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35 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Dmitry
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0c2f93bcd1 | fix: allow same-origin attachment previews (#4679) | ||
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Bohan Jiang
|
81bde585ba |
MUL-3467: batch load squad roster skills (#4386)
* MUL-3467: batch load squad roster skills Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> * test: isolate redis-backed test databases Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> --------- Co-authored-by: J <j@multica.ai> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> |
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LinYushen
|
3943358e67 | feat(billing): proxy /api/cloud-billing/* + Stripe webhook to multica-cloud (#3434) | ||
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LinYushen
|
c968c13c87 |
feat(auth): support mcn_ Cloud Node PATs verified via Fleet (#3349)
* feat(auth): support mcn_ Cloud Node PATs verified via Fleet
Adds a new token kind, mcn_ (multica cloud node), recognized in both
the regular Auth and DaemonAuth middlewares. mcn_ tokens are minted
and owned by Multica Cloud (not the local personal_access_tokens
table); the server validates them by POSTing to the Fleet's
/api/v1/pat/verify endpoint and uses the returned owner_id as
X-User-ID for downstream handlers.
Cloud is the authoritative owner of token status, so this is a
verifier-only path with no DB fallback:
* Fleet says valid:false -> 401 (token genuinely bad)
* Fleet unreachable / 5xx -> 503 (transient, retry)
* No MULTICA_CLOUD_FLEET_URL configured -> 401 (fail closed)
Verification results are cached in Redis for 60s under
mul:auth:mcn:<sha256> to bound the per-request load on Fleet without
extending the revocation window beyond what the Cloud doc allows.
Negative results are NOT cached, so a freshly minted token doesn't
get locked out by a stale 'token_not_found'.
Reuses MULTICA_CLOUD_FLEET_URL (the same env the cloud-runtime proxy
already uses) so deployments don't need a second config knob.
Tests cover the happy path, every documented invalid reason, 4xx/5xx
mapping, network error, decode error, ctx cancellation, the
fail-closed valid:true-without-owner_id case, trailing-slash URL
normalization, and the Redis cache short-circuit + negative
no-cache contract. Middleware tests pin the four 401/503/200 outcomes
in both Auth and DaemonAuth.
* auth(mcn): require owner_id to map to a real local user; drop X-User-PAT plumbing
Two related changes:
1. Cloud-verified owner_id is now checked against our local users table.
The Cloud owner_id and our users.id share the same UUID space by
contract; a missing local user means either the row was deleted
under an active node or something is forging owner_ids — either
way, fail closed.
CloudPATVerifier.Verify takes a new OwnerLookupFunc:
- returns (true, nil) -> success, cache + return
- returns (false, nil) -> ErrCloudPATInvalid (reason='owner_unknown'),
NOT cached (so a freshly-created user
doesn't get locked out for a TTL window)
- returns (_, error) -> ErrCloudPATUnavailable (transient,
middleware emits 503)
Both Auth and DaemonAuth wire ownerLookupFor(queries), a new shared
helper that wraps queries.GetUser, mapping pgx.ErrNoRows / unparseable
UUIDs to (false, nil) and other errors to a real Go error.
2. Removed all X-User-PAT plumbing. Cloud now mints node-scoped mcn_
PATs itself during /api/v1/nodes (see multica-cloud
docs/api/node-pat.md) and ships them into the EC2 instance via SSM,
so multica-api no longer needs to forward the caller's mul_ PAT.
Propagating a long-lived user PAT into a remote machine widened
the blast radius of any node compromise; that's gone now.
Removed:
- cloud_runtime.go: withUserPAT option, cloudRuntimeUserPAT,
generateCloudRuntimePAT, revokeGeneratedPAT
- cloudruntime/Request.UserPAT field + X-User-PAT header
- X-User-PAT from CORS allowed headers
- obsolete handler tests:
TestCreateCloudRuntimeNodeForwardsValidatedPAT
TestCreateCloudRuntimeNodeRejectsUnownedPAT
TestCreateCloudRuntimeNodeRejectsExpiredPAT
TestCreateCloudRuntimeNodeAutoGeneratesPAT
replaced with TestCreateCloudRuntimeNodeForwardsBody
- X-User-PAT references in packages/core/api/client.test.ts
Tests:
* 3 new verifier-level tests (owner_unknown not cached, lookup error
-> Unavailable, success path is cached for both fleet AND lookup)
* 5 new owner_lookup_test.go tests (nil queries, existing user,
missing user, malformed UUID, DB error)
* 1 new end-to-end DaemonAuth test (cloud says valid, no local user
-> 401)
* Existing X-User-PAT TS assertions removed; full vitest run passes.
* go test ./... and go vet ./... clean on the server module.
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Bohan Jiang
|
13f74e651a |
feat(agents): remove custom_env from agent resources, add audited env endpoint (MUL-2600) (#3209)
* feat(agents): remove custom_env from agent resources, add audited env endpoint (MUL-2600)
The agent resource shape (list / get / create / update / archive /
restore responses + WebSocket events) no longer carries `custom_env`
values. Reads/writes of env now flow exclusively through a dedicated
`/api/agents/{id}/env` endpoint that is owner/admin-only, rejects
agent-actor sessions, applies a "****" sentinel preserve guard on
PUT, and writes a persistent audit row per reveal/update.
Why
- `multica agent list --output json` historically returned plaintext
`custom_env` for owner/admin callers (the redaction gate gave only
members the masked map). Any agent token running on the workspace
inherits its owner's role and could read every other agent's
secrets just by listing.
- Patching list/get redaction alone (PR #3175 direction) left
symmetric leaks via mutation responses, WS events, the "reveal"
path itself (no actor-aware auth), and a `****` overwrite footgun
on UpdateAgent.
What changed
- Backend: drop `custom_env` from AgentResponse; add coarse
`has_custom_env` + `custom_env_key_count`. Strip env handling from
UpdateAgent (silently ignored if sent). Keep CreateAgent's
custom_env acceptance.
- Backend: new GET/PUT `/api/agents/{id}/env` handlers in
`internal/handler/agent_env.go`:
- resolveActor → 403 for agent actors (closes the lateral-movement
path).
- Owner/admin role gate via existing helper.
- PUT honours value == "****" as "preserve existing value".
- Both write to `activity_log` with `agent_env_revealed` /
`agent_env_updated` actions. Audit details record key names only,
never values.
- Daemon claim path (`ClaimAgentTask`) unchanged — `TaskAgentData`
still carries plaintext env for runtime injection.
- SQL: new `UpdateAgentCustomEnv` query; sqlc regenerated (v1.31.1).
- CLI: new `multica agent env get|set` subcommands. `--custom-env*`
flags removed from `multica agent update`; the no-fields error
now points to the new path.
- Frontend: drop env fields from `Agent` + `UpdateAgentRequest`; add
`getAgentEnv` / `updateAgentEnv` client methods; rewrite env-tab
to show "N variables configured" + explicit "Reveal & edit"
button, fetching values only on intentional reveal.
- Locales: parity-safe additions to en + zh-Hans.
- Docs: agents-create.{mdx,zh.mdx} reflect the new threat model and
endpoint.
- Mobile: schema drops `custom_env` / `custom_env_redacted`, adds
metadata fields.
Tests
- Handler tests pinned the new invariants: no env in list/get
responses, owner reveal happy-path + audit row, agent-actor 403,
`****` sentinel preserves real values, UpdateAgent silently
ignores `custom_env`, pure `mergeAgentEnv` cases.
