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* fix(channels): auto-reclaim orphaned bot installations + accurate rebind conflict copy channel_installation has no FK to workspace/agent (MUL-3515 §4), so deleting a workspace or hard-deleting an agent left the row behind, occupying the (channel_type, app_id) routing slot forever — the bot could never be rebound and the UI had no way to clear it (#4810). The 409 also always blamed "a different Multica workspace" even when the real owner sat in the same workspace. Auto-reclaim on delete: - DeleteWorkspace and the runtime-teardown paths now sweep the workspace's / archived agents' channel installations and every dependent row in-tx. - The shared install path (Feishu + Slack) reclaims a DEAD prior owner — a revoked placeholder or an orphan whose workspace/agent is gone — before the upsert, healing installations stranded before this fix. A live owner (active agent, including an archived one) is left in place, not stolen. Accurate conflict copy: - A rebind refused by a LIVE owner now distinguishes same-workspace / another agent, an archived agent, and a genuinely different workspace, for both Slack (typed sentinels) and Feishu (registration message). MUL-3937 Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> * fix(channels): reclaim cross-workspace revoked bots + sweep card/dedup/audit (#4810) Address the #5103 review (yyclaw + Steve): - Reclaim: a REVOKED installation in ANY workspace is now dead (except the caller's own row), not just same-workspace. Disconnect never hard-deletes the row and there is no release UI, so a cross-workspace revoked row would pin a bot's app_id slot forever, with the misleading "connected to another workspace" copy resurfacing. A new binder proves control by holding the app credentials, so reclaiming is safe. Live ACTIVE owners (incl. archived) are still refused. - Sweep the two dependent tables the cleanups missed, in all three paths (reclaim / DeleteWorkspace / runtime teardown): channel_outbound_card_message (no reaper, so a permanent orphan otherwise) and channel_inbound_message_dedup (PurgeChannelInboundDedup has no caller). - Audit rows: PURGE on the hard-delete paths instead of detaching them into permanently unattributable NULL rows; keep DETACH on reclaim, where the workspace survives and the row stays useful for triage. - Tests: flip cross-ws revoked to reclaimed + add cross-ws active preserved; extend the reclaim and both delete-path cleanup tests for card/dedup and the audit purge/detach split; assert the channel sweep on the DeleteRuntimeProfile entry point. MUL-3937 Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> --------- Co-authored-by: J <j@multica.ai> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
738 lines
29 KiB
Go
738 lines
29 KiB
Go
package lark
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/base64"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgconn"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/events"
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db "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/db/generated"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/protocol"
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)
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// pgUniqueViolation is the Postgres SQLSTATE for a unique-constraint violation.
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// A rebind upsert that trips the (channel_type, config->>'app_id') index after
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// the dead-owner reclaim ran means a LIVE owner still holds the slot.
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const pgUniqueViolation = "23505"
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// RegistrationSessionStatus is the discriminated state a `begin`
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// session lives in. The HTTP status endpoint serializes the underlying
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// string verbatim so the frontend can pattern-match without parsing
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// prose.
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type RegistrationSessionStatus string
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const (
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// RegistrationStatusPending means the QR has been minted and the
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// background goroutine is still polling Lark. The frontend keeps
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// polling our status endpoint at the cadence we return in
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// poll_interval_seconds.
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RegistrationStatusPending RegistrationSessionStatus = "pending"
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// RegistrationStatusSuccess means the device-flow returned
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// credentials AND the lark_installation + installer-binding pair
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// committed. `installation_id` is populated. The frontend closes
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// the dialog and invalidates the installations cache.
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RegistrationStatusSuccess RegistrationSessionStatus = "success"
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// RegistrationStatusError means the session reached a terminal
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// failure (expired, user-denied, Lark protocol error, follow-up
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// bot-info / DB error). `error_reason` is set to a stable code so
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// the frontend can render the right copy without parsing
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// `error_message`.
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RegistrationStatusError RegistrationSessionStatus = "error"
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)
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// Reason codes the service stores on a failed session. Stable strings
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// so the frontend can switch on them without parsing prose.
