12 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
LinYushen
cb68669c73 feat(composio): gate MCP apps behind feature flag (#4876)
* feat(composio): server-side connect flow + connections REST (Notion MVP) (MUL-3720) (#4608)

* feat(composio): server-side connect flow + connections REST (Notion MVP) (MUL-3720)

Compose the merged server/pkg/composio SDK into a user-facing connection
manager: signed-state connect handshake, local user_composio_connection
mirror, idempotent disconnect, and a per-user MCP session helper (not yet
wired into task dispatch).

- migration 127_user_composio_connection (no FK/cascade, per DB rules)
- sqlc queries: upsert (idempotent on user_id+connected_account_id), list
  active, owner-scoped get, mark revoked
- internal/integrations/composio: signed HMAC-SHA256 state, BeginConnect,
  CompleteCallback (idempotent upsert), ListConnections, Disconnect
  (upstream 404 = idempotent success), CreateMCPSession (no-op when empty,
  pins connected_accounts per toolkit), CallbackRedirect
- REST handlers under /api/integrations/composio (user-scoped, 503 when
  COMPOSIO_API_KEY unset): connect/init, callback (302), connections list,
  delete
- router wiring gated by COMPOSIO_API_KEY; COMPOSIO_AUTH_CONFIGS_JSON maps
  toolkit->auth_config (MVP: notion); state secret from COMPOSIO_STATE_SECRET
  or derived from JWT_SECRET; callback base from COMPOSIO_CALLBACK_BASE_URL
  or MULTICA_PUBLIC_URL
- tests: state (expire/tamper/wrong-secret), service (mapping, callback
  idempotency, non-success, disconnect owner/404 idempotency, MCP pin),
  handlers (httptest), redact regression for Bearer mcp_ tokens

MVP scope: Notion only; no task-dispatch overlay, sharing, or webhook
event handling (later stages).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): bind callback account to user + idempotent revoked disconnect (MUL-3720)

Address PR 4608 review (CHANGES_REQUESTED):

- callback: verify connected_account_id with Composio before mirroring it.
  The signed state only proved user/toolkit/exp, so a valid state paired with
  a tampered connected_account_id would be written verbatim. CompleteCallback
  now calls ListConnectedAccounts and fails closed (ErrAccountVerification)
  unless the account belongs to the state's user (composio_user_id == multica
  user id) and was created under the toolkit's auth config. No row is written
  on mismatch / unknown account / upstream error.

- disconnect: short-circuit to a no-op when the local row is already revoked,
  before touching upstream. Previously a second DELETE re-hit Composio and a
  non-404 upstream error surfaced as a 502, breaking the 204-idempotent
  contract.

- CreateMCPSession: document the v1 single-active-connection-per-(user,toolkit)
  constraint and make duplicate selection deterministic (newest-wins, rows are
  connected_at DESC) instead of order-dependent map overwrite. Stage 3 owns the
  real single-account-enforcement vs multi-account-shape decision.

Tests: tampered/wrong-auth-config/unknown-account callback rejection, revoked-row
disconnect no-op (asserts upstream not re-hit). composio pkg 85% coverage; all
green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): list all toolkits + dynamic auth-config resolution (MUL-3720)

Yushen's follow-up to the Notion MVP: surface the full Composio toolkit
catalog, render it in Settings, and drop the static env mapping in favor of
dynamic auth-config discovery.

Config correctness (per Composio docs):
- Remove COMPOSIO_AUTH_CONFIGS_JSON entirely. The toolkit→auth_config mapping
  is now resolved at request time from the project's /auth_configs (cached,
  5-min TTL), so enabling a toolkit is a dashboard action, not a redeploy.
- Do NOT add COMPOSIO_PROJECT_ID. The project API key (x-api-key) authenticates
  to exactly one project; the project is resolved from the key. Only org-level
  endpoints use x-org-api-key, which this integration never calls.

Backend:
- SDK: server/pkg/composio/auth_configs.go — ListAuthConfigs (toolkit_slug,
  is_composio_managed, show_disabled, limit, cursor).
- service: dynamic resolver (authConfigMap cache; betterAuthConfig prefers a
  custom/white-label config over Composio-managed, newest wins); BeginConnect
  and CompleteCallback resolve via it; ListToolkits fetches the full catalog
  (paginated, capped) annotated with connectable = has an enabled auth config,
  connectable-first ordering.
- handler + route: GET /api/integrations/composio/toolkits (user-scoped, 503
  when COMPOSIO_API_KEY unset) returning slug/name/logo/category/connectable.

Frontend:
- core: ComposioToolkit/ComposioConnection types, api client methods, and
  composio query options (@multica/core/composio).
- views: Settings → Integrations now has a Composio section rendering every
  toolkit as a card with search. Connect is gated on `connectable`;
  non-connectable toolkits show a muted "not configured" hint instead of a
  dead button. Connected toolkits show a badge + Disconnect (with confirm).
- i18n: composio block added to en/zh-Hans/ja/ko settings.

Tests: SDK + service (dynamic resolution, custom-over-managed preference,
connectable flag, resolver-error soft-degrade) and handler toolkits endpoint;
composio pkg 85.7% coverage. go build/vet/gofmt clean; core+views typecheck,
core+views lint, and core tests (691) all green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): close cross-toolkit callback fail-open by signing auth_config_id into state (MUL-3720)

Re-review blocker: CompleteCallback resolved the toolkit's auth config at
callback time and ignored a resolve error/empty result, while
verifyAccountOwnership skipped the auth-config comparison when the expected
value was empty. A user could then pass another toolkit's connected_account_id
into this toolkit's callback — the owner check passed and it was written under
the wrong toolkit_slug/account binding.

