Files
multica/server/internal/handler/autopilot_webhook_handler_test.go
Bohan Jiang 4fac8d772f feat(attribution): Human Attribution Phase 1 (MUL-4302) (#5150)
* feat(attribution): Phase 1 foundation — provenance schema + resolver (MUL-4302)

Human Attribution, Phase 1 (地基) first increment. Every agent run must be
traceable to exactly one accountable human AND record at which waterfall level
that human was resolved, so a NULL originator can be told apart from a genuine
'no human in the chain'.

- migration 149: add originator_source (waterfall label) + delegation/retry/
  rerun/rule-version lineage + kind-tagged trigger evidence to agent_task_queue.
  No FK, no cascade, no CHECK on the source enum (MUL-4302 §7); nullable ADD
  COLUMNs = fast metadata-only change on the hot queue table.
- internal/attribution: the accountable-human vocabulary (Source, EvidenceKind,
  TriggerKind) + pure, unit-tested classification rules (ClassifyComment/
  ClassifyDirect). No DB, no authorization — provenance labeling only.
- service: attributionFor{IssueTask,TriggerComment} gather facts and delegate to
  the pure classifier; the legacy originator resolvers now delegate here so
  there is one source of truth. originator_user_id's VALUE is unchanged, so the
  Composio-overlay and canInvokeAgent A2A authorization boundaries are
  byte-for-byte preserved (MUL-4302 §1.3).
- enqueueIssueTask / enqueueMentionTask stamp originator_source + evidence;
  CreateRetryTask carries the parent attribution forward and records
  retry_of_task_id so retry and manual rerun stay separable (MUL-4302 §5).

Verified: go build ./..., go vet, gofmt clean; new attribution unit tests +
enqueue stamping integration test green; existing resolve_originator tests
unchanged.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(attribution): split accountable_user_id from originator, close enqueue bypasses (MUL-4302)

Phase 1, per Bohan's decision on the MUL-4302 thread: audit and authorization
answer different questions and get different columns.

- Migration 151 adds agent_task_queue.accountable_user_id (no FK, no cascade).
  Authorization keeps reading ONLY originator_user_id (canInvokeAgent A2A gate,
  Composio overlay); audit/UI/usage read accountable_user_id + source + evidence.
- Invariant (finalizeAttribution, single chokepoint + §11 tests): originator
  non-null ⟹ accountable equals it. The two diverge only when originator is null
  (autopilot / degraded fallback), which is the deferred rule_owner/owner_fallback
  increment; this lands the column + mirror-write so that split has a home.

- Close the NULL-source enqueue bypasses Elon flagged: chat, quick-create,
  deferred-fallback and run_only-autopilot now stamp originator_source + evidence
  (+ accountable where a human exists). Autopilot stays unattributed until the
  rule-version snapshot table lands, but is no longer a silent NULL-source row.
  Retry inherits accountable_user_id like the rest of the attribution lineage.

- Fix assign/promote attribution (§4): a member who assigns/promotes an existing
  issue is now the accountable human (and, by the invariant, originator) ahead of
  the issue creator. Threaded as an OPTIONAL actor override, so comment/rerun/
  autopilot paths keep today's resolution and create-with-assignee (creator ==
  actor) is unchanged. The squad leader gate already judged the same member.

Also merges origin/main: renumbers the attribution migration 149→150 (main took
149 for issue_origin_agent_create) and folds agent_create into ClassifyDirect's
origin inheritance.

go build/vet/gofmt clean; attribution unit tests + service stamp/actor tests +
handler suite pass on a fresh DB migrated through 151.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* docs(attribution): fix accountable NULL semantics + close chat/quick-create evidence boundary (MUL-4302)

Addresses Elon's 2nd-round review on PR #5150 (pre-merge doc/evidence items):

- Migration 151 no longer overclaims NULL. accountable_user_id is NULL not only
  on pre-migration rows but on NEW rows whose audit source resolved no human yet
  (run_only autopilot writes originator_source='unattributed' with NULL
  accountable until rule_owner lands). Header + COMMENT ON COLUMN reworded so a
  schema reader does not misjudge the invariant.

- Chat now uses the UNIFORM evidence pair (kind=chat, ref=chat_session_id), like
  autopilot_run/issue_assignment, instead of relying only on the dedicated
  chat_session_id column — new EvidenceChat kind. Added a service test asserting
  chat stamps direct_human + chat evidence.

- Quick-create is documented as the ONE intentional no-antecedent-row path: no
  comment/issue/session/run exists at enqueue time (the run creates the issue), so
  trigger_evidence_kind/ref stay NULL while the human rides originator/accountable
  and source is direct_human — not a NULL-source bypass.

No authorization behavior change. attribution + service + handler suites pass on a
DB migrated through 151.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* chore(attribution): renumber migrations 150/151 → 157/158 after merging main (MUL-4302)

main's #5162 ("unblock release migrations") renumbered the chat migrations and
took 150 (agent_task_coalesced_comments) and 151 (chat_read_cursor), colliding
with this branch's attribution migrations. Renumber them above main's new highest
(156) so TestMigrationNumericPrefixesStayUniqueAfterLegacySet passes:

- 150_agent_task_attribution      → 157_agent_task_attribution
- 151_agent_task_accountable_user → 158_agent_task_accountable_user

Fixed the internal "migration 150" references in 158's header to 157. Migrations
apply cleanly through 158 on a fresh DB; migration lint green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(attribution): autopilot rule_owner — accountable = rule version publisher (MUL-4302)

Implements rule_owner (MUL-4302 §3.4), the first attribution source where the
accountable human diverges from the (NULL) authorization originator.

- Migration 159 adds the append-only autopilot_rule_version snapshot table (no FK,
  no cascade); migration 160 adds its CONCURRENTLY lookup index.
- Write-on-publish: CreateAutopilot appends v1 (publisher = creator); UpdateAutopilot
  appends a new version when a SUBSTANTIVE autopilot-row field changes (assignee /
  status / execution_mode) — cosmetic edits (title/description/template) write none.
  Both run inside the existing handler tx (atomic with the autopilot write).
- Dispatch resolution: both autopilot execution modes now resolve the active rule
  version and stamp originator_source='rule_owner', accountable_user_id=publisher,
  rule_version_id=<snapshot>, with originator_user_id left NULL (authorization
  unchanged). run_only stamps CreateAutopilotTask directly; create_issue resolves in
  attributionForIssueTask so both modes attribute identically. A missing version /
  non-member publisher degrades to unattributed — never fabricates a human.
- finalizeAttribution now enforces the invariant ONE-WAY: it mirrors originator onto
  accountable only when originator is valid, leaving an explicitly-set accountable
  (rule_owner / future owner_fallback) intact when originator is NULL. Added
  rule_version_id to CreateAgentTask so the create_issue path persists it too.

Also merges origin/main and renumbers this branch's attribution migrations
150/151 → 157/158 (main's #5162 took 150/151); rule_version table is 159/160.

Tests: attribution unit RuleOwner + one-way invariant table; service integration
tests proving an autopilot-origin issue stamps rule_owner + rule_version_id (and
degrades to unattributed with no version). Full service/attribution/handler/
migration suites pass on a DB migrated through 160; build/vet/gofmt clean.

Deferred (same PR): trigger-table republish (cron/webhook/event_filters) and
system-pause/archive versioning; owner_fallback + fail-closed; manual rerun.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): manual autopilot trigger → direct_human to the triggering member (MUL-4302)

Elon's blocking finding: a member manually triggering an autopilot was attributed
rule_owner (accountable = rule publisher, originator NULL) like a schedule/webhook
run, so member B triggering member A's autopilot landed accountable=A and carried
no originator authorization context for the run. Per MUL-4302 §4 a manual "run now"
is a direct human action and must attribute direct_human to the triggering member.

- Thread the triggering member from TriggerAutopilot into dispatch: new
  DispatchAutopilotManual carries actorUserID (resolved via resolveActor +
  memberActorUserID, so only a member actor is a human; an A2A agent actor falls
  back to rule_owner). DispatchAutopilot / DispatchAutopilotForPlan keep their
  public signatures (pass an invalid actor); only the internal dispatchAutopilot /
  dispatchCreateIssue / dispatchRunOnly gained the param, so the many existing
  callers are untouched.
- run_only: dispatchRunOnly stamps direct_human (originator == accountable ==
  actor, no rule_version) for a manual actor, else rule_owner. CreateAutopilotTask
  gains an originator_user_id param for the manual case.
- create_issue: dispatchCreateIssue enqueues a manual trigger via the actor-carrying
  *WithHandoff entry points; attributionForIssueTask's autopilot-origin rule_owner
  branch is now guarded on !actorUserID.Valid, so a valid actor falls through to the
  direct_human override. Both execution modes attribute identically.
- schedule / webhook keep rule_owner (no actor). Trigger-table + system-pause/archive
  versioning remain the pre-merge follow-ups.

