Files
multica/server/internal/handler/chat.go
Bohan Jiang ce28d0aa0e feat(integrations): add platform-agnostic channel foundation (MUL-3515) (#4412)
* feat(integrations): add platform-agnostic channel foundation

Introduce server/internal/integrations/channel — the contract every
inbound IM integration implements, so the core never learns a platform's
event JSON. Four pieces:

- Channel interface (Type/Connect/Disconnect/Send/Capabilities) + Factory
  + Config (channel_type + opaque JSON blob, maps to channel_installation).
- Normalized InboundMessage/OutboundMessage envelopes + Source/MediaRef/
  ReplyCtx/MsgType/ChatType. Envelope holds only cross-platform-true
  fields; platform specifics live in Raw, read only by the adapter.
- Capability bitmask: declaration only, no degrade logic in core.
- Registry: Type->Factory map, last-writer-wins, concurrency-safe.

Pure package (no DB/network/platform deps). Foundation for MUL-3515; the
lark cutover + lark_*->channel_* generalization land in follow-up PRs.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(channel): generalize lark_* tables into channel_* (DB layer)

Migration 123 creates channel_installation / channel_user_binding /
channel_chat_session_binding / channel_inbound_message_dedup /
channel_inbound_audit / channel_outbound_card_message /
channel_binding_token. Each carries a channel_type discriminator and a
JSONB config for platform-specific identifiers/credentials; cross-platform
columns stay flat. Existing Feishu rows are backfilled (channel_type=
'feishu', app_secret_encrypted via base64). NO foreign keys / cascades
(MUL-3515 §4) — integrity moves to the app layer in the cutover.

queries/channel.sql ports the lark query surface to channel_*, JSONB-aware,
plus DeleteChannelUserBindingsByWorkspaceMember /
DeleteChannelChatSessionBindingBySession for the app-layer cleanup that
replaces the removed cascades.

lark_* tables/queries are left in place here and removed once the Go
cutover lands, so this commit ships green on its own.

Verified: sqlc generate, go build ./..., full migrate chain (1..123) on
Postgres 17, and a real-data backfill spot-check (base64 round-trip,
NULL-strip, functional unique index on (channel_type, app_id)).

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(channel): name app_id query param + multi-IM install key + null-safe binding merge

Addresses review on MUL-3515 (PR #4412):

- GetChannelInstallationByAppID: explicitly name params and cast app_id to
  ::text so sqlc emits AppID string. A bare $2 next to `config ->> 'app_id'`
  was mis-attributed to the JSONB config column, generating Config []byte.

- channel_installation uniqueness -> (workspace_id, agent_id, channel_type),
  with the UpsertChannelInstallation conflict key matched. Lets one agent
  hold one installation per IM (feishu + slack + ...) instead of a later
  install clobbering an earlier one. Behaviorally identical in the current
  feishu-only world; "one agent, at most one IM overall" stays an app-layer
  rule per MUL-3515 §4, not a DB constraint.

- CreateChannelUserBinding merges jsonb_strip_nulls(EXCLUDED.config) so a
  re-bind carrying {"union_id": null} no longer erases an already-captured
  union_id, restoring the old COALESCE(EXCLUDED.union_id, ...) semantics.

Regenerated with sqlc v1.31.1. Verified on PG17: re-install replaces in
place, feishu+slack coexist, null re-bind keeps union_id, real union_id wins.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(lark): channel-backed Feishu store + fix base64 backfill wrapping

Cutover step 1 of switching the lark Go code from lark_* onto the channel_*
tables (MUL-3515). Introduces the JSONB config boundary the rest of the
cutover sits on, and fixes a latent backfill bug surfaced while building it.

- migration 123: strip newlines from the app_secret_encrypted base64 backfill.
  PostgreSQL encode(...,'base64') MIME-wraps at 76 chars, and a secretbox-
  sealed ~72-byte secret exceeds that. Go's encoding/json decodes a JSON
  string into []byte with base64.StdEncoding, which rejects embedded newlines,
  so without the strip every migrated installation would fail to decrypt its
  app secret once reads move to channel_installation.config.

- store.go: flat domain types (Installation / UserBinding / ChatSessionBinding)
  with field parity to the retired db.Lark* rows, plus the feishu config codec.
  Row->domain mappers decode the JSONB config; the secret decoder is
  whitespace-tolerant so legacy MIME-wrapped data still round-trips, while the
  encoder emits unwrapped base64. Binding config encodes an absent union_id as
  "{}" so the upsert's jsonb_strip_nulls merge never clobbers a stored union_id.

- store_test.go: 72-byte secret round-trip, MIME-wrapped tolerance, optional
  null-strip, and flat-column preservation. Verified on PG17.

Field parity keeps the upcoming ~190 db.LarkInstallation call sites a
mechanical rename. No call sites switched yet; behavior unchanged.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(lark): route inbound integration onto channel_* + explicit membership checks

Cutover step 2 (MUL-3515): switch the Feishu Go code from the lark_* queries to
channel_* via a ChannelStore adapter, and replace the removed member foreign key
with explicit application-layer membership checks. No user-visible behavior change.

- channel_store.go: ChannelStore embeds *db.Queries and SHADOWS the ~24 lark
  query methods with channel_*-backed equivalents, keeping the db.Lark*
  signatures so the dispatcher/hub/services and their ~20k lines of tests stay
  untouched; the feishu JSONB config is (de)coded by store.go. Adds
  IsWorkspaceMember and a tx-aware WithTx. Only production wiring swaps
  *db.Queries for *ChannelStore.