Fix: the auth_config_id is already resolved in BeginConnect (before the state
is signed), so sign it into the state and compare it exactly at callback. No
re-resolve, no fail-open. verifyAccountOwnership now fails closed when the
expected auth config is empty (rejects instead of skipping) and requires an
exact match — closing the cross-toolkit binding gap.

Tests: state round-trips auth_config_id; BeginConnect signs it; callback
rejects wrong/cross-toolkit auth config and an empty (no-mapping) auth config
fails closed. composio pkg 85.2% coverage, all green.

Frontend (non-blocking): the Composio settings tab now surfaces an error when
the connections query fails instead of silently rendering everything as
unconnected.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): hide Settings section entirely when integration unconfigured (MUL-3720)

Decision (option 2, hide-then-merge): don't show a card that leaks the internal
COMPOSIO_API_KEY env-var name to every end user. IntegrationsTab now gates the
whole Composio section (heading + body) on the toolkits query — a 503 means the
key is unset, so the section is withheld instead of rendering the not-configured
card. Admin-only setup guidance is a later, role-gated affordance.

Removed the notConfigured card (and now-unused ApiError import) from
ComposioTab; it only mounts when configured. views typecheck + lint clean.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): Stage 2 frontend polish — callback toast, last_used & expired UI, e2e (MUL-3718) (#4688)

* feat(composio): callback toast + refresh, last_used & expired UI, e2e (MUL-3718)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): real callback redirect route + StrictMode-safe toast dedup (MUL-3718 review)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): callback endpoint should not require Multica auth (MUL-3843) (#4709)

* fix(composio): move OAuth callback out of the Auth group (MUL-3843)

Composio 302-redirects the browser to /api/integrations/composio/callback
at the end of the OAuth flow, but PR #4608 mounted it inside the cookie-auth
middleware group. When the session cookie is absent (expired session,
SameSite=Strict / Safari ITP, private window, self-hosted callback subdomain)
the Auth middleware returned a hard 401 and a JSON blob instead of the
settings redirect, breaking the flow.

Identity never came from the cookie anyway: it is carried by the HMAC-signed
state param that CompleteCallback verifies (signature, expiry, replay) and
cross-checked by verifyAccountOwnership; h.Composio == nil still 503s. So the
callback is registered alongside the other public OAuth/webhook routes; the
other four composio endpoints stay session-gated.

Refs MUL-3843, MUL-3715.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): correct stale callback routing comments (MUL-3843)

The package header and ComposioCallback doc comments still described the
callback as sitting under the Auth middleware group. After the route was
moved out (this PR), update both to state it is a public route whose identity
comes from the signed state — addressing review nit from 张大彪.

Refs MUL-3843.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): inject MCP overlay into agent runtime at task dispatch (MUL-3721) (#4704)

Stage 3 of the Composio epic. Wires the per-user Composio MCP session into
every agent task so the agent process sees the initiator's connected tools
without any prompt-time plumbing.

Server side
  - Migration 128 adds agent_task_queue.runtime_mcp_overlay JSONB plus a
    BEFORE-UPDATE trigger that wipes the column on any transition into a
    terminal status (completed / failed / cancelled). A trigger is the single
    source of truth — future queries that flip status cannot bypass it.
  - composio.Service.BuildTaskOverlay(userID) reuses CreateMCPSession and
    emits the Claude-style { mcpServers: { composio: { type: http, url,
    headers } } } shape the daemon's existing sidecar generators consume.
    Returns (nil, nil) on zero active connections so we never burn a
    Composio session for a user with nothing to call.
  - TaskService grows a Composio ComposioOverlayBuilder seam, wired in
    router.go after composiointeg.NewService succeeds. Five enqueue paths
    (issue / mention / quick-create / chat / auto-retry) attach the overlay
    after CreateAgentTask returns and before the daemon is notified — so
    every claim reads a settled row, with no second daemon hop. Best-effort:
    a builder failure logs and proceeds with no overlay.
  - resolveInitiatorFromTriggerComment derives the initiator user from the
    trigger comment when it was authored by a member. Agent-authored
    triggers are not treated as initiators (their connected-apps view is
    empty by construction).

Daemon side
  - handler/daemon.go claim path merges task.runtime_mcp_overlay onto
    agent.mcp_config via mergeMCPOverlay before populating
    TaskAgentData.McpConfig. Overlay wins on server-name collisions
    because it carries the live user-scoped session URL. Errors fall back
    to the agent config unchanged — a bad overlay must not surprise-disable
    saved MCP tools. The existing execenv sidecar generators (cursor /
    codex / openclaw / opencode / hermes-kiro) need no changes: they keep
    consuming the merged result through TaskAgentData.McpConfig.

Tests
  - 9 merge cases (mcp_overlay_test): both-nil short-circuit, agent-only
    pass-through, overlay-only canonicalization, two-side merge, name
    collision (overlay wins), top-level key preservation, malformed agent
    fallback, malformed overlay fallback, non-object server rejection.
  - 4 dispatch cases (composio): zero-connections returns nil without
    CreateSession, happy-path emits the right shape with the right user
    id, empty-URL defensive branch, SDK error surfacing.
  - 4 TaskService helper cases: nil Composio is a no-op (Queries-safe),
    invalid initiator does not call the builder, nil overlay skips the
    UPDATE, builder error swallowed without panic.
  - Migration 128 verified to roll up + down + up cleanly against the test
    database.

Out of scope (deferred): assignment-triggered enqueue paths with no
trigger comment get no overlay attached today (no initiator UUID flows
through enqueueIssueTask in that case). Retry paths recompute the overlay
fresh from the parent's initiator_user_id instead of inheriting the bearer
from the parent row, so a stale token can never resurface on a retry.

Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): per-agent allowlist + originator-scoped MCP overlay (MUL-3869) (#4736)

* feat(composio): per-agent allowlist + originator-scoped MCP overlay (MUL-3869)

Stage 3.1 of the Composio epic (MUL-3721 parent). PR #4704 wired in the
runtime_mcp_overlay column and a per-task dispatch hook; this change
inverts the default from "all-on" to opt-in and locks the overlay to the
agent owner's own connected apps:

- Agents carry composio_toolkit_allowlist TEXT[]. NULL or [] => no MCP.
  Owner-only read/write; non-owner GET/PUT silently redacts/drops the
  field (same shape as mcp_config).
- agent_task_queue carries originator_user_id UUID. Set from the
  top-of-chain HUMAN at every enqueue path:
    * issue/mention comment by member  -> author_id
    * issue/mention comment by agent   -> inherit via comment.source_task_id
                                          -> parent task originator_user_id
    * quick-create                     -> requester_id
    * chat                             -> initiator_user_id
    * retry                            -> SQL-inherited from parent row
    * autopilot                        -> NULL (system-driven)
- BuildTaskOverlay (composio dispatch) now takes (ctx, originatorUserID,
  agent) and short-circuits on five gates: invalid originator,
  originator != agent.owner_id, empty allowlist, empty intersection of
  allowlist ∩ active connections, defensive empty session URL. Composio
  CreateSession is called with BOTH `toolkits.slugs` (the intersection)
  AND `connected_accounts` (the pinned account ids), narrowing the
  tool-router twice.
- The originator-vs-owner gate closes the agent-fanout privacy hole: any
  workspace member who can @-mention a public agent used to project the
  owner's connected apps into their run. Now the overlay only mounts
  when the human at the top of the chain IS the agent owner.

Tests:
- dispatch_test.go covers all 5 gates plus uppercase/whitespace slug
  normalisation.
- task_runtime_mcp_overlay_test.go covers the no-op gates of the new
  applyRuntimeMCPOverlay signature.
- agent_composio_allowlist_test.go (handler): owner roundtrip
  (list/empty/null), workspace-admin silent-drop, owner-only GET
  visibility, pure normaliseComposioToolkitAllowlist.
- resolve_originator_test.go (service, DB-backed): member-authored,
  agent-authored inherits via comment.source_task_id, invalid id.

Migration 129 up/down/up verified against docker postgres.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* chore(composio): gofmt + regenerate sqlc with v1.31.1 (MUL-3869 review nits)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): accept nested connected account auth config

* feat(views): creator-only MCP tab for per-agent Composio allowlist (MUL-3870) (#4743)

Stage 3.2 frontend on top of the Stage 3.1 backend (MUL-3869, 4708dba97).
Adds an agent-detail tab that lets the agent owner pick which of their own
active Composio connections this agent may mount as MCP servers, writing the
selection to agent.composio_toolkit_allowlist via the existing PUT /api/agents.

- core/types: composio_toolkit_allowlist (+ _redacted) on Agent; tri-state
  composio_toolkit_allowlist on UpdateAgentRequest (omit/no-change, null/clear,
  array/replace), matching the backend contract.
- core/agents: useUpdateAgentAllowlist - optimistic mutation hook (patches the
  cached workspace agent list, rolls back on error, invalidates on settle).
- views: AgentMcpTab renders the owner's active connections as checkboxes;
  empty state links to Settings -> Integrations; defensive redacted state.
- views: wired into AgentOverviewPane as tab "composio_mcp", labeled "MCP Apps"
  to disambiguate from the existing raw-JSON "MCP" (mcp_config) tab. The entry
  is gated to the creator (currentUserId === agent.owner_id), matching the
  backend's owner-only read/write of the allowlist.
- i18n: tabs.composio_mcp + tab_body.composio_mcp.* in en/ja/ko/zh-Hans.
- tests: agent-mcp-tab.test.tsx (gating, toggle->allowlist body, active-only,
  empty, redacted); e2e/agent-mcp.spec.ts (creator sees tab + PUT body,
  non-creator hidden) with Composio + agent endpoints mocked at the boundary.

Note: the product spec says "creator"; the schema has no creator_id - the
backend gate and redaction are keyed on owner_id, so the tab uses owner_id.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): mount remote MCP for codex

* feat(agents): agent invocation permission system (MUL-3963) (#4844)

* feat(agents): agent invocation permission system (permission_mode + invocation targets)

MUL-3963: split who may INVOKE an agent out of the overloaded visibility
column into an explicit, extensible model on feature/composio-integration.

- DB: agent.permission_mode (private|public_to) + agent_invocation_target
  table (workspace/member/team targets) + lossless backfill from visibility
  (migration 130).
- canInvokeAgent: owner-only for private (NO admin bypass, NO A2A bypass);
  public_to honours the allow-list; A2A judged by the top-of-chain originator.
- All trigger paths rewired: issue assign, comment @agent/@squad, chat,
  quick-create, autopilot, squad leader, child-done.
- Agent API: permission_mode + invocation_targets on responses and
  create/update (owner-only writes); legacy visibility kept as a derived field
  so old clients never see a permission widening.
- Composio: BuildTaskOverlay now FOLLOWS invocation permission and uses the
  agent OWNER connection (removed the originator==owner gate); front-end warns
  when a shared agent enables Composio apps.
- CLI: --permission-mode / --public-to-workspace / --public-to-member (legacy
  --visibility still mapped).
- Frontend: AccessPicker (Private / workspace / specific people / team soon),
  permission rules mirror canInvokeAgent, Composio warning banner.
- Tests: migration backfill, admin cannot invoke others private, public_to
  workspace/member whitelist, A2A by originator, Composio overlay uses owner
  connection.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(agents): stackable, mixed public_to invocation targets (MUL-3963)

Follow-up on PR #4844: public_to now supports selecting MULTIPLE, MIXED
targets on one agent (e.g. Public to workspace + specific people + team),
with canInvokeAgent admitting on ANY matching target (OR).