Tests: the run_only row assertion Elon asked for (schedule → rule_owner row on
CreateAutopilotTask), plus manual direct_human on BOTH modes (run_only and
create_issue), including a manual actor distinct from the rule publisher. Full
service/attribution/handler/migration/scheduler/cmd suites pass on a DB migrated
through 160; build/vet/gofmt clean.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(attribution): owner_fallback + fail-closed policy, and manual-rerun direct_human (MUL-4302)

Two of the three remaining Phase 1 items (trigger-table / system-pause versioning
is deferred — see PR description).

owner_fallback + fail-closed (§1/§3.5) — the never-null accountable guarantee:
- attribution.OwnerFallback degrades an UNATTRIBUTED result to owner_fallback:
  accountable = agent owner, originator stays NULL (audit-only, authz untouched),
  Source.Precise()==false. finalizeAttribution's one-way invariant already allows
  accountable-set / originator-NULL divergence, so nothing else changes.
- Migration 161 adds workspace.attribution_fail_closed (default FALSE) + a lean
  GetWorkspaceAttributionFailClosed read. (Also added the column to ListWorkspaces'
  explicit column list so its row type stays db.Workspace.)
- applyAttributionFallback is applied at every enqueue boundary (issue, mention,
  chat, quick-create, deferred-fallback, autopilot run_only): unattributed →
  owner_fallback (agent owner) by default, or ErrAttributionFailClosed when the
  workspace is fail-closed, which the caller surfaces to refuse the enqueue (the
  run does not start). So no run is left without an accountable human, and a
  compliance workspace can block unattributable runs instead.

manual rerun (§5) — a rerun is a NEW direct_human trigger to the rerunning member:
- RerunIssue threads the acting member (resolved in the handler via resolveActor)
  down to enqueueRerunTask, and attributionForIssueTask is now actor-first so the
  actor wins over an INHERITED trigger comment (a rerun keeps the comment for the
  daemon's prompt context but must attribute to whoever clicked rerun, not the
  original comment's human).
- rerun_of_task_id lineage is recorded via a targeted SetAgentTaskRerunOf update on
  the rerun path only (keeping the shared CreateAgentTask insert untouched), so
  system retry (retry_of_task_id) and human rerun stay separable in reporting.

Tests: OwnerFallback unit test; owner_fallback + fail-closed-refusal + manual-rerun
(direct_human + rerun_of_task_id) service tests; the prior "degrades to unattributed"
test updated to owner_fallback. Full service/attribution/handler/migration/scheduler/
cmd suites pass on a DB migrated through 161; build/vet/gofmt clean.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): close fail-open holes + move rerun_of_task_id into creation snapshot (MUL-4302)

Addresses Elon's two must-fixes on PR #5150.

1. accountable-never-null / fail-closed had fail-open holes. applyAttributionFallback
   now, for an UNATTRIBUTED run, refuses the enqueue (ErrAttributionFailClosed) in
   THREE cases instead of silently degrading to a runnable NULL-accountable task:
   - workspace policy read fails (or no workspace) → fail closed; we cannot confirm
     fallback is permitted, so we don't run an unattributable task on a DB hiccup.
     (Only the rare unattributed path pays this; precise runs never read the policy.)
   - workspace is fail-closed → refuse (unchanged).
   - owner_fallback has no valid agent owner → refuse rather than enqueue a task with
     a NULL accountable_user_id.
   ErrAttributionFailClosed's doc now covers all three "cannot guarantee an
   accountable human" refusals. Added missing-owner / policy-read-failure /
   precise-passthrough tests.

2. manual rerun rerun_of_task_id was a post-notify UPDATE (race: the queued event /
   daemon claim could see rerun_of_task_id = NULL, and a failed update degraded the
   run to a plain direct_human). It now rides the CreateAgentTask insert — threaded
   through enqueueIssueTask / enqueueMentionTask as a creation param (like
   retry_of_task_id) so it is written in the same statement before the daemon is
   notified. Removed the SetAgentTaskRerunOf follow-up query.

Also merges origin/main (unrelated CLI fix #5167, no conflict). Full service /
attribution / handler / migration / scheduler / cmd suites pass on a DB migrated
through 161; build / vet / gofmt clean.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(attribution): rule_owner versioning on trigger edits + system-pause/archive (MUL-4302)

The final remaining Phase 1 item: substantive publishes beyond the autopilot row now
republish the rule version, so a run's rule_owner accountable follows whoever last
changed what the rule does.

- Extracted the config-summary + insert into service.RecordAutopilotRuleVersion so
  the handler and the (different-package) failure monitor share one writer; the
  handler's recordAutopilotRuleVersion is now a thin wrapper.
- Trigger edits: UpdateAutopilotTrigger and DeleteAutopilotTrigger republish the rule
  version with the acting member as publisher, ATOMICALLY (tx-wrapped mutation +
  version write, mirroring CreateAutopilot/UpdateAutopilot). CreateAutopilotTrigger
  republishes best-effort — the webhook path mints its token with a retry loop that
  cannot share one tx, and a create is usually initial setup already covered by v1;
  a failed write there is benign (active version stays the current publisher, the new
  trigger fires under it, no immediate daemon claim rides it).
- Archive (DeleteAutopilot) republishes (member, status=archived), tx-wrapped.
- System auto-pause (failure monitor) republishes with a 'system' publisher,
  best-effort — a background sweep to a non-dispatching state (a paused autopilot
  never dispatches; a later member resume supersedes).
- RotateWebhookToken / SetSigningSecret deliberately do NOT version: they rotate
  credentials, not the rule's behavior (not §3.4 substantive).

Semantics: a system-published (no-member) active version degrades dispatch to
unattributed → owner_fallback, never fabricating a human.

Tests: republish-reattributes (member A → member B supersedes → dispatch resolves to
B; system publisher → unattributed). Full service/attribution/handler/migration/
scheduler/cmd suites pass on a DB migrated through 161; build/vet/gofmt clean.
Also merges origin/main (unrelated frontend feature #5074).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): make trigger-create rule-version republish atomic (MUL-4302)

Addresses Elon's final Phase 1 blocking finding: CreateAutopilotTrigger recorded the
rule-version republish best-effort AFTER the trigger insert. If member B added a
schedule/webhook trigger to member A's autopilot and the version write failed, future
schedule/webhook dispatches would keep attributing to A — violating the rule_owner
invariant that the last member to substantively change the rule owns future runs
("no immediate daemon claim" doesn't save it, since the miss surfaces at the LATER
trigger firing).

Both create paths now write the version in the SAME tx as the trigger INSERT:
- schedule create: wrap CreateAutopilotTrigger + recordAutopilotRuleVersion in one tx.
- webhook create: each mint-with-retry attempt runs in its own tx (insert + version
  commit together; a token collision rolls that attempt back and retries with a fresh
  token; a version-write failure rolls the trigger back). Passes ap + the acting
  member id into the helper.
- removed the best-effort recordTriggerRuleVersionBestEffort helper (and the now-unused
  slog import).

Test: TestCreateTrigger_RepublishesRuleVersionAtomically drives both create paths
through the handler and asserts a rule version is published by the acting member.
Existing webhook/trigger/archive handler tests still pass. Also merges origin/main
(unrelated avatar feature #5074). Full service/attribution/handler/migration/
scheduler/cmd suites pass on a DB migrated through 161; build/vet/gofmt clean.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(attribution): Phase 2.1 — surface run attribution on the task API (MUL-4302 §9)

First Phase 2 (visibility) increment: the agent-task API now returns the resolved
accountable-human provenance so the UI can render an "on behalf of" badge.

- AgentTaskResponse gains an `attribution` object: source label (never blank —
  pre-migration NULL renders "unattributed") + `precise` flag (false for the degraded
  owner_fallback / backfill / unattributed sources), the initiator (accountable) and
  originator (authorization) user refs, the evidence {kind, ref_id} pointer, and the
  rule_version / delegated / retry / rerun lineage ids.
- The label + evidence + raw ids are built in the PURE taskToResponse (no DB), so
  every task response carries them. Names are hydrated separately, only on the
  user-facing surfaces (ListAgentTasks, ListWorkspaceAgentTaskSnapshot, RerunIssue,
  CancelTaskByUser) — daemon-claim paths stay lean.
- Hydration resolves initiator/originator from the GLOBAL user table (departed-member
  safe) via a new batch GetUsersByIDs query (no N+1); best-effort, so a lookup hiccup
  leaves the raw ids intact.

Tests: pure taskAttributionBase (direct_human / rule_owner NULL-originator /
owner_fallback degraded / pre-migration→unattributed) + DB hydration (fills known
ref, leaves unknown id un-filled, skips nil). Full handler/service/attribution/
migration/scheduler/cmd suites pass on a DB migrated through 161; build/vet/gofmt
clean. The field is additive — the frontend's parseWithFallback ignores unknown keys,
so nothing breaks until the UI increment consumes it.

Also merges origin/main (unrelated editor feature #5090).

Remaining Phase 2 (next increments, same PR): frontend zod schema + "on behalf of"
badge + evidence-chain jump; append-only correction events (write + display).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(attribution): Phase 2.2 — on-behalf-of badge in the execution log (MUL-4302 §9)

Surface the accountable human on every agent run row:
- AttributionBadge composes Badge + ActorAvatar, shows "on behalf of <member>"
  with the resolution source as a tooltip; degraded (non-precise) attribution
  gets a warning tone, and an unresolved initiator renders an explicit
  "no responsible member" chip.
- Wire the badge into both active and past rows of the execution log.
- Mirror the attribution shape into AgentTaskResponseSchema (defensive, .loose())
  so the cancel-task path carries it through zod; add parse tests.
- Export TaskAttribution/AttributionUser/TaskEvidence from @multica/core/types
  and add the attribution block to all four issues.json locales.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): hydrate initiator names on issue-facing task endpoints + bound the badge (MUL-4302 §9)

Address Elon's PR #5150 review:
- ListTasksByIssue (the execution-log data source), GetActiveTaskForIssue and the
  issue-scoped CancelTask now call hydrateTaskAttributions, so the "on behalf of
  <member>" badge shows the real member name on issue detail instead of falling
  back to "someone". Mirrors the existing ListAgentTasks / snapshot behavior.
- AttributionBadge: cap width (max-w-40, min-w-0) and truncate the name span so a
  long name / narrow right column can't squeeze out trigger/status/actions; keep
  the avatar shrink-0.
- Add a handler test asserting the issue task list returns a hydrated
  attribution.initiator.name.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): use semantic AvatarSize 'xs' for the badge avatar

main refactored ActorAvatar.size from a raw pixel number to the semantic
AvatarSize union (packages/ui/lib/avatar-size). Switch the on-behalf-of badge
avatar from size={14} to size="xs" (16px) after merging main.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): stage-cascade falls back to parent-issue provenance, not agent owner (MUL-4302)

When closing the last sub-issue in a Stage wakes the parent's assignee agent, the
run was enqueued via a system-authored child-done comment with no actor, which the
resolver classified as unattributed and then degraded to owner_fallback (the agent's
own owner). That is the wrong accountable human: the woken run should be accountable
to whoever caused the parent issue to exist.

attributionForIssueTask now detects a system-authored trigger comment and falls
through to the parent issue's own provenance — the same creator / agent_create-origin
/ autopilot-origin chain a direct enqueue resolves (so an agent-decomposed parent
attributes via delegation to the human who drove it; a member-created parent to that
member; an autopilot parent to the rule publisher). owner_fallback is now only the
last resort when the parent provenance itself has no human.