- CLI tests pivot to the new flag surface: `agent update` MUST NOT
expose the env flags; `agent env set` MUST expose
--custom-env-stdin/--custom-env-file.
- Frontend test fixtures updated; pnpm typecheck / test / lint
pass cleanly.
This is a breaking API change. Scripts that read `custom_env` from
`/api/agents` must migrate to `GET /api/agents/{id}/env`.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(agents): close actor-spoofing + audit fail-closed in env endpoints (MUL-2600)
Addresses Elon's review of #3209:
* Mint a task-scoped `mat_` token per claim, bound to (agent, task,
workspace, owner). Daemon injects it into the agent process in place
of its own credential. Auth middleware authoritatively rebuilds
X-User-ID / X-Agent-ID / X-Task-ID from the token row and sets
X-Actor-Source=task_token; that header is server-set only — incoming
values are stripped before any auth branch runs. resolveActor honors
the header so an agent that strips X-Agent-ID / X-Task-ID still
resolves as actor=agent.
* GetAgentEnv / UpdateAgentEnv are now fail-closed on audit-log
failures: GET refuses to return plaintext, PUT persists inside the
same tx as the audit row so they commit/roll back together.
* PUT /api/agents/{id} returns 400 when the body carries custom_env
instead of silently dropping it — directs callers to the audited env
endpoint.
* Agent actors never see mcp_config, even when the underlying member
is owner/admin; mutation broadcasts go through a redaction shim so
WS subscribers don't pick it up either.
* Fix backend test that asserted dense JSON (jsonb::text renders
whitespace) and frontend test that assumed a unique "Test User"
match.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(agents): close residual MUL-2600 gaps from review (MUL-2600)
Migration 108 FK now correctly references agent_task_queue(id) instead
of the non-existent agent_task table; the previous name blocked CI
backend migrations.
Task-token-authenticated requests can no longer be re-routed at a
different workspace by passing workspace_slug / workspace_id /
?workspace_id / a URL workspace param. ResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest
and resolveWorkspaceUUID both short-circuit on X-Actor-Source=task_token
and return only the token-bound X-Workspace-ID; buildMiddleware adds a
defence-in-depth 403 if any URL-resolved workspace disagrees with the
token binding.
mcp_config no longer leaks back to agent actors through UpdateAgent /
CreateAgent / ArchiveAgent / RestoreAgent HTTP responses — the same
redactAgentResponseForActor helper that GetAgent/ListAgents use is now
applied to mutation responses too. WS broadcasts were already redacted
via broadcastAgentResponse.
FailTask and every TaskService cancel path (CancelTask /
CancelTasksForIssue / CancelTasksForAgent / CancelTasksByTriggerComment
/ BroadcastCancelledTasks) now eagerly DeleteTaskTokensByTask so the
mat_ token's 24h window doesn't outlive a terminated task. Failure is
non-fatal — the FK cascade and expiry remain durable guards.
Doc-only: clarify that PUT /api/agents/{id} now hard-rejects bodies
that carry custom_env (was previously "silently ignores").
Tests:
- middleware: TestResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest gains a task_token
case asserting client-supplied slug/id/query cannot override the
bound workspace.
- handler: TestUpdateAgent_RedactsMcpConfigForAgentActor and
TestUpdateAgent_KeepsMcpConfigForMemberActor pin the mutation-
response redaction contract per actor type.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(agents): match redacted mcp_config as JSON null, not Go nil (MUL-2600)
`AgentResponse.McpConfig` is `json.RawMessage` without `omitempty`, so
the redacted response serialises as `"mcp_config": null`. On decode,
`json.RawMessage` keeps the literal bytes `null` rather than collapsing
to Go nil, which made the assertion fire on a non-leak.
The product contract (field always present, distinguished from "no
config" via `mcp_config_redacted`) is intentional, so adjust the test
to check for "no secret-bearing content" instead of weakening the
contract via `omitempty`.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
---------
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
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iYuan
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2f1f90c11a | fix(agent): retry codex semantic inactivity fresh (#2593) | ||
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Kagura
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59617f376e |
feat(auth): make auth token TTL configurable via AUTH_TOKEN_TTL env var (MUL-2371) (#2713)
* feat(auth): make auth token TTL configurable via AUTH_TOKEN_TTL env var Add AUTH_TOKEN_TTL environment variable (in seconds) to override the hardcoded 30-day auth token lifetime. Self-hosted deployments on trusted networks can set a longer value to avoid frequent magic-link re-authentication. The value is read once at startup and cached. Invalid or missing values fall back to the 30-day default with a warning log. Closes #2685 * refactor(auth): extract parseAuthTokenTTL for testability Address review feedback: extract pure parse function from sync.Once wrapper so the parsing logic can be unit-tested independently. Add TestParseAuthTokenTTL with table-driven cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(auth): accept Go duration strings + hoist shared TTL in SetAuthCookies Address nice-to-have review feedback from Bohan-J: - parseAuthTokenTTL now tries time.ParseDuration first (e.g. '8760h'), falling back to ParseInt for integer seconds - Warn on unreasonable values (>10 years) but still accept them - Hoist AuthTokenTTL() and time.Now() in SetAuthCookies so both cookies share the exact same expiry - Add security trade-off note in .env.example - Add 5 new test cases for duration strings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: kagura-agent <kagura.agent.ai@gmail.com> * fix: use AuthTokenTTL() in CloudFront middleware, guard ParseInt overflow Address review feedback from Bohan-J (round 2): 1. CloudFront refresh middleware (cloudfront.go:21) was hardcoding 30*24*time.Hour instead of using auth.AuthTokenTTL(). Now calls AuthTokenTTL() so the middleware respects AUTH_TOKEN_TTL env var. 2. parseAuthTokenTTL integer-seconds branch: very large values like 9999999999 would silently overflow int64 when multiplied by time.Second. Added overflow guard comparing against math.MaxInt64/int64(time.Second) before the multiplication. 3. Updated AuthTokenTTL() doc comment to reflect that it accepts Go duration strings or integer seconds (not just seconds). 4. Added middleware test (cloudfront_test.go) verifying short AUTH_TOKEN_TTL produces short cookie expiry, not 30-day hardcode. Also covers nil signer and existing-cookie-skip cases. 5. Added integer overflow test case to cookie_test.go. * style: run gofmt on cookie.go and cookie_test.go --------- Signed-off-by: kagura-agent <kagura.agent.ai@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Zohar Babin
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e50bfc88da |
fix(auth): add per-IP rate limiting on public auth endpoints (#2636)
Adds a Redis-backed fixed-window rate limiter middleware on /auth/send-code, /auth/verify-code, and /auth/google. Prevents brute-force enumeration, verification_code table flooding, and connection pool exhaustion from rapid-fire unauthenticated requests. Key design decisions per reviewer feedback: - X-Forwarded-For trust model: XFF is NEVER trusted by default. Only honored when RemoteAddr is from a CIDR in RATE_LIMIT_TRUSTED_PROXIES. Uses rightmost-untrusted algorithm (walks XFF right-to-left, returns first non-trusted IP). Matches the project's conservative model in health_realtime.go. - Atomic INCR+EXPIRE via Lua script: prevents a stuck key (permanent ban) if EXPIRE fails independently. Follows existing Lua script pattern in runtime_local_skills_redis_store.go. - Fixed-window counter (not sliding-window): simple, adequate for auth rate limiting where precision at window boundaries is acceptable. - Fail-open with startup warning: nil Redis disables rate limiting (same as PATCache), but logs a warning at startup so ops can see. - IPv6 normalization: net.ParseIP().String() produces canonical form. - Configurable via env vars: RATE_LIMIT_AUTH (default 5/min), RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_VERIFY (default 20/min), RATE_LIMIT_TRUSTED_PROXIES. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kerim Incedayi
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9418d2a2c1 |
feat(autopilots): webhook triggers (server + CLI + UI + docs) MUL-2049 (#2348)
* feat(server): add webhook trigger DB migration + sqlc queries
Lays the foundation for webhook autopilot triggers:
- partial unique index on autopilot_trigger.webhook_token (kind=webhook only)
so the public ingress route can resolve a trigger in O(1)
- GetWebhookTriggerByToken / TouchAutopilotTriggerFiredAt /
RotateAutopilotTriggerWebhookToken / SetAutopilotTriggerWebhookToken
queries, regenerated with sqlc
* feat(server): webhook token generator + payload normalizer
Two pure helpers for the webhook autopilot work:
- generateWebhookToken: 32 random bytes -> base64-url, "awt_" prefix.
