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* fix(execenv): default-disable Codex native multi-agent in per-task config Recent Codex app-server releases enable features.multi_agent by default, exposing spawn_agent / wait / close_agent tools that let a parent thread spawn nested subagents. The daemon currently models only the parent thread, so the parent's turn/completed is treated as task completion even when spawned children are still running — leading to premature task completion and dropped child output. Disable features.multi_agent by default in the per-task CODEX_HOME/config.toml so Multica's task lifecycle is the only orchestration layer in play. Strip both the dotted-key form (features.multi_agent) at TOML root and the multi_agent key inside a [features] table; siblings and unrelated tables are preserved. Honor MULTICA_CODEX_MULTI_AGENT=1 as an opt-out for users who explicitly want Codex native subagents inside a Multica task. The user's global ~/.codex/config.toml is never modified — only the daemon's isolated per-task copy. Also widen managedBlockRe to consume `\n*` rather than `\n?` so reruns don't accumulate blank lines when both the sandbox and multi-agent managed blocks coexist. * fix(execenv): inject managed multi_agent inside existing [features] table Per PR review (codex_multi_agent.go:77-83 vs :112-115): when the user's config.toml already has a top-level `[features]` table, writing `features.multi_agent = false` at the TOML root implicitly redefines the same `features` table. The strict TOML parser used by Codex (`toml-rs`) rejects that with `table 'features' already exists`, so Codex would fail to load the per-task config and refuse to start the thread. Verified the strict-parser failure with pelletier/go-toml/v2; the previous BurntSushi/toml-based regression test was permissive enough to miss it. Detect a root-level `[features]` header and place the managed block inside that table (`multi_agent = false` with marker comments). When no such header exists, keep the existing root-level dotted-key form. The managed-block regex matches both layouts so reruns and layout transitions stay idempotent. A `[features.experimental]` sub-table without a bare `[features]` header still uses the root dotted-key form, which is spec-valid (no explicit redefinition). Tests now use pelletier/go-toml/v2 to actually parse the output and assert features.multi_agent decodes to false; the regression case from the PR review is covered explicitly. * fix(execenv): recognize feature table header variants --------- Co-authored-by: Devv <devv@Devvs-Mac-mini.local>
283 lines
11 KiB
Go
283 lines
11 KiB
Go
package execenv
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import (
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"os"
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"regexp"
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"runtime"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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)
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// Background
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//
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// On macOS, Codex's Seatbelt sandbox in the `workspace-write` mode silently
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// ignores `[sandbox_workspace_write] network_access = true`. DNS resolution is
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// blocked at the syscall layer, so processes inside the sandbox see
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// `no such host` errors when calling out (for example, `multica issue get`
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// hitting the Multica API). See upstream issue openai/codex#10390.
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//
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// Until a fixed Codex release ships, the per-task Codex config on macOS needs
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// to fall back to `sandbox_mode = "danger-full-access"` so the agent can
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// actually reach the Multica API. On Linux (and on macOS once the upstream
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// fix is released), the normal `workspace-write` + `network_access = true`
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// combo is preferred because it keeps the filesystem sandbox intact.
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//
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// CodexDarwinNetworkAccessFixedVersion is the earliest Codex CLI version in
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// which `network_access = true` is honored under Seatbelt on macOS. Bump this
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// constant when the upstream fix ships. Empty string means "no known fixed
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// release yet — always treat macOS Codex as broken for network access".
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const CodexDarwinNetworkAccessFixedVersion = ""
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// codexSandboxPolicy describes how the per-task Codex config.toml should
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// configure the sandbox.
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type codexSandboxPolicy struct {
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// Mode is the value written as `sandbox_mode = "..."`.
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Mode string
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// NetworkAccess controls `[sandbox_workspace_write] network_access`.
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// Only meaningful when Mode is "workspace-write".
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NetworkAccess bool
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// Reason is a short human-readable label used in warn-level logs.
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Reason string
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}
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// codexSandboxPolicyFor picks the right policy for the given platform and
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// detected Codex CLI version.
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//
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// - Non-darwin: always workspace-write with network access (Landlock is not
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// affected by the macOS Seatbelt bug).
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// - darwin with a version at or above CodexDarwinNetworkAccessFixedVersion:
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// workspace-write with network access (upstream bug fixed).
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// - darwin otherwise (including when the version is unknown): fall back to
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// danger-full-access so the Multica CLI can reach the API.