- Extract attributionFromComment so attributionForIssueTask can inspect author_type
  without a second GetComment; authorization resolution stays byte-identical.
- Add a DB-backed test asserting a system child-done comment resolves to the parent
  issue's origin human (delegation), not owner_fallback.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(attribution): autopilot runs attribute to the firing trigger's creator (MUL-4302)

Per Bohan: an autopilot schedule/webhook run should be accountable to the human
who created the SPECIFIC trigger that fired it, not the rule publisher. (Manual
triggers already attribute to the invoking member via direct_human — unchanged.)

- Migration 162: add autopilot_trigger.created_by_type/created_by_id (nullable, no
  FK/cascade). Capture the creating member at both trigger-create sites (schedule +
  webhook).
- New precise source trigger_owner: originator stays NULL (an autonomous fire
  carries no human authorization — same authz-safe divergence as rule_owner),
  accountable = the trigger's member creator.
- triggerOwnerAttribution resolves run.trigger_id → creator; wired into run_only
  dispatch and the create_issue path (bridging issue → active run → trigger_id).
  Legacy triggers with no recorded creator, and agent-created triggers, degrade to
  rule_owner then owner_fallback — nothing regresses.
- Frontend: trigger_owner source label in all four locales + badge switch case.
- Tests: attribution TriggerOwner unit + Precise/invariant; DB-backed resolver
  tests (member creator → trigger_owner; creatorless → rule_owner fallback).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* chore(attribution): re-trigger CI (dropped synchronize event on 249090260)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): mirror accountable_user_id on comment-coalescing merge (MUL-4302)

The one-way invariant is 'originator_user_id IS NOT NULL ⟹ accountable_user_id =
originator_user_id', enforced at finalizeAttribution for enqueues and preserved by
the retry-clone (copies both columns). But MergeCommentIntoPendingTask (main #5192)
re-stamps originator_user_id to the newly-coalesced comment's human WITHOUT touching
accountable_user_id — so folding member B's comment into member A's queued task left
originator=B / accountable=A, violating the invariant. Re-stamp accountable to mirror
the new originator (same thing finalizeAttribution does). Add a DB-backed regression
test.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): Elon's 3 must-fixes + DB cross-column invariant CHECK (MUL-4302)

Bohan approved Elon's plan; this closes the three attribution boundaries he flagged
and locks the one-way invariant at the DB.

1. Delegation now inherits the parent's ACCOUNTABLE, not just its originator. An
   autopilot-rooted chain (parent originator NULL, accountable = trigger creator)
   @mentioning an agent / creating a sub-issue used to drop to unattributed →
   owner_fallback and fail-closed workspaces wrongly rejected the fan-out. Added
   ParentAccountable/OriginAccountable to CommentFacts/DirectFacts; ClassifyComment/
   ClassifyDirect copy accountable down (source=delegation, precise, originator NULL)
   so the chain root stays stable at any depth (§3.2).
2. The direct-chat send path (SendDirectChatMessage, MUL-4351) wrote only
   originator_user_id — no accountable/source/evidence, a NULL-source bypass. It now
   stamps the full direct_human attribution like EnqueueChatTask.
3. Comment-coalescing merge re-attribution is now ATOMIC: MergeCommentIntoPendingTask
   re-stamps the whole snapshot (person columns + source + delegation lineage + rule
   version + evidence) of the new comment, not just the two person fields, so a merged
   run never shows B accountable while pointing at A's stale source/evidence.
4. Migration 169: NOT VALID CHECK (originator_user_id IS NULL OR (accountable_user_id
   IS NOT NULL AND accountable_user_id = originator_user_id)). Enforces the invariant
   on every new write (the class of bug #5192 introduced); historical rows not blocked,
   VALIDATE after Phase 3 backfill. Updated test fixtures that seeded originator-only
   rows to also set accountable.

Merged latest main (renumbered attribution migrations 163–168 after main took 161/162;
merged the retry-clone chat_input_task_id + attribution columns). Verified: go build/
vet, attribution/service/handler/cmd-server tests on a migrated DB, frontend
typecheck/lint/tests.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): trigger responsibility transfers to effective publisher; fail-closed comment merge

Elon final-review must-fix 1 (MUL-4302): trigger_owner now resolves to the
member CURRENTLY responsible for the firing trigger's effective config, not the
fixed creator. Per-trigger published_by on autopilot_trigger, seeded to the
creator and re-stamped to the editor on a substantive edit — a trigger-scoped
edit bumps only that row (UpdateAutopilotTrigger), an autopilot-level edit bumps
all its triggers (UpdateAutopilot). Editing one trigger never reassigns another.
Adds real dispatchRunOnly transfer test + resolver-level isolation test.

Must-fix 3: AttributionForMergedComment reuses applyAttributionFallback and
returns ErrAttributionFailClosed; the merge caller refuses on fail-closed,
keeping the queued task's original precise snapshot instead of degrading it to
owner_fallback. Adds regression test.

Renumbered attribution migrations to 166-172 after merging main.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): make migration 172 invariant CHECK upgrade-safe (Option A)

Elon final-review must-fix 2 (MUL-4302), rollout chosen by Bohan. The NOT VALID
CHECK still checks a pre-existing row on any later UPDATE (even one not touching
attribution columns), so cross-deployment stale queued/running tasks (originator
set, accountable NULL from before migration 167) would fail on their next
claim/complete/cancel. Exempt exactly those legacy rows via 'originator_source
IS NULL' — that column was added in 166 with no backfill, so it is NULL only on
pre-migration rows and non-NULL on every attribution-aware write. New writes
stay fully enforced; the #5192 bypass class (source always set) is unaffected.
Phase 3 backfills legacy rows then drops+re-adds the strict form + VALIDATE.

Adds TestAttributionInvariantCheck_ExemptsLegacyRows (legacy row survives a
status UPDATE) and updates the reject-bypass test to the enforced regime.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): pin substantive/cosmetic edit boundary for trigger transfer

Elon re-review must-fix 1: an autopilot-level edit only transfers trigger_owner
responsibility when it changes what the automation instructs or who/whether it
runs. autopilotRuleSubstantiveChange now includes description (the run Prompt)
and issue_title_template; title and project_id stay cosmetic/routing.
UpdateAutopilotTrigger no longer transfers on every PATCH — it compares the
persisted before/after and transfers only on a real cron/timezone/enabled/
event_filters change, not a label-only or no-op PATCH. Adds real handler tests
(prompt->all, title->none, cron->one+isolation, label->none, no-op->none).

Must-fix 3: real merge-path regression (TestMergeCommentIntoPendingTask_
FailClosedKeepsOriginalSnapshot) drives mergeCommentIntoPendingTask and asserts
a fail-closed workspace preserves the queued task's full snapshot; fail-open
control completes the owner_fallback merge.

Docs: migration 172 comment reworded to legacy-writer/unbackfilled-lineage
semantics (source NULL is not strictly pre-migration); PR description synced.

Migration renumber vs latest main (must-fix 2) deferred to pre-launch per Bohan.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* chore(attribution): renumber migrations to 167-173 after syncing main

Merged latest main (which took 166_project_dates) and shifted the attribution
migration series off the 166 collision: 166->167 agent_task_attribution,
167->168 accountable_user, 168->169 rule_version, 169->170 rule_version_index,
170->171 fail_closed, 171->172 trigger_publisher, 172->173 invariant_check.
Updated the internal cross-references in the migration comments accordingly.
Fixes TestMigrationNumericPrefixesStayUniqueAfterLegacySet on the merge tree.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(admission): unify dispatch outcome + close rerun/chat/autopilot invoke holes (MUL-4525)

P0 first increment toward a platform-wide execution-admission contract so a
user who names an execution target always gets a definite result and never a
silent no-op, and so blocked targets are reported without leaking private-agent
details.

Backend:
- New shared contract (handler/admission.go): DispatchOutcome / DispatchStatus
  (queued/coalesced/deferred/blocked) + stable, enumeration-safe
  DispatchReasonCode set, plus writeDispatchBlocked() whose legacy `error`
  string never reveals target existence.
- Rerun (task.go / task_lifecycle.go): re-validate the operator can invoke the
  RESOLVED target agent (historical agent for a task_id rerun) before any
  cancel/enqueue; blocked returns a structured 403 and mutates nothing
  (ErrRerunInvokeNotAllowed).
- Chat send (chat.go): re-run canInvokeAgent on every send, not just the softer
  canAccessPrivateAgent view gate; a revoked permission blocks before the
  message/attachments/task persist.
- Autopilot manual "run now" (service/autopilot.go): admission now keys on the
  current CLICKER, not the autopilot creator — clicker admission and clicker
  attribution no longer fork. Automation (schedule/webhook) still falls back to
  the creator gate. Added reason_code to the run response for the UI.

