateAgent
helper. This closes the back door where a plain member could assign a
private agent to an issue and let normal task dispatch run it, side-
stepping the chat / @-mention gate. Agent callers (X-Agent-ID) bypass
so A2A delegation onto a private assignee still works.

Add an integration test covering all three callers (workspace owner,
agent owner, plain member).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): close three private-agent gate bypasses found in PR review

1. X-Agent-ID forgery (resolveActor): require X-Task-ID alongside
   X-Agent-ID before trusting the agent identity. Without this a plain
   workspace member could set X-Agent-ID to any visible agent UUID and
   short-circuit the gate to "actor=agent, allow". Daemons already
   pair the two headers, so legitimate A2A traffic is unaffected.

2. Chat history read path (chat.go): GetChatSession / ListChatMessages /
   GetPendingChatTask / MarkChatSessionRead now go through a new
   gateChatSessionForUser helper that re-applies canAccessPrivateAgent
   after the ownership check, so a session creator whose role was later
   downgraded loses transcript access. ListChatSessions and
   ListPendingChatTasks filter their result sets by the same predicate.

3. Cross-workspace @mention (comment.enqueueMentionedAgentTasks):
   resolve the mentioned agent via GetAgentInWorkspace scoped to the
   issue's workspace so a UUID belonging to a different workspace's
   private agent can't slip past the gate (the gate was being applied
   against the current workspace's role table, which is the wrong
   one).

Regression tests cover each bypass, plus an update to the resolveActor
unit test to reflect the new "X-Agent-ID without X-Task-ID falls back
to member" contract.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* test(handler): seed X-Task-ID alongside X-Agent-ID in existing agent-caller tests

After tightening resolveActor to require both headers (X-Agent-ID +
X-Task-ID) for the "agent" actor identity, three existing tests that
set only X-Agent-ID started failing because their requests now resolve
to "member" instead of "agent". Add createHandlerTestTaskForAgent
helper and seed a task per agent-caller assertion. Also patch
TestAgentExplicitMentionStillTriggers — it still passed only because
the @mention path doesn't care about author type for member callers,
but the test claims to exercise the agent path, so make it faithful.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* test(handler): finish X-Task-ID seeding + fix cross-workspace mention test schema

The previous CI run still failed in two places:

1. server/cmd/server integration tests — postCommentAsAgent → authRequestWithAgent
   only set X-Agent-ID, so resolveActor downgraded the request to "member"
   and the on_comment chain produced the wrong task counts. Fix:
   authRequestWithAgent now also sets X-Task-ID, fetched or seeded by a new
   ensureAgentTask(agentID) helper.

2. TestMentionAgent_RejectsCrossWorkspaceAgentUUID's hand-crafted comment
   INSERT was missing comment.workspace_id, which migration 025 made
   NOT NULL. Pass testWorkspaceID into the seed row.

Build + vet clean locally; both packages compile.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-05-11 12:39:45 +08:00
Bohan Jiang
9ccaf18479 fix(comment): don't inherit parent @mentions from agent-authored roots (#1833)
* fix(comment): don't inherit parent @mentions when parent author is an agent

When an agent posts a comment that @mentions another agent (typically a
one-shot delegation, e.g. a PR-completion comment that asks a reviewer
agent to review), member follow-up replies in the same thread were
auto-inheriting that mention and re-triggering the reviewer on every
plain question. Same root cause: the inheritance branch only required
the reply to have no mentions, not that the parent was member-authored.

Tighten the guard: only inherit when the parent (thread root) is
authored by a member. Member-rooted threads still inherit so a member
who started by @mentioning an agent can keep replying without re-typing.
Agent-authored roots are treated as one-shot — explicit @mentions in
later comments still trigger normally.

Extracted the decision into shouldInheritParentMentions for direct unit
testing, and added an end-to-end regression
(TestMemberReplyToAgentRootDoesNotInheritParentMentions) that reproduces
MUL-1535: J posts a PR completion @mentioning Reviewer; a member's
plain follow-up must not re-enqueue Reviewer.

* chore(comment): gofmt trigger_test.go
2026-04-29 15:54:24 +08:00
Bohan Jiang
541aaa974d fix(server): clarify silent-exit prompt and pin handoff contract (#1775)
Follow-ups to #1765 review nits:

- Tighten the per-turn prompt and AGENTS.md workflow instructions so
  that "exit with no output" only applies when the trigger is from
  another agent AND no actual work was produced this turn. If the
  agent did real work, the standard "post results as a comment" rule
  still applies — a result reply is not a noise comment.

- Add TestAgentExplicitMentionStillTriggers as a positive control
  documenting the boundary the structural fix preserves: suppressing
  implicit parent-mention inheritance for agent authors does NOT
  block deliberate handoffs. An agent that explicitly @mentions
  another agent in its own content still enqueues a task for the
  mentioned agent and does not self-trigger.
2026-04-28 15:21:39 +08:00
Bright Zheng
81231e06f8 fix(server): prevent agent-to-agent mention inheritance loops (BRI-34) (#1765)
When an agent replied in a thread whose root mentioned another agent,
the reply inherited the parent mention and re-triggered the other agent.
This caused 'No reply needed' ping-pong loops between co-assigned agents.

Structural fix:
- In enqueueMentionedAgentTasks, suppress parent-mention inheritance
  when authorType == 'agent'. Explicit @mentions in the agent's own
  comment still work for deliberate handoffs.

Defense-in-depth (prompt):
- Strengthen per-turn prompt and AGENTS.md workflow instructions to
  explicitly forbid posting 'No reply needed' noise comments.

