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* feat(agents): remove custom_env from agent resources, add audited env endpoint (MUL-2600)
The agent resource shape (list / get / create / update / archive /
restore responses + WebSocket events) no longer carries `custom_env`
values. Reads/writes of env now flow exclusively through a dedicated
`/api/agents/{id}/env` endpoint that is owner/admin-only, rejects
agent-actor sessions, applies a "****" sentinel preserve guard on
PUT, and writes a persistent audit row per reveal/update.
Why
- `multica agent list --output json` historically returned plaintext
`custom_env` for owner/admin callers (the redaction gate gave only
members the masked map). Any agent token running on the workspace
inherits its owner's role and could read every other agent's
secrets just by listing.
- Patching list/get redaction alone (PR #3175 direction) left
symmetric leaks via mutation responses, WS events, the "reveal"
path itself (no actor-aware auth), and a `****` overwrite footgun
on UpdateAgent.
What changed
- Backend: drop `custom_env` from AgentResponse; add coarse
`has_custom_env` + `custom_env_key_count`. Strip env handling from
UpdateAgent (silently ignored if sent). Keep CreateAgent's
custom_env acceptance.
- Backend: new GET/PUT `/api/agents/{id}/env` handlers in
`internal/handler/agent_env.go`:
- resolveActor → 403 for agent actors (closes the lateral-movement
path).
- Owner/admin role gate via existing helper.
- PUT honours value == "****" as "preserve existing value".
- Both write to `activity_log` with `agent_env_revealed` /
`agent_env_updated` actions. Audit details record key names only,
never values.
- Daemon claim path (`ClaimAgentTask`) unchanged — `TaskAgentData`
still carries plaintext env for runtime injection.
- SQL: new `UpdateAgentCustomEnv` query; sqlc regenerated (v1.31.1).
- CLI: new `multica agent env get|set` subcommands. `--custom-env*`
flags removed from `multica agent update`; the no-fields error
now points to the new path.
- Frontend: drop env fields from `Agent` + `UpdateAgentRequest`; add
`getAgentEnv` / `updateAgentEnv` client methods; rewrite env-tab
to show "N variables configured" + explicit "Reveal & edit"
button, fetching values only on intentional reveal.
- Locales: parity-safe additions to en + zh-Hans.
- Docs: agents-create.{mdx,zh.mdx} reflect the new threat model and
endpoint.
- Mobile: schema drops `custom_env` / `custom_env_redacted`, adds
metadata fields.
Tests
- Handler tests pinned the new invariants: no env in list/get
responses, owner reveal happy-path + audit row, agent-actor 403,
`****` sentinel preserves real values, UpdateAgent silently
ignores `custom_env`, pure `mergeAgentEnv` cases.
- CLI tests pivot to the new flag surface: `agent update` MUST NOT
expose the env flags; `agent env set` MUST expose
--custom-env-stdin/--custom-env-file.
- Frontend test fixtures updated; pnpm typecheck / test / lint
pass cleanly.
This is a breaking API change. Scripts that read `custom_env` from
`/api/agents` must migrate to `GET /api/agents/{id}/env`.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(agents): close actor-spoofing + audit fail-closed in env endpoints (MUL-2600)
Addresses Elon's review of #3209:
* Mint a task-scoped `mat_` token per claim, bound to (agent, task,
workspace, owner). Daemon injects it into the agent process in place
of its own credential. Auth middleware authoritatively rebuilds
X-User-ID / X-Agent-ID / X-Task-ID from the token row and sets
X-Actor-Source=task_token; that header is server-set only — incoming
values are stripped before any auth branch runs. resolveActor honors
the header so an agent that strips X-Agent-ID / X-Task-ID still
resolves as actor=agent.
* GetAgentEnv / UpdateAgentEnv are now fail-closed on audit-log
failures: GET refuses to return plaintext, PUT persists inside the
same tx as the audit row so they commit/roll back together.
* PUT /api/agents/{id} returns 400 when the body carries custom_env
instead of silently dropping it — directs callers to the audited env
endpoint.
* Agent actors never see mcp_config, even when the underlying member
is owner/admin; mutation broadcasts go through a redaction shim so
WS subscribers don't pick it up either.
* Fix backend test that asserted dense JSON (jsonb::text renders
whitespace) and frontend test that assumed a unique "Test User"
match.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(agents): close residual MUL-2600 gaps from review (MUL-2600)
Migration 108 FK now correctly references agent_task_queue(id) instead
of the non-existent agent_task table; the previous name blocked CI
backend migrations.
