Files
multica/server/internal/handler/handler.go
Lambda 7a66de9f23 fix(selfhost): deliver MULTICA_LLM_* to the backend and log the layer state
Chat auto-titling and chat follow-up suggestions are gated on the server-side
LLM layer, which reads MULTICA_LLM_API_KEY / MULTICA_LLM_BASE_URL through
os.Getenv. The self-host compose file enumerates backend environment
explicitly and has no env_file, and those three vars were not in the list — so
setting them in .env did nothing, the container never saw them, and the layer
was off on every compose deployment regardless of configuration. .env.example
documents them, which made it look configurable.

That was survivable while quick actions were generated by the daemon's own
provider pass, which needed no server key. MUL-5573 moved generation server-
side and removed the daemon path, so on those deployments the feature stopped
appearing entirely rather than degrading.

Adds the passthrough, and one startup line reporting whether the layer is
enabled. Every consumer degrades silently by design, so without that line an
unset key is indistinguishable from a broken feature — which is exactly how
this surfaced. Helm already supports it through the operator-managed Secret;
values.yaml now says so instead of leaving it undocumented.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-07-31 16:35:01 +08:00

989 lines
38 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"math"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgconn"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/analytics"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/auth"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/cloudruntime"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/daemonws"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/events"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/integrations/channel/engine"
composio "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/integrations/composio"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/integrations/ghsnapshot"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/integrations/lark"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/integrations/slack"
obsmetrics "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/metrics"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/middleware"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/realtime"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/service"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/storage"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/util"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/util/secretbox"
db "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/db/generated"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/featureflag"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/llm"
)
// randomID returns a random 16-byte hex string used as a request ID for
// in-memory stores (model list, local skills, CLI update, etc.).
func randomID() string {
b := make([]byte, 16)
rand.Read(b)
return hex.EncodeToString(b)
}
type txStarter interface {
Begin(ctx context.Context) (pgx.Tx, error)
}
type dbExecutor interface {
Exec(ctx context.Context, sql string, arguments ...any) (pgconn.CommandTag, error)
Query(ctx context.Context, sql string, args ...any) (pgx.Rows, error)
QueryRow(ctx context.Context, sql string, args ...any) pgx.Row
}
type Config struct {
AllowSignup bool
AllowedEmails []string
AllowedEmailDomains []string
// DisableWorkspaceCreation, when true, makes POST /api/workspaces return
// 403 for every caller. There is no role/owner exception because the repo
// has no platform-admin concept; operators bootstrap the workspace with
// the flag off, then flip it on and restart so subsequent users join via
// invitation only. The public /api/config endpoint mirrors this flag so
// the UI can hide every "Create workspace" affordance — see #3433.
DisableWorkspaceCreation bool
// VCSIntegrationEnabled gates the self-hosted Git provider integration
// (Forgejo / Gitea / GitLab) at the deployment level, independent of whether
// MULTICA_VCS_SECRET_KEY is set. It is the product boundary: the feature is
// intended for self-hosted Multica only (where Multica and the Git instance
// can share a network), and is left off on the managed cloud — connect,
// rotate, and webhook handlers reject when it is false, and /api/config
// omits it so the UI hides the whole section rather than showing a
// "missing key" message a cloud user cannot act on. Populated from
// MULTICA_VCS_INTEGRATION_ENABLED; the self-host compose defaults it on.
VCSIntegrationEnabled bool
// PublicURL is the absolute base URL the API is reachable at from the
// public internet, with no trailing slash (e.g. "https://multica.ai").
// Used only to build webhook_url responses for autopilot webhook triggers
// — never for auth, routing, or workspace resolution. Empty when unset,
// in which case clients fall back to webhook_path + their own origin.
// Reading the public host from request headers (Host / X-Forwarded-Host)
// is intentionally avoided so a misconfigured reverse proxy cannot trick
// the server into minting webhook URLs pointing at an attacker-controlled
// host.
PublicURL string
// TrustedProxies are CIDRs whose source IP we trust to set
// X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP. Empty means "trust nothing": the rate
// limiter uses r.RemoteAddr exclusively. Populated via the
// MULTICA_TRUSTED_PROXIES env var (comma-separated CIDRs, e.g.
// "10.0.0.0/8,127.0.0.1/32"). This is specifically to keep the per-IP
// webhook limiter from being bypassed by a spoofed XFF on deployments
// without a header-stripping reverse proxy in front.
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// CloudRuntimeFleetURL enables the SaaS-only remote Fleet adapter when set.
// Empty keeps self-hosted deployments explicit: cloud runtime endpoints
// return 503 instead of attempting to dial a hard-coded private service.