Frontend:
- triggerAutopilot response is schema-parsed; handleRunNow branches on run
  status and shows a localized, reason_code-based warning for skipped/failed
  instead of a false-success toast.
- Chat send and rerun surface the structured 403 reason_code as localized
  toasts (dispatchReasonCode helper) instead of a generic failure.
- Additive fields only; older clients keep working. i18n added to all 4 locales.

Tests: rerun fail-before-mutation gate, autopilot clicker-vs-creator fork
(service + handler), reason-code classification, and a malformed-response
schema test. Backend handler+service suites and FE typecheck/lint green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* test(cmd/server): thread nil invoke gate through RerunIssue call sites (MUL-4525)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(admission): typed reason codes + run-now whitelist + real security tests (MUL-4525)

Addresses Elon's review of the P0 first increment (must-fix 1–3).

1. Run now no longer has a false-success branch. handleRunNow now classifies on
   a whitelist via a pure runNowToastKind(): only issue_created/running →
   success; skipped → warning; failed and any unknown/future status → error. Add
   run-now-toast unit test over all five status classes plus reason-code → key
   mapping.

2. reason_code is a typed value decided at the admission source, not
   reverse-engineered from English failure text. New leaf package
   internal/dispatch holds the canonical ReasonCode enum (shared by handler +
   service so they can never drift). shouldSkipDispatch / errDispatchSkipped /
   the fail path now carry a typed code through DispatchAutopilotManual straight
   into the response; the substring classifier is deleted. Fixes the two missed
   branches: attribution fail-closed → attribution_blocked (typed errors.Is),
   "agent has no runtime bound" → runtime_offline. Regression tests for both.

3. Security acceptance tests exercise the REAL handlers, not injected callbacks:
   - Chat: create session while invokable → revoke invoke (flip to private, keep
     owner-view) → send returns 403 + reason_code with zero chat_message / task
     writes.
   - Rerun: private historical agent through RerunIssue + canInvokeAgent — a
     non-invoking workspace owner is refused 403 + reason_code and mutates
     nothing (fail-before-mutation); the agent owner is allowed 202.

No migration; reason_code is a decision-time value only the manual "run now"
response carries. Additive on the wire. Backend build/vet/handler+service
suites and FE typecheck/lint/vitest green. (Migration-prefix collision with main
remains the deferred pre-merge renumber.)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* test(admission): make must-fix 3 acceptance tests prove the invariant (MUL-4525)

Addresses Elon's round-3 narrow review — the two security tests were not yet
falsifiable against the bugs they must catch.

- Rerun: after enqueuing the historical task, reassign the issue to a SECOND
  agent that the denied user CAN invoke. Now the current assignee and the
  task_id agent differ, so a rerun that wrongly validated the current assignee
  would let the denied user through — the 403 proves the gate is keyed on the
  historical private agent. The allow case now asserts the reran task's agent_id
  is the historical agent, not the current assignee.

- Chat: the blocked send now carries a valid, still-unbound attachment. After
  the 403 the test asserts the attachment's chat_session_id and chat_message_id
  are both still NULL, guarding against anyone moving attachment binding ahead
  of the invoke gate.

Test-only. Full internal/handler Go suite green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(comments): surface blocked @mention trigger_outcomes instead of silent no-op (MUL-4525 §2)

A comment that @mentions an agent/squad the author cannot invoke used to save
with zero feedback — the user assumed a bug. Now the explicit-mention path
reports a per-target outcome on both preview and create/edit.

Backend (server/internal/handler/comment.go):
- resolveMentionedAgentCommentTriggers collects blocked outcomes instead of a
  silent `continue`. The invoke gate is evaluated BEFORE any archived/runtime
  state is read, so a caller who cannot invoke a private target only ever sees
  the generic invocation_not_allowed and can never enumerate its existence.
- enqueueCommentAgentTriggers returns queued/coalesced/deferred/blocked per
  explicit mention; enqueue errors are typed (attribution_blocked via
  errors.Is), not swallowed. Implicit routing (assignee/thread/conversation)
  carries no outcome — the user never named those targets.
- trigger-preview returns `blocked[]`; create/edit return additive
  `trigger_outcomes[]`. One blocked mention never fails the comment.

Frontend:
- Composer shows a warning chip for blocked mentions before sending; after
  sending, a "posted, but N not triggered" toast (blocked-only; coalesced/
  deferred are success-shaped). Additive schema + defensive parse; i18n ×4.

Tests: handler partial-success + enumeration-safety acceptance tests; core
outcome-parse + preview-schema tests; hook/parity updated. Backend
handler+service suites and FE typecheck/lint/vitest green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* i18n(admission): clearer, consistent blocked-trigger copy (MUL-4525)

Reword the awkward "you are not allowed to run this autopilot's assignee" and
polish all MUL-4525 blocked/partial copy across en/zh-Hans/ja/ko:

- Unify on "you don't have permission to use this <agent|target>" (zh: 没有…的
  使用权限) for autopilot Run now, comment mentions, rerun, and chat send —
  replacing the various "not allowed to run/trigger" phrasings.
- Align zh to the glossary term 智能体 (was mixed "Agent"), matching the
  surrounding UI voice (e.g. agent_link_no_access).
- Drop jargon: "blocked by an admission policy"/"被准入策略拦截" → "the run was
  blocked"/"本次运行已被拦截"; "attributed"/"归因" → plainer wording.
- Comment copy counts "mentions" (was "targets") for consistency with the chip.

Backend dispatchBlockedFallbackMessage (old-client English fallback) reworded to
match; its enumeration-safety test assertion updated. Copy-only — no key/logic
changes; parity + typecheck green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(comments): one outcome per explicit mention + FE success whitelist (MUL-4525)

Addresses Elon's round-2 review of the §2 comment trigger_outcomes.

1. Separate execution dedup from per-target outcomes. resolveMentionedAgent-
   CommentTriggers now returns triggers (deduped by executing agent) AND one
   commentMentionTarget per EXPLICIT mention. enqueueCommentAgentTriggers returns
   a per-executing-agent result map; commentTriggerOutcomes fans each agent's
   status to every target that resolved to it. So @Agent A + @Squad S(leader=A)
   coalesces to ONE task but yields TWO outcomes. The squad-leader self-suppress
   branch now returns a definite `deferred` outcome instead of no result. New
   CreateComment test asserts 1 task, 2 outcomes.

2. Frontend no longer treats an unknown status as success. unhandledComment-
   TriggerOutcomes whitelists queued/coalesced/deferred as handled; blocked and
   any unknown/future/empty status warn (mirrors the Run now whitelist). The
   preview schema's `blocked` now drops malformed entries INDIVIDUALLY instead of
   z.array(...).catch([]) discarding the whole set. Regression tests for the
   unknown status and the per-item drop.

Backend handler suite + go vet, FE typecheck/lint/vitest green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(comments): honest role + status in trigger_outcomes fan-out (MUL-4525)

Addresses Elon's round-3 review of the §2 fan-out.

1. Execution merge preserves the squad-leader role instead of first-mention-
   wins. The dedup now UPGRADES an already-added plain @agent trigger to a
   @squad-leader trigger for the same agent, so @Agent A + @Squad S(leader=A)
   always runs as a leader task (is_leader_task + squad_id=S) regardless of
   mention order — the daemon still injects S's briefing. When two DIFFERENT
   squads share one leader, the single run carries one squad's context and the
   other squad is reported `coalesced` (folded), never a second `queued`. The
   enqueue result now records the executed squad so the fan-out can tell them
   apart. Tests assert the task role in both orders and the two-squad split.

2. Squad-leader self-suppression no longer fakes success. The self-trigger
   guard keys on the latest task ROLE with no status filter, so a long-completed
   task also suppresses; reporting `deferred/already_active` when nothing is
   active was a false success. The branch now reports `deferred` only when a
   real non-terminal task is active (its reconcile covers the comment), else a
   non-success `blocked` + new `already_handled` reason. Fixed the reversed
   helper-semantics comment. New handler test covers the completed-task branch.

Backend handler+service suites and go vet green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(comments): fail-closed active-task check, never fake deferred (MUL-4525)

Elon round-4 must-fix: hasActiveTaskForIssueAndAgent swallowed DB errors by
returning true, so both call sites could turn a query failure into a
success-shaped `deferred/already_active` — a silent false success, exactly what
this issue forbids for admission-query failures.

- hasActiveTaskForIssueAndAgent now returns (bool, error).
- Two pure decision helpers govern the branches, fail closed on error:
  - decidePostMergeMiss: on query error, do NOT enqueue a fresh task (duplicate
    concurrent-run risk) AND report non-success blocked/internal_error; a
    confirmed active task defers; a confirmed-none enqueues fresh.
  - decideSuppressedLeaderOutcome: on query error, blocked/internal_error; a
    confirmed active run defers; else self_trigger_suppressed. Never a fabricated
    deferred.
- Renamed reason already_handled -> self_trigger_suppressed (Elon non-blocking
  note): the old name implied the new comment was already processed, but the
  real meaning is a suppressed self-trigger.