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const (
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RegistrationReasonExpired = "expired"
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RegistrationReasonAccessDenied = "access_denied"
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RegistrationReasonProtocol = "lark_protocol_error"
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RegistrationReasonBotInfoFailed = "bot_info_failed"
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RegistrationReasonInstallationConflict = "installation_conflict"
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RegistrationReasonInstallerBindFailed = "installer_bind_failed"
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RegistrationReasonInternalError = "internal_error"
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)
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// RegistrationServiceConfig configures the service.
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type RegistrationServiceConfig struct {
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// SessionTTL caps how long a successful or errored session stays in
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// the in-process cache before GC. Default 30 minutes — long enough
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// for the frontend to fetch the final status after the dialog
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// closes, short enough that abandoned sessions do not pin memory
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// forever. Independent of the device-flow expiry (Lark's
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// expire_in, ~10 min).
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SessionTTL time.Duration
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// Now is overridable for deterministic expiry-bound tests.
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Now func() time.Time
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// Logger is used for protocol-level warnings (Lark error codes,
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// post-success bot info failures). Nil uses slog.Default().
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Logger *slog.Logger
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}
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func (c RegistrationServiceConfig) withDefaults() RegistrationServiceConfig {
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if c.SessionTTL == 0 {
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c.SessionTTL = 30 * time.Minute
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}
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if c.Now == nil {
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c.Now = time.Now
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}
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if c.Logger == nil {
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c.Logger = slog.Default()
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}
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return c
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}
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// RegistrationService owns the device-flow install lifecycle. It is the
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// one place that:
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//
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// 1. opens a new device-flow session against Lark (Begin),
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// 2. tracks the session's polling state in-process,
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// 3. runs the background polling goroutine,
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// 4. on success, calls APIClient.GetBotInfo with the freshly minted
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// credentials, then writes lark_installation + the installer's
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// lark_user_binding in a single transaction.
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//
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// In-process session storage is intentional: device-flow sessions are
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// short-lived (<10 min), the QR has no value outside the same browser
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// session that initiated it, and persisting half-completed installs
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// into Postgres would add a migration + GC sweep without delivering any
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// product capability the user can re-use across server restarts.
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type RegistrationService struct {
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cfg RegistrationServiceConfig
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client *RegistrationClient
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api APIClient
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queries *ChannelStore
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tx TxStarter
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installs *InstallationService
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binder InstallerBinder
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authQueries authQueriesAdapter
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// bus is optional. When wired (SetEventBus), a successful install
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// publishes lark_installation:created the moment the row commits, so
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// every workspace client refreshes its connection badge without
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// waiting for a browser to poll the status endpoint to success. Nil
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// is valid — install still works, it just won't push the WS frame.
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bus *events.Bus
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mu sync.Mutex
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sessions map[string]*registrationSession
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}
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// authQueriesAdapter is the minimal lookup surface the service needs
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// before kicking off a session: agent ↔ workspace ownership validation.
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// Kept as an interface so tests can drop in a stub instead of a real
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// *db.Queries + Postgres fixture.
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type authQueriesAdapter interface {
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GetAgentInWorkspace(ctx context.Context, params db.GetAgentInWorkspaceParams) (db.Agent, error)
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}
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// NewRegistrationService wires the device-flow client, the APIClient
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// (for the post-success GetBotInfo lookup), and the DB write path. Any
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// required dependency missing surfaces as a constructor error so a
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// silent half-init at startup cannot leave the install button
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// returning 500s at runtime.
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func NewRegistrationService(
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cfg RegistrationServiceConfig,
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client *RegistrationClient,
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api APIClient,
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queries *db.Queries,
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tx TxStarter,
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installs *InstallationService,
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binder InstallerBinder,
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) (*RegistrationService, error) {
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if client == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("lark registration: RegistrationClient is required")
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}
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if api == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("lark registration: APIClient is required")
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}
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if queries == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("lark registration: queries is required")
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}
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if tx == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("lark registration: TxStarter is required")
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}
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if installs == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("lark registration: InstallationService is required")
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}
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if binder == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("lark registration: InstallerBinder is required")
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}
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return &RegistrationService{
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cfg: cfg.withDefaults(),
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client: client,
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api: api,
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queries: NewChannelStore(queries),
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tx: tx,
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installs: installs,
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binder: binder,
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authQueries: queries,
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sessions: make(map[string]*registrationSession),
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}, nil
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}
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// SetEventBus wires the optional event bus AFTER construction so the
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// six positional constructor-validation cases stay untouched and the
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// bus remains nil-safe. With it set, finishSuccess publishes
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// lark_installation:created at the row-commit point — the authoritative
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// moment of truth — instead of relying on the HTTP status-poll handler
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// to emit it only when a browser happens to poll to success.