CloudRuntimeFleetURL string
CloudRuntimeFleetTimeout time.Duration
AttachmentDownloadMode string
AttachmentDownloadURLTTL time.Duration
// AttachmentFrameAncestors are trusted browser origins allowed to embed
// attachment preview responses. In production this should mirror the
// frontend/CORS origin allowlist so split app/api self-hosted deployments
// can frame API-hosted PDFs without allowing arbitrary third-party frames.
AttachmentFrameAncestors []string
// LLM* configure the basic LLM API layer (MUL-4238). They back the
// server-internal LLM helpers in pkg/llm (e.g. chat title generation).
// The generic OpenAI-compatible passthrough endpoints were removed in
// MUL-4309; LLM access is internal-only now. When both LLMAPIKey and
// LLMBaseURL are empty the layer is disabled and callers fall back
// silently (see maybeGenerateChatTitleAsync).
// - LLMAPIKey -> MULTICA_LLM_API_KEY
// - LLMBaseURL -> MULTICA_LLM_BASE_URL (OpenAI or any compatible gateway)
// - LLMDefaultModel -> MULTICA_LLM_DEFAULT_MODEL (used when a request omits `model`)
LLMAPIKey string
LLMBaseURL string
LLMDefaultModel string
// ServerVersion is the build version of the running API binary (the same
// value main.go stamps via -X main.version and reports on /metrics).
// Surfaced through /api/config so self-hosted operators can confirm which
// server build is deployed. Empty in dev builds.
ServerVersion string
}
type cloudRuntimeProxy interface {
Enabled() bool
Do(ctx context.Context, req cloudruntime.Request) (*cloudruntime.Response, error)
}
type RuntimeProfileRefreshNotifier interface {
NotifyRuntimeProfilesChanged(workspaceID, profileID string)
}
type WorkspaceSetRefreshNotifier interface {
NotifyWorkspacesChanged(userID string)
}
// DaemonPendingWorkNotifier pushes a runtime-scoped "heartbeat now" hint to the
// daemon so a queued heartbeat-carried request (model discovery) is picked up
// immediately instead of on the daemon's next scheduled tick (MUL-5444).
// Satisfied by both *daemonws.Hub (single-node) and *daemonws.RelayNotifier
// (multi-node, fans out through Redis).
type DaemonPendingWorkNotifier interface {
NotifyPendingWork(runtimeID, kind string)
}
type Handler struct {
Queries *db.Queries
DB dbExecutor
TxStarter txStarter
Hub *realtime.Hub
DaemonHub *daemonws.Hub
DaemonProfileRefresh RuntimeProfileRefreshNotifier
DaemonWorkspaceRefresh WorkspaceSetRefreshNotifier
Bus *events.Bus
TaskService *service.TaskService
IssueService *service.IssueService
AutopilotService *service.AutopilotService
EmailService *service.EmailService
UpdateStore UpdateStore
ModelListStore ModelListStore
LocalSkillListStore LocalSkillListStore
LocalSkillImportStore LocalSkillImportStore
FeatureFlags *featureflag.Service
LivenessStore LivenessStore
HeartbeatScheduler HeartbeatScheduler
Storage storage.Storage
CFSigner *auth.CloudFrontSigner
Analytics analytics.Client
// DaemonPendingWork pushes "heartbeat now" hints for queued
// heartbeat-carried requests (MUL-5444). Optional: when nil,
// requestDaemonPendingWork falls back to the local DaemonHub, which is the
// correct delivery scope for a single-node deployment.
DaemonPendingWork DaemonPendingWorkNotifier
// ModelCatalogCache serves the last known good model list for a runtime so
// the picker can render without waiting for a daemon round trip
// (stale-while-revalidate, MUL-5444). Nil-safe: every call site treats a nil
// cache as a permanent miss and falls back to the full discovery flow.
ModelCatalogCache ModelCatalogCache
// Metrics is the shared business-metrics collector built by main.go.
// May be nil in tests / self-hosted with the metrics listener disabled;
// every Record* method is nil-safe and obsmetrics.RecordEvent treats a
// nil Metrics as "PostHog only".
Metrics *obsmetrics.BusinessMetrics
PATCache *auth.PATCache
DaemonTokenCache *auth.DaemonTokenCache
MembershipCache *auth.MembershipCache
WebhookRateLimiter WebhookRateLimiter
WebhookIPRateLimiter WebhookRateLimiter
WebhookAbsoluteIPRateLimiter WebhookRateLimiter
WebhookDeliveryWorker *WebhookDeliveryWorker
CloudRuntime cloudRuntimeProxy
// Lark integration. All three are nil when the Lark master key
// (MULTICA_LARK_SECRET_KEY) is unset; the corresponding HTTP
// handlers return 503 in that case so a misconfigured self-host
// deployment surfaces a clear error instead of silently using a
// zero key. Wired in cmd/server/router.go after handler.New.