- Membership re-check (§4 removed the lark_user_binding -> member FK, so a
  binding row no longer proves current membership):
  * the dispatcher inbound identity step verifies membership after the binding
    lookup; a former member's stale binding is dropped as non_workspace_member
    + audited and never reaches chat_session (§4.3 safety property).
  * RedeemAndBind and BindInstallerTx replace the now-dead FK (23503) branch
    with an explicit IsWorkspaceMember gate, preserving the existing
    ErrBindingNotWorkspaceMember outcome without burning the token.

- router wires the ChannelStore into the patcher, typing indicator, dispatcher,
  hub, and the union_id/region backfills; constructor-based services wrap
  *db.Queries internally so their signatures and nil-check tests are unchanged.

Verified: go build ./... ; go vet ; gofmt ; go test -race ./internal/integrations/...
(full lark suite green unchanged + new membership drop/error tests). Adapter
field mappings (secret base64, union_id RMW, chat-id/open-id remaps, dedup,
token, card) checked end-to-end against a PG17 channel_* schema.

lark_* tables and queries remain (unused at runtime) until the S3 cleanup-hooks
and S4 drop-tables/rename commits.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(channel): renumber generalization migration 123 -> 124

main merged 123_issue_stage after this branch forked, so the branch's 123_channel_generalization now collides on the migration number. The runner keys schema_migrations by full version string and would still apply both, but a duplicate number is a merge hazard and convention violation, so move the channel migration to the next free slot (124).

issue_stage (ALTER issue ADD COLUMN stage) and the channel generalization touch disjoint tables; verified on PG17 that 123_issue_stage applies cleanly on a DB already carrying 124_channel_generalization, so the two are order-independent. sqlc regenerated (v1.31.1): only the migration-number comment changed.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(channel): prune channel bindings on member removal + chat session delete

MUL-3515 §4 dropped every channel_* foreign key, so the old ON DELETE CASCADE that cleared a user's channel_user_binding when they left a workspace, and a chat's channel_chat_session_binding when its chat_session was deleted, no longer fires. Re-establish that integrity in the application layer, inside the existing transactions: revokeAndRemoveMember -> DeleteChannelUserBindingsByWorkspaceMember, DeleteChatSession -> DeleteChannelChatSessionBindingBySession.

Adds real-DB tests for both paths, including a scoping check that a remaining member's binding survives the prune. Verified on PG17: both new tests plus the existing revocation tests and the full handler package pass.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(channel): scope Lark/Feishu store reads to channel_type='feishu'

The S2 cutover routed the Feishu integration onto channel_*, but the Lark-facing ChannelStore wrappers read installation / chat-session-binding / outbound-card rows across ALL channel_type values. Once a second IM exists, that would let the Lark hub supervise a non-Feishu installation, the Lark install list show it, /lark/installations/{id} revoke another channel's row, and the outbound patcher / typing indicator act on a non-Feishu chat binding or card.

Add a channel_type predicate to the six read/list channel queries and pass channelTypeFeishu from every wrapper: GetChannelInstallation, GetChannelInstallationInWorkspace, ListChannelInstallationsByWorkspace, ListActiveChannelInstallations, GetChannelChatSessionBindingBySession, GetChannelOutboundCardByTask.

The S3 cleanup deletes (DeleteChannelUserBindingsByWorkspaceMember / DeleteChannelChatSessionBindingBySession) stay all-channel on purpose: a member leaving or a chat_session being deleted should clear every IM's binding. Adds a real-DB test that seeds a Slack installation/binding/card next to the Feishu ones and asserts the Lark wrappers never return them.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* refactor(channel): replace db.Lark* translation layer with lark domain types

S2 introduced ChannelStore as a translation layer that read/wrote channel_* but kept the retired db.Lark* struct/param shapes so the dispatcher/hub/services and their ~20k lines of tests did not have to change. This collapses that layer: the store now takes and returns the package's flat domain types (Installation, UserBinding, ChatSessionBinding, InboundMessageDedup, BindingTokenRow, OutboundCardMessage) and the *Params types in params.go, with channel-neutral field names (ChannelUserID / ChannelChatID / ...). All call sites, fakes, and tests move to the domain types.

No behavior change: only channel_* is read/written (as before); db.Lark* is now unused, and the lark_* tables + queries/lark.sql are removed in the next commit. Verified on PG17: go build / vet / gofmt clean, go test -race ./internal/integrations/... green (the ~20k-line fake suite), and the lark + handler suites pass.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* refactor(channel): drop lark_* tables and queries (remove old path)

The Go cutover (previous commit) moved the lark package entirely onto channel_* and the domain types, leaving the lark_* tables, queries/lark.sql, and the generated db.Lark* models unused. Remove them per the design (§5: replace, do not keep both): migration 125 drops the seven lark_* tables (data already lives in channel_* since migration 124), and queries/lark.sql is deleted + sqlc regenerated, removing the db.Lark* models and lark query methods.

The 125 down recreates the authoritative pre-drop schema (bot_union_id, region, per-installation dedup PK, thread-reply columns). Verified on PG17: fresh migrate up ends with lark_* gone + channel_* present; isolated 125 down/up round-trips correctly; go build / vet / gofmt clean; go test -race ./internal/integrations/... and the handler suite pass.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(migrations): remove trailing blank line at EOF of 125 down migration

git diff --check flagged a blank line at EOF of 125_drop_lark_tables.down.sql (a pg_dump-generation artifact). Whitespace only; the recreate SQL is unchanged.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* refactor(channel): defer lark_* table drop to a follow-up migration

Preflight deploy review: dropping lark_* in the same release that cuts over (old migration 125) is not rollback/rolling-safe — the v0.3.27 release still reads lark_*, so a rolling deploy or a post-deploy code rollback would hit "relation does not exist". Remove the drop and keep the old tables for one release (standard expand/contract): migration 124 already backfilled lark_* -> channel_*, the new code reads/writes only channel_*, and the physical drop moves to a separate cleanup migration once this ships and is observed.