256 bits of entropy keeps brute-force off the table; the prefix makes
leaked tokens recognisable in logs.
- normalizeWebhookPayload: turns arbitrary JSON into the WebhookEnvelope
shape (event/eventPayload/request) used by trigger_payload. Header- and
body-based event inference covers GitHub, GitLab, X-Event-Type, and
caller-provided envelopes; scalar/empty/invalid bodies are rejected so
the handler can answer 400.
* feat(server): generate webhook tokens and expose rotate endpoint
- New handler.Config.PublicURL fed by MULTICA_PUBLIC_URL env so
/api/autopilots/.../triggers responses can include an absolute
webhook_url alongside the always-present webhook_path.
- CreateAutopilotTrigger now mints a webhook_token via crypto/rand
for kind=webhook and ignores cron/timezone for non-schedule kinds.
api triggers stay accepted-but-inert per PLAN.md.
- New POST /api/autopilots/{id}/triggers/{triggerId}/rotate-webhook-token
protected by the existing workspace auth group; old tokens stop
working immediately because the unique-index lookup keys on the
current row value.
* feat(server): public webhook ingress route + per-token rate limiter
- New POST /api/webhooks/autopilots/{token} route, mounted outside the
authenticated group: the path token is the credential. Workspace
context is derived from the joined autopilot row, never headers.
- Body capped at 256 KiB via http.MaxBytesReader; oversized payloads
return 413 mid-read instead of being fully buffered.
- Disabled triggers / paused / archived autopilots return
200 {"status":"ignored"} so providers stop retrying.
- Skipped-runtime dispatches surface 200 {"status":"skipped"} with the
reason from the autopilot service's pre-flight admission check.
- WebhookRateLimiter interface with sliding-window in-memory + Redis
Lua-script implementations. Default 60 req/min per token. Test
coverage on the in-memory path; Redis variant fails open on cache
errors so a Redis hiccup never blocks ingress.
- Integration tests exercise token generation, dispatch, payload
envelope persistence, GitHub-header inference, paused/disabled
short-circuits, oversized rejection, and rotate-then-old-token-404.
* feat(server): include webhook payload in create_issue description
When an autopilot run is triggered by a webhook and execution_mode is
create_issue, the agent only sees the issue body — never the run's
trigger_payload. Append a 'Webhook event:' line and a fenced JSON block
with the normalized eventPayload so the agent has the inbound context
inline. Schedule / manual runs are unchanged.
Tests cover:
- schedule path keeps existing italic note, no webhook block
- webhook path emits event line + payload block, italic before block
- non-envelope JSON falls back to raw body (defensive)
- non-webhook source with payload still gets no webhook block
* feat(core): types, API client and mutations for webhook triggers
- AutopilotRunStatus gains 'skipped' so the run-list UI handles the
admission-skipped state explicitly instead of falling through to a
generic case (the backend already emits it via MUL-1899).
- AutopilotTrigger picks up optional webhook_path / webhook_url. Both
are optional so older self-hosted servers that pre-date this change
still parse cleanly.
- buildAutopilotWebhookUrl helper composes a usable absolute URL with
the priority webhook_url > apiBaseUrl + path > origin + path > path.
Tested with seven cases covering each branch.
- ApiClient.rotateAutopilotTriggerWebhookToken posts to
/api/autopilots/{id}/triggers/{triggerId}/rotate-webhook-token; the
HTTP-contract test pins URL + method.
- useRotateAutopilotTriggerWebhookToken mutation invalidates
autopilotKeys.detail on settle, mirroring the existing trigger-mutation
pattern.
* feat(views): webhook trigger UI in Add Trigger dialog and trigger row
Add Trigger dialog gains a Schedule/Webhook segmented toggle:
- Schedule reuses TriggerConfigSection unchanged.
- Webhook hides the cron config and shows a help line; the trigger is
created with kind=webhook and the URL is generated server-side.
- Toast text differentiates schedule vs webhook on success.
TriggerRow grows a webhook branch:
- Webhook icon, kind translated via trigger_kind.
- URL shown in a truncating monospace pill, with copy + rotate
buttons. Copy uses navigator.clipboard with toast feedback; rotate
uses an AlertDialog confirm because the old URL stops working
immediately.
- api triggers render a Deprecated badge and skip URL/copy/rotate
affordances.
RunRow gains a 'skipped' RUN_VISUAL entry (muted dash) so admission-
skipped runs don't fall through to a generic case. Source label uses the
new run_source i18n key instead of capitalize.
Locales: en + zh-Hans gain run_status.skipped, run_source.*,
trigger_kind.*, trigger_row.{copy_url,rotate_url,*_confirm_*,toast_*},
add_trigger_dialog.{type_*,webhook_help,toast_added_{schedule,webhook}}.
* feat(cli): support webhook trigger creation and URL rotation
- multica autopilot trigger-add now takes --kind schedule|webhook
(default schedule for backward compatibility). For webhook it skips
--cron / --timezone validation and prints the resulting webhook URL,
preferring the server-provided webhook_url and falling back to
client.BaseURL + webhook_path.
- New multica autopilot trigger-rotate-url <autopilot-id> <trigger-id>
command for rotating the bearer URL of a webhook trigger.
* docs(autopilots): add webhook trigger guide (en + zh)
Replaces the 'Webhook and API triggers are not available yet' section
with end-to-end webhook documentation: how the URL is generated, what
payload shapes are accepted, the inferred-event rules, the bearer-secret
warning + rotate flow, status-code semantics for accepted/skipped/
ignored/4xx/5xx outcomes, and the MULTICA_PUBLIC_URL self-host
configuration.
Run history list now mentions skipped status. The 'unavailable
features' section narrows to api-kind triggers, HMAC signing, IP
allowlists, and provider presets.
* feat(views): add Schedule/Webhook toggle to the create autopilot dialog
Closes the gap where a brand-new autopilot could only be created with a
schedule trigger. The right-column config now has a Trigger section
with a segmented Schedule/Webhook control:
- Schedule keeps the existing cron/timezone UI.
- Webhook hides the cron UI and shows a help line; on submit, a
kind=webhook trigger is created right after the autopilot.
In edit mode the toggle is intentionally hidden (PLAN.md treats trigger-
type changes as delete-old + create-new, not in-place updates), but the
panel still picks the right kind based on props.triggers[0].kind so a
webhook autopilot doesn't render an irrelevant cron form.