LarkInstallations *lark.InstallationService
LarkBindingTokens *lark.BindingTokenService
// LarkRegistration owns the device-flow install lifecycle: begin
// a registration session against accounts.feishu.cn, poll, and
// on success write lark_installation + the installer's
// lark_user_binding in one DB transaction. Nil when the at-rest
// key is unset or the RegistrationService failed to construct at
// boot.
LarkRegistration *lark.RegistrationService
// LarkAPIClient is the live transport that backs SendInteractiveCard,
// PatchInteractiveCard, SendBindingPromptCard, GetBotInfo. The
// router wires the real Lark HTTP client whenever
// MULTICA_LARK_SECRET_KEY is set; tests that need a no-op
// behaviour can swap in `lark.NewStubAPIClient(...)` directly. The
// UI consults IsConfigured() to decide whether to surface install
// entry points.
LarkAPIClient lark.APIClient
// Composio integration (MUL-3720). Nil when COMPOSIO_API_KEY is unset;
// the composio HTTP handlers return 503 in that case. Wired in
// cmd/server/router.go after handler.New.
Composio *composio.Service
// ChannelSupervisor owns the per-installation supervisor goroutines
// that hold the §4.4 WS lease and drive each channel.Channel
// (MUL-3620 generalized the Feishu-only Hub into this channel-agnostic
// engine). The router constructs it UNCONDITIONALLY — it drives any
// channel type, not just Feishu, so it does not depend on the Lark
// master key; each platform registers its Factory only when configured
// (Feishu when MULTICA_LARK_SECRET_KEY is set). The router does NOT
// call Run; the process owner (main.go) starts it under a long-running
// context and joins via WaitWithTimeout (bounded, fenced by
// ShutdownTimeout) during graceful shutdown so the lease renewer yields
// cleanly when the DB is healthy without blocking process exit if the
// pool is frozen — at worst the next replica waits the full TTL.
ChannelSupervisor *engine.Supervisor
// ChannelRouter is the channel-agnostic inbound pipeline (the shared
// handler the Supervisor injects into every Channel). main.go calls
// Drain on it during shutdown, after the Supervisor has stopped
// delivering events, to flush debounced run triggers and join in-flight
// reply goroutines. Built unconditionally (even without Lark).
ChannelRouter *engine.Router
// ChannelMediaReconciler settles the channel-media intent ledger
// (uploaded-but-unbound object reclaim). Built in cmd/server/router.go
// where the storage backend exists; main.go starts it as an independent
// worker goroutine. Nil when no storage backend is configured.
ChannelMediaReconciler *service.ChannelMediaReconciler
// SlackInstall owns the bring-your-own-app Slack install lifecycle (register
// pasted tokens / list / revoke) and the at-rest encryption of each app's bot
// + app tokens (MUL-3666). Nil unless MULTICA_SLACK_SECRET_KEY is set.
SlackInstall *slack.InstallService
// SlackBindingTokens mints/redeems the user-binding tokens behind the
// "link your Slack account" prompt (MUL-3666). Nil unless Slack is
// configured (MULTICA_SLACK_SECRET_KEY set).
SlackBindingTokens *slack.BindingTokenService
// SlackHistory backs the agent-facing `multica chat history` command: it
// reads a chat session's bound Slack conversation on demand (MUL-3871). Nil
// unless Slack is configured; GetChatChannelHistory then reports "no channel
// integration". A future platform satisfies the same reader interface.
SlackHistory ChatChannelHistoryReader
// LLM is the basic LLM API layer (MUL-4238): a thin wrapper over the
// OpenAI Go SDK backing server-internal one-shot LLM helpers such as chat
// title generation. The generic passthrough endpoints were removed in
// MUL-4309, so it is internal-only now. Always non-nil (New builds it from
// Config); when unconfigured its Enabled() reports false and callers fall
// back silently.
LLM *llm.Client
// VCSSecretBox encrypts/decrypts per-workspace Git provider access tokens and
// webhook secrets at rest (Forgejo / Gitea / GitLab). Nil when
// MULTICA_VCS_SECRET_KEY is unset; the connect/webhook handlers return 503
// in that case so a misconfigured self-host deployment surfaces a clear
// error rather than silently storing plaintext. Wired in
// cmd/server/router.go after New.
VCSSecretBox *secretbox.Box
// PRRefresh drives the GitHub API snapshot pipeline for PR cards (MUL-5265):
// webhook / page-visit / TTL triggers → authenticated GraphQL fetch →
// head-SHA-guarded atomic snapshot write. Always non-nil, but inert (every
// trigger is a no-op) when GITHUB_APP_ID / GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY are unset,
// so the feature degrades cleanly on deployments without a private key.
// Wired in cmd/server/router.go after New.
