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* feat(auth): support mcn_ Cloud Node PATs verified via Fleet
Adds a new token kind, mcn_ (multica cloud node), recognized in both
the regular Auth and DaemonAuth middlewares. mcn_ tokens are minted
and owned by Multica Cloud (not the local personal_access_tokens
table); the server validates them by POSTing to the Fleet's
/api/v1/pat/verify endpoint and uses the returned owner_id as
X-User-ID for downstream handlers.
Cloud is the authoritative owner of token status, so this is a
verifier-only path with no DB fallback:
* Fleet says valid:false -> 401 (token genuinely bad)
* Fleet unreachable / 5xx -> 503 (transient, retry)
* No MULTICA_CLOUD_FLEET_URL configured -> 401 (fail closed)
Verification results are cached in Redis for 60s under
mul:auth:mcn:<sha256> to bound the per-request load on Fleet without
extending the revocation window beyond what the Cloud doc allows.
Negative results are NOT cached, so a freshly minted token doesn't
get locked out by a stale 'token_not_found'.
Reuses MULTICA_CLOUD_FLEET_URL (the same env the cloud-runtime proxy
already uses) so deployments don't need a second config knob.
Tests cover the happy path, every documented invalid reason, 4xx/5xx
mapping, network error, decode error, ctx cancellation, the
fail-closed valid:true-without-owner_id case, trailing-slash URL
normalization, and the Redis cache short-circuit + negative
no-cache contract. Middleware tests pin the four 401/503/200 outcomes
in both Auth and DaemonAuth.
* auth(mcn): require owner_id to map to a real local user; drop X-User-PAT plumbing
Two related changes:
1. Cloud-verified owner_id is now checked against our local users table.
The Cloud owner_id and our users.id share the same UUID space by
contract; a missing local user means either the row was deleted
under an active node or something is forging owner_ids — either
way, fail closed.
CloudPATVerifier.Verify takes a new OwnerLookupFunc:
- returns (true, nil) -> success, cache + return
- returns (false, nil) -> ErrCloudPATInvalid (reason='owner_unknown'),
NOT cached (so a freshly-created user
doesn't get locked out for a TTL window)
- returns (_, error) -> ErrCloudPATUnavailable (transient,
middleware emits 503)
Both Auth and DaemonAuth wire ownerLookupFor(queries), a new shared
helper that wraps queries.GetUser, mapping pgx.ErrNoRows / unparseable
UUIDs to (false, nil) and other errors to a real Go error.
2. Removed all X-User-PAT plumbing. Cloud now mints node-scoped mcn_
PATs itself during /api/v1/nodes (see multica-cloud
docs/api/node-pat.md) and ships them into the EC2 instance via SSM,
so multica-api no longer needs to forward the caller's mul_ PAT.
Propagating a long-lived user PAT into a remote machine widened
the blast radius of any node compromise; that's gone now.
Removed:
- cloud_runtime.go: withUserPAT option, cloudRuntimeUserPAT,
generateCloudRuntimePAT, revokeGeneratedPAT
- cloudruntime/Request.UserPAT field + X-User-PAT header
- X-User-PAT from CORS allowed headers
- obsolete handler tests:
TestCreateCloudRuntimeNodeForwardsValidatedPAT
TestCreateCloudRuntimeNodeRejectsUnownedPAT
TestCreateCloudRuntimeNodeRejectsExpiredPAT
TestCreateCloudRuntimeNodeAutoGeneratesPAT
replaced with TestCreateCloudRuntimeNodeForwardsBody
- X-User-PAT references in packages/core/api/client.test.ts
Tests:
* 3 new verifier-level tests (owner_unknown not cached, lookup error
-> Unavailable, success path is cached for both fleet AND lookup)
* 5 new owner_lookup_test.go tests (nil queries, existing user,
missing user, malformed UUID, DB error)
* 1 new end-to-end DaemonAuth test (cloud says valid, no local user
-> 401)
* Existing X-User-PAT TS assertions removed; full vitest run passes.
* go test ./... and go vet ./... clean on the server module.