Locales: section_trigger_kind, trigger_kind_{schedule,webhook},
section_webhook, webhook_help_{create,edit} added in en + zh-Hans.
* feat(views): show webhook URL inline after creating a webhook autopilot
After a successful create with kind=webhook, the dialog stays open and
swaps to a confirmation panel showing the freshly minted URL with a
copy button + 'Treat this URL like a password' warning + Done button.
Avoids the friction of "create the autopilot, then go find it in the
list, click in, scroll to triggers, copy URL."
Locales: dialog.webhook_created_{title,description,warning,done} added
in en + zh-Hans.
Schedule create flow is unchanged (toast + close). The success panel is
gated on the trigger returned from the create mutation, so a partial
failure (autopilot created, trigger creation errored) still falls
through to the toast_create_partial path.
* feat(views): show webhook payload in run detail dialog
The agent transcript dialog now accepts an optional headerSlot that
sits above the event list. The autopilot RunRow drops a
WebhookPayloadPreview into that slot when the run came from a webhook
and trigger_payload is non-empty.
The preview is collapsed by default (the transcript itself is the main
event), shows the inferred event name + receivedAt in the header, and
reveals the eventPayload as pretty-printed JSON with a copy button on
expand. Falls back gracefully if the row's trigger_payload doesn't
match the WebhookEnvelope shape — the whole value is shown instead so
nothing is hidden.
Closes the "agent didn't echo the payload, now I can't see what
triggered the run" gap. PLAN.md tracked this as
"Payload preview in run history" under follow-ups.
Locales: webhook_payload.{label, unknown_event, payload, content_type,
copy, copied, copied_short, copy_failed} added in en + zh-Hans.
* chore(server): wire MULTICA_PUBLIC_URL through self-host compose
Two small follow-ups split out of the webhook trigger PR:
- docker-compose.selfhost.yml passes MULTICA_PUBLIC_URL into the
backend container so a self-hosted deployment behind a real domain
gets absolute webhook URLs in the trigger response. Documented in
.env.example with the rationale for not deriving the public host
from request headers.
- Drop a duplicated 'invalid json:' prefix in the webhook ingress
400 error path. normalizeWebhookPayload already prefixes its
errors, so the handler doesn't need to re-prefix.
* fix(migrations): renumber webhook trigger migration 081 → 089 to avoid collision
The branch's 081_autopilot_webhook_triggers.{up,down}.sql collided
numerically with 081_runtime_timezone.{up,down}.sql that landed on
main, making migration apply order undefined. Renumber to 089 so the
file slots after the latest main migration (088_squad_instructions).
The SQL itself doesn't conflict — it only creates a partial unique
index on autopilot_trigger.webhook_token — but the duplicate prefix
is what the migration runner sees, so the filename must move.
* fix(autopilot-webhook): address PR review blocking issues
- Redact bearer tokens from request logs: paths matching
/api/webhooks/autopilots/<token> now log "[redacted]" instead of the
token. The resolved trigger ID is plumbed via context so audit lines
stay useful for debugging. (Review item Blocking #1.)
- Distinguish pgx.ErrNoRows from transient DB errors in token lookup:
no-row stays 404 (so providers don't retry on a deleted webhook),
other errors return 500 (which providers DO retry, avoiding silent
drops on DB blips). (Review item Blocking #2.)
- Add per-IP sliding-window rate limiter that runs BEFORE the token
lookup, so spraying random tokens can no longer probe the
autopilot_trigger index unboundedly. Reuses the existing Lua script
with a separate Redis key namespace; falls open on Redis errors.
Default budget 30 req/min/IP. (Review item Blocking #3.)
The webhook handler now applies the gates in the order: per-IP rate
limit → token lookup → per-token rate limit → handler logic.
* fix(autopilot): atomic webhook trigger creation + strict kind/timezone validation
- Mint the webhook bearer token BEFORE the INSERT and pass it via
CreateAutopilotTriggerParams so the row never exists in a half-written
kind=webhook + webhook_token=NULL state. On the (vanishingly rare)
unique-index collision the whole INSERT is retried with a fresh token
— no UPDATE second step. Removes the now-dead attachFreshWebhookToken
helper. (Review item Recommended #4.)
- Add new GET /api/autopilots/{id}/runs/{runId} endpoint that returns a
single run including the full trigger_payload. The list response is
now slim (omits trigger_payload) so worst-case payload size drops
from ~5 MB to ~5 KB. (Review item Recommended #5, server side.)
- Reject kind=api with 400 ("kind=api is deprecated; use schedule or
webhook") and reject kind=webhook with --timezone with 400 — both
surfaces stragglers loudly instead of silently dropping fields.
CLI mirrors the check so --timezone with --kind webhook errors
client-side. (Review nits.)
- Add --yes (-y) flag and an interactive y/N confirmation prompt to
`multica autopilot trigger-rotate-url` so the destructive rotate
matches the UI's AlertDialog safety. (Review item Recommended #6.)
* fix(views): fetch webhook payload on-demand and truncate at 4 KiB
- Add useAutopilotRun query hook + getAutopilotRun API client method
paired with the new server endpoint. The run-detail dialog now mounts
a WebhookPayloadSlot that fetches the full run (incl. trigger_payload)
lazily — list responses no longer carry up to 256 KiB × N runs of
envelope data.
- WebhookPayloadPreview truncates its in-DOM <pre> at 4 KiB with a
localized marker so jank-y machines aren't asked to render a 256 KiB
JSON blob. The Copy button still yields the full string.
- Adds the truncated_marker i18n string to en + zh-Hans.
Review items Recommended #5 (frontend) and a nit on the preview's
unbounded <pre>.
* test(autopilot-webhook): close coverage gaps flagged in PR review
- request_logger: redactWebhookPath unit tests + integration test
proving the bearer token never lands in slog output, plus the
webhook_trigger_id context plumbing.
- autopilot_webhook_handler: empty body → 400, archived autopilot →
200 ignored, per-IP rate limiter trips before DB lookup, kind=api
and webhook+timezone are rejected at 400, slim list + full detail
endpoint round-trip.
- webhook_rate_limiter: Lua script structure guard (catches reordering
even without a live Redis), plus live-Redis tests for both per-token
and per-IP limiters (REDIS_TEST_URL gated, matching the existing
Redis test pattern in the package).
- WebhookPayloadPreview: envelope rendering, fallback shape, and the
>4 KiB truncation path with full-payload-on-Copy guarantee.
Two branches are documented as code-review-protected rather than
covered by tests: the 500-on-DB-error path requires injecting a stub
Queries (no interface here), and the cross-workspace defense-in-depth
check is unreachable from valid SQL state.
* fix(middleware): SetWebhookTriggerID must mutate request in place
The round-1 helper returned a fresh *http.Request from WithContext, and
the webhook handler did `r = SetWebhookTriggerID(r, ...)`. That swaps
the handler's local pointer but doesn't propagate the new context back
to RequestLogger, which is still holding the original *http.Request —
so the audit line never actually included webhook_trigger_id in
production. The round-1 test happened to pass because it pre-stashed
the value on the request before calling ServeHTTP, bypassing the bug
it was meant to verify.
Switch to in-place mutation via `*r = *r.WithContext(...)` so the
wrapping middleware sees the new context after next.ServeHTTP returns,
and update the test to exercise the real call pattern (set the context
from inside the handler, assert the surrounding logger reads it).