Regression test:
- TestAgentReplyDoesNotInheritParentMentions covers both the fix
  (agent reply does not re-trigger) and the positive control
  (member reply still inherits mentions).

Also updates TestBuildPromptCommentTriggeredByAgent to match the
new prompt wording.
2026-04-28 15:14:14 +08:00
devv-eve
6ef711cd35 fix: gate dev verification code behind explicit env (#1773)
* fix: gate dev verification code behind explicit env

* docs: fold dev verification code into env table

* docs: clarify fixed verification code opt-in

---------

Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai>
2026-04-28 15:14:07 +08:00
Bohan Jiang
f628e48775 refactor(server): error-returning ParseUUID to prevent silent data loss
* refactor(server): make ParseUUID error-returning to prevent silent data loss (MUL-1410)

util.ParseUUID previously swallowed errors and returned a zero pgtype.UUID
on invalid input. When this zero UUID reached a write query (DELETE/UPDATE),
the SQL matched zero rows and the handler returned 2xx success — producing
silent data corruption. #1661 (DeleteIssue with identifier-style ID) was the
visible symptom; PR #1680 patched that one site, this commit closes the
class of bug.

Changes:

- util.ParseUUID now returns (pgtype.UUID, error). Add util.MustParseUUID
  for trusted round-trips that should panic on invalid input.
- handler/handler.go: parseUUID wrapper now calls MustParseUUID — any
  unguarded user-input string reaching it surfaces as a recovered panic
  (chi middleware.Recoverer → 500) instead of silently corrupting data.
  Add parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, s, fieldName) for handler entry points.
- Convert every Queries.Delete*/Update* call site reachable from raw user
  input (autopilot, comment, project, skill, skill_file, label, pin,
  attachment, feedback, issue assignee, daemon runtime, workspace) to
  validate UUIDs explicitly with parseUUIDOrBadRequest, returning 400 on
  invalid input. Where a resolved entity.ID is already in scope, write
  queries now use it directly instead of re-parsing the URL string.
- Update getWorkspaceMember + loadIssueForUser to handle invalid UUIDs
  gracefully (404/400 instead of panic).
- Update util/middleware/cmd-level callers (subscriber_listeners,
  notification_listeners, activity_listeners, scope_authorizer,
  middleware/workspace) to use the error-returning API.
- Add server/internal/util/pgx_test.go covering valid/invalid input and
  the MustParseUUID panic contract.
- Add TestDeleteIssueByIdentifier + TestDeleteIssueRejectsInvalidUUID
  regression tests in handler_test.go (the original #1661 bug + the
  invalid-input case).
- Document the handler UUID parsing convention in CLAUDE.md so the rule
  is enforceable in future PR review.

* fix(server): address GPT-Boy review of #1748

P1 fixes from PR #1748 review:

1. Migrate remaining request-boundary UUIDs to parseUUIDOrBadRequest so
   malformed input returns 400 instead of panic/500. Was missing on:
   - issue.go: workspace_id in CreateIssue/ChildIssueProgress/ListIssues/
     SearchIssues/BatchUpdateIssues/BatchDeleteIssues; project_id /
     parent_issue_id / lead_id / assignee_id / assignee_ids / creator_id
     filters; batch issue_ids and assignee/parent/project fields in
     BatchUpdateIssues (skip on bad input via util.ParseUUID, matching
     the existing per-row continue semantics).
   - project.go: project id + workspace_id in GetProject/UpdateProject/
     DeleteProject; lead_id in CreateProject/UpdateProject;
     workspace_id in ListProjects + SearchProjects.
   - handler.go: resolveActor now uses util.ParseUUID for X-Agent-ID /
     X-Task-ID headers; invalid UUID falls back to "member" (matches
     pre-existing semantics) instead of panicking.
   - issue.go: validateAssigneePair returns 400 on invalid workspace_id
     instead of panicking.

2. Fix issue:deleted WS event payloads to emit uuidToString(issue.ID)
   instead of the raw URL string. After an identifier-path delete
   ("MUL-7"), the previous payload would have leaked the identifier to
   subscribers, leaving stale entries in frontend caches that key by
   UUID. Updated DeleteIssue (issue.go:1341) and BatchDeleteIssues
   (issue.go:1641). The slog "issue deleted" log line also now records
   the resolved UUID so logs match the WS payload.

3. Extend TestDeleteIssueByIdentifier to subscribe to the bus and
   assert issue:deleted.payload.issue_id is the resolved UUID, not
   the identifier.

* fix(server): validate remaining reviewed UUID inputs

* fix(server): validate remaining handler UUID inputs

* fix(server): finish request boundary UUID audit

* fix(server): validate remaining request body UUIDs

* fix(server): validate runtime path UUIDs

* fix(server): validate remaining audit UUID inputs

---------

Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai>
2026-04-28 14:50:28 +08:00
Bohan Jiang
58547faf31 fix(server): validate assignee_id existence on issue create/update (#1694)
* fix(server): validate assignee_id existence on issue create/update

POST /api/issues and PUT /api/issues/:id silently accepted any
well-formed UUID as assignee_id (#1662). The new validateAssigneePair
helper consolidates the existing canAssignAgent check and adds:

- existence lookup against workspace members for assignee_type=member
- existence lookup against workspace agents for assignee_type=agent
- pair consistency: type and id must be both set or both null
- whitelist for assignee_type values (member|agent)

UpdateIssue and BatchUpdateIssues now run the same validator on the
post-merge assignee pair whenever the caller touches either field,
closing the parallel gap on the update path.

* fix(server): reject malformed assignee_id at handler entry

parseUUID silently returns an invalid pgtype.UUID for unparseable input
and validateAssigneePair treats (type unset + id invalid) as "no
assignee". Together they let `POST /api/issues` and `PUT /api/issues/:id`
silently drop a malformed assignee_id and return a successful response.