270 lines
9.7 KiB
Go
270 lines
9.7 KiB
Go
package middleware
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import (
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"context"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/auth"
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db "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/db/generated"
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)
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// TestDaemonAuth_DaemonTokenCacheHit pins the daemon-token cache short-circuit:
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// when the cache holds an entry for an mdt_ token, DaemonAuth must skip the DB
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// lookup. nil queries would otherwise nil-deref on a miss.
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func TestDaemonAuth_DaemonTokenCacheHit(t *testing.T) {
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rdb := newRedisTestClient(t)
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cache := auth.NewDaemonTokenCache(rdb)
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if cache == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected non-nil cache")
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}
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const rawToken = "mdt_cache_hit_test_token"
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hash := auth.HashToken(rawToken)
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cache.Set(context.Background(), hash, auth.DaemonTokenIdentity{
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WorkspaceID: "ws-cached",
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DaemonID: "daemon-cached",
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}, auth.AuthCacheTTL)
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var gotWS, gotDaemon, gotPath string
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mw := DaemonAuth(nil, nil, cache, nil) // nil queries — only safe on cache hit
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handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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gotWS = DaemonWorkspaceIDFromContext(r.Context())
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gotDaemon = DaemonIDFromContext(r.Context())
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gotPath = DaemonAuthPathFromContext(r.Context())
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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}))
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/daemon/heartbeat", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+rawToken)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("expected 200 on cache hit, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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if gotWS != "ws-cached" || gotDaemon != "daemon-cached" {
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t.Fatalf("expected (ws-cached, daemon-cached), got (%q, %q)", gotWS, gotDaemon)
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}
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if gotPath != DaemonAuthPathDaemonToken {
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t.Fatalf("expected auth path %q, got %q", DaemonAuthPathDaemonToken, gotPath)
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}
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}
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// TestDaemonAuth_PATCacheHit pins the PAT-fallback short-circuit. Production
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// daemon traffic today uses mul_ PATs (mdt_ minting isn't wired up yet), so
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// this is the cache hit that actually matters for /api/daemon/* DB load.
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func TestDaemonAuth_PATCacheHit(t *testing.T) {
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rdb := newRedisTestClient(t)
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cache := auth.NewPATCache(rdb)
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if cache == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected non-nil cache")
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}
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const rawToken = "mul_daemon_pat_cache_hit_test"
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hash := auth.HashToken(rawToken)
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cache.Set(context.Background(), hash, "cached-user-id", auth.AuthCacheTTL)
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var gotUserID, gotPath string
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mw := DaemonAuth(nil, cache, nil, nil)
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handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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gotUserID = r.Header.Get("X-User-ID")
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gotPath = DaemonAuthPathFromContext(r.Context())
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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}))
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/daemon/heartbeat", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+rawToken)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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if gotUserID != "cached-user-id" {
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t.Fatalf("expected cached X-User-ID, got %q", gotUserID)
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}
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if gotPath != DaemonAuthPathPAT {
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t.Fatalf("expected auth path %q, got %q", DaemonAuthPathPAT, gotPath)
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}
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}
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func TestDaemonAuth_MissingAuth(t *testing.T) {
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mw := DaemonAuth(nil, nil, nil, nil)
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handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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t.Fatal("next must not be called")
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}))
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/daemon/heartbeat", nil)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("expected 401, got %d", w.Code)
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}
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}
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func TestDaemonAuth_InvalidMDT_NilQueries(t *testing.T) {
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mw := DaemonAuth(nil, nil, nil, nil) // no caches, no DB
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handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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t.Fatal("next must not be called")
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}))
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/daemon/heartbeat", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer mdt_unknown")
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("expected 401, got %d", w.Code)
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}
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}
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// TestDaemonAuth_MCN_NoVerifierConfigured pins the fail-closed
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// behaviour when MULTICA_CLOUD_FLEET_URL is empty: an mcn_ token MUST
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// be rejected at the prefix branch with 401, not silently fall
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// through to the mul_/JWT paths (an mcn_ string would never match a
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// valid PAT or JWT, but failing closed makes the contract explicit).