Task-token-authenticated requests can no longer be re-routed at a
different workspace by passing workspace_slug / workspace_id /
?workspace_id / a URL workspace param. ResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest
and resolveWorkspaceUUID both short-circuit on X-Actor-Source=task_token
and return only the token-bound X-Workspace-ID; buildMiddleware adds a
defence-in-depth 403 if any URL-resolved workspace disagrees with the
token binding.
mcp_config no longer leaks back to agent actors through UpdateAgent /
CreateAgent / ArchiveAgent / RestoreAgent HTTP responses — the same
redactAgentResponseForActor helper that GetAgent/ListAgents use is now
applied to mutation responses too. WS broadcasts were already redacted
via broadcastAgentResponse.
FailTask and every TaskService cancel path (CancelTask /
CancelTasksForIssue / CancelTasksForAgent / CancelTasksByTriggerComment
/ BroadcastCancelledTasks) now eagerly DeleteTaskTokensByTask so the
mat_ token's 24h window doesn't outlive a terminated task. Failure is
non-fatal — the FK cascade and expiry remain durable guards.
Doc-only: clarify that PUT /api/agents/{id} now hard-rejects bodies
that carry custom_env (was previously "silently ignores").
Tests:
- middleware: TestResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest gains a task_token
case asserting client-supplied slug/id/query cannot override the
bound workspace.
- handler: TestUpdateAgent_RedactsMcpConfigForAgentActor and
TestUpdateAgent_KeepsMcpConfigForMemberActor pin the mutation-
response redaction contract per actor type.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(agents): match redacted mcp_config as JSON null, not Go nil (MUL-2600)
`AgentResponse.McpConfig` is `json.RawMessage` without `omitempty`, so
the redacted response serialises as `"mcp_config": null`. On decode,
`json.RawMessage` keeps the literal bytes `null` rather than collapsing
to Go nil, which made the assertion fire on a non-leak.
The product contract (field always present, distinguished from "no
config" via `mcp_config_redacted`) is intentional, so adjust the test
to check for "no secret-bearing content" instead of weakening the
contract via `omitempty`.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
---------
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
332 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript
332 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import type { Agent, Comment, Member, RuntimeDevice, Skill } from "../types";
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import {
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canAssignAgentToIssue,
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canChangeMemberRole,
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canDeleteComment,
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canDeleteRuntime,
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canDeleteSkill,
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canDeleteWorkspace,
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canEditAgent,
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canEditComment,
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canEditSkill,
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canManageMembers,
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canUpdateWorkspaceSettings,
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} from "./rules";
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const ALICE = "user-alice";
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const BOB = "user-bob";
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function makeAgent(overrides: Partial<Agent> = {}): Agent {
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return {
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id: "agt_1",
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workspace_id: "ws_1",
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runtime_id: "rt_1",
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name: "agent",
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description: "",
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instructions: "",
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avatar_url: null,
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runtime_mode: "local",
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runtime_config: {},
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custom_args: [],
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visibility: "workspace",
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status: "idle",
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max_concurrent_tasks: 1,
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model: "default",
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owner_id: ALICE,
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skills: [],
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created_at: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
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updated_at: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
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archived_at: null,
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archived_by: null,
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...overrides,
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};
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}
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function makeSkill(createdBy: string | null): Skill {
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return {
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id: "skl_1",
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workspace_id: "ws_1",
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name: "skill",
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description: "",
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content: "",
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config: {},
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files: [],
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created_by: createdBy,
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created_at: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
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updated_at: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
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};
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}
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function makeComment(overrides: Partial<Comment> = {}): Comment {
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return {
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id: "cmt_1",
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issue_id: "iss_1",
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author_type: "member",
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author_id: ALICE,
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content: "hi",
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type: "comment",
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parent_id: null,
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reactions: [],
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attachments: [],
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created_at: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
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updated_at: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
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resolved_at: null,
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resolved_by_type: null,
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resolved_by_id: null,
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...overrides,
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};
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}
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function makeRuntime(ownerId: string | null): RuntimeDevice {
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return {
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id: "rt_1",
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workspace_id: "ws_1",
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daemon_id: null,
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name: "runtime",
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runtime_mode: "local",
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provider: "anthropic",
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launch_header: "",
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status: "online",
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device_info: "",
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metadata: {},
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owner_id: ownerId,
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visibility: "private",
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last_seen_at: null,
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created_at: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
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updated_at: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
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};
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}
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describe("canEditAgent", () => {
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const agent = makeAgent({ owner_id: ALICE });
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it("allows the owner", () => {
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expect(canEditAgent(agent, { userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed).toBe(
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true,
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);
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});
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it("allows workspace owner", () => {
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expect(canEditAgent(agent, { userId: BOB, role: "owner" }).allowed).toBe(
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true,
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);
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});
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it("allows workspace admin", () => {
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expect(canEditAgent(agent, { userId: BOB, role: "admin" }).allowed).toBe(
