mirror of
https://github.com/multica-ai/multica.git
synced 2026-08-02 18:13:27 +02:00
Wires the Phase 1 terminal.Manager into the live daemonws transport so a
browser tab on the Multica Desktop app can attach to a PTY running in
the daemon's task workdir. End-to-end frame path:
Desktop (xterm.js) → /ws/issues/{id}/terminal (server proxy, cookie
or first-frame JWT auth, workspace membership
enforced before upgrade)
→ daemonws hub (new SendToRuntime + TerminalRouter routing
terminal.* frames back to the proxy by
request_id, then re-keyed on session_id)
→ daemon (new terminal_bridge.go owns one Manager per WS
connection, drains PtySession.Output() into
terminal.data frames, surfaces ExitC as
terminal.exit; closeAll on WS disconnect)
→ terminal.Manager.OpenWithInfo (new method) — server resolves
task.work_dir/issue_id/prior_session_id from its DB and embeds
them on the protocol; daemon trusts the server payload, no
daemon-local task cache needed.
Auth + ACL:
- Browser proxy enforces workspace membership before the upgrade.
- TerminalOpenPayload carries the resolved task info; cross-workspace
is structurally impossible at the bridge layer because both
OpenParams.WorkspaceID and TaskInfo.WorkspaceID come from the same
server-resolved field.
- terminal_bridge maps terminal.{Manager.OpenWithInfo} errors to the
protocol error codes (workspace_mismatch / task_not_found /
unsupported_os / spawn_failed / internal).
Resume:
- Server passes prior_session_id; daemon injects CLAUDE_SESSION_ID +
MULTICA_{WORKSPACE,ISSUE,TASK,USER}_ID into the PTY env per the RFC.
`claude --resume \$CLAUDE_SESSION_ID` continues the agent's session.
Lifecycle:
- Daemon installs a fresh terminalBridge per daemonws connection and
tears every PtySession down on disconnect; session_ids minted on one
WS cannot be reused on a reconnect because the server-side routing
registration is also gone.
- daemonws client.send buffer raised from 16 to 256 and read limit
from 4KB to 64KB so PTY traffic fits without evicting connections
used for heartbeat / wakeup hints.
Desktop UI:
- packages/views/issues/components/terminal-panel.tsx renders an
xterm.js console with FitAddon, base64 wire encoding, ResizeObserver
→ terminal.resize, reconnect button, and a clear web-only placeholder
when window.desktopAPI is absent.
- TerminalPanelSection wrapper hangs collapsed in the issue-detail
sidebar next to the execution log so bootstrap doesn't run for
every issue view.
Tests:
- terminal/manager_test.go: OpenWithInfo happy path + cross-workspace
reject (16 tests total, all -race clean).
- daemonws/terminal_test.go: TerminalRouter request_id → session_id
re-keying and unknown-session drop.
- daemon/terminal_bridge_test.go: server-supplied workdir round-trips
through OpenWithInfo, missing-workdir surfaces task_not_found and
never spawns, data+exit round trip.
- GOOS=windows go test -c clean for both daemon and daemon/terminal.
Phase 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 mapping unchanged: Phase 3 (CLI) and Phase 4
(execenv GC hook + issue runs entry + audit log) are still untouched.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
197 lines
5.8 KiB
Go
197 lines
5.8 KiB
Go
package daemonws
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"encoding/json"
|
|
"errors"
|
|
"log/slog"
|
|
"sync"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/protocol"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// TerminalSink receives terminal.* frames addressed to a single browser
|
|
// WebSocket connection. The handler implementation owns the frame queue;
|
|
// implementations must be non-blocking — the hub drops the frame if Deliver
|
|
// returns false rather than back up the daemon read pump.
|
|
type TerminalSink interface {
|
|
Deliver(frame []byte) bool
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TerminalRouter is the daemonws-side multiplex for terminal.* frames coming
|
|
// back from a daemon. Browser proxy connections register under their pending
|
|
// request_id and, after terminal.opened arrives, re-register under the
|
|
// session_id the daemon picked.
|
|
type TerminalRouter struct {
|
|
mu sync.RWMutex
|
|
sinks map[string]TerminalSink
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NewTerminalRouter constructs an empty router. The Hub owns the only
|
|
// instance in production; tests can build their own.
|
|
func NewTerminalRouter() *TerminalRouter {
|
|
return &TerminalRouter{sinks: make(map[string]TerminalSink)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Register installs sink under the given key. The key is either a
|
|
// request_id (before the daemon assigns a session_id) or a session_id
|
|
// (after the open ack). Re-registering an existing key replaces the sink.
|
|
func (r *TerminalRouter) Register(key string, sink TerminalSink) {
|
|
if r == nil || key == "" || sink == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
r.mu.Lock()
|
|
r.sinks[key] = sink
|
|
r.mu.Unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Unregister removes the sink for key, if any.
|
|
func (r *TerminalRouter) Unregister(key string) {
|
|
if r == nil || key == "" {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
r.mu.Lock()
|
|
delete(r.sinks, key)
|
|
r.mu.Unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Route extracts the routing key (request_id or session_id) from a
|
|
// terminal.* frame and forwards the raw frame to the registered sink.