Reject the parse failure inline at every entry point — Create, Update,
and BatchUpdateIssues — so the validator never sees an unparseable id.
Adds two regression tests covering the create and update paths.
2026-04-26 10:35:47 +08:00
devv-eve
637bdc8eb3 feat(analytics): full PostHog pipeline + 6 funnel events (MUL-1122) (#1367)
* feat(analytics): add PostHog client with async batch shipping

Introduces server/internal/analytics, the shipping layer for the product
funnel defined in docs/analytics.md. Capture is non-blocking — events are
enqueued into a bounded channel and a background worker batches them to
PostHog's /batch/ endpoint. A broken backend drops events rather than
blocking request handlers.

Local dev and self-hosted instances run a noop client until the operator
sets POSTHOG_API_KEY. This is PR 1 of MUL-1122; signup and workspace_created
emission land in the follow-up commit so this change is independently
reviewable.

* feat(server): emit signup and workspace_created analytics events

Wires analytics.Client through handler.New and main, then emits the first
two funnel events:

- signup fires from findOrCreateUser (which now reports isNew), covering
  both the verification-code and Google OAuth entry points — a single
  emission site guarantees Google signups aren't missed.
- workspace_created fires after the CreateWorkspace transaction commits,
  with is_first_workspace computed from a post-commit ListWorkspaces count
  so we can distinguish fresh-user activation from returning-user
  expansion.

Tests use analytics.NoopClient so nothing ships from test runs. PR 1 of
MUL-1122; runtime_registered and issue_executed follow in later PRs per
the plan.

* refactor(analytics): drop is_first_workspace from workspace_created

Stamping "is this the user's first workspace?" at emit time races under
concurrent CreateWorkspace requests: two transactions committing close
together can both read a post-commit count greater than one and both emit
false. Fixing it at the SQL layer requires a schema change we don't want in
PR 1.

PostHog answers the same question exactly from the event stream (funnel on
"first time user does X" / cohort on $initial_event), so removing the
property loses no information and makes the emit side race-free.

* docs(analytics): document self-host safety defaults

Spell out why self-hosted instances never ship events upstream by default
(empty POSTHOG_API_KEY → noop client) and explain how operators can point
at their own PostHog project without any code change.

* feat(analytics): emit runtime_registered, issue_executed, team_invite_*

Three server-side funnel events, all gated on first-time state transitions
so retries and re-runs don't inflate the WAW buckets:

- runtime_registered fires from DaemonRegister when UpsertAgentRuntime
  reports (xmax = 0) — i.e. the row was inserted, not updated. Heartbeats
  and re-registrations stay silent.
- issue_executed fires from CompleteTask after an atomic
  UPDATE issue SET first_executed_at = now() WHERE id = $1 AND
  first_executed_at IS NULL flips the column for the first time. Retries,
  re-assignments, and comment-triggered follow-up tasks hit the WHERE
  clause and no-op. Carries nth_issue_for_workspace so the ≥1/≥2/≥5/≥10
  buckets filter without extra queries.
- team_invite_sent fires from CreateInvitation and team_invite_accepted
  from AcceptInvitation, closing the expansion funnel.

Adds a 050 migration for issue.first_executed_at plus a partial index so
the workspace-scoped executed-count query doesn't scan the never-executed
tail.

* feat(config): surface PostHog key via /api/config

Extends AppConfig with posthog_key / posthog_host sourced from env on
every request (so operators can rotate the key via secret refresh without
a restart). Reading the key off the server — rather than baking it into
the frontend bundle via NEXT_PUBLIC_* — means self-hosted instances
inherit the blank key automatically and never ship events upstream.

* feat(analytics): wire posthog-js identify + UTM capture on the client

Adds @multica/core/analytics — a thin wrapper around posthog-js that owns
attribution capture and identity merge. Posthog-js config comes from
/api/config (not NEXT_PUBLIC_*), so self-hosted instances whose server
returns an empty key automatically run the SDK inert.

captureSignupSource stamps a multica_signup_source cookie with UTM params
and the referrer's origin (never the full referrer — that can leak OAuth
code/state in the callback URL). The backend signup event reads this
cookie on new-user creation.

Identity flows:
- auth-initializer fires identify() right after getMe() resolves, on both
  cookie and token paths. A getConfig/getMe race is handled by buffering
  a pending identify inside the analytics module and flushing it once
  initAnalytics finishes.
- auth store calls identify() on verifyCode / loginWithGoogle /
  loginWithToken and resetAnalytics() on logout so the next login merges
  cleanly without bleeding events.

* docs(analytics): describe runtime_registered, issue_executed, invite events

Fills in the schema for the remaining funnel events. Captures the
design commentary that belongs next to the contract rather than in a PR
description — in particular why issue_executed uses the atomic
first_executed_at flip instead of counting task-terminal events, and why
runtime_registered relies on xmax = 0 rather than a query-then-write.

* fix(analytics): drop non-atomic nth_issue_for_workspace from issue_executed

Computing the workspace's Nth-issue ordinal at emit time is not atomic
under concurrent first-completions — two transactions can both run
MarkIssueFirstExecuted, then both run CountExecutedIssuesInWorkspace, and
both observe count=1 before either has committed, so both events go out
stamped as n=1. Serialising it would mean a per-workspace advisory lock
or a SERIALIZABLE-isolated tx; PostHog answers the same question exactly
at query time via row_number() partitioned by workspace_id, so the
emit-time property adds risk without adding information.