Verified live: an accepted webhook now logs
path=/api/webhooks/autopilots/[redacted] webhook_trigger_id=<uuid>
* fix(autopilot-webhook): symmetric ErrNoRows split + trusted-proxy gate
Round-2 review (Bohan-J, PR #2348 follow-up):
- Must-fix #1: the second lookup at autopilot_webhook.go:258
(GetAutopilot after the token resolves) was folding every error into
404. A transient DB blip would tell a webhook sender "not found" and
it would never retry. Apply the same errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows)
→ 404 / else → 500 split as the first lookup got in round 1.
- Must-fix #2: clientIPForRateLimit was honoring X-Forwarded-For /
X-Real-IP from any caller. An attacker spraying random tokens could
just rotate the XFF header and the per-IP bucket became per-request,
so the limiter that's specifically supposed to gate spraying before
it hits the DB unique index was bypassed.
New shape — matches Bohan's suggestion exactly:
* Default: r.RemoteAddr only, headers ignored.
* Operator opt-in via MULTICA_TRUSTED_PROXIES (comma-separated
CIDRs). XFF/X-Real-IP are honored only when r.RemoteAddr is
inside one of the listed prefixes; otherwise they're dropped.
Wired through .env.example and docker-compose.selfhost.yml so
self-host operators can configure their reverse-proxy's CIDR.
Invalid CIDRs in the env var are dropped with a single slog.Warn at
startup rather than crashing the server. Uses net/netip (stdlib,
value-typed) for parsing and containment checks.
Verified live on the rebuilt self-host backend: a 35-request spray
from one source with rotating XFF gets the expected 30× 404 + 5× 429,
proving the per-IP bucket is keyed on the real connection IP.
* fix(autopilot): reject cron/timezone PATCH on non-schedule triggers
Round-2 review should-fix. CreateAutopilotTrigger already 400s on
kind=webhook + timezone/cron_expression, but UpdateAutopilotTrigger
silently wrote those fields regardless of prev.Kind. The values then
sat in the DB visible to nobody and read by nothing — a back door that
left the API contract fuzzy across create vs update.
Mirror the create-path discipline: after loading prev, if prev.Kind
!= "schedule" and the PATCH body sets cron_expression or timezone,
return 400 with a clear message. enabled and label remain accepted on
every kind.
The existing prev.Kind == "schedule" guard on next_run_at recompute
stays as belt-and-braces, but with this gate in place the recompute
branch is now reachable only for the kind it was meant for.
* test(autopilot-webhook): close round-2 coverage gaps
- IPRateLimitNotBypassedByXFFSpoof: drives the must-fix #2 invariant
by rotating XFF across three calls from the same RemoteAddr and
asserting the third gets 429. Pre-round-2 this test would have
passed for the wrong reason (limiter trusted XFF, so per-bucket
collision was incidental); now it pins the bypass-closed property.
- IPRateLimitReturns429BeforeDBLookup: updated to set RemoteAddr
explicitly and drop the XFF header it was leaning on. With
TrustedProxies empty (test default) the limiter keys on the real
connection IP, which is what the test wants to assert anyway.
- UpdateAutopilotTrigger_RejectsCronExpressionOnWebhookKind +
UpdateAutopilotTrigger_RejectsTimezoneOnWebhookKind: drive the
round-2 should-fix from the handler boundary.
- UpdateAutopilotTrigger_AcceptsEnabledAndLabelOnWebhookKind: counter
test so a regression to a blanket reject is caught.
* fix(migrations): bump webhook trigger migration 089 → 091
origin/main added 089_squad_no_action_activity_index (and 090_task_is_leader)
since our last rebase, re-colliding with our 089_autopilot_webhook_triggers.
Bump to 091 so the filename ordering is unambiguous again. The SQL is
unchanged — same partial unique index on autopilot_trigger.webhook_token —
only the filename moves.
* fix(views): dedupe skipped icon in autopilot RUN_VISUAL after rebase
The rebase against origin/main merged main's add of `Ban` for the
skipped status next to our round-1 `MinusCircle` entry, leaving the
RUN_VISUAL map with two `skipped` keys (only the last would have been
read at runtime, and MinusCircle had been dropped from the imports
during conflict resolution — so the file would not compile).
Keep main's `Ban` icon (latest design) and a single `skipped` entry.
Carry over the round-1 comment about why the muted styling matters
for failure-ratio readability.
---------
Co-authored-by: Kerim Incedayi <kerim.incedayi@digitalchargingsolutions.com>
|
||
|
Bohan Jiang
|
fae8558263 |
fix(daemon): self-heal when a runtime is deleted server-side (#2404)
Closes #2391. |
||
|
Bohan Jiang
|
86e7de3e41 |
feat(server/auth): cache auth token lookups in Redis with 10m TTL
* feat(server/auth): cache PAT lookups in Redis with 60s TTL
Personal access tokens used to hit Postgres on every request: a SELECT
to resolve token_hash → user_id, plus a fire-and-forget UPDATE of
last_used_at. For a CLI / daemon making many requests per second this
is wasted DB load — the token is the same and the answer hasn't changed.
Add a Redis-backed cache (auth.PATCache) keyed by token hash, TTL 60s:
- On cache hit, the auth middleware skips both the SELECT and the
last_used_at UPDATE. last_used_at is now refreshed at most once per
TTL window per token, not per request.
- On cache miss the middleware falls back to today's behavior: query
Postgres, populate the cache, async-update last_used_at.
- On revoke, the handler invalidates the cache entry so revocation
takes effect immediately rather than waiting for the TTL to expire.
This required changing RevokePersonalAccessToken from :exec to :one
RETURNING token_hash.
The cache is nil-safe: when REDIS_URL isn't configured, NewPATCache
returns nil and the middleware degrades to today's always-hit-DB
behavior. JWT validation is untouched (already DB-free).
Tested with REDIS_TEST_URL — same gating pattern the rest of the
suite uses for Redis-backed tests. New tests cover nil-safety, set/
get/invalidate, TTL, and the middleware short-circuit on cache hit.
* fix(server/auth): clamp PAT cache TTL to token's remaining lifetime
GPT-Boy review caught: a PAT expiring in <60s would still be cached
for the full PATCacheTTL window, so the token could continue passing
auth on cache hit for up to ~60s after its expires_at. The DB query
filters expired tokens (revoked = FALSE AND expires_at > now()), but
that filter never ran on a cache hit.
Make Set take an explicit ttl, and add TTLForExpiry to compute it:
- no expires_at → full PATCacheTTL
- expires_at far → full PATCacheTTL
- expires_at <60s → time until expiry
- already expired → 0, Set skips caching (TOCTOU defense between
the SELECT and the Set, since the SELECT
already filters expired rows)
Regression test pins the clamp behavior end-to-end against Redis.
* feat(server/auth): cache daemon-token + PAT lookups in DaemonAuth, bump TTL to 10m
Daemon /api/daemon/* requests (heartbeat, claim task) hit DaemonAuth
which previously did its own GetDaemonTokenByHash on every request and
*also* duplicated the PAT lookup on the mul_ fallback — bypassing the
cache added in
|
||
|
Bohan Jiang
|
22136a55fc |
fix(server/heartbeat): split auth_ms into decode/runtime_lookup/workspace_check + auth_path (#1822)
Prod slow-log on the deployed v0.2.17 fix shows total_ms=4012,
auth_ms=4010, update_ms=1, all skill stages = 0 — meaning the bottleneck
on /api/daemon/heartbeat is now the auth section, not the Redis claim
path. To pinpoint which sub-stage dominates, decompose auth_ms into:
- decode_ms — JSON body decode
- runtime_lookup_ms — Queries.GetAgentRuntime (PG PK select)
- workspace_check_ms — requireDaemonWorkspaceAccess (string compare for
daemon-token, requireWorkspaceMember for PAT/JWT)
Also add auth_path ("daemon_token" | "pat" | "jwt") set by DaemonAuth
middleware so slow-logs disambiguate which token kind was used. PAT/JWT
takes an extra DB round-trip via requireWorkspaceMember and is a
candidate cause of long auth tails on daemons that haven't migrated to
mdt_ tokens.