Deterministic unit tests cover the query-failure branch at both call sites
(no fresh enqueue, non-success outcome) — a real DB fault can't be forced
through valid handler inputs, and the decision is what governs the behavior.
Backend handler+service suites and go vet green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(comments): honest merge outcome — refused merge is blocked, not fake coalesced (MUL-4525)

A pending-task merge previously reported success (coalesced) even when it
was refused or failed: attribution fail-closed and unknown DB errors both
returned handled=true, so the caller recorded coalesced for a merge that
never happened. mergeCommentIntoPendingTask now returns a distinguishable
commentMergeResult; commentMergeTerminalOutcome maps a real merge to
coalesced, a fail-closed refusal to blocked/attribution_blocked, and any
other failure to blocked/internal_error. Only "no queued task to fold"
falls through to the active-task decision. Adds pure coverage of the
mapping plus a fail-closed regression asserting the non-success outcome
and unchanged task count.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(comments): name blocked @mentions in preview + toast instead of a vague count (MUL-4525)

The blocked-trigger preview showed a red "1 mention won't trigger" with no
name, and the post-send toast said "but 1 mention wasn't triggered" — the
user can't tell which target or why. Now each blocked mention renders its own
chip named from the mention markup the user typed ("Go · No permission"),
with an error indicator and a short reason; the toast names the single target
too. The wire outcome still omits the target name (enumeration-safety) — the
label comes from the user's own draft, so nothing new is disclosed.

Shares a blocked-trigger-copy module (long + short reason labels) between the
chip and the toast, and a pure mentionLabelsByTarget/parseMentions helper in
core (fresh regex per call — a shared global leaked lastIndex). Adds core +
chip tests; drops the now-unused trigger_blocked_count keys across locales.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(attribution): accountable-member avatar on agent task rows + transcript header (MUL-4302)

Surface who each agent run is on behalf of where runs are actually
browsed:
- Agent detail activity tab: an avatar-only AttributionBadge on every
  task row's meta line (Now + Recent work), tooltip carries the name +
  resolution source.
- Execution-record (transcript) dialog header: the full on-behalf-of
  badge next to the status pill.

Adds a compact variant="avatar" mode to AttributionBadge, reusing its
source-label mapping and degraded-attribution tone. Renders nothing when
a run has no resolved accountable member.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: J <j@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-07-15 03:09:56 +08:00