Removes the property from analytics.IssueExecuted, deletes the unused
CountExecutedIssuesInWorkspace query, and regenerates sqlc. The partial
index stays — any future workspace-scoped executed-issue query will want
it.

* fix(analytics): wire $pageview and harden signup_source cookie payload

Two frontend fixes from the PR review:

- PageviewTracker, mounted under WebProviders, fires capturePageview on
  every Next.js App Router path / query-string change. Without this the
  capturePageview helper in @multica/core/analytics was never called and
  the acquisition funnel's / → signup step was empty.
- captureSignupSource now caps each UTM / referrer value at 96 chars
  *before* JSON.stringify, and drops the whole cookie when the serialised
  payload still exceeds 512 chars. Previously the overall slice(0, 256)
  could leave a half-JSON string on the wire that neither the backend nor
  PostHog could parse.

Both capturePageview and identify now buffer a single pending call when
fired before initAnalytics resolves — otherwise the initial "/" pageview
and same-turn login identify race the /api/config fetch and get dropped.
resetAnalytics clears both buffers so a logout→login cycle stays clean.

* fix(analytics): URL-decode signup_source cookie on read

Go does not URL-decode Cookie.Value automatically, so the frontend's
JSON-then-encodeURIComponent payload was landing in PostHog as
percent-encoded garbage (%7B%22utm_source...). Unescape on read so the
backend receives the original JSON string the frontend intended, and
drop values that fail to decode or exceed the server-side cap — sending
truncated garbage is worse than sending nothing. Oversized-cookie guard
matches the frontend's SIGNUP_SOURCE_MAX_LEN.

* docs(analytics): reflect nth-issue drop, $pageview wiring, cookie encoding

Pulls the schema doc back in line with the code: issue_executed no longer
advertises nth_issue_for_workspace (with a note about why PostHog derives
it at query time instead), the frontend $pageview section names the
actual PageviewTracker component that fires it, and the signup_source
section documents the per-value cap / overall drop rule and the
encode-on-write / decode-on-read contract.

---------

Co-authored-by: Jiang Bohan <bhjiang@outlook.com>
2026-04-21 14:42:52 +08:00
Azaan Ali Raza
b428f36ca6 feat: add ALLOW_SIGNUP + ALLOWED_EMAIL_* for self-hosted instances (#1098)
Closes #930

- Added environment variables to control signups
- Updated frontend to hide signup text when disabled
- Added backend check to block new user creation via magic link
- Updated .env.example
2026-04-19 21:02:42 -07:00
Korkyzer
63800f05ff fix(agent): add per-agent mcp_config field to restore MCP access (#1168)
* fix(agent): add per-agent mcp_config field to restore MCP access

Closes #1111

The --strict-mcp-config flag was added defensively in #592 to prevent
Claude agents from inheriting MCP state from the outer Claude Code session.
It was meant to be paired with --mcp-config <path> to inject a controlled
set of MCPs, but that path was never implemented, which silently stripped
all user-scope MCPs from spawned agents.

This PR completes the original design by:

- Adding a nullable mcp_config jsonb column to the agents table
- Wiring mcp_config through AgentResponse, Create/Update requests
- Piping it into ExecOptions.McpConfig in the daemon
- Serializing to a temp file and passing --mcp-config <path> in buildClaudeArgs
- Blocklisting --mcp-config in claudeBlockedArgs to prevent override
  via custom_args

Does not touch Codex provider (tracked separately in #674).
Does not implement Multica MCP auto-injection (out of scope).

* fix: disambiguate JSON null vs absent for mcp_config
2026-04-18 01:35:22 +08:00
joyanup
3ea6b5c7b8 fix(agent): return 409 on duplicate agent name (#1182)
- Migration 046 adds UNIQUE(workspace_id, name) with dedup (keep most recently updated)
- CreateAgent handler returns 409 Conflict scoped to constraint name agent_workspace_name_unique
- Dedup verified as (0 rows) against worktree DB; rerun against staging/production before applying
- Down migration drops the constraint only; deleted rows and cascaded data are not restored

Co-authored-by: Anup Joy <joyanup@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 13:40:02 +08:00
Naiyuan Qing
6d6bc5a6f2 fix(routing): rename /new-workspace to /workspaces/new + extend reserved slug list (#1188)
* fix(routing): rename /new-workspace to /workspaces/new + extend reserved slug list

Two related changes:

1. Rename the global workspace-creation route from /new-workspace to
   /workspaces/new. The hyphenated word-group `new-workspace` is a
   common user workspace name (last deploy was blocked by a real user
   with exactly this slug). Industry consensus from auditing Linear,
   Vercel, Notion, Slack, GitHub: zero major SaaS uses hyphenated
   word-group root routes — they all use single words or `/{noun}/{verb}`
   pairs. Reserving the noun `workspaces` automatically protects the
   entire `/workspaces/*` subtree, so future workspace-related routes
   (`/workspaces/{id}/edit`, `/workspaces/{id}/billing`, etc.) need no
   additional reserved slugs or audit migrations.

2. Extend the reserved slug list to cover the minimal set recommended by
   the URL-design audit: full auth flow vocab, RFC 2142 mailbox names
   (postmaster, abuse, noreply...), hostname confusables (mail, ftp,
   static, cdn...), and likely-future platform routes (docs, support,
   status, legal, privacy, terms, security, etc.). Production data
   audit confirmed zero conflicts for every newly added slug, so
   migration 047 (the safety net) passes cleanly.

Slugs intentionally NOT added despite being in scope of the audit:
admin, multica, new, setup, www. Each has one production workspace
already using it; adding them now would block deploy. They will be
handled in a follow-up PR via owner outreach + targeted rename.