PRRefresh *ghsnapshot.Manager
cfg Config
}
func New(queries *db.Queries, txStarter txStarter, hub *realtime.Hub, bus *events.Bus, emailService *service.EmailService, store storage.Storage, cfSigner *auth.CloudFrontSigner, analyticsClient analytics.Client, cfg Config, daemonHubs ...*daemonws.Hub) *Handler {
var executor dbExecutor
if candidate, ok := txStarter.(dbExecutor); ok {
executor = candidate
}
if analyticsClient == nil {
analyticsClient = analytics.NoopClient{}
}
if mode, ok := normalizeAttachmentDownloadMode(cfg.AttachmentDownloadMode); ok {
cfg.AttachmentDownloadMode = string(mode)
} else {
slog.Warn("invalid ATTACHMENT_DOWNLOAD_MODE, using auto", "value", cfg.AttachmentDownloadMode)
cfg.AttachmentDownloadMode = string(attachmentDownloadModeAuto)
}
if cfg.AttachmentDownloadURLTTL <= 0 {
cfg.AttachmentDownloadURLTTL = defaultAttachmentDownloadURLTTL
}
var daemonHub *daemonws.Hub
if len(daemonHubs) > 0 {
daemonHub = daemonHubs[0]
}
var daemonProfileRefresh RuntimeProfileRefreshNotifier
var daemonWorkspaceRefresh WorkspaceSetRefreshNotifier
if daemonHub != nil {
daemonProfileRefresh = daemonHub
daemonWorkspaceRefresh = daemonHub
}
llmClient := llm.New(llm.Config{
APIKey: cfg.LLMAPIKey,
BaseURL: cfg.LLMBaseURL,
DefaultModel: cfg.LLMDefaultModel,
})
// One boot-time line so an operator can tell configured-and-working apart
// from silently-off. Every consumer of this layer degrades quietly by
// design (auto-titling keeps the original title, chat follow-up suggestions
// simply never appear), which without this log makes an unset key
// indistinguishable from a broken feature.
if llmClient.Enabled() {
slog.Info("llm layer enabled", "default_model", llmClient.DefaultModel())
} else {
slog.Warn("llm layer disabled: set MULTICA_LLM_API_KEY or MULTICA_LLM_BASE_URL to enable chat auto-titling and chat follow-up suggestions")
}
taskSvc := service.NewTaskService(queries, txStarter, hub, bus, daemonHub)
taskSvc.Analytics = analyticsClient
// Chat follow-up suggestions run through the same internal LLM layer that
// backs auto-titling. A deployment with no MULTICA_LLM_* configuration gets
// a disabled client, which turns the feature off rather than failing.
taskSvc.QuickActions = llmClient
h := &Handler{
Queries: queries,
DB: executor,
TxStarter: txStarter,
Hub: hub,
DaemonHub: daemonHub,
DaemonProfileRefresh: daemonProfileRefresh,
DaemonWorkspaceRefresh: daemonWorkspaceRefresh,
Bus: bus,
TaskService: taskSvc,
IssueService: service.NewIssueService(queries, txStarter, bus, analyticsClient, taskSvc),
AutopilotService: service.NewAutopilotService(queries, txStarter, bus, taskSvc),
EmailService: emailService,
UpdateStore: NewInMemoryUpdateStore(),
ModelListStore: NewInMemoryModelListStore(),
ModelCatalogCache: NewInMemoryModelCatalogCache(),
LocalSkillListStore: NewInMemoryLocalSkillListStore(),
LocalSkillImportStore: NewInMemoryLocalSkillImportStore(),
LivenessStore: NewNoopLivenessStore(),
HeartbeatScheduler: NewPassthroughHeartbeatScheduler(queries),
Storage: store,
CFSigner: cfSigner,
Analytics: analyticsClient,
WebhookRateLimiter: NewMemoryWebhookRateLimiter(DefaultWebhookRateLimit()),
WebhookIPRateLimiter: NewMemoryWebhookIPRateLimiter(DefaultWebhookIPRateLimit()),
WebhookAbsoluteIPRateLimiter: NewMemoryWebhookAbsoluteIPRateLimiter(DefaultWebhookAbsoluteIPRateLimit()),
CloudRuntime: cloudruntime.NewClient(cloudruntime.Config{
BaseURL: cfg.CloudRuntimeFleetURL,
Timeout: cfg.CloudRuntimeFleetTimeout,
}),
LLM: llmClient,
cfg: cfg,
}
h.WebhookDeliveryWorker = NewWebhookDeliveryWorker(h)
// GitHub API snapshot pipeline for PR cards (MUL-5265). Built
// unconditionally but inert (every trigger no-ops) when the App private key
// is unconfigured, so the feature degrades cleanly. main.go calls
// h.PRRefresh.Start(ctx) to launch its worker pool + TTL sweeper.