1117 lines
44 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype"
db "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/db/generated"
)
// All tests in this file require a working DB. testHandler / testWorkspaceID /
// testUserID / testRuntimeID are wired in TestMain (handler_test.go) and
// TestMain skips the suite if Postgres isn't reachable.
// ── Fixture helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
func createWebhookTestAgent(t *testing.T, name string) string {
t.Helper()
var agentID string
if err := testPool.QueryRow(context.Background(), `
INSERT INTO agent (
workspace_id, name, description, runtime_mode, runtime_config,
runtime_id, visibility, max_concurrent_tasks, owner_id,
instructions, custom_env, custom_args, mcp_config
)
VALUES ($1, $2, '', 'cloud', '{}'::jsonb, $3, 'private', 1, $4, '', '{}'::jsonb, '[]'::jsonb, '{}'::jsonb)
RETURNING id
`, testWorkspaceID, name, testRuntimeID, testUserID).Scan(&agentID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create agent: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
testPool.Exec(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM agent WHERE id = $1`, agentID)
})
return agentID
}
func createWebhookTestAutopilot(t *testing.T, agentID, status, mode string) string {
t.Helper()
var apID string
if err := testPool.QueryRow(context.Background(), `
INSERT INTO autopilot (
workspace_id, title, assignee_id, status, execution_mode,
created_by_type, created_by_id
) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, 'member', $6)
RETURNING id
`, testWorkspaceID, "Webhook test "+status, agentID, status, mode, testUserID).Scan(&apID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create autopilot: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
testPool.Exec(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM autopilot WHERE id = $1`, apID)
})
return apID
}
func createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t *testing.T, autopilotID string) AutopilotTriggerResponse {
t.Helper()
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := newRequest("POST", "/api/autopilots/"+autopilotID+"/triggers", map[string]any{
"kind": "webhook",
})
req = withURLParam(req, "id", autopilotID)
testHandler.CreateAutopilotTrigger(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusCreated {
t.Fatalf("CreateAutopilotTrigger: expected 201, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp AutopilotTriggerResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
return resp
}
// TestCreateTrigger_RepublishesRuleVersionAtomically verifies Elon's final Phase 1
// must-fix: creating a trigger (a substantive change to what fires, MUL-4302 §3.4)
// republishes the autopilot's rule version with the acting member as publisher,
// written atomically in the same tx as the trigger INSERT — for BOTH the webhook
// create path (mint-with-retry, whole attempt wrapped in a tx) and the schedule path.
func TestCreateTrigger_RepublishesRuleVersionAtomically(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "TriggerVersion Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
ctx := context.Background()
verParams := db.GetActiveAutopilotRuleVersionParams{
WorkspaceID: parseUUID(testWorkspaceID),
AutopilotID: parseUUID(apID),
}
// The test autopilot is inserted directly (no v1), so no rule version exists yet.
if _, err := testHandler.Queries.GetActiveAutopilotRuleVersion(ctx, verParams); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected no rule version before any trigger is created")
}
// Webhook create (mint-with-retry) republishes atomically.
createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
ver, err := testHandler.Queries.GetActiveAutopilotRuleVersion(ctx, verParams)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("webhook trigger create must republish a rule version: %v", err)
}
if ver.PublishedByType != "member" || uuidToString(ver.PublishedByID) != testUserID {
t.Errorf("webhook version published_by = %s/%s, want member/%s", ver.PublishedByType, uuidToString(ver.PublishedByID), testUserID)
}
// Schedule create appends a fresh version, also published by the acting member.
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := newRequest("POST", "/api/autopilots/"+apID+"/triggers", map[string]any{
"kind": "schedule",
"cron_expression": "0 0 * * *",
})
req = withURLParam(req, "id", apID)
testHandler.CreateAutopilotTrigger(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusCreated {
t.Fatalf("schedule CreateAutopilotTrigger: got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
ver2, err := testHandler.Queries.GetActiveAutopilotRuleVersion(ctx, verParams)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("schedule trigger create must republish a rule version: %v", err)
}
if ver2.ID.Bytes == ver.ID.Bytes {
t.Error("schedule create must append a NEW rule version, not reuse the webhook one")
}
if ver2.PublishedByType != "member" || uuidToString(ver2.PublishedByID) != testUserID {
t.Errorf("schedule version published_by = %s/%s, want member/%s", ver2.PublishedByType, uuidToString(ver2.PublishedByID), testUserID)
}
}
// createWebhookTriggerWithFilters builds the request body with a real JSON
// array — the same shape the frontend sends. Earlier revisions of this
// helper marshaled the filters separately and assigned the resulting
// []byte to the "event_filters" map key, which encoding/json then encoded
// as a base64 string (since []byte → JSON-string). The base64 path
// happened to work against an []byte server-side field but masked the
// actual contract bug fixed in PR #3231 review.
func createWebhookTriggerWithFilters(t *testing.T, autopilotID string, filters []WebhookEventFilter) AutopilotTriggerResponse {
t.Helper()
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := newRequest("POST", "/api/autopilots/"+autopilotID+"/triggers", map[string]any{
"kind": "webhook",
"event_filters": filters,
})
req = withURLParam(req, "id", autopilotID)
testHandler.CreateAutopilotTrigger(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusCreated {
t.Fatalf("CreateAutopilotTrigger: expected 201, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp AutopilotTriggerResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
return resp
}
func TestWebhookHandler_FiltersUndeclaredEvent(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookFilter Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerWithFilters(t, apID, []WebhookEventFilter{
{Event: "workflow_run", Actions: []string{"completed"}},
{Event: "check_suite", Actions: []string{"completed"}},
})
w := postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, map[string]any{
"action": "in_progress",
"workflow_run": map[string]any{"id": 123},
}, map[string]string{"X-GitHub-Event": "workflow_run"})
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
if resp["status"] != "ignored" || resp["reason"] != "event_filtered" {
t.Fatalf("expected ignored/event_filtered, got %#v body=%s", resp, w.Body.String())
}
if _, ok := resp["run_id"]; ok {
t.Fatalf("filtered response must not include run_id: %#v", resp)
}
runs, err := testHandler.Queries.ListAutopilotRuns(context.Background(), db.ListAutopilotRunsParams{
AutopilotID: parseUUID(apID),
Limit: 10,
Offset: 0,
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("list runs: %v", err)
}
if len(runs) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("filtered webhook should not create runs, got %d", len(runs))
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_AllowsDeclaredEvent(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookAllow Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerWithFilters(t, apID, []WebhookEventFilter{
{Event: "workflow_run", Actions: []string{"completed"}},
})
w := postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, map[string]any{
"action": "completed",
"workflow_run": map[string]any{"id": 123},
}, map[string]string{"X-GitHub-Event": "workflow_run"})
delivery := processQueuedWebhookDelivery(t, requireAcceptedWebhookResponse(t, w))
if delivery.Status != deliveryStatusDispatched || !delivery.AutopilotRunID.Valid {
t.Fatalf("expected worker dispatch, got status=%s run=%v", delivery.Status, delivery.AutopilotRunID.Valid)
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_EmptyFiltersAllowsAll(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookEmptyFilter Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
w := postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, map[string]any{
"action": "in_progress",
"workflow_run": map[string]any{"id": 123},
}, map[string]string{"X-GitHub-Event": "workflow_run"})
delivery := processQueuedWebhookDelivery(t, requireAcceptedWebhookResponse(t, w))
if delivery.Status != deliveryStatusDispatched || !delivery.AutopilotRunID.Valid {
t.Fatalf("expected worker dispatch, got status=%s run=%v", delivery.Status, delivery.AutopilotRunID.Valid)
}
}
// ── HTTP contract: event_filters JSON shape & PATCH semantics ──────────────
//
// These tests pin the wire contract the frontend depends on: a real JSON
// array of {event, actions} objects flows in on create, comes back as the
// same array on read, and update accepts tri-state semantics (omitted =
// preserve, explicit [] = clear, explicit [...] = replace). Earlier
// revisions used []byte at the HTTP boundary and the round-trip silently
// passed via base64 — which the frontend cannot parse. See PR #3231 review.
func TestCreateWebhookTrigger_EventFiltersRoundTripAsJSONArray(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "EventFilterRT Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
body := map[string]any{
"kind": "webhook",
"event_filters": []map[string]any{
{"event": "workflow_run", "actions": []string{"completed"}},
{"event": "pull_request", "actions": []string{"opened", "synchronize"}},
},
}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := newRequest("POST", "/api/autopilots/"+apID+"/triggers", body)
req = withURLParam(req, "id", apID)
testHandler.CreateAutopilotTrigger(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusCreated {
t.Fatalf("expected 201, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
// Decode against the strongly-typed response to verify shape.
var typed AutopilotTriggerResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &typed); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode typed: %v", err)
}
if len(typed.EventFilters) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 filters, got %d body=%s", len(typed.EventFilters), w.Body.String())
}
if typed.EventFilters[0].Event != "workflow_run" ||
len(typed.EventFilters[0].Actions) != 1 ||
typed.EventFilters[0].Actions[0] != "completed" {
t.Fatalf("first filter mismatch: %#v", typed.EventFilters[0])
}
if typed.EventFilters[1].Event != "pull_request" || len(typed.EventFilters[1].Actions) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("second filter mismatch: %#v", typed.EventFilters[1])
}
// Decode against json.RawMessage to confirm we serialize as an array,
// not a base64-encoded string. A regression here is exactly the bug
// PR #3231 review flagged: []byte through encoding/json produced
// `"event_filters": "W3si..."` which the UI can't .map() over.
var raw struct {
EventFilters json.RawMessage `json:"event_filters"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &raw); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode raw: %v", err)
}
trimmed := bytes.TrimSpace(raw.EventFilters)
if len(trimmed) == 0 || trimmed[0] != '[' {
t.Fatalf("event_filters must serialize as a JSON array, got %s", raw.EventFilters)
}
}
func TestUpdateWebhookTrigger_ExplicitEmptyArrayClearsFilters(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "EventFilterClear Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
created := createWebhookTriggerWithFilters(t, apID, []WebhookEventFilter{
{Event: "workflow_run", Actions: []string{"completed"}},
})
if len(created.EventFilters) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("seed should have 1 filter, got %d", len(created.EventFilters))
}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := newRequest("PATCH", "/api/autopilots/"+apID+"/triggers/"+created.ID, map[string]any{
"event_filters": []any{},
})
req = withURLParams(req, "id", apID, "triggerId", created.ID)
testHandler.UpdateAutopilotTrigger(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var updated AutopilotTriggerResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &updated); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
if len(updated.EventFilters) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected cleared filters in response, got %#v", updated.EventFilters)
}
// Stored row should now accept any event (matcher sees length 0).
row, err := testHandler.Queries.GetAutopilotTrigger(context.Background(), parseUUID(created.ID))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
}
env := WebhookEnvelope{
Event: "github.something_else.opened",
EventPayload: json.RawMessage(`{"action":"opened"}`),
}
if !webhookEventAllowedByTriggerScope(row.EventFilters, env) {
t.Fatal("after clear, matcher should allow all events")
}
}
func TestUpdateWebhookTrigger_OmittedFiltersPreserveExisting(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "EventFilterPreserve Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
created := createWebhookTriggerWithFilters(t, apID, []WebhookEventFilter{
{Event: "workflow_run", Actions: []string{"completed"}},
})
// PATCH that does NOT include event_filters at all. Must leave the
// existing filter set untouched (omitted ≠ clear).
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := newRequest("PATCH", "/api/autopilots/"+apID+"/triggers/"+created.ID, map[string]any{
"label": "renamed-but-keep-filters",
})
req = withURLParams(req, "id", apID, "triggerId", created.ID)
testHandler.UpdateAutopilotTrigger(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var updated AutopilotTriggerResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &updated); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
if len(updated.EventFilters) != 1 || updated.EventFilters[0].Event != "workflow_run" {
t.Fatalf("filters must be preserved when field omitted, got %#v", updated.EventFilters)
}
}
func TestUpdateWebhookTrigger_ReplacesFilters(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "EventFilterReplace Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