The lark_* tables remain in the schema, so sqlc regenerates the (now unused) db.Lark* models; queries/lark.sql stays deleted (the new code uses channel_*). No code path reads lark_* — only the destructive drop is deferred, keeping the design's no-compat-layer / no-dual-write rule while being deploy-safe.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(channel): skip orphaned installations in hub-boot active scan

Preflight deploy review: channel_installation dropped the workspace/agent FK (MUL-3515 §4), so unlike lark_installation it does not cascade away when its workspace is deleted or its agent is hard-deleted (e.g. runtime teardown). The hub-boot query then keeps opening a WebSocket for a bot whose owner is gone.

JOIN ListActiveChannelInstallations to live workspace + agent so an orphaned installation is never connected, uniformly for every deletion path. The JOIN matches the old ON DELETE CASCADE semantics (row existence, not agent archival), so an archived-but-present agent's installation is still listed; the orphaned row's encrypted secret is thereby never decrypted/used.

Tests: a real-DB handler test asserts a deleted-workspace/agent installation and a non-Feishu one are both excluded; the lark scope test's active-list assertion moved there since the JOIN now needs real workspace/agent fixtures. (Physically deleting dormant orphaned channel rows on workspace/agent deletion is a separate app-layer-cleanup follow-up.)

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* docs(channel): document non-rolling cutover constraint for the lark->channel migration

Elon deploy review: keeping the lark_* tables (deferred drop) stops old v0.3.27 code from crashing, but is not full expand/contract. Migration 124 is a one-time backfill; afterwards new code runs on channel_* (lease + dedup on channel_*) while pre-cutover code runs on lark_* (lease + dedup on lark_*). If both run concurrently during a rolling deploy, each side claims the same Feishu bot's WS lease on its own table and double-processes inbound events.

This release therefore requires a NON-ROLLING cutover (stop the old hub before applying migration 124 + starting new code; rollback is not lossless once new code writes channel_*). Documented where deployers/reviewers see it: migration 124 header gains a ROLLOUT note; the channel_store.go header is corrected (lark_* tables are retained one release for rollback safety, not "gone"; the store still never touches them). Comment-only — no schema/codegen/behavior change.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(lark): add MULTICA_LARK_HUB_DISABLED switch for the channel cutover

The lark_*->channel_* cutover needs a way to make the Feishu bot briefly unavailable WITHOUT taking down the whole multica-api process — the Lark hub is a goroutine inside it, not a separate Deployment. MULTICA_LARK_HUB_DISABLED=true parks the hub at startup: the API serves HTTP normally but never claims a WS lease or opens a Feishu connection.

Rollout (see migration 124 ROLLOUT note): ship the new release with the flag SET so new pods run API-only while old pods (hub on lark_*) drain during the rolling deploy — the two hubs never overlap. After the old pods are gone and migration 124 has run, flip the flag off; the new hub comes up on channel_*. The old backend does NOT need this switch — its hub stops when k8s terminates the old pods, not via a flag. Nil-ing LarkHub reuses the existing not-configured path so both the startup start and the shutdown join skip it.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* docs(channel): point migration 124 ROLLOUT note at the hub-disable switch

Refine the rollout note to use MULTICA_LARK_HUB_DISABLED for a bot-only cutover (new pods serve API with the hub parked while old pods drain; flip the switch off after the migration), instead of the earlier whole-API recreate. Comment-only.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* docs(channel): fix migration 124 rollout order and document self-host cutover

The previous ROLLOUT note shipped the new (channel_*) build before
running migration 124, so the channel_*-backed HTTP paths (installation
list/install/revoke, chat-session delete, member revoke) would 500 in
the window between new-pod boot and the deferred migration. Restate the
runbook around two explicit invariants — channel_* must exist before the
new build serves those paths, and the old/new hubs must never overlap —
and order the steps so channel_* is created first (park old hub -> snapshot
-> deploy parked new build -> unpark). Document that default self-host
(entrypoint migrate + single-replica Recreate) satisfies both invariants
automatically and needs no manual steps; only prd / multi-replica rolling
self-host needs the switch procedure. Clarify in main.go that the
hub-park switch is generation-agnostic (parks whichever hub the build
carries), which is what enables the preparatory release.

Refs MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: J <j@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-06-24 12:46:20 +08:00