Also adds a CLAUDE.md convention rule: new global routes MUST use a
single word or `/{noun}/{verb}` pair, never hyphenated word groups.
This prevents the pattern from regenerating itself.

This PR does NOT resolve the currently-blocked prd deploy — that requires
the existing `slug='new-workspace'` workspace (owner: Dhruv Raina) to be
renamed by ops. After that workspace is renamed and migration 046 passes,
this PR's migration 047 will also pass on its first run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* review: drop migration 046, sweep stale comments, drive reserved test from map

Address code review on PR #1188:

1. Delete migration 046 (audit_new_workspace_slug). It audits "new-workspace"
   which is no longer a reserved slug after this PR's rename. Removing 046
   has an unexpected upside: it directly unblocks the currently-stuck prd
   deploy. Migration 046 had never successfully applied (it was the source
   of the deploy block); the audit-only nature means down-rollback is a
   no-op. The user workspace previously caught by 046 (slug='new-workspace',
   owner: Dhruv Raina) is now safe — `new-workspace` is no longer reserved,
   so the slug correctly resolves to that workspace and the global route
   `/workspaces/new` doesn't shadow it.

2. Refactor workspace_test.go to drive its reserved-slug list from the
   reservedSlugs map directly via `for slug := range reservedSlugs`. The
   previous hand-copied list was already drifting (40-ish entries vs 58 in
   the map). Now drift is impossible.

3. Sweep ~10 stale `/new-workspace` references in code comments to
   `/workspaces/new`. Comments only — runtime unchanged. The references
   in reserved-slugs.ts/workspace_reserved_slugs.go and CLAUDE.md are
   intentionally kept as anti-pattern examples ("don't add hyphenated
   word-group root routes like /new-workspace").

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-16 21:21:20 +08:00
Naiyuan Qing
6a2432b16b refactor: remove onboarding flow, fix daemon zero-workspace bootstrap (#1175)
* fix(daemon): allow startup with zero workspaces

The daemon used to fail fast with "no runtimes registered" when the
initial workspace sync returned zero workspaces. This masked a latent
bug: a newly-signed-up user has no workspaces yet, so the daemon would
crash immediately after login instead of waiting for the first
workspace to be created.

workspaceSyncLoop already polls every 30s (daemon.go:107, 365) to
discover new workspaces — the fail-fast check at startup was bypassing
this dynamic discovery. Remove the check so the daemon stays resident
and picks up the first workspace whenever it appears.

PR #1001 partially addressed this for the "server has workspaces but
local CLI config is empty" case. This finishes the job for the true
zero-workspace state, which until now was masked by the onboarding
wizard always creating a workspace before the daemon started.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(views): extract CreateWorkspaceForm for reuse

Modal and the upcoming /new-workspace page share the same form +
mutation + slug validation. Extract to a shared component so they
can't drift.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(views): add NoAccessPage for unknown or inaccessible workspace slugs

Rendered when the URL slug doesn't resolve to a workspace the user has
access to. Deliberately doesn't distinguish 404 vs 403 to avoid letting
attackers enumerate workspace slugs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(paths): add /new-workspace route and reserve slug on both sides

Adds paths.newWorkspace() builder, registers /new-workspace as a global
(pre-workspace) prefix, and reserves the "new-workspace" slug on both
frontend and backend (kept in sync per convention). Existing
"onboarding" reservation retained — removing it would desync FE/BE
and leaves no future fallback if an onboarding route is revived.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(migrations): audit no existing workspace uses 'new-workspace' slug

Migration 046 blocks deploy if any workspace in the DB has slug =
'new-workspace', which would shadow the new global workspace creation
route at /new-workspace.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add /new-workspace route on web and desktop

Renders the CreateWorkspaceForm as a full-page workspace creation flow,
used as the destination for first-time users with zero workspaces.
Replaces the 4-step onboarding wizard with a single form.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: show NoAccessPage on unknown workspace slug, hold null during active removal

Layouts render NoAccessPage when the URL slug doesn't resolve to an
accessible workspace — except when the slug previously resolved during
this layout instance's lifetime.

URL and cache are two asynchronous signals: there will always be a
short window where the URL still points at the old workspace but the
cache has already been invalidated (e.g. just after a delete/leave
mutation, or a realtime workspace:deleted event). Rendering
NoAccessPage during that window would flash "Workspace not available"
with recovery buttons in front of a user who just deleted the
workspace themselves — jarring and wrong.

useWorkspaceSeen classifies the two cases:
 - slug was seen before, now gone → user's intent is changing (caller
   is navigating away); render null, no flash
 - slug never seen → user is genuinely looking at an inaccessible
   workspace (stale bookmark, revoked access, link from a former
   teammate); render NoAccessPage with recovery options

NoAccessPage deliberately does not distinguish 404 vs 403 to avoid
letting attackers enumerate workspace slugs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: redirect zero-workspace users to /new-workspace instead of /onboarding

Switches 8 call sites and the CLI:
- Web: login, auth callback, landing redirect-if-authenticated
- Desktop: routes.tsx IndexRedirect
- Shared: dashboard guard, invite page fallback, workspace-tab on delete,
  realtime sync on workspace loss
- CLI: cmd_login.go waitForOnboarding now opens /new-workspace

Also adds /new-workspace to navigation store's lastPath exclusion list
so it doesn't get persisted as a 'last visited' page.