created := createWebhookTriggerWithFilters(t, apID, []WebhookEventFilter{
{Event: "workflow_run", Actions: []string{"completed"}},
})
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := newRequest("PATCH", "/api/autopilots/"+apID+"/triggers/"+created.ID, map[string]any{
"event_filters": []map[string]any{
{"event": "pull_request", "actions": []string{"opened"}},
{"event": "issues"},
},
})
req = withURLParams(req, "id", apID, "triggerId", created.ID)
testHandler.UpdateAutopilotTrigger(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var updated AutopilotTriggerResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &updated); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
}
if len(updated.EventFilters) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 replaced filters, got %d", len(updated.EventFilters))
}
if updated.EventFilters[0].Event != "pull_request" || updated.EventFilters[1].Event != "issues" {
t.Fatalf("replaced filter list wrong: %#v", updated.EventFilters)
}
}
func TestCreateAutopilotTrigger_RejectsInvalidEventFilter(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "EventFilterInvalid Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := newRequest("POST", "/api/autopilots/"+apID+"/triggers", map[string]any{
"kind": "webhook",
"event_filters": []map[string]any{
{"event": "", "actions": []string{"completed"}},
},
})
req = withURLParam(req, "id", apID)
testHandler.CreateAutopilotTrigger(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("expected 400 on empty event name, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestCreateAutopilotTrigger_RejectsEventFiltersOnSchedule(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "EventFilterSched Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := newRequest("POST", "/api/autopilots/"+apID+"/triggers", map[string]any{
"kind": "schedule",
"cron_expression": "0 9 * * *",
"event_filters": []map[string]any{
{"event": "workflow_run"},
},
})
req = withURLParam(req, "id", apID)
testHandler.CreateAutopilotTrigger(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("expected 400 on event_filters for schedule trigger, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func postWebhook(t *testing.T, token string, body any, headers map[string]string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
var buf bytes.Buffer
switch v := body.(type) {
case []byte:
buf.Write(v)
case string:
buf.WriteString(v)
default:
if err := json.NewEncoder(&buf).Encode(body); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("encode: %v", err)
}
}
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/webhooks/autopilots/"+token, &buf)
for k, v := range headers {
req.Header.Set(k, v)
}
if req.Header.Get("Content-Type") == "" {
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
}
req = withURLParam(req, "token", token)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
testHandler.HandleAutopilotWebhook(w, req)
return w
}
func requireAcceptedWebhookResponse(t *testing.T, w *httptest.ResponseRecorder) string {
t.Helper()
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200 accepted/skipped, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode accepted response: %v", err)
}
if resp["status"] != "accepted" && resp["status"] != "skipped" {
t.Fatalf("expected accepted or skipped status, got %#v", resp)
}
deliveryID, _ := resp["delivery_id"].(string)
if deliveryID == "" {
t.Fatalf("accepted response missing delivery_id: %#v", resp)
}
if runID, _ := resp["run_id"].(string); runID == "" {
t.Fatalf("accepted response missing run_id: %#v", resp)
}
return deliveryID
}
func processQueuedWebhookDelivery(t *testing.T, deliveryID string) db.WebhookDelivery {
t.Helper()
ctx := context.Background()
for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
delivery, err := testHandler.Queries.GetWebhookDelivery(ctx, parseUUID(deliveryID))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load queued delivery: %v", err)
}
if delivery.Status != deliveryStatusQueued {
return delivery
}
worked, err := testHandler.WebhookDeliveryWorker.ProcessNext(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("process queued delivery: %v", err)
}
if !worked {
t.Fatalf("delivery %s remained queued with no claimable work", deliveryID)
}
}
t.Fatalf("delivery %s did not reach a terminal state", deliveryID)
return db.WebhookDelivery{}
}
// ── Tests ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
func TestCreateWebhookTrigger_GeneratesToken(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookGen Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
resp := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
if resp.Kind != "webhook" {
t.Fatalf("kind: %q", resp.Kind)
}
if resp.WebhookToken == nil || *resp.WebhookToken == "" {
t.Fatal("webhook_token should be present and non-empty")
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(*resp.WebhookToken, "awt_") {
t.Fatalf("token prefix: %q", *resp.WebhookToken)
}
if resp.WebhookPath == nil {
t.Fatal("webhook_path should be present")
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(*resp.WebhookPath, *resp.WebhookToken) {
t.Fatalf("webhook_path %q should contain token %q", *resp.WebhookPath, *resp.WebhookToken)
}
}
func TestCreateWebhookTrigger_TwoUniqueTokens(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookUnique Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
a := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
b := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
if a.WebhookToken == nil || b.WebhookToken == nil {
t.Fatal("missing tokens")
}
if *a.WebhookToken == *b.WebhookToken {
t.Fatalf("tokens should differ: %q == %q", *a.WebhookToken, *b.WebhookToken)
}
}
func TestCreateWebhookTrigger_PublicURLAffectsResponse(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookURL Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
prev := testHandler.cfg.PublicURL
t.Cleanup(func() { testHandler.cfg.PublicURL = prev })
testHandler.cfg.PublicURL = ""
respNoURL := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
if respNoURL.WebhookURL != nil {
t.Fatalf("webhook_url should be nil when PublicURL unset, got %q", *respNoURL.WebhookURL)
}
testHandler.cfg.PublicURL = "https://app.example"
respURL := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
if respURL.WebhookURL == nil {
t.Fatal("webhook_url should be present when PublicURL set")
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(*respURL.WebhookURL, "https://app.example/api/webhooks/autopilots/") {
t.Fatalf("webhook_url shape: %q", *respURL.WebhookURL)
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_404OnUnknownToken(t *testing.T) {
w := postWebhook(t, "awt_unknown_token_value", map[string]any{"hello": "world"}, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("expected 404, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_RejectsInvalidJSON(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookBadJSON Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
w := postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, []byte(`not json`), nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("expected 400, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_RejectsScalarBody(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookScalar Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
w := postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, []byte(`"hello"`), nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("expected 400, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_RejectsOversized(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookSize Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
big := make([]byte, maxWebhookBodyBytes+10)
for i := range big {
big[i] = 'a'
}
body := append([]byte(`{"x":"`), big...)
body = append(body, []byte(`"}`)...)
w := postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, body, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge {
t.Fatalf("expected 413, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_DisabledTriggerReturnsIgnored(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookDisabled Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
if _, err := testHandler.Queries.UpdateAutopilotTrigger(context.Background(), db.UpdateAutopilotTriggerParams{
ID: parseUUID(trig.ID),
Enabled: pgtype.Bool{Bool: false, Valid: true},
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("disable trigger: %v", err)
}
w := postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, map[string]any{"hello": "world"}, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp map[string]any
json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp)
if resp["status"] != "ignored" {
t.Fatalf("status: %v", resp["status"])
}
if resp["reason"] != "trigger_disabled" {
t.Fatalf("reason: %v", resp["reason"])
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_PausedAutopilotReturnsIgnored(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookPaused Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "paused", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
w := postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, map[string]any{"x": 1}, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp map[string]any
json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp)
if resp["reason"] != "autopilot_paused" {
t.Fatalf("reason: %v", resp["reason"])
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_ActiveDispatchesRunWithPayload(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookDispatch Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
w := postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, map[string]any{
"event": "demo.received",
"eventPayload": map[string]any{"k": "v"},
}, nil)
deliveryID := requireAcceptedWebhookResponse(t, w)
var resp map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode accepted response: %v", err)
}
if resp["status"] != "accepted" {
t.Fatalf("expected accepted, got %#v", resp)
}
runID := resp["run_id"].(string)
// The run ID is allocated synchronously, while durable dispatch remains
// owned by the queued delivery worker.
delivery := processQueuedWebhookDelivery(t, deliveryID)
if got := uuidToString(delivery.AutopilotRunID); got != runID {
t.Fatalf("delivery run_id mismatch: got %q want %q", got, runID)
}
// Validate the persisted run carries the normalized envelope.
run, err := testHandler.Queries.GetAutopilotRun(context.Background(), parseUUID(runID))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load run: %v", err)
}
if run.Source != "webhook" {
t.Fatalf("run.source: %q", run.Source)
}
if uuidToString(run.TriggerID) != trig.ID {
t.Fatalf("run.trigger_id mismatch: %q vs %q", uuidToString(run.TriggerID), trig.ID)
}
var payload struct {
Event string `json:"event"`
EventPayload map[string]interface{} `json:"eventPayload"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(run.TriggerPayload, &payload); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("payload decode: %v body=%s", err, string(run.TriggerPayload))
}
if payload.Event != "demo.received" {
t.Fatalf("envelope event: %q", payload.Event)
}
if payload.EventPayload["k"] != "v" {
t.Fatalf("envelope payload: %#v", payload.EventPayload)
}
// last_fired_at must have been bumped.
trigRow, err := testHandler.Queries.GetAutopilotTrigger(context.Background(), parseUUID(trig.ID))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load trigger: %v", err)
}
if !trigRow.LastFiredAt.Valid {
t.Fatal("last_fired_at should be set after webhook dispatch")
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_ActiveSkippedRunReturnsLegacyContract(t *testing.T) {
var offlineRuntimeID string
if err := testPool.QueryRow(context.Background(), `
INSERT INTO agent_runtime (
workspace_id, daemon_id, name, runtime_mode, provider, status,
device_info, metadata, owner_id, last_seen_at
) VALUES ($1, NULL, $2, 'cloud', $3, 'offline', $4, '{}'::jsonb, $5, now())
RETURNING id
`, testWorkspaceID, "Webhook Offline Runtime", "webhook_test_runtime", "Webhook test runtime", testUserID).Scan(&offlineRuntimeID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create offline runtime: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
testPool.Exec(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM agent_runtime WHERE id = $1`, offlineRuntimeID)
})
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookSkipped Agent")
if _, err := testPool.Exec(context.Background(), `UPDATE agent SET runtime_id = $1 WHERE id = $2`, offlineRuntimeID, agentID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("bind offline agent runtime: %v", err)
}
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
w := postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, map[string]any{"event": "demo.skipped"}, nil)
deliveryID := requireAcceptedWebhookResponse(t, w)
var resp map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode skipped response: %v", err)
}
if resp["status"] != "skipped" {
t.Fatalf("expected skipped, got %#v", resp)
}
if reason, _ := resp["reason"].(string); reason == "" {
t.Fatalf("skipped response missing reason: %#v", resp)
}
runID := resp["run_id"].(string)
run, err := testHandler.Queries.GetAutopilotRun(context.Background(), parseUUID(runID))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load skipped run: %v", err)
}
if run.Status != "skipped" {
t.Fatalf("run status: got %q want skipped", run.Status)
}
delivery := processQueuedWebhookDelivery(t, deliveryID)
if delivery.Status != deliveryStatusDispatched || uuidToString(delivery.AutopilotRunID) != runID {
t.Fatalf("skipped run was not linked to delivery: status=%s run_id=%s", delivery.Status, uuidToString(delivery.AutopilotRunID))
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_GitHubHeaderInferredEvent(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookGH Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
w := postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, map[string]any{
"action": "opened",
"pull_request": map[string]any{
"number": 42,
},
}, map[string]string{"X-GitHub-Event": "pull_request"})
delivery := processQueuedWebhookDelivery(t, requireAcceptedWebhookResponse(t, w))
runID := uuidToString(delivery.AutopilotRunID)
run, err := testHandler.Queries.GetAutopilotRun(context.Background(), parseUUID(runID))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load run: %v", err)
}
var env struct {
Event string `json:"event"`
}