|
|
// Unknown keys are dropped silently — the daemon-side session ultimately
|
|
// observes the dead client via send-side errors / idle timeout.
|
|
func (r *TerminalRouter) Route(frame []byte, msgType string, payload json.RawMessage) {
|
|
if r == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
key := terminalRouteKey(msgType, payload)
|
|
if key == "" {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
r.mu.RLock()
|
|
sink := r.sinks[key]
|
|
r.mu.RUnlock()
|
|
if sink == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if !sink.Deliver(frame) {
|
|
slog.Debug("daemon ws terminal frame dropped: slow sink", "type", msgType, "key", key)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func terminalRouteKey(msgType string, payload json.RawMessage) string {
|
|
switch msgType {
|
|
case protocol.MessageTypeTerminalOpened, protocol.MessageTypeTerminalError:
|
|
var p struct {
|
|
RequestID string `json:"request_id,omitempty"`
|
|
SessionID string `json:"session_id,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &p); err != nil {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
// terminal.error may carry either request_id (pre-open failure) or
|
|
// session_id (post-open failure). Prefer request_id so the proxy
|
|
// receives the failure on the same key it registered.
|
|
if p.RequestID != "" {
|
|
return p.RequestID
|
|
}
|
|
return p.SessionID
|
|
case protocol.MessageTypeTerminalData,
|
|
protocol.MessageTypeTerminalClose,
|
|
protocol.MessageTypeTerminalExit:
|
|
var p struct {
|
|
SessionID string `json:"session_id"`
|
|
}
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(payload, &p); err != nil {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
return p.SessionID
|
|
}
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetTerminalRouter installs an explicit router. Tests use this to inject a
|
|
// fake; production code can rely on the auto-created router exposed by
|
|
// TerminalRouter() below.
|
|
func (h *Hub) SetTerminalRouter(r *TerminalRouter) {
|
|
if h == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
h.termMu.Lock()
|
|
h.termRouter = r
|
|
h.termMu.Unlock()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TerminalRouter returns the hub's router, creating one on first access.
|
|
// The browser proxy WS handler grabs this to register per-session sinks;
|
|
// production wiring does not need an explicit SetTerminalRouter call.
|
|
func (h *Hub) TerminalRouter() *TerminalRouter {
|
|
if h == nil {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
h.termMu.RLock()
|
|
r := h.termRouter
|
|
h.termMu.RUnlock()
|
|
if r != nil {
|
|
return r
|
|
}
|
|
h.termMu.Lock()
|
|
defer h.termMu.Unlock()
|
|
if h.termRouter == nil {
|
|
h.termRouter = NewTerminalRouter()
|
|
}
|
|
return h.termRouter
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// terminalRouter is the internal read-only accessor used by handleFrame.
|
|
// It returns nil if no router has been configured, which short-circuits
|
|
// dispatch — the auto-create only happens through the public accessor.
|
|
func (h *Hub) terminalRouter() *TerminalRouter {
|
|
h.termMu.RLock()
|
|
defer h.termMu.RUnlock()
|
|
return h.termRouter
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ErrNoDaemonForRuntime is returned by SendToRuntime when no daemon is
|
|
// currently connected for the given runtime_id. The browser proxy uses this
|
|
// to fail the open request with a clear error.
|
|
var ErrNoDaemonForRuntime = errors.New("daemonws: no daemon connected for runtime")
|
|
|
|
// SendToRuntime delivers a raw frame to one daemon connection serving
|
|
// runtimeID. If multiple daemons are registered (rare — usually one per
|
|
// runtime), the first one wins. Returns ErrNoDaemonForRuntime when no
|
|
// connection exists, or a "buffer full" error when the daemon's outbound
|
|
// queue is saturated — callers should surface that as a transient failure
|
|
// to the browser rather than retrying tightly.
|
|
func (h *Hub) SendToRuntime(runtimeID string, frame []byte) error {
|
|
if h == nil || runtimeID == "" {
|
|
return ErrNoDaemonForRuntime
|
|
}
|
|
h.mu.RLock()
|
|
var target *client
|
|
for c := range h.byRuntime[runtimeID] {
|
|
target = c
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
h.mu.RUnlock()
|
|
if target == nil {
|
|
return ErrNoDaemonForRuntime
|
|
}
|
|
if !target.trySend(frame) {
|
|
return errors.New("daemonws: daemon send buffer full")
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// trySend pushes frame onto the client's outbound queue without blocking.
|
|
// Returns false if the buffer is saturated. We deliberately do not evict
|
|
// the connection here — terminal back-pressure should slow the producing
|
|
// browser/server side, not tear down the entire daemonws connection (which
|
|
// would also break heartbeat + wakeup delivery for unrelated runtimes).
|
|
func (c *client) trySend(frame []byte) bool {
|
|
select {
|
|
case c.send <- frame:
|
|
return true
|
|
default:
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|