Adds a desktop App.tsx effect that restarts the daemon when workspace
count transitions 0 → ≥1, so first-workspace creation triggers
immediate daemon pickup rather than waiting up to 30s for the daemon's
workspaceSyncLoop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: remove onboarding flow

The 4-step onboarding wizard (workspace → runtime → agent → demo issues)
is replaced by:
- /new-workspace: a single-page workspace creation form (Phase 3)
- NoAccessPage: explicit feedback when a slug doesn't resolve (Phase 4)
- daemon zero-workspace bootstrap (Phase 1) so the daemon doesn't
  crash before the user creates their first workspace
- desktop daemon restart on first workspace creation (Phase 5) for
  instant pickup instead of the 30s workspaceSyncLoop tick

Deletions:
- packages/views/onboarding/ (OnboardingWizard + 4 step components + tests)
- apps/web/app/(auth)/onboarding/page.tsx
- apps/desktop/src/renderer/src/components/onboarding-gate.tsx (+test)
- OnboardingGate wrapper in desktop-layout.tsx
- OnboardingRoute + /onboarding route in desktop routes.tsx
- paths.onboarding() builder + /onboarding from GLOBAL_PREFIXES
- packages/views/package.json onboarding export
- /onboarding from navigation store's EXCLUDED_PREFIXES

Retained (intentional):
- 'onboarding' in RESERVED_SLUGS (both FE + BE) — kept for FE/BE sync
  and future-proofing if /onboarding is ever revived

Also drops 4 demo issues that onboarding used to create on the new
workspace ('Say hello', 'Set up repo', etc.). New workspaces are now
fully empty; all list views already render empty-state UI correctly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: clean stale 'onboarding' references in comments and CLI helpers

Batch cleanup of references to the removed onboarding flow:
- 13 comment sites mentioning 'onboarding' updated to reflect the
  new /new-workspace flow or removed where no longer accurate
- CLI waitForOnboarding renamed to waitForWorkspaceCreation (function
  name + docstring); behavior unchanged

The 'onboarding' reserved slug entries (frontend + backend) are
intentionally retained — see prior commit rationale.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(views): extract shared NewWorkspacePage shell

The web (/new-workspace) and desktop (NewWorkspaceRoute) pages had
identical outer layout — same container, heading, and copy — with only
the onSuccess navigation primitive differing. That's exactly the
No-Duplication Rule pattern: extract the shared UI, inject the
platform-specific behavior.

The apps now only own the thin auth guard (web needs it, desktop
routes below WorkspaceRouteLayout already handle it) and the
onSuccess → navigate call.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: remove rollback compat layer and tighten daemon restart trigger

Two cleanup items:

1. Drop localStorage['multica_workspace_id'] double-write in both
   workspace layouts. That write was added as a rollback safety net
   for the workspace-slug URL refactor (PR #1138) — the refactor has
   since landed and stabilized, so the compat shim is no longer
   needed. Per CLAUDE.md: don't keep compat layers beyond their
   purpose.

2. Tighten the desktop daemon-restart trigger. The previous ref-based
   logic fired a restart on any 0→1 workspace-count transition,
   including account switches (user A logout → user B login). Scope
   it precisely to 'this session started with zero workspaces and
   just gained one' using a three-state ref (null=undecided,
   true=empty-start, false=already-restarted-or-started-nonempty).
   Account switches are already handled by daemon-manager.ts on
   token change, so this avoids a redundant restart there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): redirect to /login on logout and unauthenticated workspace visits

Two gaps previously left users stuck on blank workspace pages:

1. app-sidebar logout() cleared all state but never moved the URL. The
   current path is /{workspaceSlug}/... which has no meaning without
   auth; the workspace layout would then see user=null, render null
   (via the hasBeenSeen short-circuit), and the user saw a blank page
   thinking logout didn't work.

2. The workspace layouts (web + desktop) had no !user handling at all.
   Any path that leaves user=null — token expiration, cross-tab logout,
   or fresh visit to a workspace URL without a session — resulted in
   the same blank screen.

Fix:
- app-sidebar.logout() explicitly push(paths.login()) after authLogout()
  to cover the primary (user-initiated) logout path.
- Both workspace layouts get a defensive useEffect that redirects to
  /login whenever auth has settled and user is null. Covers token
  expiration, realtime logout, and any other silent session loss.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-16 19:18:43 +08:00
Jiayuan Zhang
d930bcaa18 feat(server): trigger agent when issue moves out of backlog (#1006)
* feat(server): trigger agent when issue moves out of backlog

When a member moves an agent-assigned issue from "backlog" to an active
status (e.g. "todo", "in_progress"), enqueue an agent task so the agent
starts working. This lets backlog act as a parking lot where issues can
be assigned to agents without immediately triggering execution.

Applies to both single and batch issue updates.

* fix(server): treat backlog as parking lot — no trigger on create/assign

Address review feedback: creating or assigning an agent to a backlog
issue no longer triggers immediate execution. Only moving out of backlog
to an active status triggers the agent, producing exactly one task.

- shouldEnqueueAgentTask now gates on backlog status
- backlog→active trigger uses isAgentAssigneeReady directly
- Added TestBacklogNoTriggerOnCreate test
- Updated TestBacklogToTodoTriggersAgent to assert exactly 1 task
  across the full create→move path (no manual cleanup)

* feat(ui): show toast hint when assigning agent to backlog issue

Users may not know that backlog issues won't trigger agent execution
until moved to an active status. Show an actionable toast with a
"Move to Todo" button when:

- Assigning an agent to a backlog issue in the detail page
- Creating a backlog issue with an agent assignee

* feat(ui): add "Don't show again" option to backlog agent toast

Users who understand the backlog parking lot behavior can dismiss the
hint permanently. Uses localStorage to persist the preference.