1028 lines
36 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/analytics"
obsmetrics "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/metrics"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/middleware"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/util"
db "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/db/generated"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/protocol"
)
// chatSessionTitleMaxLen caps the rename input. Long enough to fit a
// meaningful summary, short enough to keep the dropdown row scannable.
const chatSessionTitleMaxLen = 200
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Chat Sessions
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
type CreateChatSessionRequest struct {
AgentID string `json:"agent_id"`
Title string `json:"title"`
}
func (h *Handler) CreateChatSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
var req CreateChatSessionRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
return
}
if req.AgentID == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "agent_id is required")
return
}
agentID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, req.AgentID, "agent_id")
if !ok {
return
}
workspaceUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, workspaceID, "workspace id")
if !ok {
return
}
// Verify agent exists in workspace.
agent, err := h.Queries.GetAgentInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetAgentInWorkspaceParams{
ID: agentID,
WorkspaceID: workspaceUUID,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "agent not found")
return
}
if agent.ArchivedAt.Valid {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "agent is archived")
return
}
// Private-agent gate: members must be in allowed_principals to start
// a chat with a private agent. Agent-to-agent chat sessions bypass
// the gate so A2A collaboration still works.
actorType, actorID := h.resolveActor(r, userID, workspaceID)
if !h.canAccessPrivateAgent(r.Context(), agent, actorType, actorID, workspaceID) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "you do not have access to this agent")
return
}
session, err := h.Queries.CreateChatSession(r.Context(), db.CreateChatSessionParams{
WorkspaceID: workspaceUUID,
AgentID: agentID,
CreatorID: parseUUID(userID),
Title: req.Title,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to create chat session")
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, chatSessionToResponse(session))
}
func (h *Handler) ListChatSessions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
// Compute the accessible-agents set once and use it to drop sessions
// whose target agent the caller no longer has access to — without this,
// a member whose role was downgraded would still see the session list
// (and transcripts via ListChatMessages) for any private agent they
// previously had access to. Falls back to the user's role from the
// workspace member context.
member, ok := h.workspaceMember(w, r, workspaceID)
if !ok {
return
}
actorType, actorID := h.resolveActor(r, userID, workspaceID)
allowed, ok := h.accessibleAgentIDs(r.Context(), workspaceID, actorType, actorID, member.Role)
if !ok {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to resolve agent access")
return
}
status := r.URL.Query().Get("status")
// Two call sites → two row types with identical shape. Collect into a
// common response slice via small per-branch loops.
var resp []ChatSessionResponse
if status == "all" {
rows, err := h.Queries.ListAllChatSessionsByCreator(r.Context(), db.ListAllChatSessionsByCreatorParams{
WorkspaceID: parseUUID(workspaceID),
CreatorID: parseUUID(userID),
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list chat sessions")
return
}
resp = make([]ChatSessionResponse, 0, len(rows))
for _, s := range rows {
if _, ok := allowed[uuidToString(s.AgentID)]; !ok {
continue
}
resp = append(resp, ChatSessionResponse{
ID: uuidToString(s.ID),
WorkspaceID: uuidToString(s.WorkspaceID),
AgentID: uuidToString(s.AgentID),
CreatorID: uuidToString(s.CreatorID),
Title: s.Title,
Status: s.Status,
HasUnread: s.HasUnread,
CreatedAt: timestampToString(s.CreatedAt),
UpdatedAt: timestampToString(s.UpdatedAt),
})
}
} else {
rows, err := h.Queries.ListChatSessionsByCreator(r.Context(), db.ListChatSessionsByCreatorParams{
WorkspaceID: parseUUID(workspaceID),
CreatorID: parseUUID(userID),
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list chat sessions")
return
}
resp = make([]ChatSessionResponse, 0, len(rows))
for _, s := range rows {
if _, ok := allowed[uuidToString(s.AgentID)]; !ok {
continue
}
resp = append(resp, ChatSessionResponse{
ID: uuidToString(s.ID),
WorkspaceID: uuidToString(s.WorkspaceID),
AgentID: uuidToString(s.AgentID),
CreatorID: uuidToString(s.CreatorID),
Title: s.Title,
Status: s.Status,
HasUnread: s.HasUnread,
CreatedAt: timestampToString(s.CreatedAt),
UpdatedAt: timestampToString(s.UpdatedAt),
})
}
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
func (h *Handler) loadChatSessionForUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, userID, workspaceID, sessionID string) (db.ChatSession, bool) {
sessionUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, sessionID, "chat session id")
if !ok {
return db.ChatSession{}, false
}
workspaceUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, workspaceID, "workspace id")
if !ok {
return db.ChatSession{}, false
}
session, err := h.Queries.GetChatSessionInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetChatSessionInWorkspaceParams{
ID: sessionUUID,
WorkspaceID: workspaceUUID,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "chat session not found")
return db.ChatSession{}, false
}
if uuidToString(session.CreatorID) != userID {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "not your chat session")
return db.ChatSession{}, false
}
return session, true
}
// gateChatSessionForUser combines the session ownership check with the
// private-agent access gate so a member who has lost access to the target
// agent (role downgrade, ownership transfer, agent flipped to private)
// cannot continue reading the chat transcript even though they remain the
// session creator. Returns ok=false after writing the error response.
func (h *Handler) gateChatSessionForUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, userID, workspaceID, sessionID string) (db.ChatSession, bool) {
session, ok := h.loadChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
if !ok {
return db.ChatSession{}, false
}
agent, err := h.Queries.GetAgent(r.Context(), session.AgentID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "agent not found")