ghClient, err := ghsnapshot.NewClientFromEnv()
if err != nil {
// Malformed key is operator-actionable; the pipeline stays disabled.
slog.Warn("github: PR snapshot pipeline disabled (invalid App private key)", "err", err)
}
h.PRRefresh = ghsnapshot.NewManager(ghClient, queries, txStarter, h.broadcastPRSnapshotApplied)
return h
}
func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) {
// Marshal the body up front so we can advertise an accurate Content-Length
// header. Streaming straight into the ResponseWriter after WriteHeader forces
// net/http into chunked transfer encoding, which omits Content-Length; buffering
// first lets clients (and proxies) see the exact body size.
body, err := json.Marshal(v)
if err != nil {
// Fall back to a minimal, self-describing error payload rather than leaving
// the client with a half-written response.
body = []byte(`{"error":"failed to encode response"}`)
status = http.StatusInternalServerError
}
// Match the trailing newline that json.Encoder.Encode historically appended.
body = append(body, '\n')
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(body)))
w.WriteHeader(status)
_, _ = w.Write(body)
}
// writeMeasuredJSON behaves like writeJSON but returns the encoded body size so
// callers can record payload bytes in slow-endpoint diagnostics. It measures the
// uncompressed JSON length and is unrelated to transport compression.
func writeMeasuredJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) (int, error) {
body, err := json.Marshal(v)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to encode response")
return 0, err
}
body = append(body, '\n')
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Header().Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(body)))
w.WriteHeader(status)
if _, err := w.Write(body); err != nil {
return len(body), err
}
return len(body), nil
}
func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, msg string) {
writeJSON(w, status, map[string]string{"error": msg})
}
// Thin wrappers around util functions.
//
// parseUUID is intentionally the panicking variant: any handler call site
// reachable here is expected to feed a UUID that is either (a) a sqlc round-trip
// of a DB-sourced value, or (b) a raw request input that has already been
// validated upstream. A panic here means an unguarded user-input string slipped
// in — that is a real bug we want surfaced loudly (chi's middleware.Recoverer
// converts it to a 500) instead of silently corrupting data via a zero UUID.
//
// For unvalidated user input at request boundaries, use parseUUIDOrBadRequest
// (writes 400) — never feed raw chi.URLParam / request-body strings into
// parseUUID directly when the call writes to the database.
func parseUUID(s string) pgtype.UUID { return util.MustParseUUID(s) }
func uuidToString(u pgtype.UUID) string { return util.UUIDToString(u) }
func textToPtr(t pgtype.Text) *string { return util.TextToPtr(t) }
func ptrToText(s *string) pgtype.Text { return util.PtrToText(s) }
func strToText(s string) pgtype.Text { return util.StrToText(s) }
func timestampToString(t pgtype.Timestamptz) string { return util.TimestampToString(t) }
func timestampToPtr(t pgtype.Timestamptz) *string { return util.TimestampToPtr(t) }
func dateToPtr(d pgtype.Date) *string { return util.DateToPtr(d) }
func uuidToPtr(u pgtype.UUID) *string { return util.UUIDToPtr(u) }
// uuidsToStrings maps a UUID array column to string ids, skipping NULL/invalid
// entries. Returns nil (not an empty slice) when there is nothing to emit so
// `omitempty` JSON fields drop out cleanly (MUL-4195).
func uuidsToStrings(us []pgtype.UUID) []string {
if len(us) == 0 {
return nil
}
out := make([]string, 0, len(us))
for _, u := range us {
if u.Valid {
out = append(out, uuidToString(u))
}
}
if len(out) == 0 {
return nil
}
return out
}
// uuidStringsOrEmpty preserves the distinction between a modern, authoritative
// empty UUID-array value (`[]`) and a field omitted by a legacy server. Delivery
// receipts use this so clients never mistake zero delivered comments for an
// unknown receipt and fall back to the enqueue-time plan.
func uuidStringsOrEmpty(us []pgtype.UUID) []string {
out := uuidsToStrings(us)
if out == nil {
return []string{}
}
return out
}
func int8ToPtr(v pgtype.Int8) *int64 { return util.Int8ToPtr(v) }
func int4ToPtr(v pgtype.Int4) *int32 { return util.Int4ToPtr(v) }
func ptrToInt4(v *int32) pgtype.Int4 { return util.PtrToInt4(v) }
// parseUUIDOrBadRequest validates a UUID string sourced from user input
// (URL params, request body, headers). On invalid input it writes a 400
// response and returns ok=false; callers must return immediately.