- Frontend AccessPicker: reworked from a single exclusive kind into a
  stackable multi-select — an "Everyone in workspace" toggle, a member
  multi-select checklist, and a (disabled, v1) team placeholder can be
  combined freely. Emits the full union of selected targets; empty union
  collapses to Private. Existing team targets are preserved across saves.
  Added the access.public_group locale string (en/zh-Hans/ja/ko).
- Backend already supported this (agent_invocation_target is multi-row per
  agent; create/update take a target ARRAY and batch-replace the whole
  allow-list; canInvokeAgent OR-matches). Added tests to lock it in:
  mixed member+team targets, overlapping-member batch replace, and
  workspace+member stacking then narrowing.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): address review on invocation permission (MUL-3963)

张大彪 review on PR #4844 — three blockers + product ruling + nits:

1. Migration 130: drop the FK/cascade on agent_invocation_target
   (agent_id, created_by) per the Multica no-FK rule; relationships are now
   maintained in the app layer (matching MUL-3515 §4). Added
   DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByArchivedRuntimeAgents and call it before
   DeleteArchivedAgentsByRuntime in all three runtime-delete paths
   (runtime.go x2, runtime_profile.go) so hard-deleting agents can't orphan
   target rows.
2. revokeAndRemoveMember: prune the leaving member's member-target grants
   (DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByMember) in the same tx as the member-row
   delete, so a re-invited user can't reclaim a stale invocation grant.
3. Empty public_to is a phantom — parsePermissionInput now normalises a
   public_to with no resolvable targets to a single workspace target, so
   `--permission-mode public_to` alone (and any empty target array) means
   "public to workspace" instead of "shared but nobody can run it".

Product ruling: the system/no-human-originator → workspace-target path in
canInvokeAgent is a deliberate, documented exception (webhook/system/
workspace-wide automation); member/team targets still fail closed without a
resolved originator. Documented in code + locked with a test.

Nits: refreshed the stale "originator must be owner" comments — models.go
(via migration 130 COMMENT ON COLUMN + sqlc regen for composio_toolkit_allowlist
and originator_user_id) and agent-mcp-tab.tsx — to the owner-connection +
invocation-permission rules.

Tests: member remove/re-add regression, system workspace exception + member
fail-closed, empty public_to → workspace (plus the earlier mixed/overlap/
batch-replace suite). Migration 130 applied to the test DB; Go handler/service/
composio suites green; views typecheck clean.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): scope member invocation-target cleanup to one workspace (MUL-3963)

张大彪 3rd review — cross-workspace permission bug + comment nits:

- DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByMember was a GLOBAL delete by user id, so
  removing a user from workspace A also wiped their member-target grants on
  agents in workspace B. Scoped it to a single workspace by joining through
  agent.workspace_id; revokeAndRemoveMember now passes (workspaceID, userID).
- Regression test TestRevokeMember_InvocationTargetCleanupIsWorkspaceScoped:
  same user allow-listed by agents in two workspaces; removal from one leaves
  the other workspace's target intact.
- Nits: refreshed the remaining stale "originator == agent.owner_id" /
  "owner-vs-originator" comments — CreateRetryTask (agent.sql, regenerated),
  and the AgentResponse allowlist doc + ListAgents/UpdateAgent redaction
  rationale in agent.go — to the owner-connection + invocation-permission rule.

Migration 130 applied to the test DB; Go handler/service/composio suites green;
go vet clean.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): agent access owner-only editable, read-only for others (MUL-3963) (#4853)

* fix(agents): make agent access owner-only editable, read-only for others (MUL-3963)

Interaction bug: a non-owner (incl. workspace admin) could open the AccessPicker
and set an agent public — the backend silently ignored it and the UI bounced
back to private. Access is owner-only, so non-owners must see a read-only state
and the backend must reject real changes explicitly.

Frontend:
- AccessPicker renders a static, non-interactive read-only state when the
  viewer is not the owner: the current access value + a lock affordance + a
  tooltip "Only the agent owner can change who can run this agent." No clickable
  trigger is rendered, so a non-owner can never open a control the backend would
  reject (the GitHub/Notion pattern for permission settings you can see but not
  edit). The editable multi-select picker is unchanged for the owner.
- agent-detail-inspector gates the picker on ownership specifically
  (currentUserId === agent.owner_id), NOT the general canEdit (which also admits
  admins, who may edit other fields but not access).
- New locale key access.owner_only_readonly (en/zh-Hans/ja/ko).

Backend:
- UpdateAgent now returns an explicit 403 when a non-owner submits a REAL
  permission change (permissionInputChangesAgent compares requested mode +
  target set against the persisted state); a no-op resubmit (admin PATCH-as-PUT
  echoing unchanged permission) is still tolerated so admin edits of other
  fields keep working. Replaces the previous silent-drop that caused the bounce.

Tests:
- access-picker.test.tsx: non-owner gets a non-interactive read-only display
  with the owner-only tooltip; owner gets an interactive picker; owner can pick
  a member and stack workspace + member.
- TestUpdateAgent_AccessChangeIsOwnerOnly: admin real change → 403; admin no-op
  resubmit → 200; admin editing other fields → 200; owner change → 200.

Incidental: fixed a pre-existing base typecheck break in
slash-command-suggestion.test.tsx (stray `signal` arg not in the suggestion
items type) that otherwise fails the whole @multica/views typecheck.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): compare legacy visibility, not expanded permission, for no-op detection (MUL-3963)

PR #4853 review: permissionInputChangesAgent expanded a legacy-only
visibility:"private" into a real private permission and compared it against the
agent's actual permission. A member-only public_to agent derives legacy
visibility "private", so an admin PATCH-as-PUT echoing visibility:"private"
while editing another field was misread as a public_to→private downgrade and
rejected with 403 — contradicting the "unchanged permission no-op is allowed"
contract.