json.Unmarshal(run.TriggerPayload, &env)
if env.Event != "github.pull_request.opened" {
t.Fatalf("event inference: got %q", env.Event)
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_ValidBurstPersistsWithoutHTTP429(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookRate Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
prev := testHandler.WebhookRateLimiter
testHandler.WebhookRateLimiter = NewMemoryWebhookRateLimiter(WebhookRateLimit{Limit: 2, Window: 60_000_000_000})
t.Cleanup(func() { testHandler.WebhookRateLimiter = prev })
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
w := postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, map[string]any{"i": i}, nil)
requireAcceptedWebhookResponse(t, w)
}
if got := len(listDeliveries(t, apID)); got != 3 {
t.Fatalf("all valid burst deliveries must be persisted, got %d", got)
}
}
func TestRotateWebhookToken_ReplacesOldToken(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookRotate Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
oldToken := *trig.WebhookToken
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := newRequest("POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/autopilots/%s/triggers/%s/rotate-webhook-token", apID, trig.ID), nil)
req = withURLParams(req, "id", apID, "triggerId", trig.ID)
testHandler.RotateAutopilotTriggerWebhookToken(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("rotate: expected 200, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var rotated AutopilotTriggerResponse
json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &rotated)
if rotated.WebhookToken == nil || *rotated.WebhookToken == oldToken {
t.Fatalf("rotate did not change token: old=%q new=%v", oldToken, rotated.WebhookToken)
}
// Old token should now 404.
resOld := postWebhook(t, oldToken, map[string]any{"x": 1}, nil)
if resOld.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("old token should be 404, got %d", resOld.Code)
}
// New token should accept.
resNew := postWebhook(t, *rotated.WebhookToken, map[string]any{"x": 1}, nil)
requireAcceptedWebhookResponse(t, resNew)
}
// ── Additional coverage (PR #2348 review) ──────────────────────────────────
func TestWebhookHandler_EmptyBodyReturns400(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookEmpty Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
w := postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, []byte(``), nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("expected 400 for empty body, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_ArchivedAutopilotReturnsIgnored(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookArchived Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
if _, err := testPool.Exec(context.Background(),
`UPDATE autopilot SET status = 'archived' WHERE id = $1`, apID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("archive autopilot: %v", err)
}
w := postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, map[string]any{"x": 1}, nil)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var resp map[string]any
json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp)
if resp["status"] != "ignored" || resp["reason"] != "autopilot_archived" {
t.Fatalf("expected ignored/autopilot_archived, got %#v", resp)
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_IPRateLimitReturns429BeforeDBLookup(t *testing.T) {
// Spray random (likely-unknown) tokens from one IP and prove the IP
// limiter trips before we exhaust the budget — without this gate an
// attacker can probe the trigger-lookup index unboundedly. Rate-limit
// keying is by the real source IP (r.RemoteAddr) since TrustedProxies
// is empty here, so the bucket is per-connection — exactly the
// property the per-IP limiter is meant to provide.
prev := testHandler.WebhookIPRateLimiter
testHandler.WebhookIPRateLimiter = NewMemoryWebhookIPRateLimiter(WebhookRateLimit{Limit: 2, Window: 60_000_000_000})
t.Cleanup(func() { testHandler.WebhookIPRateLimiter = prev })
post := func(token string) int {
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/webhooks/autopilots/"+token,
bytes.NewBufferString(`{"x":1}`))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.RemoteAddr = "192.0.2.7:1234" // stable source, three calls = same bucket
req = withURLParam(req, "token", token)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
testHandler.HandleAutopilotWebhook(w, req)
return w.Code
}
if got := post("awt_unknown_a"); got != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("first probe: expected 404, got %d", got)
}
if got := post("awt_unknown_b"); got != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("second probe: expected 404, got %d", got)
}
if got := post("awt_unknown_c"); got != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Fatalf("third probe: expected 429 (IP bucket), got %d", got)
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_IPRateLimitNotBypassedByXFFSpoof(t *testing.T) {
// Round-2 fix: with the default empty TrustedProxies, an attacker who
// rotates X-Forwarded-For per request must still get bucketed by the
// real connection IP — otherwise the per-IP limiter is trivially
// bypassable and we're back to one DB index probe per request.
prev := testHandler.WebhookIPRateLimiter
testHandler.WebhookIPRateLimiter = NewMemoryWebhookIPRateLimiter(WebhookRateLimit{Limit: 2, Window: 60_000_000_000})
t.Cleanup(func() { testHandler.WebhookIPRateLimiter = prev })
post := func(token, xff string) int {
req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/webhooks/autopilots/"+token,
bytes.NewBufferString(`{"x":1}`))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", xff) // <-- attacker-controlled
req.RemoteAddr = "198.51.100.42:5555" // real (untrusted) source
req = withURLParam(req, "token", token)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
testHandler.HandleAutopilotWebhook(w, req)
return w.Code
}
if got := post("awt_unknown_x", "1.1.1.1"); got != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("first probe: expected 404, got %d", got)
}
if got := post("awt_unknown_y", "2.2.2.2"); got != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("second probe: expected 404, got %d", got)
}
// Third request with yet another spoofed XFF — would have bypassed
// the limiter under the old (header-trusting) behavior, but with the
// CIDR-gated trust the bucket is still the real source IP.
if got := post("awt_unknown_z", "3.3.3.3"); got != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Fatalf("third probe: expected 429 (bucket keyed by real IP), got %d", got)
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_AbsoluteIPRateLimitRetainsEmergencyCeiling(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookAbsoluteLimit Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
prev := testHandler.WebhookAbsoluteIPRateLimiter
testHandler.WebhookAbsoluteIPRateLimiter = NewMemoryWebhookAbsoluteIPRateLimiter(WebhookRateLimit{Limit: 1, Window: time.Minute})
t.Cleanup(func() { testHandler.WebhookAbsoluteIPRateLimiter = prev })
requireAcceptedWebhookResponse(t, postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, map[string]any{"n": 1}, nil))
second := postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, map[string]any{"n": 2}, nil)
if second.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Fatalf("absolute ceiling: expected 429, got %d body=%s", second.Code, second.Body.String())
}
if second.Header().Get("Retry-After") == "" {
t.Fatal("absolute ceiling 429 must include Retry-After")
}
}
func TestWebhookHandler_DBErrorOnTokenLookupReturns500(t *testing.T) {
// Inject a fake Queries-like wrapper via a shadow type isn't simple
// here because Handler.Queries is a *db.Queries struct, not an
// interface. Instead, simulate the path by deleting the trigger row
// out from under a known-valid token AND swapping in a stub limiter
// that always allows. The handler will then call
// GetWebhookTriggerByToken with a non-existent value → pgx.ErrNoRows
// → 404. So this test alone can't drive the 500 branch without
// breaking the DB connection. The 500 branch is exercised via the
// unit tests in this package's TestRedactWebhookPath /
// TestRequestLogger_*; we leave a regression marker here so a future
// refactor that collapses ErrNoRows into 500 (or vice versa) is
// caught by a code review rather than a missing test.
//
// The real verification for this branch is: the file diff for
// autopilot_webhook.go must show `errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows)` —
// see PR #2348 review item Blocking #2.
t.Skip("500-branch requires injecting a stub Queries; left as a code-review-protected invariant")
}
func TestCreateAutopilotTrigger_RejectsAPIKind(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookAPIKind Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := newRequest("POST", "/api/autopilots/"+apID+"/triggers", map[string]any{
"kind": "api",
})
req = withURLParam(req, "id", apID)
testHandler.CreateAutopilotTrigger(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("expected 400 on kind=api, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "schedule or webhook") {
t.Fatalf("expected message to name allowed kinds, body=%s", w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestCreateAutopilotTrigger_RejectsWebhookWithTimezone(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookTZReject Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := newRequest("POST", "/api/autopilots/"+apID+"/triggers", map[string]any{
"kind": "webhook",
"timezone": "Europe/Berlin",
})
req = withURLParam(req, "id", apID)
testHandler.CreateAutopilotTrigger(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("expected 400 on webhook+timezone, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestUpdateAutopilotTrigger_RejectsCronExpressionOnWebhookKind(t *testing.T) {
// Round-2 should-fix: UpdateAutopilotTrigger must mirror create-path
// strictness — cron_expression on a non-schedule trigger is rejected
// with 400 rather than silently persisted.
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookUpdCron Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := newRequest("PATCH", "/api/autopilots/"+apID+"/triggers/"+trig.ID, map[string]any{
"cron_expression": "0 0 * * *",
})
req = withURLParams(req, "id", apID, "triggerId", trig.ID)
testHandler.UpdateAutopilotTrigger(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("expected 400 on cron_expression for webhook trigger, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "cron_expression") {
t.Fatalf("error message should mention cron_expression, got %s", w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestUpdateAutopilotTrigger_RejectsTimezoneOnWebhookKind(t *testing.T) {
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookUpdTZ Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := newRequest("PATCH", "/api/autopilots/"+apID+"/triggers/"+trig.ID, map[string]any{
"timezone": "Europe/Berlin",
})
req = withURLParams(req, "id", apID, "triggerId", trig.ID)
testHandler.UpdateAutopilotTrigger(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("expected 400 on timezone for webhook trigger, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(w.Body.String(), "timezone") {
t.Fatalf("error message should mention timezone, got %s", w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestUpdateAutopilotTrigger_AcceptsEnabledAndLabelOnWebhookKind(t *testing.T) {
// Counter-test: enabled and label remain valid on every kind. Without
// this, the kind-aware guard could regress to a blanket reject.
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookUpdAllowed Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
req := newRequest("PATCH", "/api/autopilots/"+apID+"/triggers/"+trig.ID, map[string]any{
"enabled": false,
"label": "renamed",
})
req = withURLParams(req, "id", apID, "triggerId", trig.ID)
testHandler.UpdateAutopilotTrigger(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("expected 200 on enabled+label PATCH, got %d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestGetAutopilotRun_ReturnsFullPayload(t *testing.T) {
// List endpoint omits trigger_payload; the new GET /runs/{runId}
// endpoint must return it intact.
agentID := createWebhookTestAgent(t, "WebhookGetRun Agent")
apID := createWebhookTestAutopilot(t, agentID, "active", "run_only")
trig := createWebhookTriggerViaHandler(t, apID)
// Fire one webhook so there's a run with a payload.
post := postWebhook(t, *trig.WebhookToken, map[string]any{
"event": "demo.x",
"eventPayload": map[string]any{"answer": 42},
}, nil)
delivery := processQueuedWebhookDelivery(t, requireAcceptedWebhookResponse(t, post))
runID := uuidToString(delivery.AutopilotRunID)
// LIST: trigger_payload should be omitted (slim response).
wList := httptest.NewRecorder()
reqList := newRequest("GET", "/api/autopilots/"+apID+"/runs", nil)
reqList = withURLParam(reqList, "id", apID)
testHandler.ListAutopilotRuns(wList, reqList)
if wList.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("list: expected 200, got %d body=%s", wList.Code, wList.Body.String())
}
if strings.Contains(wList.Body.String(), `"answer":42`) {
t.Fatalf("list response should NOT carry trigger_payload, body=%s", wList.Body.String())
}
// DETAIL: trigger_payload should be present.
wDetail := httptest.NewRecorder()
reqDetail := newRequest("GET", "/api/autopilots/"+apID+"/runs/"+runID, nil)
reqDetail = withURLParams(reqDetail, "id", apID, "runId", runID)
testHandler.GetAutopilotRun(wDetail, reqDetail)
if wDetail.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("detail: expected 200, got %d body=%s", wDetail.Code, wDetail.Body.String())
}
if !strings.Contains(wDetail.Body.String(), `"answer":42`) {
t.Fatalf("detail response should carry full trigger_payload, body=%s", wDetail.Body.String())
}
}
// NOTE: the cross-workspace paranoia branch in autopilot_webhook.go
// (uuidToString(autopilot.WorkspaceID) != uuidToString(trigRow.AutopilotWorkspaceID))
// is defense-in-depth against a TOCTOU race between the joined token
// lookup and the follow-up GetAutopilot read. It is not reachable from
// any valid SQL state — the two reads compute against the same
// autopilot.workspace_id column — and would require a mock-able
// Queries interface to drive deterministically. We pin the behaviour
// via code review rather than a brittle race test. See PR #2348 review
// item under "Test coverage gaps."