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func codexSandboxPolicyFor(goos, detectedVersion string) codexSandboxPolicy {
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if goos == "" {
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goos = runtime.GOOS
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}
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if goos != "darwin" {
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return codexSandboxPolicy{
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Mode: "workspace-write",
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NetworkAccess: true,
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Reason: "non-darwin platform — seatbelt bug does not apply",
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}
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}
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if codexDarwinNetworkAccessFixed(detectedVersion) {
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return codexSandboxPolicy{
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Mode: "workspace-write",
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NetworkAccess: true,
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Reason: "codex version includes macOS network_access fix",
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}
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}
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reason := "codex on macOS: seatbelt ignores sandbox_workspace_write.network_access (openai/codex#10390)"
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if detectedVersion == "" {
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reason += " — version unknown, assuming broken"
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}
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return codexSandboxPolicy{
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Mode: "danger-full-access",
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NetworkAccess: false,
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Reason: reason,
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}
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}
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// codexDarwinNetworkAccessFixed returns true if the given detected version is
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// known to honor `network_access = true` under Seatbelt on macOS.
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func codexDarwinNetworkAccessFixed(detectedVersion string) bool {
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if CodexDarwinNetworkAccessFixedVersion == "" || detectedVersion == "" {
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return false
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}
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fixed, err := parseCodexSemver(CodexDarwinNetworkAccessFixedVersion)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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got, err := parseCodexSemver(detectedVersion)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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return !got.lessThan(fixed)
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}
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// codexUpgradeHint returns a short, actionable hint for users running a Codex
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// version that suffers from the macOS network_access bug.
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func codexUpgradeHint() string {
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return "upgrade Codex CLI (e.g. `brew upgrade codex` or `npm i -g @openai/codex`) once a release including openai/codex#10390 is available to restore workspace-write + network_access"
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}
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// multicaManagedBeginMarker / multicaManagedEndMarker delimit the block the
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// daemon writes into the per-task config.toml. Everything between the markers
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// is owned by the daemon and will be rewritten idempotently; anything outside
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// the markers is preserved as-is.
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const (
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multicaManagedBeginMarker = "# BEGIN multica-managed (do not edit; regenerated by daemon)"
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multicaManagedEndMarker = "# END multica-managed"
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)
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// renderMulticaManagedBlock produces the managed block for the given policy.
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//
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// The block contains only top-level key=value assignments — no `[table]`
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// headers — and uses TOML dotted-key syntax for nested values. This is
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// important because the block is inserted into a user-owned config.toml:
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//
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// - If the block opened a `[sandbox_workspace_write]` header, any user
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// content that happened to sit below it would be silently reparented into
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// that table.
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// - If the block were appended after a file that already ends inside some
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// other table (e.g. `[permissions.multica]`), a bare `sandbox_mode = ...`
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// key would be parsed as a child of that preceding table.
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//
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// Keeping the block as pure top-level dotted-key assignments, and placing it
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// at the top of the file (see upsertMulticaManagedBlock), avoids both traps.
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func renderMulticaManagedBlock(policy codexSandboxPolicy) string {
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var b strings.Builder
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b.WriteString(multicaManagedBeginMarker)
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b.WriteString("\n")
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b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("sandbox_mode = %q\n", policy.Mode))
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if policy.Mode == "workspace-write" {
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b.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("sandbox_workspace_write.network_access = %t\n", policy.NetworkAccess))
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}
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b.WriteString(multicaManagedEndMarker)
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b.WriteString("\n")
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return b.String()
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}
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// managedBlockRe captures the daemon-owned block (including the surrounding
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// markers and any trailing blank lines) so it can be replaced idempotently.
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// `\n*` rather than `\n?` so reruns don't accumulate blank lines when the
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// block coexists with another managed block (e.g. multi-agent) in the file.
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var managedBlockRe = regexp.MustCompile(
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`(?ms)^` + regexp.QuoteMeta(multicaManagedBeginMarker) +
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`.*?^` + regexp.QuoteMeta(multicaManagedEndMarker) + `\n*`)
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// upsertMulticaManagedBlock returns the config content with the multica-managed
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// block placed at the very top of the file. Any previously written managed
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// block is removed in place; user content outside the markers is preserved.