Fix (per review): when a request carries ONLY legacy `visibility` (no
permission_mode / invocation_targets), derive the agent's CURRENT legacy
visibility from its real targets and compare the legacy string values. Equal =
no-op (allowed); a real legacy change (e.g. "workspace") still returns 403.
Requests that carry permission_mode / invocation_targets keep the precise
mode+target comparison.

Regression test TestUpdateAgent_LegacyVisibilityNoOpForMemberOnlyPublicTo:
member-only public_to agent — admin submitting visibility:"private" + a
non-permission field → 200 with targets unchanged; admin submitting
visibility:"workspace" → 403.

Go handler/composio suites green; migration 130 applied; go vet clean.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): brief agents on connected apps

* feat(composio): gate MCP apps behind feature flag

* fix(mobile): parse agent invocation permissions

* fix(tests): update agent fixtures for access fields

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: Multica Eve <eve@devv.ai>
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local>
2026-07-03 14:18:43 +08:00
Naiyuan Qing
b336f07617 Revert "feat(analytics): anonymous self-host onboarding source beacon (MUL-37…" (#4712)
This reverts commit 63eb6f73ad.
2026-06-29 19:01:14 +08:00
Naiyuan Qing
63eb6f73ad feat(analytics): anonymous self-host onboarding source beacon (MUL-3708) (#4691)
* feat(analytics): anonymous self-host onboarding source beacon (MUL-3708)

Production self-host servers now report the anonymous onboarding "how did
you hear about us" channel to Multica's public write-only ingest, so the
self-host source distribution becomes visible alongside official cloud.
Official cloud keeps its existing PostHog capture unchanged; this is a
submit-time beacon, not a background telemetry pipeline.

- server/internal/sourcebeacon: ShouldSend gate (production + non-local +
  non-*.multica.ai app host, fail-closed — judged by the app/frontend host,
  not the backend URL, which official often leaves unset), per-instance
  salted hashing, deterministic event uuid, fire-and-forget sender.
- POST /api/telemetry/self-host-source: public, write-only, per-IP
  rate-limited, 4 KiB body cap, channel allowlist, strict unknown-field
  rejection. Lands in PostHog as self_host_source_channel with a
  deterministic uuid (best-effort dedup), $process_person_profile=false,
  and deployment=self_host — a distinct event name so it never pollutes the
  official onboarding funnel.
- Hook in PatchOnboarding fires once when the source is first set; never
  blocks onboarding. Only channel enum(s) + two per-instance hashes leave
  the box — never user_id/email/name/workspace/org/domain/role/use_case/the
  source_other free-text/IP.
- migration 128: system_settings singleton holding instance_salt.
- frontend: self-host-only anonymous-collection notice on the source step,
  gated by a new /api/config self_host_source_notice flag (en/zh-Hans/ko/ja).
- analytics.Event gains an optional top-level uuid; docs/analytics.md,
  SELF_HOSTING.md and .env.example document exactly what is/isn't sent and
  how to disable it (ANALYTICS_DISABLED). Also fixes the long-standing
  team_size→source drift in docs/analytics.md.

Verified locally: go build/vet, go test (sourcebeacon, analytics, handler),
pnpm typecheck (all packages), locale parity (157), step-source (6) + core
config/schema (69) vitest, lint (0 errors).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(analytics): wire self-host source beacon through metrics, guard nil pool (MUL-3708)

Addresses Howard CI blockers on #4691 (no product-direction change):

- loadInstanceSalt returns "" on nil pool; salt is only loaded when
  ShouldSendFromEnv() is true, via a bounded (5s) context — restores the
  "router constructible without a DB" invariant (nil-pool routing tests).
- Add multica_self_host_source_channel_total counter (by source) + an
  IncForEvent case, so every analytics event is paired with a Prometheus
  counter. NormalizeSourceChannel reuses sourcebeacon allowlist (no 3rd copy).
- Beacon handler now builds the event via the analytics.SelfHostSourceChannel
  helper and ships it through obsmetrics.RecordEvent (no naked Capture); not
  IsMetricsOnly, so it still reaches PostHog.
- Prime the new family in the registry-families test.

Verified: go build/vet, go test ./internal/metrics ./internal/sourcebeacon
./internal/handler ./cmd/server (incl. the 3 named blockers + registry +
record-event-helper lints) all green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-06-29 15:56:16 +08:00
Bohan Jiang
6c17771cce fix: re-sign inline attachment media for token-mode clients (#4085)
The two prior MUL-3254 fixes preserved draft/description state across a
modal close, but Desktop still could not RENDER the reopened image: in
CloudFront signed-URL mode every URL the renderer holds after reopen is
unloadable. The persisted record strips the expired signed download_url,
the raw CDN url is unsigned (403 on a signed distribution), and the
durable /api/attachments/<id>/download endpoint needs credentials that a
cross-site file:// <img> fetch cannot carry (web works via the same-site
session cookie, which is why the bug was desktop-only).

Two changes close the last mile:

- /api/config now reports cdn_signed when CloudFront signing is enabled,
  and pickInlineMediaURL stops picking the raw (unsigned) CDN url in
  that mode — it is a guaranteed 403.
- The Attachment renderer upgrades an auth-gated media URL to a freshly
  signed one via authenticated GET /api/attachments/<id> (the same
  re-sign the click-time download path already does), but only on
  clients without a same-origin /api proxy (api.getBaseUrl() non-empty:
  Desktop, mobile webview). Cached via TanStack Query with a 20-minute
  staleTime, inside the server's 30-minute signed-URL TTL.

