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The session cookie's Secure flag was tied to APP_ENV, and the docker-compose self-host stack defaults APP_ENV to "production". On plain-HTTP self-host deployments (LAN IP, private network) the browser silently drops Secure cookies, leaving every subsequent /api/* call anonymous and surfacing as 401 "auth: no token found" right after a successful login. Derive Secure from the scheme of FRONTEND_ORIGIN so HTTPS origins get Secure cookies and plain-HTTP origins get non-secure cookies the browser will actually store. Also harden cookieDomain() against the other common trap: COOKIE_DOMAIN=<ip>, which RFC 6265 forbids and browsers reject. Log a one-shot warning and fall back to host-only. Docs: correct the COOKIE_DOMAIN description (it was labelled as CloudFront-only but applies to session cookies too) and call out the IP-literal pitfall in SELF_HOSTING_ADVANCED.md, self-hosting.mdx, and .env.example. Refs #1321
102 lines
3.1 KiB
Go
102 lines
3.1 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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)
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func TestIsSecureCookie(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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frontendOrigin string
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want bool
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}{
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{"https origin → Secure", "https://app.example.com", true},
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{"https with port", "https://app.example.com:8443", true},
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{"http origin → not Secure", "http://192.168.5.5:13000", false},
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{"http localhost → not Secure", "http://localhost:3000", false},
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{"empty → not Secure", "", false},
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{"malformed → not Secure", "::not-a-url", false},
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{"uppercase scheme still matches", "HTTPS://app.example.com", true},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Setenv("FRONTEND_ORIGIN", tc.frontendOrigin)
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if got := isSecureCookie(); got != tc.want {
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t.Errorf("isSecureCookie() = %v, want %v (FRONTEND_ORIGIN=%q)", got, tc.want, tc.frontendOrigin)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestCookieDomain(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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name string
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env string
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want string
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}{
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{"empty", "", ""},
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{"whitespace only", " ", ""},
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{"real domain", ".example.com", ".example.com"},
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{"bare domain", "example.com", "example.com"},
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{"IPv4 rejected", "192.168.5.5", ""},
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{"IPv4 with leading dot rejected", ".192.168.5.5", ""},
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{"IPv6 rejected", "::1", ""},
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{"IPv6 bracketed is not a valid IP literal → passthrough", "[::1]", "[::1]"},
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}
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for _, tc := range cases {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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t.Setenv("COOKIE_DOMAIN", tc.env)
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if got := cookieDomain(); got != tc.want {
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t.Errorf("cookieDomain() = %q, want %q (COOKIE_DOMAIN=%q)", got, tc.want, tc.env)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// TestSetAuthCookies_HTTPSelfHost covers the exact misconfiguration that
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// shipped to users on LAN self-host: COOKIE_DOMAIN=<ip> + HTTP FRONTEND_ORIGIN.
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// The cookie must land with no Domain attribute and Secure=false so browsers
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// actually store it.
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func TestSetAuthCookies_HTTPSelfHost(t *testing.T) {
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t.Setenv("FRONTEND_ORIGIN", "http://192.168.5.5:13000")
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t.Setenv("COOKIE_DOMAIN", "192.168.5.5")
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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if err := SetAuthCookies(rec, "test-token"); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("SetAuthCookies: %v", err)
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}
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cookies := rec.Result().Cookies()
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if len(cookies) != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("expected 2 cookies (auth + csrf), got %d", len(cookies))
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}
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for _, c := range cookies {
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if c.Secure {
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t.Errorf("cookie %q has Secure=true on HTTP origin; browser would reject it", c.Name)
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}
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if c.Domain != "" {
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t.Errorf("cookie %q has Domain=%q; IP-address Domain would be rejected by the browser (RFC 6265)", c.Name, c.Domain)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestSetAuthCookies_HTTPSProduction(t *testing.T) {
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t.Setenv("FRONTEND_ORIGIN", "https://app.example.com")
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t.Setenv("COOKIE_DOMAIN", "app.example.com")
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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if err := SetAuthCookies(rec, "test-token"); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("SetAuthCookies: %v", err)
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}
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for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
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if !c.Secure {
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t.Errorf("cookie %q missing Secure flag on HTTPS origin", c.Name)
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}
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if c.Domain != "app.example.com" {
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t.Errorf("cookie %q Domain = %q, want %q", c.Name, c.Domain, "app.example.com")
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}
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}
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}
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