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func (s *RegistrationService) SetEventBus(bus *events.Bus) {
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s.bus = bus
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}
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// publishInstalled emits lark_installation:created on the optional bus.
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// Mirrors the revoke path (RevokeLarkInstallation publishes
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// lark_installation:revoked from its handler): both events broadcast to
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// the whole workspace via the SubscribeAll fanout, and the frontend
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// invalidates larkKeys.installations on the lark_installation prefix, so
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// every mounted surface (agent Integrations tab, inspector, Settings)
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// refreshes its connection badge with no page reload. Covers fresh
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// installs and revoked→active re-installs alike — both ride the same
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// UpsertLarkInstallation write. Nil-safe.
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func (s *RegistrationService) publishInstalled(workspaceID, installationID pgtype.UUID) {
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if s.bus == nil {
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return
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}
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s.bus.Publish(events.Event{
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Type: protocol.EventLarkInstallationCreated,
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WorkspaceID: uuidString(workspaceID),
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ActorType: "system",
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Payload: map[string]any{"installation_id": uuidString(installationID)},
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})
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}
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// registrationSession is the in-memory state for one in-flight install.
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type registrationSession struct {
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id string
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workspaceID pgtype.UUID
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agentID pgtype.UUID
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initiatorID pgtype.UUID
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deviceCode string
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domain string
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qrCodeURL string
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interval time.Duration
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expiresAt time.Time
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// region is the cloud the install was started against. The polling
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// loop reads it as the initial value of its `region` local; if the
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// poll stream surfaces a tenant_brand mid-flow, the local flips to
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// RegionLark, but the session field stays at what the user picked
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// (it is informational — the authoritative cloud flows back through
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// finishSuccess via the loop's local).
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region Region
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mu sync.Mutex
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status RegistrationSessionStatus
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installationID pgtype.UUID
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errorReason string
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errorMessage string
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gcAfter time.Time
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}
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func (s *registrationSession) snapshot() RegistrationSessionState {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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return RegistrationSessionState{
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ID: s.id,
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Status: s.status,
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InstallationID: s.installationID,
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ErrorReason: s.errorReason,
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ErrorMessage: s.errorMessage,
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// InitiatorID is immutable after BeginInstall, so it is safe to
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// read outside the mutex too — it is included here so the status
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// handler can scope reads to the session's initiator.
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InitiatorID: s.initiatorID,
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}
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}
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func (s *registrationSession) markSuccess(installationID pgtype.UUID, gcAfter time.Time) {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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s.status = RegistrationStatusSuccess
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s.installationID = installationID
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s.gcAfter = gcAfter
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}
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func (s *registrationSession) markError(reason, msg string, gcAfter time.Time) {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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// Idempotent: if a parallel goroutine already terminated the
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// session (e.g. expiry fired between status reads), don't clobber
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// the first reason — the user already saw it.
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if s.status != RegistrationStatusPending {
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return
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}
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s.status = RegistrationStatusError
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s.errorReason = reason
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s.errorMessage = msg
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s.gcAfter = gcAfter
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}
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// RegistrationSessionState is the read-only snapshot the handler
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// serializes to the frontend. Internal mutex is hidden by construction.
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// InitiatorID is not serialized to the client — the handler uses it only
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// to authorize the status read (session initiator or workspace admin).
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type RegistrationSessionState struct {
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ID string
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Status RegistrationSessionStatus
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InstallationID pgtype.UUID
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ErrorReason string
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ErrorMessage string
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InitiatorID pgtype.UUID
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}
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// BeginInstallParams is the trusted input from the handler — the
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// workspace, agent, and initiating user have already been authenticated
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// and authorized by the handler (canManageAgent: the agent's owner OR a
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// workspace owner/admin; agent belongs to the workspace). The service
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// re-checks agent↔workspace membership below as defense-in-depth.