Old servers omit cdn_signed; the schema defaults it to false so behavior
is unchanged there. Non-CloudFront deployments return the API path again
from the metadata fetch and the renderer keeps the original URL.

Co-authored-by: J <j@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-06-15 13:54:36 +08:00
Xinmin Zeng
270d177475 fix: broken "Add a computer" command on Multica Cloud + two CLI amplifiers (MUL-3087) (#3817)
* fix(server): recognize official cloud by frontend host in daemon setup config

The 'Add a computer' dialog builds its command from /api/config's
daemon_server_url/daemon_app_url, falling back to 'multica setup' when
both are empty. The official cloud is meant to omit them, but the
omission only fired when MULTICA_PUBLIC_URL=https://api.multica.ai. When
that env is unset the server URL defaults to the frontend origin and the
old guard (which required serverURL host == api.multica.ai) didn't match,
so the dialog emitted 'multica setup self-host --server-url
https://multica.ai' — pointing the daemon backend at the frontend (no
/health, no WebSocket proxy).

Identify the official cloud by its frontend host alone (multica.ai /
app.multica.ai) so a missing or misconfigured MULTICA_PUBLIC_URL can no
longer leak the broken self-host command. Regression from #3474.

* fix(cli): probe before persisting self-host config to preserve auth on failure

setup self-host wrote a fresh CLIConfig{ServerURL, AppURL} (a full
overwrite that drops the saved token) and only then probed the server,
returning early on failure. A failed probe therefore logged the user out
and left them unconnected, with no recovery in the same command.

Probe first via persistSelfHostConfigIfReachable: an unreachable server
leaves the existing config — and its token — untouched (failed setup =
no-op). The prober is injected so both branches are unit-tested.

* fix(daemon): serve health before preflight so daemon start readiness is accurate

The CLI's 'daemon start' polls the health endpoint for 15s expecting
status=running, but the daemon only began serving health after
preflightAuth, whose initial workspace sync detects every configured
agent's version by exec'ing it (~20s cold with 8 agents). Health served
too late, so a perfectly healthy daemon printed 'may not have started
successfully'.

Start the health server right after resolveAuth (which still fails fast
on a missing token) and before the slow preflight, so readiness reflects
the daemon core being up rather than agent-version detection finishing.

* fix(daemon): gate /health readiness so daemon start can't report a false start

Serving health before preflightAuth fixed the false-negative (a healthy
daemon printed "may not have started"), but health still returned
status:"running" unconditionally — before preflight (PAT renew + workspace
sync + runtime registration) had completed. `daemon start` and the desktop
treat "running" as ready, so a slow or *failing* preflight could be
misreported as a started daemon: setup prints "connected", then the process
exits or hangs in agent-version detection with no runtime registered. That
is harder to diagnose than the original false-negative.

Split liveness from readiness: bind/serve the health port early (so callers
see a live "starting" daemon instead of connection-refused), but report
status:"starting" until d.ready is set after preflight, then "running".

- daemon.go: add d.ready (atomic.Bool); set it true after the background
  loops launch, before pollLoop.
- health.go: healthHandler reports "starting" until ready, else "running".
- cmd_daemon.go: `daemon start` waits for "running" with a deadline raised
  to 45s (covers cold-start agent detection) and a clearer "still starting"
  message; new daemonAlive() helper treats both "running" and "starting" as
  a live daemon, so the already-running guard, restart, and stop act on a
  starting daemon and don't double-spawn or race its listener; `daemon
  status` shows "starting" distinctly.

Older CLIs/desktop that only know "running" safely treat "starting" as
not-ready (status != "running"), so no boundary break.

Tests: health reports starting-then-running; daemonAlive truth table.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(desktop): handle daemon "starting" health status in lifecycle

The daemon now reports /health status:"starting" until preflight completes
(liveness/readiness split). That made "starting" a new external contract of
/health, but the Desktop daemon-manager only knew "running", so the readiness
fix would have moved the CLI's false-negative into a Desktop start regression:

- `daemon start` now blocks up to 45s waiting for readiness, but the Desktop
  spawned it via execFile({ timeout: 20_000 }). On a cold start (the ~20s agent
  detection this PR targets) Electron killed the CLI supervisor at 20s and
  reported a start failure, even though the detached daemon child kept booting —
  the UI flashed "stopped" then "running". Raise the timeout to 60s (must exceed
  the CLI's 45s startupTimeout).
- The Desktop treated only raw status === "running" as a live daemon, so a
  daemon that was still "starting" (booting on its own or started via the CLI)
  showed as "stopped", and startDaemon() would spawn a second one — which the new
  CLI rejects as "already running", surfacing as a start error.

Add daemonStatusAlive() (shared, pure, unit-tested) mirroring the Go daemonAlive()
and use it for liveness: fetchHealth() surfaces a daemon-reported "starting" as
state "starting" regardless of our own currentState; startDaemon()'s
already-running guard and the restart-on-user-switch guard treat "starting" as an
existing daemon. version-decision stays gated on "running" (readiness, not
liveness) — unchanged.

Verified: desktop typecheck, eslint, full vitest suite (193 tests) all pass.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: J <j@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-06-05 17:01:23 +08:00
Ivan Vinokurov
9aa8ba0191 fix(runtimes): self-host daemon setup URLs (MUL-2804) (#3474)
Expose self-host daemon setup URLs from /api/config at runtime so the Add computer dialog renders the operator's own server/app domains, while Multica Cloud defaults stay unchanged.