* feat(ui): replace backlog agent toast with AlertDialog

Use a modal dialog instead of a toast notification so users must
explicitly acknowledge the hint. The dialog offers three options:
- "Move to Todo" — changes status and triggers the agent
- "Keep in Backlog" — dismisses without action
- "Don't show again" — persists dismissal in localStorage

* fix(ui): improve backlog agent dialog

* fix(ui): close create dialog behind hint, use checkbox for don't-show-again

1. Create Issue dialog now closes when the backlog agent hint appears,
   so only the hint dialog is visible (not stacked behind).
2. "Don't show again" is now a checkbox instead of a separate button.
   When checked, clicking either "Keep in Backlog" or "Move to Todo"
   persists the preference.

* fix(ui): smooth backlog agent hint dialog

* fix(test): add useUpdateIssue mock to create-issue test

The test mock for @multica/core/issues/mutations was missing the
useUpdateIssue export that create-issue.tsx now imports, causing
CI failure.
2026-04-15 19:07:48 +08:00
Jiayuan Zhang
a29ecfe02a test(issue): cover explicit sub-issue project 2026-04-14 01:51:48 +08:00
Jiayuan Zhang
56c38dc521 fix(issue): inherit parent project for sub-issues 2026-04-14 01:30:40 +08:00
Jiayuan Zhang
5b4ee7c5e1 fix(workspace): surface slug conflicts (#895) 2026-04-14 00:09:12 +08:00
Jiayuan Zhang
01232fc2f9 feat(onboarding): add full-screen onboarding wizard for new workspaces (#852)
* feat(onboarding): add full-screen onboarding wizard for new workspaces

Replace auto-provisioned workspace with an interactive 4-step onboarding
wizard: Create Workspace → Connect Runtime → Create Agent → Get Started.

- Remove server-side ensureUserWorkspace() so new users land in onboarding
- Add onboarding wizard in packages/views/onboarding/ (4 steps)
- Wire login/OAuth callbacks to redirect to /onboarding when no workspace
- Add DashboardGuard onboardingPath fallback for workspace-less users
- Sidebar "Create workspace" navigates to /onboarding instead of modal
- Remove CreateWorkspaceModal (replaced by wizard step 1)
- Auto-generate workspace slug from name (no user-facing URL field)
- Unified CLI install flow: install.sh + multica setup (auto-detects local)
- Create onboarding issues on completion with interactive "Say hello" task

* test(auth): update workspace tests to match onboarding flow

Login no longer auto-creates workspaces — new users start with zero
workspaces and create one through the onboarding wizard. Update both
integration and handler tests to assert 0 workspaces after verify-code.
2026-04-13 17:59:51 +08:00
pradeep7127
297b436e65 fix(issue): default create status to todo instead of backlog (#746)
* fix(issue): default create status to todo instead of backlog

Issues created without an explicit status now default to `todo` so the
local daemon picks them up immediately. Previously they defaulted to
`backlog`, which daemons ignore, leaving new issues silently idle until
a user manually moved them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(issue): verify create defaults to todo, explicit backlog still works

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-13 16:49:35 +08:00
LinYushen
39ca8ed9e8 Revert "feat(issues): add structured ticket search" 2026-04-08 15:15:08 +08:00
pseudoyu
34c39b765e feat(issues): add structured ticket search 2026-04-08 11:30:53 +08:00
devv-eve
7c79611309 refactor: remove agent triggers config field (#469)
* refactor: remove agent triggers config field

Remove the triggers field from agent configuration. The on_assign,
on_comment, and on_mention behaviors are now always enabled (hardcoded),
as decided in the Agentflow design discussion (MUL-372).

Changes:
- Database: migration 032 drops triggers column from agent table
- Backend: remove triggers from create/update agent APIs and response
- Backend: simplify trigger-checking logic to always-enabled
- Frontend: remove TriggersTab UI and AgentTrigger types
- Tests: remove trigger config unit tests (no longer configurable)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: also remove agent tools config field

Remove the tools field from agent configuration alongside triggers.
The tools field was a placeholder — stored in the DB and shown in the
UI but never passed to the daemon or used at runtime.

- Database: migration 032 now also drops tools column
- Backend: remove tools from create/update agent APIs and response
- Frontend: remove ToolsTab UI, AgentTool type, and tools tab
- Update landing page copy

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(test): remove tools/triggers columns from test fixtures

The test fixtures still referenced the dropped tools and triggers
columns when inserting agent rows, causing CI failures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Devv <devv@Devvs-Mac-mini.local>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-07 22:02:28 +08:00
LinYushen
b5674869ed fix(auth): enforce auth on daemon API routes (#224)
* fix(auth): enforce auth middleware and workspace membership on daemon API routes

Daemon routes were registered without the Auth middleware, meaning the
server accepted unauthenticated requests to register runtimes, claim
tasks, etc. The daemon client already sends a Bearer token — the server
just wasn't validating it.

- Split /api/daemon routes: pairing-session endpoints stay public (used
  before the daemon has a token), all others now require Auth middleware
- Add workspace membership check in DaemonRegister so only workspace
  members can register runtimes
- Update test to include X-User-ID header matching the new auth requirement

Closes MUL-90

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(daemon): remove dead pairing-session feature

The daemon pairing flow was never completed — the daemon authenticates
via CLI config token, not pairing sessions. Remove all related code:

- Delete daemon_pairing.go handler (4 unused handlers)
- Remove pairing routes from router.go (3 public + 1 protected)
- Delete /pair/local page + test from frontend
- Remove DaemonPairingSession types and API client methods
- Add migration 029 to drop daemon_pairing_session table
- Update LOCAL_DEVELOPMENT.md to reflect actual auth flow

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-31 16:13:58 +08:00
yushen
29a80e057e feat(upload): add file upload API with S3 + CloudFront signed cookies
Add POST /api/upload-file endpoint that uploads files to S3 and returns
CDN URLs protected by CloudFront signed cookies (same pattern as Linear).