//
// Use this anywhere a malformed UUID would otherwise reach a write query
// (DELETE / UPDATE) — the silent zero-UUID behavior of the old ParseUUID
// caused real silent-data-loss bugs (#1661).
func parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, s, fieldName string) (pgtype.UUID, bool) {
u, err := util.ParseUUID(s)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid "+fieldName)
return pgtype.UUID{}, false
}
return u, true
}
func parseUUIDSliceOrBadRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, ids []string, fieldName string) ([]pgtype.UUID, bool) {
uuids := make([]pgtype.UUID, len(ids))
for i, id := range ids {
u, err := util.ParseUUID(id)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid "+fieldName)
return nil, false
}
uuids[i] = u
}
return uuids, true
}
// publish sends a domain event through the event bus.
func (h *Handler) publish(eventType, workspaceID, actorType, actorID string, payload any) {
h.Bus.Publish(events.Event{
Type: eventType,
WorkspaceID: workspaceID,
ActorType: actorType,
ActorID: actorID,
Payload: payload,
})
}
func (h *Handler) notifyDaemonWorkspacesChanged(userIDs ...string) {
if h.DaemonWorkspaceRefresh == nil {
return
}
seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(userIDs))
for _, userID := range userIDs {
if userID == "" {
continue
}
if _, ok := seen[userID]; ok {
continue
}
seen[userID] = struct{}{}
h.DaemonWorkspaceRefresh.NotifyWorkspacesChanged(userID)
}
}
// publishTask is publish() plus a TaskID hint so the realtime layer can route
// the event to the per-task scope rather than the whole workspace.
func (h *Handler) publishTask(eventType, workspaceID, actorType, actorID, taskID string, payload any) {
h.Bus.Publish(events.Event{
Type: eventType,
WorkspaceID: workspaceID,
ActorType: actorType,
ActorID: actorID,
TaskID: taskID,
Payload: payload,
})
}
// publishChat is publish() plus a ChatSessionID hint so the realtime layer
// can route the event to the per-chat-session scope.
func (h *Handler) publishChat(eventType, workspaceID, actorType, actorID, chatSessionID string, payload any) {
h.Bus.Publish(events.Event{
Type: eventType,
WorkspaceID: workspaceID,
ActorType: actorType,
ActorID: actorID,
ChatSessionID: chatSessionID,
Payload: payload,
})
}
func isNotFound(err error) bool {
return errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows)
}
func isUniqueViolation(err error) bool {
var pgErr *pgconn.PgError
return errors.As(err, &pgErr) && pgErr.Code == "23505"
}
// isCheckViolation reports whether err is a PostgreSQL CHECK constraint
// violation (SQLSTATE 23514). Used to translate column-level CHECK failures
// into a 4xx instead of a generic 500.
func isCheckViolation(err error) bool {
var pgErr *pgconn.PgError
return errors.As(err, &pgErr) && pgErr.Code == "23514"
}
func requestUserID(r *http.Request) string {
return r.Header.Get("X-User-ID")
}
// resolveActor determines whether the request is from an agent or a human member.
//
// First-class signal: X-Actor-Source set to "task_token" means the request
// authenticated via an `mat_` task-scoped token. The auth middleware sets
// that header (and stripped any client-supplied value first), so it is
// authoritative — the bound (agent_id, task_id) cannot be forged or
// stripped by the agent process. This is the path MUL-2600 relies on to
// reject agent-process traffic on owner-only endpoints.
//
// Fallback signal (legacy CLI / member-token paths): the request MUST
// carry both X-Agent-ID and a valid X-Task-ID, and the task must belong
// to the claimed agent. Otherwise we fall back to "member".
//
// X-Agent-ID alone is not trusted: any workspace member can guess or observe
// an agent's UUID, and a member-supplied X-Agent-ID would otherwise let that
// member impersonate the agent and bypass the private-agent gate (#2359
// review). The daemon always pairs the two headers, so requiring both has
// no effect on legitimate agent callers but closes the impersonation path.
//
// Returns ("agent", agentID) on success, ("member", userID) otherwise.
func (h *Handler) resolveActor(r *http.Request, userID, workspaceID string) (actorType, actorID string) {
if r.Header.Get("X-Actor-Source") == "task_token" {
// Server-set header — auth middleware also forced X-Agent-ID
// from the token row. Trust it directly without re-querying.
return "agent", r.Header.Get("X-Agent-ID")
}
agentID := r.Header.Get("X-Agent-ID")
if agentID == "" {
return "member", userID
}
taskID := r.Header.Get("X-Task-ID")
if taskID == "" {
slog.Debug("resolveActor: X-Agent-ID present but X-Task-ID missing, refusing to trust agent identity", "agent_id", agentID)
return "member", userID
}
agentUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(agentID)
if err != nil {
slog.Debug("resolveActor: X-Agent-ID is not a valid UUID, falling back to member", "agent_id", agentID)
return "member", userID
}
// Validate the agent exists in the target workspace.
agent, err := h.Queries.GetAgent(r.Context(), agentUUID)
if err != nil || uuidToString(agent.WorkspaceID) != workspaceID {
slog.Debug("resolveActor: X-Agent-ID rejected, agent not found or workspace mismatch", "agent_id", agentID, "workspace_id", workspaceID)
return "member", userID
}
taskUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(taskID)
if err != nil {
slog.Debug("resolveActor: X-Task-ID is not a valid UUID, falling back to member", "task_id", taskID)
return "member", userID
}
task, err := h.Queries.GetAgentTask(r.Context(), taskUUID)
if err != nil || uuidToString(task.AgentID) != agentID {
slog.Debug("resolveActor: X-Task-ID rejected, task not found or agent mismatch", "agent_id", agentID, "task_id", taskID)
return "member", userID
}
return "agent", agentID
}
func requireUserID(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
userID := requestUserID(r)
if userID == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "user not authenticated")
return "", false
}
return userID, true
}
// resolveWorkspaceID returns the workspace UUID for this request. Delegates
// to middleware.ResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest so middleware-protected routes
// and middleware-less routes (e.g. /api/upload-file) share identical
// resolution behavior — including slug → UUID translation via the DB.
//
// Returns "" when no workspace identifier was provided or a slug was provided
// but doesn't match any workspace.
func (h *Handler) resolveWorkspaceID(r *http.Request) string {
return middleware.ResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest(r, h.Queries)
}
// ctxMember returns the workspace member from context (set by workspace middleware).
func ctxMember(ctx context.Context) (db.Member, bool) {
return middleware.MemberFromContext(ctx)
}
// ctxWorkspaceID returns the workspace ID from context (set by workspace middleware).
func ctxWorkspaceID(ctx context.Context) string {
return middleware.WorkspaceIDFromContext(ctx)
}
// workspaceIDFromURL returns the workspace ID from context (preferred) or chi URL param (fallback).
func workspaceIDFromURL(r *http.Request, param string) string {
if id := middleware.WorkspaceIDFromContext(r.Context()); id != "" {
return id
}
return chi.URLParam(r, param)
}
// workspaceMember returns the member from middleware context, or falls back to a DB
// lookup when the handler is called directly (e.g. in tests).
func (h *Handler) workspaceMember(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, workspaceID string) (db.Member, bool) {
if m, ok := ctxMember(r.Context()); ok {
return m, true
}
return h.requireWorkspaceMember(w, r, workspaceID, "workspace not found")
}
func roleAllowed(role string, roles ...string) bool {
for _, candidate := range roles {
if role == candidate {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func countOwners(members []db.Member) int {
owners := 0
for _, member := range members {
if member.Role == "owner" {
owners++
}
}
return owners
}
func (h *Handler) getWorkspaceMember(ctx context.Context, userID, workspaceID string) (db.Member, error) {
userUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(userID)
if err != nil {
return db.Member{}, err
}
wsUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(workspaceID)
if err != nil {
return db.Member{}, err
}
return h.Queries.GetMemberByUserAndWorkspace(ctx, db.GetMemberByUserAndWorkspaceParams{
UserID: userUUID,
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
})
}
func (h *Handler) requireWorkspaceMember(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, workspaceID, notFoundMsg string) (db.Member, bool) {
if workspaceID == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "workspace_id is required")
return db.Member{}, false
}
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return db.Member{}, false
}
member, err := h.getWorkspaceMember(r.Context(), userID, workspaceID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, notFoundMsg)
return db.Member{}, false
}
return member, true
}
func (h *Handler) requireWorkspaceRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, workspaceID, notFoundMsg string, roles ...string) (db.Member, bool) {
member, ok := h.requireWorkspaceMember(w, r, workspaceID, notFoundMsg)
if !ok {
return db.Member{}, false
}
if !roleAllowed(member.Role, roles...) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "insufficient permissions")
return db.Member{}, false
}
return member, true
}
// isWorkspaceEntity checks whether a user_id belongs to the given workspace,
// as either a member or an agent depending on userType.
func (h *Handler) isWorkspaceEntity(ctx context.Context, userType, userID, workspaceID string) bool {
switch userType {
case "member":
_, err := h.getWorkspaceMember(ctx, userID, workspaceID)
return err == nil
case "agent":
userUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(userID)
if err != nil {
return false
}
wsUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(workspaceID)
if err != nil {
return false
}
_, err = h.Queries.GetAgentInWorkspace(ctx, db.GetAgentInWorkspaceParams{
ID: userUUID,
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
})
return err == nil
default:
return false
}
}
func (h *Handler) loadIssueForUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, issueID string) (db.Issue, bool) {
if _, ok := requireUserID(w, r); !ok {
return db.Issue{}, false
}
workspaceID := h.resolveWorkspaceID(r)
if workspaceID == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "workspace_id is required")
return db.Issue{}, false
}
// Try identifier format first (e.g., "JIA-42"). resolveIssueByIdentifier
// silently returns false for non-identifier strings, falling through to
// the UUID path below.
if issue, ok := h.resolveIssueByIdentifier(r.Context(), issueID, workspaceID); ok {
return issue, true
}
issueUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(issueID)
if err != nil {
// Not a valid UUID and didn't match identifier format → 404 (consistent
// with previous silent-zero behavior, which would also have produced 404).