The handler keeps the same external behavior; the change inlines and
instruments requireDaemonRuntimeAccess in DaemonHeartbeat only — other
callers of the helper are untouched. logHeartbeatEndpointSlow gains the
new fields.
Existing heartbeat tests pass; the slow-probe test output now shows the
new auth_path / decode_ms / runtime_lookup_ms / workspace_check_ms
fields populated.
|
||
|
Bohan Jiang
|
f628e48775 |
refactor(server): error-returning ParseUUID to prevent silent data loss
* refactor(server): make ParseUUID error-returning to prevent silent data loss (MUL-1410) util.ParseUUID previously swallowed errors and returned a zero pgtype.UUID on invalid input. When this zero UUID reached a write query (DELETE/UPDATE), the SQL matched zero rows and the handler returned 2xx success — producing silent data corruption. #1661 (DeleteIssue with identifier-style ID) was the visible symptom; PR #1680 patched that one site, this commit closes the class of bug. Changes: - util.ParseUUID now returns (pgtype.UUID, error). Add util.MustParseUUID for trusted round-trips that should panic on invalid input. - handler/handler.go: parseUUID wrapper now calls MustParseUUID — any unguarded user-input string reaching it surfaces as a recovered panic (chi middleware.Recoverer → 500) instead of silently corrupting data. Add parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, s, fieldName) for handler entry points. - Convert every Queries.Delete*/Update* call site reachable from raw user input (autopilot, comment, project, skill, skill_file, label, pin, attachment, feedback, issue assignee, daemon runtime, workspace) to validate UUIDs explicitly with parseUUIDOrBadRequest, returning 400 on invalid input. Where a resolved entity.ID is already in scope, write queries now use it directly instead of re-parsing the URL string. - Update getWorkspaceMember + loadIssueForUser to handle invalid UUIDs gracefully (404/400 instead of panic). - Update util/middleware/cmd-level callers (subscriber_listeners, notification_listeners, activity_listeners, scope_authorizer, middleware/workspace) to use the error-returning API. - Add server/internal/util/pgx_test.go covering valid/invalid input and the MustParseUUID panic contract. - Add TestDeleteIssueByIdentifier + TestDeleteIssueRejectsInvalidUUID regression tests in handler_test.go (the original #1661 bug + the invalid-input case). - Document the handler UUID parsing convention in CLAUDE.md so the rule is enforceable in future PR review. * fix(server): address GPT-Boy review of #1748 P1 fixes from PR #1748 review: 1. Migrate remaining request-boundary UUIDs to parseUUIDOrBadRequest so malformed input returns 400 instead of panic/500. Was missing on: - issue.go: workspace_id in CreateIssue/ChildIssueProgress/ListIssues/ SearchIssues/BatchUpdateIssues/BatchDeleteIssues; project_id / parent_issue_id / lead_id / assignee_id / assignee_ids / creator_id filters; batch issue_ids and assignee/parent/project fields in BatchUpdateIssues (skip on bad input via util.ParseUUID, matching the existing per-row continue semantics). - project.go: project id + workspace_id in GetProject/UpdateProject/ DeleteProject; lead_id in CreateProject/UpdateProject; workspace_id in ListProjects + SearchProjects. - handler.go: resolveActor now uses util.ParseUUID for X-Agent-ID / X-Task-ID headers; invalid UUID falls back to "member" (matches pre-existing semantics) instead of panicking. - issue.go: validateAssigneePair returns 400 on invalid workspace_id instead of panicking. 2. Fix issue:deleted WS event payloads to emit uuidToString(issue.ID) instead of the raw URL string. After an identifier-path delete ("MUL-7"), the previous payload would have leaked the identifier to subscribers, leaving stale entries in frontend caches that key by UUID. Updated DeleteIssue (issue.go:1341) and BatchDeleteIssues (issue.go:1641). The slog "issue deleted" log line also now records the resolved UUID so logs match the WS payload. 3. Extend TestDeleteIssueByIdentifier to subscribe to the bus and assert issue:deleted.payload.issue_id is the resolved UUID, not the identifier. * fix(server): validate remaining reviewed UUID inputs * fix(server): validate remaining handler UUID inputs * fix(server): finish request boundary UUID audit * fix(server): validate remaining request body UUIDs * fix(server): validate runtime path UUIDs * fix(server): validate remaining audit UUID inputs --------- Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai> |
||
|
devv-eve
|
9ed1fa95fc |
feat(server): add readiness health endpoints (#1605)
* feat(server): add readiness health endpoints * fix(server): cache readiness checks * fix(server): raise readiness cache ttl --------- Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai> |
||
|
LinYushen
|
b624cd98ad |
feat: identify clients via X-Client-Platform/Version/OS (#1477)
* feat: identify clients via X-Client-Platform/Version/OS
Adds client identification headers (and matching WS query params) across
all first-party clients so the server can split logs/metrics/gating by
caller without parsing User-Agent.
- HTTP: X-Client-Platform, X-Client-Version, X-Client-OS
- WS: client_platform, client_version, client_os query params
- Platform ∈ {web, desktop, cli, daemon}; OS ∈ {macos, windows, linux}
Wired through the shared TS ApiClient/WSClient via a new identity option
on CoreProvider. Web reads its version from package.json/env; Desktop
captures version + OS synchronously in preload via sendSync IPC. Go CLI
and daemon clients populate the same headers using runtime.GOOS
(normalized darwin → macos).
Server-side adds a ClientMetadata middleware that stashes the headers in
request context; the request logger and logger.RequestAttrs surface them
on every access log and handler-level log. Realtime hub logs the same
fields on websocket connect.
CORS allowlist extended for the new headers.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* test: address client-identity PR nits
- Memoize the CoreProvider identity object on Web and Desktop, and key
WSProvider's effect on identity primitives instead of the object
reference, so unrelated parent re-renders no longer tear down and
reconnect the WebSocket.
- Add direct header-injection tests for the CLI and daemon Go HTTP
clients (X-Client-Platform/Version/OS) and a normalizeGOOS unit test
on both packages.
- Add a TS test for WSClient that asserts client_platform/client_version/
client_os land on the upgrade URL and never leak the auth token.
- Add a hub test that dials the WS endpoint with client_* query params
and asserts the "websocket connected" log entry surfaces them as
structured attributes.