return db.ChatSession{}, false
}
actorType, actorID := h.resolveActor(r, userID, workspaceID)
if !h.canAccessPrivateAgent(r.Context(), agent, actorType, actorID, workspaceID) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "you do not have access to this agent")
return db.ChatSession{}, false
}
return session, true
}
func (h *Handler) GetChatSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
session, ok := h.gateChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
if !ok {
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, chatSessionToResponse(session))
}
type UpdateChatSessionRequest struct {
Title *string `json:"title"`
}
// UpdateChatSession updates user-editable fields on a chat session — today
// just `title`, surfaced by the inline rename affordance in the session
// dropdown. Title is the only field accepted: `status` is legacy + read-only,
// agent/creator/workspace are immutable, the resume pointers
// (session_id / work_dir / runtime_id) are daemon-owned.
func (h *Handler) UpdateChatSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
var req UpdateChatSessionRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
return
}
if req.Title == nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "title is required")
return
}
title := strings.TrimSpace(*req.Title)
if title == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "title is required")
return
}
if len([]rune(title)) > chatSessionTitleMaxLen {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "title is too long")
return
}
session, ok := h.gateChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
if !ok {
return
}
updated, err := h.Queries.UpdateChatSessionTitle(r.Context(), db.UpdateChatSessionTitleParams{
ID: session.ID,
Title: title,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to update chat session")
return
}
resolvedSessionID := uuidToString(updated.ID)
h.publishChat(protocol.EventChatSessionUpdated, workspaceID, "member", userID, resolvedSessionID, protocol.ChatSessionUpdatedPayload{
ChatSessionID: resolvedSessionID,
Title: updated.Title,
UpdatedAt: timestampToString(updated.UpdatedAt),
})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, chatSessionToResponse(updated))
}
// DeleteChatSession hard-deletes a chat session owned by the caller. The
// row lock + cancel + delete run inside a single tx so a concurrent
// SendChatMessage cannot enqueue a task that would later be orphaned by
// the FK ON DELETE SET NULL on agent_task_queue.chat_session_id. Cancel
// failure aborts the delete; events fire only after commit.
func (h *Handler) DeleteChatSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
session, ok := h.loadChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
if !ok {
return
}
tx, err := h.TxStarter.Begin(r.Context())
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to start transaction")
return
}
defer tx.Rollback(r.Context())
qtx := h.Queries.WithTx(tx)
// FOR UPDATE on the chat_session row blocks any concurrent INSERT into
// agent_task_queue that references it (the FK validation needs a
// KEY SHARE lock). After we commit the delete, the blocked INSERT
// fails its FK check, so it can't land an orphaned task.
if _, err := qtx.LockChatSessionForDelete(r.Context(), session.ID); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
// Already gone — treat as idempotent success.
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
return
}
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to lock chat session")
return
}
cancelled, err := qtx.CancelAgentTasksByChatSession(r.Context(), session.ID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to cancel chat session tasks")
return
}
// channel_chat_session_binding used to carry a chat_session FK with
// ON DELETE CASCADE; MUL-3515 §4 dropped every channel_* foreign key, so
// prune the binding here in the same tx that deletes its chat_session.
if err := qtx.DeleteChannelChatSessionBindingBySession(r.Context(), session.ID); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to delete chat session binding")
return
}
if err := qtx.DeleteChatSession(r.Context(), db.DeleteChatSessionParams{
ID: session.ID,
WorkspaceID: session.WorkspaceID,
}); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to delete chat session")
return
}
if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
slog.Warn("commit chat session delete failed", "session_id", sessionID, "error", err)
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to commit chat session delete")
return
}
// Post-commit broadcasts. Subscribers should never observe events for a
// tx that didn't actually persist.
h.TaskService.BroadcastCancelledTasks(r.Context(), cancelled)
resolvedSessionID := uuidToString(session.ID)
h.publishChat(protocol.EventChatSessionDeleted, workspaceID, "member", userID, resolvedSessionID, protocol.ChatSessionDeletedPayload{
ChatSessionID: resolvedSessionID,
})
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Chat Messages
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
type SendChatMessageRequest struct {
Content string `json:"content"`
AttachmentIDs []string `json:"attachment_ids"`
}
type SendChatMessageResponse struct {
MessageID string `json:"message_id"`
TaskID string `json:"task_id"`
// AttachmentIDs are the attachment rows actually bound to this message by
// the server. The client diffs these against the ids it requested so it
// can warn the user when an attachment silently failed to bind — no extra
// round-trip needed. No `omitempty`: a send that requested attachments but
// bound none must serialize `[]` (not be omitted), otherwise the client
// can't tell "all binds failed" from "older server without this field" and
// would silently skip the very warning this exists for. When no
// attachments were requested the value is nil → `null`, which the client's
// guard short-circuits on the requested-ids check.
AttachmentIDs []string `json:"attachment_ids"`
// CreatedAt anchors the chat StatusPill timer the instant the user
// hits send. Without it the front-end falls back to its local clock
// and the timer "snaps backwards" later when WS events deliver the
// real created_at. Returning it here means the pill renders 0s from
// the start with a stable anchor.
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
}
func (h *Handler) SendChatMessage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
var req SendChatMessageRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
return
}