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true,
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);
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});
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it("denies non-owner member", () => {
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const d = canEditAgent(agent, { userId: BOB, role: "member" });
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expect(d.allowed).toBe(false);
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expect(d.reason).toBe("not_resource_owner");
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});
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it("denies when userId is null", () => {
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const d = canEditAgent(agent, { userId: null, role: null });
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expect(d.allowed).toBe(false);
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expect(d.reason).toBe("not_authenticated");
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});
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it("denies when agent owner_id is null and user is plain member", () => {
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const orphan = makeAgent({ owner_id: null });
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expect(
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canEditAgent(orphan, { userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed,
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).toBe(false);
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});
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it("admin can still edit an orphan (owner_id null) agent", () => {
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const orphan = makeAgent({ owner_id: null });
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expect(canEditAgent(orphan, { userId: BOB, role: "admin" }).allowed).toBe(
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true,
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);
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});
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});
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describe("canAssignAgentToIssue", () => {
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it("allows any member to assign workspace-visibility agents", () => {
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const a = makeAgent({ visibility: "workspace", owner_id: ALICE });
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expect(
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canAssignAgentToIssue(a, { userId: BOB, role: "member" }).allowed,
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).toBe(true);
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});
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it("denies non-members from assigning workspace agents", () => {
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const a = makeAgent({ visibility: "workspace", owner_id: ALICE });
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const d = canAssignAgentToIssue(a, { userId: BOB, role: null });
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expect(d.allowed).toBe(false);
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expect(d.reason).toBe("not_member");
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});
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it("allows the owner to assign their private agent", () => {
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const a = makeAgent({ visibility: "private", owner_id: ALICE });
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expect(
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canAssignAgentToIssue(a, { userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed,
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).toBe(true);
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});
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it("allows workspace admin to assign someone else's private agent", () => {
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const a = makeAgent({ visibility: "private", owner_id: ALICE });
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expect(
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canAssignAgentToIssue(a, { userId: BOB, role: "admin" }).allowed,
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).toBe(true);
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});
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it("denies a plain member from assigning someone else's private agent", () => {
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const a = makeAgent({ visibility: "private", owner_id: ALICE });
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const d = canAssignAgentToIssue(a, { userId: BOB, role: "member" });
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expect(d.allowed).toBe(false);
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expect(d.reason).toBe("private_visibility");
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});
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it("denies logged-out users", () => {
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const a = makeAgent({ visibility: "workspace" });
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const d = canAssignAgentToIssue(a, { userId: null, role: null });
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expect(d.allowed).toBe(false);
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expect(d.reason).toBe("not_authenticated");
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});
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});
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describe("canEditSkill / canDeleteSkill", () => {
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const skill = makeSkill(ALICE);
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it("allows admins", () => {
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expect(canEditSkill(skill, { userId: BOB, role: "admin" }).allowed).toBe(
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true,
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);
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});
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it("allows the creator", () => {
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expect(canEditSkill(skill, { userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed)
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.toBe(true);
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});
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it("denies non-creator member", () => {
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expect(canEditSkill(skill, { userId: BOB, role: "member" }).allowed)
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.toBe(false);
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});
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it("denies when created_by is null and user is plain member", () => {
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expect(
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canEditSkill(makeSkill(null), { userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed,
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).toBe(false);
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});
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it("canDeleteSkill mirrors canEditSkill", () => {
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expect(canDeleteSkill(skill, { userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed)
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.toBe(true);
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expect(canDeleteSkill(skill, { userId: BOB, role: "member" }).allowed)
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.toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe("canEditComment / canDeleteComment", () => {
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it("allows the author to edit their own comment", () => {
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const c = makeComment({ author_id: ALICE });
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expect(canEditComment(c, { userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed).toBe(
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true,
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);
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});
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it("allows workspace admin to edit someone else's comment", () => {
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const c = makeComment({ author_id: ALICE });
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expect(canEditComment(c, { userId: BOB, role: "admin" }).allowed).toBe(
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true,
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);
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});
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it("denies non-author non-admin", () => {
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const c = makeComment({ author_id: ALICE });
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expect(canEditComment(c, { userId: BOB, role: "member" }).allowed).toBe(
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false,
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);
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});
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it("denies edit on agent-authored comments", () => {
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const c = makeComment({ author_type: "agent", author_id: "agt_1" });
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const d = canEditComment(c, { userId: BOB, role: "owner" });
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expect(d.allowed).toBe(false);
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expect(d.reason).toBe("not_resource_owner");
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});
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it("admin CAN delete an agent-authored comment", () => {
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// delete is broader than edit — admins moderate any comment regardless of
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// author type. Mirrors backend `comment.go:507-512`.