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type BeginInstallParams struct {
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WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID
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AgentID pgtype.UUID
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InitiatorID pgtype.UUID
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// Region picks which cloud's accounts host the device-flow begins
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// against — Feishu (mainland, accounts.feishu.cn) or Lark
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// (international, accounts.larksuite.com). The user picks this
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// explicitly in the UI ("Bind to Feishu" vs "Bind to Lark") so the
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// QR rendered up front already targets the right cloud and Lark
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// users do not have to hit a Feishu URL first and rely on the
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// tenant-brand auto-switch. Empty / unknown values fall back to
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// Feishu, matching RegionOrDefault, so existing callers without
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// the new field keep working.
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Region Region
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}
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// BeginInstallResult is the public payload the handler echoes to the
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// frontend. The session_id is the opaque handle the frontend uses to
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// poll status; we deliberately do NOT echo the device_code or the
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// polling interval (which is internal scheduling state).
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type BeginInstallResult struct {
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SessionID string
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QRCodeURL string
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ExpiresInSeconds int
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PollIntervalSeconds int
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}
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// BeginInstall opens a fresh device-flow session and kicks off the
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// background polling goroutine. The returned payload feeds the QR-code
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// dialog on the frontend; the polling goroutine runs until success,
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// terminal failure, or device_code expiry.
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//
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// The session_id is the only opaque token returned to the browser —
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// the device_code is server-side only (Lark would honor a poll from
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// anywhere if the device_code leaked, so we never echo it).
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func (s *RegistrationService) BeginInstall(ctx context.Context, p BeginInstallParams) (BeginInstallResult, error) {
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if !p.WorkspaceID.Valid || !p.AgentID.Valid || !p.InitiatorID.Valid {
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return BeginInstallResult{}, errors.New("lark registration: workspace, agent, and initiator are required")
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}
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// Agent↔workspace pre-check — without this, a caller could open an
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// install session against another workspace's agent by guessing the
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// UUID, and the device_code minted against Lark would still produce
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// credentials. The handler already loads this agent to run
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// canManageAgent; re-checking here keeps the service self-defending.
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//
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// We keep the agent: its name pre-fills the bot name on Lark's
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// PersonalAgent creation form (see botNamePreset) so the installed
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// bot reads "<agent> - Multica" instead of "{用户姓名}的智能助手".
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agent, err := s.authQueries.GetAgentInWorkspace(ctx, db.GetAgentInWorkspaceParams{
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ID: p.AgentID,
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WorkspaceID: p.WorkspaceID,
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})
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if err != nil {
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return BeginInstallResult{}, fmt.Errorf("lark registration: agent not in workspace: %w", err)
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}
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// Normalize the requested region: empty / unknown → Feishu, the same
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// back-compat invariant the storage layer uses (RegionOrDefault).
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// This both protects the device-flow client from a bogus value
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// from the handler AND means a pre-region caller (omitting the
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// field) keeps getting the historical mainland-first behaviour.
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region := RegionOrDefault(string(p.Region))
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begin, err := s.client.Begin(ctx, botNamePreset(agent.Name), region)
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if err != nil {
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return BeginInstallResult{}, fmt.Errorf("lark registration: begin: %w", err)
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}
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now := s.cfg.Now()
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sessionID, err := randomSessionID()
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if err != nil {
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return BeginInstallResult{}, fmt.Errorf("lark registration: mint session id: %w", err)
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}
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sess := ®istrationSession{
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id: sessionID,
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workspaceID: p.WorkspaceID,
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agentID: p.AgentID,
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initiatorID: p.InitiatorID,
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deviceCode: begin.DeviceCode,
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domain: begin.Domain,
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qrCodeURL: begin.QRCodeURL,
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interval: begin.Interval,
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expiresAt: now.Add(begin.ExpiresIn),
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region: region,
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status: RegistrationStatusPending,
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}
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s.mu.Lock()
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s.sessions[sessionID] = sess
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s.mu.Unlock()
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// The polling goroutine outlives the request context, so we cannot
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// reuse ctx here. We size its own context to the device_code
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// expiry — the worst case is a session that quietly times out
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// after Lark's window closes, which we surface to the user as
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// RegistrationReasonExpired on the next status read.
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go s.runPolling(sess)
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return BeginInstallResult{
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SessionID: sessionID,
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QRCodeURL: begin.QRCodeURL,
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ExpiresInSeconds: int(begin.ExpiresIn / time.Second),
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PollIntervalSeconds: int(begin.Interval / time.Second),
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}, nil
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}
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// GetSession returns the current state of an in-flight or recently-
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// finished session. The workspace UUID is required so a session
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// initiated by one workspace cannot be polled by another (the session
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// id is unguessable but defense-in-depth costs nothing here).