Fixes #3013.
2026-05-30 18:13:02 +08:00
Bohan Jiang
90ddfb04e2 feat(self-host): DISABLE_WORKSPACE_CREATION env var (MUL-2777) (#3441)
* feat(self-host): DISABLE_WORKSPACE_CREATION env var (MUL-2777, #3433)

When self-hosters set DISABLE_WORKSPACE_CREATION=true, POST /api/workspaces
returns 403 for every caller and the UI hides every "Create workspace"
affordance (sidebar, modal, /workspaces/new page, onboarding Step 2). This
closes the gap where ALLOW_SIGNUP=false still let any signed-in user open
an isolated workspace the platform admin couldn't see.

- server: new Config.DisableWorkspaceCreation, gate in CreateWorkspace,
  workspace_creation_disabled in /api/config, Go tests.
- frontend: new workspaceCreationDisabled in configStore, hide sidebar
  entry, swap NewWorkspacePage / CreateWorkspaceModal / onboarding
  StepWorkspace to a "creation disabled, ask for invite" state when the
  flag is on, EN + zh-Hans locale strings.
- ops: .env.example, docker-compose.selfhost, helm values + configmap,
  SELF_HOSTING.md, SELF_HOSTING_ADVANCED.md, environment-variables docs
  (EN + zh).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(onboarding): drive create path off workspaceCreationAllowed (#3433)

PR #3441 review: when DISABLE_WORKSPACE_CREATION=true and the user already
has a workspace, StepWorkspace still walked the resume copy (`headline_resume`
/ `lede_resume` mentioning "or start another") and `creatingActive` ignored
the flag, leaving a stale clickable create CTA possible if /api/config
arrived late.

Refactor StepWorkspace to derive a single `workspaceCreationAllowed`
boolean from the config store. It now drives:

- Initial `mode` state (defaults to "existing" when disabled + reusing so
  the CTA is pre-armed for the only valid action).
- `creatingActive` so the footer CTA cannot fall back into the create
  branch even mid-render.
- Eyebrow / headline / lede strings — adds
  `creation_disabled_{eyebrow,headline,lede}_resume` (EN + zh-Hans) for
  the disabled + reusing variant.

Tests: cover the three reachable shapes — flag off + no existing, flag on
+ no existing, flag on + existing.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: J <j@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-05-28 16:42:08 +08:00
Multica Eve
ce00e05169 Add canonical PostHog core metrics events (#2302)
* Add canonical PostHog core metrics events

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* Address analytics review feedback

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* Tighten analytics review follow-ups

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Devv <devv@Devvs-Mac-mini.local>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-05-09 13:12:00 +08:00
Bohan Jiang
9dcc082920 docs(handler): note that GetConfig is public-only and what may be returned (#1538)
Adds a doc comment on GetConfig spelling out that the endpoint is mounted on
the unauthenticated route group (so the login page can fetch GoogleClientID /
AllowSignup before the user is signed in) and that only instance-level public
fields may be added. Prevents accidentally returning user- or tenant-scoped
data from this handler in the future.
2026-04-23 01:51:59 +08:00
devv-eve
fbf41bde73 feat(selfhost): ship public GHCR deployment flow
Publish stable GHCR self-host images, switch self-host deploys to official image pulls with a source-build fallback, and move self-host signup / Google OAuth config onto runtime /api/config.
2026-04-22 16:58:42 +08:00
devv-eve
637bdc8eb3 feat(analytics): full PostHog pipeline + 6 funnel events (MUL-1122) (#1367)
* feat(analytics): add PostHog client with async batch shipping

Introduces server/internal/analytics, the shipping layer for the product
funnel defined in docs/analytics.md. Capture is non-blocking — events are
enqueued into a bounded channel and a background worker batches them to
PostHog's /batch/ endpoint. A broken backend drops events rather than
blocking request handlers.

Local dev and self-hosted instances run a noop client until the operator
sets POSTHOG_API_KEY. This is PR 1 of MUL-1122; signup and workspace_created
emission land in the follow-up commit so this change is independently
reviewable.

* feat(server): emit signup and workspace_created analytics events

Wires analytics.Client through handler.New and main, then emits the first
two funnel events:

- signup fires from findOrCreateUser (which now reports isNew), covering
  both the verification-code and Google OAuth entry points — a single
  emission site guarantees Google signups aren't missed.
- workspace_created fires after the CreateWorkspace transaction commits,
  with is_first_workspace computed from a post-commit ListWorkspaces count
  so we can distinguish fresh-user activation from returning-user
  expansion.

Tests use analytics.NoopClient so nothing ships from test runs. PR 1 of
MUL-1122; runtime_registered and issue_executed follow in later PRs per
the plan.

* refactor(analytics): drop is_first_workspace from workspace_created

Stamping "is this the user's first workspace?" at emit time races under
concurrent CreateWorkspace requests: two transactions committing close
together can both read a post-commit count greater than one and both emit
false. Fixing it at the SQL layer requires a schema change we don't want in
PR 1.

PostHog answers the same question exactly from the event stream (funnel on
"first time user does X" / cohort on $initial_event), so removing the
property loses no information and makes the emit side race-free.

* docs(analytics): document self-host safety defaults

Spell out why self-hosted instances never ship events upstream by default
(empty POSTHOG_API_KEY → noop client) and explain how operators can point
at their own PostHog project without any code change.

* feat(analytics): emit runtime_registered, issue_executed, team_invite_*

Three server-side funnel events, all gated on first-time state transitions
so retries and re-runs don't inflate the WAW buckets:

- runtime_registered fires from DaemonRegister when UpsertAgentRuntime
  reports (xmax = 0) — i.e. the row was inserted, not updated. Heartbeats
  and re-registrations stay silent.
- issue_executed fires from CompleteTask after an atomic
  UPDATE issue SET first_executed_at = now() WHERE id = $1 AND
  first_executed_at IS NULL flips the column for the first time. Retries,
  re-assignments, and comment-triggered follow-up tasks hit the WHERE
  clause and no-op. Carries nth_issue_for_workspace so the ≥1/≥2/≥5/≥10
  buckets filter without extra queries.
- team_invite_sent fires from CreateInvitation and team_invite_accepted
  from AcceptInvitation, closing the expansion funnel.

Adds a 050 migration for issue.first_executed_at plus a partial index so
the workspace-scoped executed-count query doesn't scan the never-executed
tail.

* feat(config): surface PostHog key via /api/config

Extends AppConfig with posthog_key / posthog_host sourced from env on
every request (so operators can rotate the key via secret refresh without
a restart). Reading the key off the server — rather than baking it into
the frontend bundle via NEXT_PUBLIC_* — means self-hosted instances
inherit the blank key automatically and never ship events upstream.

* feat(analytics): wire posthog-js identify + UTM capture on the client

Adds @multica/core/analytics — a thin wrapper around posthog-js that owns
attribution capture and identity merge. Posthog-js config comes from
/api/config (not NEXT_PUBLIC_*), so self-hosted instances whose server
returns an empty key automatically run the SDK inert.

captureSignupSource stamps a multica_signup_source cookie with UTM params
and the referrer's origin (never the full referrer — that can leak OAuth
code/state in the callback URL). The backend signup event reads this
cookie on new-user creation.

Identity flows:
- auth-initializer fires identify() right after getMe() resolves, on both
  cookie and token paths. A getConfig/getMe race is handled by buffering
  a pending identify inside the analytics module and flushing it once
  initAnalytics finishes.
- auth store calls identify() on verifyCode / loginWithGoogle /
  loginWithToken and resetAnalytics() on logout so the next login merges
  cleanly without bleeding events.

* docs(analytics): describe runtime_registered, issue_executed, invite events

Fills in the schema for the remaining funnel events. Captures the
design commentary that belongs next to the contract rather than in a PR
description — in particular why issue_executed uses the atomic
first_executed_at flip instead of counting task-terminal events, and why
runtime_registered relies on xmax = 0 rather than a query-then-write.

* fix(analytics): drop non-atomic nth_issue_for_workspace from issue_executed

Computing the workspace's Nth-issue ordinal at emit time is not atomic
under concurrent first-completions — two transactions can both run
MarkIssueFirstExecuted, then both run CountExecutedIssuesInWorkspace, and
both observe count=1 before either has committed, so both events go out
stamped as n=1. Serialising it would mean a per-workspace advisory lock
or a SERIALIZABLE-isolated tx; PostHog answers the same question exactly
at query time via row_number() partitioned by workspace_id, so the
emit-time property adds risk without adding information.

Removes the property from analytics.IssueExecuted, deletes the unused
CountExecutedIssuesInWorkspace query, and regenerates sqlc. The partial
index stays — any future workspace-scoped executed-issue query will want
it.

* fix(analytics): wire $pageview and harden signup_source cookie payload

Two frontend fixes from the PR review:

- PageviewTracker, mounted under WebProviders, fires capturePageview on
  every Next.js App Router path / query-string change. Without this the
  capturePageview helper in @multica/core/analytics was never called and
  the acquisition funnel's / → signup step was empty.
- captureSignupSource now caps each UTM / referrer value at 96 chars
  *before* JSON.stringify, and drops the whole cookie when the serialised
  payload still exceeds 512 chars. Previously the overall slice(0, 256)
  could leave a half-JSON string on the wire that neither the backend nor
  PostHog could parse.

Both capturePageview and identify now buffer a single pending call when
fired before initAnalytics resolves — otherwise the initial "/" pageview
and same-turn login identify race the /api/config fetch and get dropped.
resetAnalytics clears both buffers so a logout→login cycle stays clean.

* fix(analytics): URL-decode signup_source cookie on read

Go does not URL-decode Cookie.Value automatically, so the frontend's
JSON-then-encodeURIComponent payload was landing in PostHog as
percent-encoded garbage (%7B%22utm_source...). Unescape on read so the
backend receives the original JSON string the frontend intended, and
drop values that fail to decode or exceed the server-side cap — sending
truncated garbage is worse than sending nothing. Oversized-cookie guard
matches the frontend's SIGNUP_SOURCE_MAX_LEN.

* docs(analytics): reflect nth-issue drop, $pageview wiring, cookie encoding

Pulls the schema doc back in line with the code: issue_executed no longer
advertises nth_issue_for_workspace (with a note about why PostHog derives
it at query time instead), the frontend $pageview section names the
actual PageviewTracker component that fires it, and the signup_source
section documents the per-value cap / overall drop rule and the
encode-on-write / decode-on-read contract.

---------

Co-authored-by: Jiang Bohan <bhjiang@outlook.com>
2026-04-21 14:42:52 +08:00
Naiyuan Qing
53cb01cc91 refactor(editor): remove hardcoded CDN domain, unify file card rendering
- Add GET /api/config endpoint exposing cdn_domain from CLOUDFRONT_DOMAIN
- Create packages/core/config/ zustand store, fetched at app startup
- Extract file card preprocessing to packages/ui/markdown/file-cards.ts
  with isCdnUrl(url, cdnDomain) using exact hostname match
- Add file card support to packages/ui/markdown/Markdown.tsx (was missing)
- Remove hardcoded .copilothub.ai hostname check from file-card.tsx
- Fix LocalStorage.CdnDomain() to return hostname not full URL
- Always run preprocessFileCards regardless of cdnDomain availability
  (!file syntax works without CDN domain, only legacy matching needs it)
- Use useConfigStore hook in common/markdown.tsx for reactive updates

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-15 10:43:36 +08:00