Infrastructure:
- Two private S3 buckets (static.multica.ai, static-staging.multica.ai)
- Two CloudFront distributions with OAC and Trusted Key Groups
- ACM wildcard cert in us-east-1, DNS records in Route 53
- RSA signing key stored in AWS Secrets Manager

Backend:
- S3 storage service with CloudFront CDN domain support
- CloudFront signed cookie generation (RSA-SHA1)
- Private key loaded from Secrets Manager (env var fallback for local dev)
- Cookies set on login (VerifyCode) with 72h expiry matching JWT
- Upload handler: multipart form → S3 → CloudFront URL response

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-31 14:41:17 +08:00
LinYushen
d41b986cb0 feat(server): distinguish agent vs human CLI actions (#181)
* feat(server): distinguish agent vs human CLI actions via X-Agent-ID/X-Task-ID headers

Extract resolveActor helper in handler to centralize agent identity resolution
from X-Agent-ID header with X-Task-ID cross-validation. Fix DeleteComment,
DeleteIssue, and UpdateComment handlers that previously hardcoded "member" as
actor type. Forward MULTICA_TASK_ID as X-Task-ID header from CLI client.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(server): add debug logging and test coverage for resolveActor

Add slog.Debug on agent/task validation failures for easier debugging.
Add TestResolveActor with 5 cases covering member fallback, valid agent,
non-existent agent, valid task, and mismatched task.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-30 13:12:59 +08:00
Jiayuan
9fbac49f24 feat(issues): add human-readable issue identifiers (e.g. JIA-1)
Add per-workspace auto-incrementing issue numbers with a configurable
prefix, producing identifiers like "JIA-1" instead of truncated UUIDs.

Database:
- Add issue_prefix and issue_counter to workspace table
- Add number column to issue table with UNIQUE(workspace_id, number)
- Backfill existing issues with sequential numbers

Backend:
- Issue creation atomically increments counter in a transaction
- API responses include number and identifier fields
- Support issue lookup by identifier format (KEY-N)
- Workspace prefix auto-generated from name, customizable via API

Frontend:
- Display identifier in list rows and issue detail breadcrumb
- Add issue_prefix to Workspace type, number/identifier to Issue type
2026-03-29 16:49:55 +08:00
LinYushen
5c9c2f69fd feat(auth): email verification login and personal access tokens
* feat(auth): add email verification login flow with 401 auto-redirect

Replace the old OAuth-based login with email verification codes:
- Backend: send-code / verify-code endpoints, verification_codes table (migration 009), rate limiting, Resend email service
- Frontend: two-step login UI (email → 6-digit OTP), auth store with sendCode/verifyCode
- SDK: ApiClient gains onUnauthorized callback; 401 responses auto-clear token and redirect to /login
- Fix login button staying disabled due to global isLoading state

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): add brute-force protection, redirect loop guard, and expired code cleanup

- VerifyCode: increment attempts on wrong code, reject after 5 failed tries (migration 010)
- onUnauthorized: skip redirect if already on /login to prevent infinite loops
- SendCode: best-effort cleanup of expired verification codes older than 1 hour

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): add master verification code for non-production environments

Allow code "888888" to bypass email verification in non-production
environments to simplify development and testing workflows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(auth): add personal access tokens for CLI and API authentication

Add full-stack PAT support: users create tokens in Settings, CLI authenticates
via `multica auth login`. Server stores SHA-256 hashes only. Auth middleware
extended to accept both JWTs and PATs (distinguished by `mul_` prefix).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-26 14:32:30 +08:00
yushen
a5aedf5dfe fix(test): gracefully skip DB tests when database is unreachable
pgxpool.New is lazy and doesn't connect immediately. Add pool.Ping()
after creation so CI environments without PostgreSQL skip cleanly
instead of failing with os.Exit(1).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-25 17:44:36 +08:00
Naiyuan Qing
a5a5febdf6 fix(test): events.NewBus → events.New (correct function name)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-25 16:54:18 +08:00
Naiyuan Qing
fc3dc39b82 fix(test): update tests for event bus + room-based Hub signatures
- integration_test: pass events.Bus to NewRouter
- handler_test: pass events.Bus to handler.New
- hub_test: add mock MembershipChecker, JWT token generation,
  replace hub.clients with totalClients() helper for room-based Hub

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-25 16:49:45 +08:00
Jiayuan Zhang
fb709ff143 fix(test): remove skills column from integration test fixtures
Migration 008 drops agent.skills column, so test fixtures inserting
into the agent table must no longer reference it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-25 15:27:50 +08:00
Jiayuan Zhang
4c6eb81789 Provision default workspaces and harden daemon pairing 2026-03-24 15:19:27 +08:00
Jiayuan Zhang
2c28c4cba2 refactor(dev): share postgres across main and worktrees 2026-03-24 14:27:35 +08:00
Jiayuan Zhang
81e64e9fce Add workspace management and isolated worktree environments 2026-03-23 18:12:11 +08:00
Jiayuan Zhang
1e61c1974c feat(server): implement full REST API with JWT auth and real-time WebSocket
- Add HTTP handlers for issues, comments, agents, workspaces, inbox, members, and activity
- Implement JWT authentication middleware with Bearer token validation
- Add sqlc queries for all entities (CRUD operations)
- Extract router into reusable NewRouter() for testability
- Expand SDK with full API client methods (CRUD for all resources)
- Add updateWorkspace to SDK, add Member type to shared types

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-22 11:50:03 +08:00