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "issue not found")
return db.Issue{}, false
}
wsUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(workspaceID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid workspace_id")
return db.Issue{}, false
}
issue, err := h.Queries.GetIssueInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetIssueInWorkspaceParams{
ID: issueUUID,
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "issue not found")
return db.Issue{}, false
}
return issue, true
}
// resolveIssueByIdentifier tries to look up an issue by "PREFIX-NUMBER" format.
//
// The prefix must match the workspace's own issue prefix, the same rule
// `lookupIssueByIdentifier` applies to VCS webhooks. Without it every prefix
// resolved to the same issue number, so `FOO-134` and `TRS-134` were
// interchangeable — which makes the identifier URL `/{ws}/issues/{key}`
// unusable as a canonical link.
func (h *Handler) resolveIssueByIdentifier(ctx context.Context, id, workspaceID string) (db.Issue, bool) {
parts := splitIdentifier(id)
if parts == nil {
return db.Issue{}, false
}
if workspaceID == "" {
return db.Issue{}, false
}
wsUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(workspaceID)
if err != nil {
return db.Issue{}, false
}
// Case-insensitive: a hand-typed `trs-134` should open `TRS-134`.
prefix := h.getIssuePrefix(ctx, wsUUID)
if prefix == "" || !strings.EqualFold(parts.prefix, prefix) {
return db.Issue{}, false
}
issue, err := h.Queries.GetIssueByNumber(ctx, db.GetIssueByNumberParams{
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
Number: parts.number,
})
if err != nil {
return db.Issue{}, false
}
return issue, true
}
type identifierParts struct {
prefix string
number int32
}
func splitIdentifier(id string) *identifierParts {
idx := -1
for i := len(id) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
if id[i] == '-' {
idx = i
break
}
}
if idx <= 0 || idx >= len(id)-1 {
return nil
}
numStr := id[idx+1:]
num := 0
for _, c := range numStr {
if c < '0' || c > '9' {
return nil
}
num = num*10 + int(c-'0')
// Guard the int32 conversion below: a UUID whose last group happens to
// be all digits ("…-421234567890") reaches here and would otherwise be
// truncated into a plausible-looking issue number.
if num > math.MaxInt32 {
return nil
}
}
if num <= 0 {
return nil
}
return &identifierParts{prefix: id[:idx], number: int32(num)}
}
// getIssuePrefix fetches the issue_prefix for a workspace.
// Falls back to generating a prefix from the workspace name if the stored
// prefix is empty (e.g. workspaces created before the prefix was introduced).
func (h *Handler) getIssuePrefix(ctx context.Context, workspaceID pgtype.UUID) string {
ws, err := h.Queries.GetWorkspace(ctx, workspaceID)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
if ws.IssuePrefix != "" {
return ws.IssuePrefix
}
return generateIssuePrefix(ws.Name)
}
func (h *Handler) loadAgentForUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, agentID string) (db.Agent, bool) {
if _, ok := requireUserID(w, r); !ok {
return db.Agent{}, false
}
workspaceID := h.resolveWorkspaceID(r)
if workspaceID == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "workspace_id is required")
return db.Agent{}, false
}
agentUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, agentID, "agent id")
if !ok {
return db.Agent{}, false
}
wsUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, workspaceID, "workspace id")
if !ok {
return db.Agent{}, false
}
agent, err := h.Queries.GetAgentInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetAgentInWorkspaceParams{
ID: agentUUID,
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "agent not found")
return db.Agent{}, false
}
if agent.Kind != "user" {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "agent not found")
return db.Agent{}, false
}
return agent, true
}
func (h *Handler) loadInboxItemForUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, itemID string) (db.InboxItem, bool) {
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return db.InboxItem{}, false
}
workspaceID := h.resolveWorkspaceID(r)
if workspaceID == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "workspace_id is required")
return db.InboxItem{}, false
}
itemUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, itemID, "inbox item id")
if !ok {
return db.InboxItem{}, false
}
wsUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, workspaceID, "workspace id")
if !ok {
return db.InboxItem{}, false
}
item, err := h.Queries.GetInboxItemInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetInboxItemInWorkspaceParams{
ID: itemUUID,
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "inbox item not found")
return db.InboxItem{}, false
}
if item.RecipientType != "member" || uuidToString(item.RecipientID) != userID {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "inbox item not found")
return db.InboxItem{}, false
}
return item, true
}