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const c = makeComment({ author_type: "agent", author_id: "agt_1" });
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expect(canDeleteComment(c, { userId: BOB, role: "admin" }).allowed).toBe(
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true,
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);
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});
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it("denies plain member from deleting agent-authored comment", () => {
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const c = makeComment({ author_type: "agent", author_id: "agt_1" });
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expect(
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canDeleteComment(c, { userId: BOB, role: "member" }).allowed,
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).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe("canDeleteRuntime", () => {
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it("allows the owner", () => {
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const r = makeRuntime(ALICE);
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expect(canDeleteRuntime(r, { userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed)
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.toBe(true);
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});
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it("allows workspace admin", () => {
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const r = makeRuntime(ALICE);
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expect(canDeleteRuntime(r, { userId: BOB, role: "admin" }).allowed).toBe(
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true,
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);
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});
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it("denies non-owner non-admin", () => {
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const r = makeRuntime(ALICE);
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expect(canDeleteRuntime(r, { userId: BOB, role: "member" }).allowed)
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.toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe("workspace-level rules", () => {
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it("only owner can delete workspace", () => {
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expect(canDeleteWorkspace({ userId: ALICE, role: "owner" }).allowed).toBe(
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true,
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);
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expect(canDeleteWorkspace({ userId: ALICE, role: "admin" }).allowed).toBe(
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false,
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);
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expect(canDeleteWorkspace({ userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed)
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.toBe(false);
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});
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it("owner+admin can update settings, member cannot", () => {
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expect(
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canUpdateWorkspaceSettings({ userId: ALICE, role: "owner" }).allowed,
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).toBe(true);
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expect(
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canUpdateWorkspaceSettings({ userId: ALICE, role: "admin" }).allowed,
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).toBe(true);
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expect(
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canUpdateWorkspaceSettings({ userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed,
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).toBe(false);
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});
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it("manage members same gate as settings", () => {
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expect(canManageMembers({ userId: ALICE, role: "admin" }).allowed).toBe(
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true,
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);
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expect(canManageMembers({ userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed).toBe(
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false,
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);
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});
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});
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describe("canChangeMemberRole", () => {
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const ctxOwner = { userId: ALICE, role: "owner" as const };
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const ctxAdmin = { userId: ALICE, role: "admin" as const };
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const ctxMember = { userId: ALICE, role: "member" as const };
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const targetOwner: Pick<Member, "role"> = { role: "owner" };
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const targetAdmin: Pick<Member, "role"> = { role: "admin" };
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const targetMember: Pick<Member, "role"> = { role: "member" };
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it("non-managers cannot change roles", () => {
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expect(canChangeMemberRole(targetMember, 2, ctxMember).allowed).toBe(false);
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});
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it("admin cannot change owner's role", () => {
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const d = canChangeMemberRole(targetOwner, 2, ctxAdmin);
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expect(d.allowed).toBe(false);
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expect(d.reason).toBe("not_owner_role");
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});
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it("admin can change admin/member roles", () => {
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expect(canChangeMemberRole(targetAdmin, 1, ctxAdmin).allowed).toBe(true);
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expect(canChangeMemberRole(targetMember, 1, ctxAdmin).allowed).toBe(true);
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});
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it("owner cannot demote the last owner", () => {
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const d = canChangeMemberRole(targetOwner, 1, ctxOwner);
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expect(d.allowed).toBe(false);
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expect(d.reason).toBe("last_owner");
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});
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it("owner can change owner role when 2+ owners exist", () => {
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expect(canChangeMemberRole(targetOwner, 2, ctxOwner).allowed).toBe(true);
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});
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});
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