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//
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// The block is always hoisted to the top (rather than replaced in place or
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// appended to EOF) so that its top-level keys are parsed at the TOML root,
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// regardless of whether the user's config ends inside a table like
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// `[permissions.multica]` or `[profiles.foo]`. Combined with the dotted-key
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// form used by renderMulticaManagedBlock, this means the managed block neither
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// leaks into nor inherits from any surrounding table scope.
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func upsertMulticaManagedBlock(content string, policy codexSandboxPolicy) string {
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// Drop any previously written managed block (wherever it sits).
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content = managedBlockRe.ReplaceAllString(content, "")
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block := renderMulticaManagedBlock(policy)
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// Trim leading blank lines left behind by the removal so we don't grow
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// the file on every idempotent rewrite.
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content = strings.TrimLeft(content, "\n")
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if content == "" {
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return block
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}
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return block + "\n" + content
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}
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// stripLegacySandboxDirectives removes top-level `sandbox_mode = ...` lines
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// and any `[sandbox_workspace_write]` section that would otherwise conflict
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// with the managed block. This lets the daemon migrate tasks whose config.toml
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// was produced by an older daemon that wrote those values inline.
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//
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// Only top-level entries are stripped; anything under an unrelated section
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// header (like `[permissions.foo]`) is preserved untouched.
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func stripLegacySandboxDirectives(content string) string {
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lines := strings.Split(content, "\n")
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out := make([]string, 0, len(lines))
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inLegacyWorkspaceWrite := false
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for _, line := range lines {
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trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(line)
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if strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "[") {
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// Entering a new section. Exit legacy-tracking if we were in one.
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inLegacyWorkspaceWrite = trimmed == "[sandbox_workspace_write]"
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if inLegacyWorkspaceWrite {
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continue
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}
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out = append(out, line)
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continue
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}
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if inLegacyWorkspaceWrite {
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// Drop the legacy section body until the next section.
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continue
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}
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if strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "sandbox_mode") {
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// Drop legacy top-level sandbox_mode declarations.
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continue
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}
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out = append(out, line)
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}
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return strings.Join(out, "\n")
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}
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// ensureCodexSandboxConfig writes the multica-managed sandbox block into the
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// given config.toml according to the policy. It is idempotent: running it
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// twice produces the same file contents. The file is created if it doesn't
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// exist.
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//
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// The function logs (at warn level) when it falls back to danger-full-access
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// on macOS so the incident is visible in daemon logs.
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func ensureCodexSandboxConfig(configPath string, policy codexSandboxPolicy, detectedVersion string, logger *slog.Logger) error {
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data, err := os.ReadFile(configPath)
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if err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
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return fmt.Errorf("read config.toml: %w", err)
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}
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existing := string(data)
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// Drop inline sandbox_mode / [sandbox_workspace_write] from older daemon
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// versions so they don't collide with the managed block.
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if existing != "" && !managedBlockRe.MatchString(existing) {
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existing = stripLegacySandboxDirectives(existing)
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}
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updated := upsertMulticaManagedBlock(existing, policy)
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if updated == string(data) {
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return nil
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}
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if policy.Mode == "danger-full-access" && logger != nil {
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version := detectedVersion
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if version == "" {
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version = "unknown"
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}
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logger.Warn("codex sandbox: falling back to danger-full-access on macOS",
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"reason", policy.Reason,
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"codex_version", version,
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"hint", codexUpgradeHint(),
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"config_path", configPath,
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)
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}
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if err := os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(updated), 0o644); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("write config.toml: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// --- small semver helper, scoped to this package to avoid an import cycle
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// with server/pkg/agent. The agent package already has a similar parser; we
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// duplicate the minimal bits here because execenv cannot depend on agent.
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type codexSemver struct {
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Major, Minor, Patch int
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}
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var codexSemverRe = regexp.MustCompile(`v?(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)`)
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func parseCodexSemver(raw string) (codexSemver, error) {
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m := codexSemverRe.FindStringSubmatch(raw)
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if m == nil {
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return codexSemver{}, fmt.Errorf("cannot parse version %q", raw)
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}
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maj, _ := strconv.Atoi(m[1])
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min, _ := strconv.Atoi(m[2])
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pat, _ := strconv.Atoi(m[3])
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return codexSemver{Major: maj, Minor: min, Patch: pat}, nil
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}
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func (v codexSemver) lessThan(o codexSemver) bool {
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if v.Major != o.Major {
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return v.Major < o.Major
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}
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if v.Minor != o.Minor {
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return v.Minor < o.Minor
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}
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return v.Patch < o.Patch
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}
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