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
|
||
|
Naiyuan Qing
|
f0f3cb5c3a |
fix(server): resolve X-Workspace-Slug in middleware-less handlers (#1165)
Problem ------- The v2 workspace URL refactor (#1141) switched the frontend from sending X-Workspace-ID (UUID) to X-Workspace-Slug. The workspace middleware was updated to accept the slug and translate it via GetWorkspaceBySlug. But the handler package maintained a PARALLEL resolver (`resolveWorkspaceID` in handler.go) used by endpoints that sit outside the workspace middleware — and that resolver was never updated. It only checked context / ?workspace_id / X-Workspace-ID, never the slug. /api/upload-file is the one production route that hit the broken path: it's user-scoped (not behind workspace middleware) because it also serves avatar uploads (no workspace). Post-refactor requests from the frontend arrived with only X-Workspace-Slug; the handler resolver returned "", the code fell into the "no workspace context" branch, and every file upload since v2 landed in S3 with no corresponding DB attachment row — files orphaned, invisible to the UI. Root cause is structural: two resolvers doing the same job, written independently, diverged silently when one was updated. Fix --- Collapse to a single shared helper. middleware.ResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest is the new canonical resolver; both the middleware's internal `resolveWorkspaceUUID` (for middleware gating) and the handler-side `(h *Handler).resolveWorkspaceID` (promoted from a package function) now delegate to it. Priority order matches what the middleware has had since v2: context > X-Workspace-Slug header > ?workspace_slug query > X-Workspace-ID header > ?workspace_id query. Impact analysis --------------- 47 call sites of the old `resolveWorkspaceID(r)` are renamed to `h.resolveWorkspaceID(r)`. 46 of them sit behind workspace middleware, so they hit the context fast path and see zero behavior change. The one caller that actually gains capability is UploadFile — which now correctly recognizes slug requests and creates DB attachment rows. Tests ----- - New table-driven unit test for ResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest covers all priority levels and the unknown-slug fallback. - Regression tests for UploadFile: once with X-Workspace-Slug only (the broken path), once with X-Workspace-ID only (legacy CLI/daemon compat path). Both assert that a DB attachment row is created. - Full Go test suite passes; typecheck + pnpm test unaffected. Plan ---- See docs/plans/2026-04-16-unify-workspace-identity-resolver.md for the full first-principles writeup. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Naiyuan Qing
|
fe358feff0 |
Reapply "feat: workspace URL refactor v2 + rollback-safe compat layer (#1138)" (#1139) (#1141)
This reverts commit
|
||
|
Naiyuan Qing
|
b30fd98605 |
Revert "feat: workspace URL refactor v2 + rollback-safe compat layer (#1138)" (#1139)
This reverts commit
|
||
|
Naiyuan Qing
|
75d12c26c5 |
feat: workspace URL refactor v2 + rollback-safe compat layer (#1138)
* Reapply "feat: workspace URL refactor + slug-first API identity (#1131)" (#1137)
This reverts commit
|
||
|
Naiyuan Qing
|
9b94914bc8 |
Revert "feat: workspace URL refactor + slug-first API identity (#1131)" (#1137)
This reverts commit
|
||
|
Naiyuan Qing
|
59ace95a1e |
feat: workspace URL refactor + slug-first API identity (#1131)
* feat: workspace URL refactor + slug-first API identity
Make the URL the single source of truth for workspace identity.
All workspace-scoped URLs now carry the workspace slug as the first
path segment (/{slug}/issues, /{slug}/projects, etc.), matching the
industry standard (Linear, Notion, Vercel, GitHub).
## Key architectural changes
**URL-driven workspace identity:**
- Web routes moved under app/[workspaceSlug]/(dashboard)/
- Desktop routes nested under /:workspaceSlug
- paths.ts builder centralises all URL construction
- reserved-slugs validation (backend + frontend + DB migration audit)
**Slug-first API contract:**
- Frontend sends X-Workspace-Slug header (from URL) instead of X-Workspace-ID (UUID)
- Backend middleware resolves slug → UUID via GetWorkspaceBySlug, falls back to
X-Workspace-ID for CLI/daemon backwards compatibility
- WebSocket auth accepts ?workspace_slug query param with SlugResolver callback
**State cleanup:**
- Deleted: useWorkspaceStore (Zustand mirror), switchWorkspace/hydrateWorkspace/
clearWorkspace, localStorage["multica_workspace_id"], api._workspaceId
- useCurrentWorkspace() derives from URL slug + React Query workspace list
- useWorkspaceId() is now a bridge hook (no Context, derives from useCurrentWorkspace)
- WorkspaceIdProvider removed from DashboardGuard
- Paired module vars (slug + UUID) in workspace-storage.ts for non-React consumers
**Layout simplified:**
- Render-phase ref guard sets workspace context synchronously (no async gate)
- DashboardGuard handles auth redirect, loading state, and workspace resolution
- Subscriber notifications deferred via queueMicrotask (React 19 compat)
- persist namespace uses slug (immutable) instead of UUID
## Issues resolved
MUL-43 (share links), MUL-509 (mobile workspace switch), MUL-723 (workspace in URL),
MUL-727 (create workspace flash), MUL-728 (delete workspace no-navigate),
MUL-820 (sidebar Join not switching)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: resolve code review C3/C4/C5/C6 — desktop deadlock + hardcoded paths
C3: Desktop OnboardingGate was calling useCurrentWorkspace() outside
WorkspaceSlugProvider → always null → permanent onboarding deadlock.
Rewrite to use useQuery(workspaceListOptions()) which reads React Query
cache directly without slug context. Remove DashboardGuard from
DesktopShell (auth gating handled by AppContent, workspace routing by
WorkspaceRouteLayout per-tab).
C4: Landing page "Dashboard" links hardcoded /issues (no longer valid).
Changed to / — proxy handles redirect to /{lastSlug}/issues.
C5: autopilots-page.tsx had one hardcoded /autopilots/${id} link.
Changed to wsPaths.autopilotDetail(id).
C6: inbox-page.tsx hardcoded /inbox paths. Changed to wsPaths.inbox().
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(desktop): wrap shell in WorkspaceSlugProvider from module var
AppSidebar calls useWorkspacePaths() → useRequiredWorkspaceSlug() which
throws outside WorkspaceSlugProvider. In the desktop shell, the sidebar
renders at the shell level (outside any tab's WorkspaceRouteLayout).
Fix: DesktopShell reads the current slug via useSyncExternalStore on
the workspace-storage singleton. When slug is available, wraps the
entire shell in WorkspaceSlugProvider. When null (first mount before
any tab's WorkspaceRouteLayout sets it), shows a loading spinner.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(desktop): migrate old tab paths + fix shell slug deadlock
Tab store rehydration: old-format paths like "/issues/abc" (missing
workspace slug prefix) are reset to "/" so IndexRedirect picks the
correct workspace. Detection: if the first segment is a known route
name (issues, projects, etc.) rather than a workspace slug, it's an
old-format path.
Desktop shell: TabContent must always render (not gated behind slug
check) so WorkspaceRouteLayout can mount and call setCurrentWorkspace.