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func TestDaemonAuth_MCN_NoVerifierConfigured(t *testing.T) {
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mw := DaemonAuth(nil, nil, nil, nil)
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handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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t.Fatal("next must not be called when verifier is unconfigured")
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}))
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/daemon/heartbeat", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer mcn_anything")
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("expected 401 with no verifier, got %d", w.Code)
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}
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}
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// TestDaemonAuth_MCN_ValidTokenSetsUserID confirms that on a successful
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// Fleet verify, DaemonAuth surfaces owner_id as X-User-ID and tags the
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// auth path as cloud_pat for telemetry. We use a stub Fleet here
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// (no Redis) so the test runs without external services.
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func TestDaemonAuth_MCN_ValidTokenSetsUserID(t *testing.T) {
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{
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"valid": true,
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"owner_id": "01972f7e-7e8d-77ef-a13d-1b0ce3e9c001",
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"instance_id": "i-01"
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}`))
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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verifier := auth.NewCloudPATVerifier(auth.CloudPATVerifierConfig{FleetBaseURL: srv.URL})
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var gotUser, gotPath string
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mw := DaemonAuth(nil, nil, nil, verifier)
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handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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gotUser = r.Header.Get("X-User-ID")
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gotPath = DaemonAuthPathFromContext(r.Context())
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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}))
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/daemon/heartbeat", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer mcn_some_token")
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("expected 200, got %d: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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if gotUser != "01972f7e-7e8d-77ef-a13d-1b0ce3e9c001" {
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t.Errorf("expected owner_id propagated as X-User-ID, got %q", gotUser)
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}
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if gotPath != DaemonAuthPathCloudPAT {
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t.Errorf("expected auth path %q, got %q", DaemonAuthPathCloudPAT, gotPath)
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}
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}
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// TestDaemonAuth_MCN_FleetSaysInvalid confirms that a valid:false
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// Fleet response maps to 401 (not 503) — the token IS known to be bad,
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// retrying won't help.
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func TestDaemonAuth_MCN_FleetSaysInvalid(t *testing.T) {
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"valid":false,"reason":"token_revoked"}`))
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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verifier := auth.NewCloudPATVerifier(auth.CloudPATVerifierConfig{FleetBaseURL: srv.URL})
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mw := DaemonAuth(nil, nil, nil, verifier)
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handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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t.Fatal("next must not be called when fleet says invalid")
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}))
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/daemon/heartbeat", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer mcn_revoked")
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("expected 401 for invalid token, got %d", w.Code)
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}
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}
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// TestDaemonAuth_MCN_FleetUnreachable confirms the Unavailable branch
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// emits 503 — the daemon must distinguish "your token is bad" (401, drop
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// it) from "cloud is down" (503, retry later) so a brief outage doesn't
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// invalidate everyone's PAT.
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func TestDaemonAuth_MCN_FleetUnreachable(t *testing.T) {
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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verifier := auth.NewCloudPATVerifier(auth.CloudPATVerifierConfig{FleetBaseURL: srv.URL})
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mw := DaemonAuth(nil, nil, nil, verifier)
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handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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t.Fatal("next must not be called when fleet is unavailable")
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}))
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/daemon/heartbeat", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer mcn_x")
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
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t.Fatalf("expected 503 when fleet is unavailable, got %d", w.Code)
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}
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}
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// TestDaemonAuth_MCN_OwnerNotInLocalDB pins the new owner-existence
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// guard end-to-end through the middleware. Cloud verifies the token
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// successfully and returns an owner_id that does not exist in our
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// local user table — DaemonAuth must reject with 401 (not 503) and
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// MUST NOT call the next handler with a phantom X-User-ID.
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func TestDaemonAuth_MCN_OwnerNotInLocalDB(t *testing.T) {
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pool := openPool(t)
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defer pool.Close()
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queries := db.New(pool)
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srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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// Owner_id is syntactically valid but not seeded in the DB.
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{
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"valid": true,
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"owner_id": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-0000000feed1",
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"instance_id": "i-99"
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}`))
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}))
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defer srv.Close()
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verifier := auth.NewCloudPATVerifier(auth.CloudPATVerifierConfig{FleetBaseURL: srv.URL})
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mw := DaemonAuth(queries, nil, nil, verifier)
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handler := mw(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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t.Fatal("next must not be called when owner_id has no local user")
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}))
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req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "/api/daemon/heartbeat", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer mcn_phantom_owner")
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Fatalf("expected 401 when local user is missing, got %d", w.Code)
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}
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}
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