if req.Content == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "content is required")
return
}
// Pre-validate attachment ids early so invalid input returns 400 before
// any state mutation. The actual link runs after CreateChatMessage so we
// have a message_id to back-fill into the attachment rows.
attachmentIDs, ok := parseUUIDSliceOrBadRequest(w, req.AttachmentIDs, "attachment_ids")
if !ok {
return
}
// Load chat session and re-check the private-agent gate on every send.
// The session's creator passed the gate at create time, but their
// workspace role (or the agent's owner) may have changed since — keep
// stale sessions from being a back-door into a private agent the user
// can no longer reach. Agent senders bypass to preserve A2A collaboration.
session, ok := h.gateChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
if !ok {
return
}
// New archive flow doesn't exist anymore, but legacy rows with
// status='archived' may still be in the DB from before the feature
// was removed. Refuse to enqueue new agent work for them — frontend
// surfaces these as read-only.
if session.Status != "active" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "chat session is archived")
return
}
// Create the user message first so the daemon can always find it.
msg, err := h.Queries.CreateChatMessage(r.Context(), db.CreateChatMessageParams{
ChatSessionID: session.ID,
Role: "user",
Content: req.Content,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to create chat message")
return
}
// Back-fill chat_message_id on attachments the sender uploaded while
// composing. New clients upload workspace-scoped unattached rows and bind
// them here; older clients may still upload against the chat_session_id.
// The query accepts both shapes, but only for this workspace, this actor,
// and rows that are not already linked to an issue/comment/message.
var boundAttachmentIDs []string
if len(attachmentIDs) > 0 {
actorType, actorID := h.resolveActor(r, userID, workspaceID)
bound, err := h.Queries.LinkAttachmentsToChatMessage(r.Context(), db.LinkAttachmentsToChatMessageParams{
ChatMessageID: msg.ID,
ChatSessionID: session.ID,
WorkspaceID: session.WorkspaceID,
UploaderType: actorType,
UploaderID: parseUUID(actorID),
AttachmentIds: attachmentIDs,
})
if err != nil {
// Don't fail the send — the message content is already saved and
// the attachments remain on the session (still downloadable).
slog.Warn("link chat attachments failed", "error", err, "message_id", uuidToString(msg.ID))
}
boundAttachmentIDs = make([]string, 0, len(bound))
for _, id := range bound {
boundAttachmentIDs = append(boundAttachmentIDs, uuidToString(id))
}
}
// Enqueue a chat task after the message exists. For web chat the sender is
// the authenticated request user (sessions are creator-only), so they are
// the task initiator — surfaced to the agent under `## Task Initiator`.
task, err := h.TaskService.EnqueueChatTask(r.Context(), session, parseUUID(userID))
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to enqueue chat task: "+err.Error())
return
}
if err := h.Queries.LinkChatMessageToTask(r.Context(), db.LinkChatMessageToTaskParams{
ID: msg.ID,
TaskID: task.ID,
}); err != nil {
// Don't fail the send: the task already exists and the user message
// is persisted. The link is only needed for precise empty-cancel
// cleanup; older/unlinked rows simply keep the historical behavior.
slog.Warn("link user chat message to task failed",
"message_id", uuidToString(msg.ID),
"task_id", uuidToString(task.ID),
"error", err,
)
}
// Touch session updated_at.
if err := h.Queries.TouchChatSession(r.Context(), session.ID); err != nil {
slog.Warn("failed to touch chat session", "session_id", sessionID, "error", err)
}
taskContext := h.TaskService.AnalyticsContextForTask(r.Context(), task)
platform, _, _ := middleware.ClientMetadataFromContext(r.Context())
obsmetrics.RecordEvent(h.Analytics, h.Metrics, analytics.ChatMessageSent(
userID,
workspaceID,
uuidToString(session.ID),
uuidToString(task.ID),
uuidToString(session.AgentID),
taskContext.RuntimeMode,
taskContext.Provider,
platform,
))
// Broadcast the user message.
resolvedSessionID := uuidToString(session.ID)
h.publishChat(protocol.EventChatMessage, workspaceID, "member", userID, resolvedSessionID, protocol.ChatMessagePayload{
ChatSessionID: resolvedSessionID,
MessageID: uuidToString(msg.ID),
Role: "user",
Content: req.Content,
TaskID: uuidToString(task.ID),
CreatedAt: timestampToString(msg.CreatedAt),
})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, SendChatMessageResponse{
MessageID: uuidToString(msg.ID),
TaskID: uuidToString(task.ID),
CreatedAt: timestampToString(task.CreatedAt),
AttachmentIDs: boundAttachmentIDs,
})
}
type ChatMessagesCursorResponse struct {
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
ID string `json:"id"`
}
type ChatMessagesPageResponse struct {
Messages []ChatMessageResponse `json:"messages"`
Limit int `json:"limit"`
HasMore bool `json:"has_more"`
NextCursor *ChatMessagesCursorResponse `json:"next_cursor,omitempty"`
}
func parseChatMessagesPageParams(r *http.Request) (int, pgtype.Timestamptz, pgtype.UUID, error) {
limit := 50
if raw := r.URL.Query().Get("limit"); raw != "" {
parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
if err != nil || parsed < 1 || parsed > 100 {
return 0, pgtype.Timestamptz{}, pgtype.UUID{}, errors.New("invalid limit")
}
limit = parsed
}
rawBeforeCreatedAt := r.URL.Query().Get("before_created_at")
rawBeforeID := r.URL.Query().Get("before_id")
if rawBeforeCreatedAt == "" && rawBeforeID == "" {
return limit, pgtype.Timestamptz{}, pgtype.UUID{}, nil
}
if rawBeforeCreatedAt == "" || rawBeforeID == "" {
return 0, pgtype.Timestamptz{}, pgtype.UUID{}, errors.New("invalid cursor")
}
beforeTime, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, rawBeforeCreatedAt)
if err != nil {
return 0, pgtype.Timestamptz{}, pgtype.UUID{}, errors.New("invalid cursor")
}
beforeID, err := util.ParseUUID(rawBeforeID)
if err != nil {
return 0, pgtype.Timestamptz{}, pgtype.UUID{}, errors.New("invalid cursor")
}
return limit, pgtype.Timestamptz{Time: beforeTime, Valid: true}, beforeID, nil
}
func (h *Handler) ListChatMessages(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
session, ok := h.gateChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
if !ok {
return
}
messages, err := h.Queries.ListChatMessages(r.Context(), session.ID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list chat messages")
return
}
messageIDs := make([]pgtype.UUID, len(messages))
for i, m := range messages {
messageIDs[i] = m.ID