Only sidebar and shell-level UI (chat, modals, search) gate on slug
being present.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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|
LinYushen
|
e20c507dcc |
fix(security): add Content-Security-Policy response header (#822)
Adds CSP middleware to the global middleware chain as a browser-level defense against XSS: script-src 'self', object-src 'none', frame-ancestors 'none', base-uri 'self', form-action 'self'. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
LinYushen
|
95bfd7dd96 |
feat(auth): migrate auth token to HttpOnly Cookie & WebSocket Origin whitelist (#819)
* feat(auth): migrate auth token to HttpOnly cookie & implement WebSocket Origin whitelist Security improvements from the MUL-566 audit report: 1. Auth token is now set as an HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax cookie on login, preventing XSS-based token theft. Cookie-based auth includes CSRF protection via double-submit cookie pattern. The Authorization header path is preserved for Electron desktop app and CLI/PAT clients. 2. WebSocket upgrader now validates the Origin header against a configurable allowlist (ALLOWED_ORIGINS env var), rejecting connections from unauthorized origins. Backend: new auth cookie helpers, middleware reads cookie as fallback, WS handler accepts cookie auth, Origin whitelist, logout endpoint. Frontend: CSRF token in API headers, cookie-aware auth store and WS client, web app opts into cookieAuth mode while desktop keeps tokens. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): address PR review — Strict cookies, HMAC-bound CSRF, origin sync 1. SameSite=Lax → SameSite=Strict per spec requirement 2. CSRF token now HMAC-signed with auth token (nonce.signature format), preventing subdomain cookie injection attacks 3. allowedWSOrigins uses atomic.Value to eliminate data race 4. Removed magic "cookie" sentinel string in WSProvider — pass null token and guard with boolean check instead 5. Removed dead delete uploadHeaders["Content-Type"] in API client Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
Jiayuan Zhang
|
82bbce98fd |
fix(security): add workspace ownership checks to daemon API routes (#684)
* fix(security): add workspace ownership checks to all daemon API routes Switch daemon routes from middleware.Auth to middleware.DaemonAuth and add per-handler workspace ownership verification. This prevents cross-workspace access to runtimes, tasks, usage, and daemon lifecycle endpoints (HIGH-1/2/3 + CHAIN-1/2/3). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): support mdt_ daemon tokens in DaemonRegister + add regression tests DaemonRegister now handles both auth paths: - mdt_ daemon tokens: verify workspace match, skip member check, zero OwnerID (SQL COALESCE preserves existing owner on upsert) - PAT/JWT: existing member check + OwnerID from member Also adds WithDaemonContext helper and regression tests covering: - Successful register with daemon token - Workspace mismatch rejection - Cross-workspace heartbeat rejection - Cross-workspace task status rejection Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
sunjie21
|
3bf094ebf7 |
fix(auth): extend JWT and CloudFront cookie expiration from 72h to 30 days
Reduces login frequency for users by increasing token lifetime. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
Jiang Bohan
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b8c784dda3 |
merge: resolve conflicts with main
- Take main's router.go, rich-text-editor.tsx, comment-card.tsx - Remove deleted daemon_pairing.go - Keep issue mention card feature |
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Jiayuan
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afdfee78b9 |
feat(daemon): add authentication for daemon API routes
Issue daemon auth tokens (mdt_) on pairing session claim, bound to workspace_id + daemon_id with 1-year expiry. Add DaemonAuth middleware that validates these tokens and falls back to JWT/PAT for backward compatibility. Apply middleware to all daemon routes except pairing endpoints. |
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yushen
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9e23fb76fc |
fix(upload): harden upload flow — sanitize filenames, refresh CF cookies, deduplicate handlers
- Sanitize Content-Disposition filenames to prevent header injection (strip control chars, quotes, semicolons) - Add CloudFront cookie refresh middleware so cookies are re-issued when expired - Log errors in groupAttachments instead of silently swallowing them - Move useFileUpload hook to shared/hooks/ per project architecture conventions - Add uploadWithToast helper to deduplicate try/catch/toast pattern across 3 components - Refactor ApiClient.uploadFile to reuse auth headers, 401 handling, and error parsing - Allow empty MIME types client-side (let server sniff and decide) - Constrain Image extension max-width in rich-text-editor to prevent layout overflow Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jiayuan
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f4a6e7c475 |
refactor(server): consolidate workspace permission checks into middleware
Move workspace membership and role validation from individual handlers into dedicated Chi middleware. The new middleware resolves workspace ID (from query param, X-Workspace-ID header, or URL param), validates membership via DB, and injects the member into request context. Handlers now read workspace ID and member from context instead of calling requireWorkspaceMember/requireWorkspaceRole directly. This eliminates ~17 duplicated permission checks across handlers and makes it harder to accidentally omit access control on new routes. |
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LinYushen
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5c9c2f69fd |
feat(auth): email verification login and personal access tokens
* feat(auth): add email verification login flow with 401 auto-redirect Replace the old OAuth-based login with email verification codes: - Backend: send-code / verify-code endpoints, verification_codes table (migration 009), rate limiting, Resend email service - Frontend: two-step login UI (email → 6-digit OTP), auth store with sendCode/verifyCode - SDK: ApiClient gains onUnauthorized callback; 401 responses auto-clear token and redirect to /login - Fix login button staying disabled due to global isLoading state Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): add brute-force protection, redirect loop guard, and expired code cleanup - VerifyCode: increment attempts on wrong code, reject after 5 failed tries (migration 010) - onUnauthorized: skip redirect if already on /login to prevent infinite loops - SendCode: best-effort cleanup of expired verification codes older than 1 hour Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): add master verification code for non-production environments Allow code "888888" to bypass email verification in non-production environments to simplify development and testing workflows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): add personal access tokens for CLI and API authentication Add full-stack PAT support: users create tokens in Settings, CLI authenticates via `multica auth login`. Server stores SHA-256 hashes only. Auth middleware extended to accept both JWTs and PATs (distinguished by `mul_` prefix). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Naiyuan Qing
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8983a9fefa |
feat(logging): add structured logging across server and SDK
Replace raw fmt/log calls with structured slog logger (Go) and console-based logger (TypeScript). Add request logging middleware. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jiayuan Zhang
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81e64e9fce | Add workspace management and isolated worktree environments | ||
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Jiayuan Zhang
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6dfc61fa86 |
test: add comprehensive test suite (Go unit/integration, Vitest, Playwright E2E)
- Add JWT middleware unit tests (8 tests covering all auth edge cases) - Add WebSocket hub tests (5 tests for client lifecycle and broadcast) - Add full HTTP integration tests (12 tests through real Chi router with DB) - Add frontend component tests for login, issues, and issue detail pages - Add auth context unit tests (9 tests for login/logout/name resolution) - Add Playwright E2E tests for auth, issues, comments, and navigation - Configure Vitest with jsdom, React plugin, and path aliases Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jiayuan Zhang
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1e61c1974c |
feat(server): implement full REST API with JWT auth and real-time WebSocket
- Add HTTP handlers for issues, comments, agents, workspaces, inbox, members, and activity - Implement JWT authentication middleware with Bearer token validation - Add sqlc queries for all entities (CRUD operations) - Extract router into reusable NewRouter() for testability - Expand SDK with full API client methods (CRUD for all resources) - Add updateWorkspace to SDK, add Member type to shared types Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Jiayuan Zhang
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d4f5c5b16f |
feat: pivot to AI-native task management platform (#232)
Replace the agent framework codebase with a new monorepo structure for an AI-native Linear-like product where agents are first-class citizens. New architecture: - server/ — Go backend (Chi + gorilla/websocket + sqlc) - API server with REST routes for issues, agents, inbox, workspaces - WebSocket hub for real-time updates - Local daemon entry point for agent runtime connection - PostgreSQL migration with 13 tables (issue, agent, inbox, etc.) - WebSocket protocol types for server<->daemon communication - apps/web/ — Next.js 16 frontend - Dashboard layout with sidebar navigation - Route skeleton: inbox, issues, agents, board, settings - packages/ui/ — Preserved shadcn/ui design system (26+ components) - packages/types/ — Full API contract types (Issue, Agent, Workspace, Inbox, Events) - packages/sdk/ — REST ApiClient + WebSocket WSClient - packages/store/ — Zustand stores (issue, agent, inbox, auth) - packages/hooks/ — React hooks (useIssues, useAgents, useInbox, useRealtime) - packages/utils/ — Shared utilities Removed: apps/cli, apps/desktop, apps/mobile, apps/gateway, packages/core, skills/, and all agent-framework code. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |