Files
multica/server/internal/handler/install_token.go
Jiayuan Zhang f52db9e96c feat(server): install_token mint+exchange + daemon_token revoke (MUL-2305)
Phase 1 of RFC MUL-2297 — DB and credential contract for the new runtime
install flow. CLI/daemon/UI plumbing lands in later phases.

Schema (migration 091):
- daemon_token.revoked_at — explicit revoke replaces TTL-based expiry; the
  exchange path now mints daemon_token rows with a ~100y expires_at so the
  cleanup query stays intact while the credential is effectively long-lived
  until revoked.
- install_token — short-lived (15m) single-use credential. used_at IS NULL
  is the atomic gate enforced inside the UPDATE so a concurrent second
  exchange returns zero rows.

API:
- POST /api/workspaces/{id}/install-tokens — admin-only mint, returns mit_
  once; only the hash is stored.
- POST /api/install-tokens/exchange — public (the mit_ is the credential);
  atomically consumes the install_token and returns a fresh mdt_.

Error contract for Phase 2 daemon installer:
- 401 invalid_install_token — unknown hash OR expired
- 401 install_token_already_used — hash exists but used_at IS NOT NULL

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-05-17 00:09:48 +08:00

185 lines
6.5 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/auth"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/middleware"
db "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/db/generated"
)
// installTokenTTL bounds how long an install_token stays valid between mint
// and exchange. The RFC (MUL-2297 Phase 1) suggests 15 minutes — long enough
// for a user to copy the snippet, switch to their machine, paste it into an
// installer, and complete a network round-trip; short enough that a token
// leaked onto a chat log or screenshot doesn't stay armed for long.
const installTokenTTL = 15 * time.Minute
// daemonTokenLongLivedExpiry is how far in the future an mdt_ token issued
// via the install_token exchange is dated. The point is "no automatic
// expiry" — explicit revoke via daemon_token.revoked_at is the only way to
// retire one. We keep expires_at NOT NULL (legacy schema constraint) and
// the DeleteExpiredDaemonTokens cleanup query intact by picking a stamp so
// far out that no rational deployment will reach it. See RFC MUL-2297.
const daemonTokenLongLivedExpiry = 100 * 365 * 24 * time.Hour
// CreateInstallTokenResponse is the workspace-admin-facing mint response.
// Token is shown once — the server only retains the hash.
type CreateInstallTokenResponse struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Token string `json:"token"`
WorkspaceID string `json:"workspace_id"`
ExpiresAt string `json:"expires_at"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
}
// CreateInstallToken mints a short-lived single-use install token for the
// authenticated admin's workspace. Routed under
// /api/workspaces/{id}/install-tokens so workspace membership/role is
// enforced by the RequireWorkspaceRoleFromURL middleware before this
// handler runs.
func (h *Handler) CreateInstallToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
workspaceID := middleware.WorkspaceIDFromContext(r.Context())
if workspaceID == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "workspace_id is required")
return
}
wsUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, workspaceID, "workspace_id")
if !ok {
return
}
rawToken, err := auth.GenerateInstallToken()
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to generate token")
return
}
expiresAt := pgtype.Timestamptz{Time: time.Now().Add(installTokenTTL), Valid: true}
row, err := h.Queries.CreateInstallToken(r.Context(), db.CreateInstallTokenParams{
TokenHash: auth.HashToken(rawToken),
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
CreatedBy: parseUUID(userID),
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to create install token")
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, CreateInstallTokenResponse{
ID: uuidToString(row.ID),
Token: rawToken,
WorkspaceID: uuidToString(row.WorkspaceID),
ExpiresAt: timestampToString(row.ExpiresAt),
CreatedAt: timestampToString(row.CreatedAt),
})
}
// ExchangeInstallTokenRequest is the public unauthenticated body posted by a
// daemon installer. The mit_ token itself is the credential.
type ExchangeInstallTokenRequest struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
DaemonID string `json:"daemon_id"`
}
// ExchangeInstallTokenResponse returns the long-lived daemon token. The
// caller stores `token` and authenticates subsequent /api/daemon/* requests
// with it.
type ExchangeInstallTokenResponse struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
WorkspaceID string `json:"workspace_id"`
DaemonID string `json:"daemon_id"`
ExpiresAt string `json:"expires_at"`
}
// ExchangeInstallToken validates a `mit_` install token, atomically burns
// it, and returns a fresh long-lived `mdt_` daemon token bound to the
// caller-supplied daemon_id. Public (no Authorization header) — the install
// token IS the credential.
//
// Error contract (Phase 2 daemon depends on these):
// - 400 `invalid_install_token` — malformed body or missing fields
// - 401 `invalid_install_token` — unknown hash OR expired
// - 401 `install_token_already_used` — hash exists but used_at IS NOT NULL
// - 500 any DB / token-gen failure
func (h *Handler) ExchangeInstallToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var req ExchangeInstallTokenRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_install_token")
return
}
req.Token = strings.TrimSpace(req.Token)
req.DaemonID = strings.TrimSpace(req.DaemonID)
if req.Token == "" || !strings.HasPrefix(req.Token, "mit_") {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid_install_token")
return
}
if req.DaemonID == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "daemon_id is required")
return
}
hash := auth.HashToken(req.Token)
// Try to consume the row atomically (single UPDATE flips used_at). A
// miss here means one of: unknown hash, expired, or already used. We
// disambiguate with a follow-up read so the "already used" path can
// return the dedicated error code the daemon installer surfaces to
// the user — that copy explicitly tells them to mint a fresh mit_.
consumed, err := h.Queries.ConsumeInstallToken(r.Context(), hash)
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to exchange install token")
return
}
existing, lookupErr := h.Queries.GetInstallTokenByHash(r.Context(), hash)
if lookupErr == nil && existing.UsedAt.Valid {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "install_token_already_used")
return
}
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "invalid_install_token")
return
}
daemonToken, err := auth.GenerateDaemonToken()
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to generate daemon token")
return
}
expiresAt := pgtype.Timestamptz{
Time: time.Now().Add(daemonTokenLongLivedExpiry),
Valid: true,
}
created, err := h.Queries.CreateDaemonToken(r.Context(), db.CreateDaemonTokenParams{
TokenHash: auth.HashToken(daemonToken),
WorkspaceID: consumed.WorkspaceID,
DaemonID: req.DaemonID,
ExpiresAt: expiresAt,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to issue daemon token")
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, ExchangeInstallTokenResponse{
Token: daemonToken,
WorkspaceID: uuidToString(created.WorkspaceID),
DaemonID: created.DaemonID,
ExpiresAt: timestampToString(created.ExpiresAt),
})
}