}
groupedAtt := h.groupChatMessageAttachments(r.Context(), workspaceID, messageIDs)
resp := make([]ChatMessageResponse, len(messages))
for i, m := range messages {
resp[i] = chatMessageToResponse(m, groupedAtt[uuidToString(m.ID)])
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
func (h *Handler) ListChatMessagesPage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
session, ok := h.gateChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
if !ok {
return
}
limit, beforeCreatedAt, beforeID, err := parseChatMessagesPageParams(r)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
messages, err := h.Queries.ListChatMessagesPage(r.Context(), db.ListChatMessagesPageParams{
ChatSessionID: session.ID,
Limit: int32(limit + 1),
BeforeCreatedAt: beforeCreatedAt,
BeforeID: beforeID,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list chat messages")
return
}
hasMore := len(messages) > limit
if hasMore {
messages = messages[:limit]
}
var nextCursor *ChatMessagesCursorResponse
if hasMore && len(messages) > 0 {
oldest := messages[len(messages)-1]
nextCursor = &ChatMessagesCursorResponse{
CreatedAt: oldest.CreatedAt.Time.Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
ID: uuidToString(oldest.ID),
}
}
// SQL fetches newest windows first so the empty cursor opens at the recent
// tail. Reverse each cursor page before serializing to keep message order
// chronological within the viewport.
for i, j := 0, len(messages)-1; i < j; i, j = i+1, j-1 {
messages[i], messages[j] = messages[j], messages[i]
}
messageIDs := make([]pgtype.UUID, len(messages))
for i, m := range messages {
messageIDs[i] = m.ID
}
groupedAtt := h.groupChatMessageAttachments(r.Context(), workspaceID, messageIDs)
resp := make([]ChatMessageResponse, len(messages))
for i, m := range messages {
resp[i] = chatMessageToResponse(m, groupedAtt[uuidToString(m.ID)])
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, ChatMessagesPageResponse{
Messages: resp,
Limit: limit,
HasMore: hasMore,
NextCursor: nextCursor,
})
}
// PendingChatTaskResponse is returned by GetPendingChatTask — either the
// current in-flight task's id/status, or an empty object when none is active.
// CreatedAt is the anchor the frontend uses to time the chat StatusPill
// (elapsed seconds = now - CreatedAt). It must come from the server because
// optimistic seeds don't have a real task created_at and the timer needs to
// survive refresh / reopen.
type PendingChatTaskResponse struct {
TaskID string `json:"task_id,omitempty"`
Status string `json:"status,omitempty"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at,omitempty"`
}
// MarkChatSessionRead clears the session's unread_since (→ has_unread=false)
// and broadcasts chat:session_read so other devices of the same user drop
// their badges.
func (h *Handler) MarkChatSessionRead(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
session, ok := h.gateChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
if !ok {
return
}
if err := h.Queries.MarkChatSessionRead(r.Context(), session.ID); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to mark session read")
return
}
resolvedSessionID := uuidToString(session.ID)
h.publishChat(protocol.EventChatSessionRead, workspaceID, "member", userID, resolvedSessionID, protocol.ChatSessionReadPayload{
ChatSessionID: resolvedSessionID,
})
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// PendingChatTasksResponse is the aggregate view consumed by the FAB.
type PendingChatTasksResponse struct {
Tasks []PendingChatTaskItem `json:"tasks"`
}
type PendingChatTaskItem struct {
TaskID string `json:"task_id"`
Status string `json:"status"`
ChatSessionID string `json:"chat_session_id"`
}
type CancelledChatMessageResponse struct {
ChatSessionID string `json:"chat_session_id"`
MessageID string `json:"message_id"`
Content string `json:"content"`
RestoreToInput bool `json:"restore_to_input"`
Attachments []AttachmentResponse `json:"attachments,omitempty"`
}
type CancelTaskByUserResponse struct {
AgentTaskResponse
CancelledChatMessage *CancelledChatMessageResponse `json:"cancelled_chat_message,omitempty"`
}
// ListPendingChatTasks returns every in-flight chat task owned by the current
// user in this workspace. Drives the FAB's "running" indicator when the chat
// window is closed (no per-session query is subscribed). Tasks belonging to
// private agents the caller has lost access to are dropped from the response.
func (h *Handler) ListPendingChatTasks(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
member, ok := h.workspaceMember(w, r, workspaceID)
if !ok {
return
}
actorType, actorID := h.resolveActor(r, userID, workspaceID)
allowed, ok := h.accessibleAgentIDs(r.Context(), workspaceID, actorType, actorID, member.Role)
if !ok {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to resolve agent access")
return
}
rows, err := h.Queries.ListPendingChatTasksByCreator(r.Context(), db.ListPendingChatTasksByCreatorParams{
WorkspaceID: parseUUID(workspaceID),
CreatorID: parseUUID(userID),
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list pending chat tasks")
return
}
// Map session → agent so we can filter without an N+1. The user's own
// session list is small, so one extra query is cheaper than per-row
// lookups.
sessions, err := h.Queries.ListAllChatSessionsByCreator(r.Context(), db.ListAllChatSessionsByCreatorParams{
WorkspaceID: parseUUID(workspaceID),
CreatorID: parseUUID(userID),
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to resolve chat session agents")
return
}
sessionAgent := make(map[string]string, len(sessions))
for _, s := range sessions {
sessionAgent[uuidToString(s.ID)] = uuidToString(s.AgentID)
}
items := make([]PendingChatTaskItem, 0, len(rows))
for _, row := range rows {
sessionID := uuidToString(row.ChatSessionID)
agentID, hasAgent := sessionAgent[sessionID]
if !hasAgent {
continue
}
if _, ok := allowed[agentID]; !ok {
continue
}
items = append(items, PendingChatTaskItem{
TaskID: uuidToString(row.TaskID),
Status: row.Status,
ChatSessionID: sessionID,
})
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, PendingChatTasksResponse{Tasks: items})
}
// GetPendingChatTask returns the most recent in-flight task (queued / dispatched
// / running) for a chat session. The frontend polls this on mount / session
// switch so pending UI state survives refresh and reopen.
func (h *Handler) GetPendingChatTask(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
session, ok := h.gateChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
if !ok {
return
}
task, err := h.Queries.GetPendingChatTask(r.Context(), session.ID)
if err != nil {
// No in-flight task — return an empty object, not an error.
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, PendingChatTaskResponse{})
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, PendingChatTaskResponse{
TaskID: uuidToString(task.ID),
Status: task.Status,
CreatedAt: timestampToString(task.CreatedAt),
})
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Task cancellation (user-facing, with ownership check)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// CancelTaskByUser cancels a task the caller is allowed to act on within the
// current workspace.
//
// Tenancy is enforced uniformly through the task's owning agent: every
// agent_task_queue row carries a NOT NULL agent_id (ON DELETE CASCADE, so the
// agent always exists), and agents are workspace-scoped. GetAgentTaskInWorkspace
// is therefore the single tenant guard that works regardless of which optional
// source FK (issue / chat_session / autopilot_run) is set — which is what makes
// run_only autopilot tasks and quick_create tasks (whose issue does not exist
// yet) cancellable at all. Keying cancellation off issue_id / chat_session_id
// alone is exactly what 404'd these tasks before (MUL-2827).
//
// On top of tenancy, two privacy models layer on:
// - a chat task is private to the member who started the conversation, so
// only that creator may cancel it;
// - every other task surfaces on the agent Activity tab and the workspace
// task snapshot, both of which hide private agents from members without
// access. Cancellation mirrors that gate via canAccessPrivateAgent so the
// id-only endpoint is never more permissive than the surface that exposes
// the task.
func (h *Handler) CancelTaskByUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
wsUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, workspaceID, "workspace id")
if !ok {
return
}
taskID := chi.URLParam(r, "taskId")
taskUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, taskID, "task id")
if !ok {
return
}
task, err := h.Queries.GetAgentTaskInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetAgentTaskInWorkspaceParams{
ID: taskUUID,
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "task not found")
return
}
if task.ChatSessionID.Valid {
// Chat privacy: only the member who opened the conversation may
// cancel its task, even though the workspace is shared.
cs, err := h.Queries.GetChatSessionInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetChatSessionInWorkspaceParams{
ID: task.ChatSessionID,
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "task not found")
return
}
if uuidToString(cs.CreatorID) != userID {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "not your task")
return
}
} else {
// Issue / autopilot / quick_create tasks are all visible on the
// agent Activity tab + workspace snapshot, which gate private
// agents. Mirror that gate here.
agent, err := h.Queries.GetAgentInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetAgentInWorkspaceParams{
ID: task.AgentID,
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "task not found")
return
}
actorType, actorID := h.resolveActor(r, userID, workspaceID)
if !h.canAccessPrivateAgent(r.Context(), agent, actorType, actorID, workspaceID) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "you do not have access to this agent")
return
}
}
cancelled, err := h.TaskService.CancelTaskWithResult(r.Context(), taskUUID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
return
}
resp := CancelTaskByUserResponse{
AgentTaskResponse: taskToResponse(cancelled.Task, workspaceID),
}
if cancelled.CancelledChatMessage != nil {
attachments := make([]AttachmentResponse, 0, len(cancelled.CancelledChatMessage.Attachments))
for _, a := range cancelled.CancelledChatMessage.Attachments {
attachments = append(attachments, h.attachmentToResponse(a))
}
resp.CancelledChatMessage = &CancelledChatMessageResponse{
ChatSessionID: cancelled.CancelledChatMessage.ChatSessionID,
MessageID: cancelled.CancelledChatMessage.MessageID,
Content: cancelled.CancelledChatMessage.Content,
RestoreToInput: cancelled.CancelledChatMessage.RestoreToInput,
Attachments: attachments,
}
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Response types & helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
type ChatSessionResponse struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
WorkspaceID string `json:"workspace_id"`
AgentID string `json:"agent_id"`
CreatorID string `json:"creator_id"`
Title string `json:"title"`
Status string `json:"status"`
// Only populated by list endpoints — single-session fetches return false.
HasUnread bool `json:"has_unread"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt string `json:"updated_at"`
}
type ChatMessageResponse struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
ChatSessionID string `json:"chat_session_id"`
Role string `json:"role"`
Content string `json:"content"`
TaskID *string `json:"task_id"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
// FailureReason flags an assistant row synthesized by FailTask's chat
// fallback. Front-end uses it to switch to the destructive bubble.
FailureReason *string `json:"failure_reason"`
// ElapsedMs is the wall-clock duration from task creation to terminal
// state. Drives "Replied in 38s" / "Failed after 12s" captions.
ElapsedMs *int64 `json:"elapsed_ms"`
// Attachments linked to this message via chat_message_id. The chat
// bubble renders file cards from these, and the daemon claim path
// (daemon.go) pulls structured metadata from the same source so the
// agent can `multica attachment download <id>` rather than guessing
// from a markdown URL that may expire.
Attachments []AttachmentResponse `json:"attachments,omitempty"`
}
func chatSessionToResponse(s db.ChatSession) ChatSessionResponse {
return ChatSessionResponse{
ID: uuidToString(s.ID),
WorkspaceID: uuidToString(s.WorkspaceID),
AgentID: uuidToString(s.AgentID),
CreatorID: uuidToString(s.CreatorID),
Title: s.Title,
Status: s.Status,
CreatedAt: timestampToString(s.CreatedAt),
UpdatedAt: timestampToString(s.UpdatedAt),
}
}
func chatMessageToResponse(m db.ChatMessage, attachments []AttachmentResponse) ChatMessageResponse {
return ChatMessageResponse{
ID: uuidToString(m.ID),
ChatSessionID: uuidToString(m.ChatSessionID),
Role: m.Role,
Content: m.Content,
TaskID: uuidToPtr(m.TaskID),
CreatedAt: timestampToString(m.CreatedAt),
FailureReason: textToPtr(m.FailureReason),
ElapsedMs: int8ToPtr(m.ElapsedMs),
Attachments: attachments,
}
}