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//
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// ErrRegistrationSessionNotFound is returned for unknown / expired /
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// GC'd sessions; the frontend treats it the same as an error reason
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// of "session_lost" — prompt the user to restart the install.
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func (s *RegistrationService) GetSession(workspaceID pgtype.UUID, sessionID string) (RegistrationSessionState, error) {
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if strings.TrimSpace(sessionID) == "" {
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return RegistrationSessionState{}, ErrRegistrationSessionNotFound
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}
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s.gcExpiredLocked()
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s.mu.Lock()
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sess, ok := s.sessions[sessionID]
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s.mu.Unlock()
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if !ok {
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return RegistrationSessionState{}, ErrRegistrationSessionNotFound
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}
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if !uuidEqual(sess.workspaceID, workspaceID) {
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// Treat as not found — leaking "exists but wrong workspace"
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// would let an attacker enumerate session ids across workspaces.
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return RegistrationSessionState{}, ErrRegistrationSessionNotFound
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}
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return sess.snapshot(), nil
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}
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|
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// runPolling is the background loop. The pattern matches the upstream
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// SDK: wait → poll → branch on result. On any terminal outcome we
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// either record the installation+binding (success) or mark the session
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// errored.
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func (s *RegistrationService) runPolling(sess *registrationSession) {
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// Bound the entire polling life by Lark's expiry — once that
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// window closes, no further poll can succeed.
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ctx, cancel := context.WithDeadline(context.Background(), sess.expiresAt)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
|
|
interval := sess.interval
|
|
if interval <= 0 {
|
|
interval = time.Duration(registrationDefaultPollSeconds) * time.Second
|
|
}
|
|
domain := sess.domain
|
|
deviceCode := sess.deviceCode
|
|
// region tracks which cloud this install belongs to. It starts at
|
|
// whatever the user picked at begin-time (Feishu by default; the
|
|
// frontend now exposes an explicit Lark CTA that begins on
|
|
// accounts.larksuite.com directly). The SwitchedDomain branch
|
|
// below is still honored as a safety net — if a user clicks the
|
|
// Feishu CTA but actually authorizes with a Lark-international
|
|
// account, the poll stream surfaces tenant_brand="lark" and we
|
|
// flip the local accordingly. So at finishSuccess time `region`
|
|
// is the authoritative per-install cloud, derived first from the
|
|
// user's UI choice and then from the protocol's role-based switch
|
|
// — never by string-matching accounts hostnames (so staging/mock
|
|
// domains classify correctly too).
|
|
region := sess.region
|
|
if region == "" {
|
|
region = RegionFeishu
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for {
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-ctx.Done():
|
|
s.cfg.Logger.Info("lark registration: session expired",
|
|
"session_id", sess.id,
|
|
"workspace_id", uuidString(sess.workspaceID))
|
|
sess.markError(RegistrationReasonExpired, "QR expired before authorization", s.gcDeadline())
|
|
return
|
|
case <-time.After(interval):
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
res, err := s.client.Poll(ctx, domain, deviceCode)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
var re *RegistrationError
|
|
if errors.As(err, &re) {
|
|
s.cfg.Logger.Warn("lark registration: protocol error",
|
|
"session_id", sess.id, "code", re.Code, "desc", re.Description)
|
|
sess.markError(RegistrationReasonProtocol, re.Error(), s.gcDeadline())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
// Transient transport error (DNS, network) — log and try
|
|
// again on the next tick rather than killing the session,
|
|
// which lets a 30-second cross-region blip self-heal.
|
|
s.cfg.Logger.Warn("lark registration: transport error, will retry",
|
|
"session_id", sess.id, "err", err)
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch {
|
|
case res.SwitchedDomain != "":
|
|
// Tenant-brand switch — re-aim immediately without
|
|
// honoring the interval, matching the upstream SDK's
|
|
// behavior. Lark emits the brand hint exactly once on the
|
|
// transition poll and the credential-bearing response
|
|
// lands on the next call to the new domain.
|
|
//
|
|
// Both directions are honored (feishu→lark and lark→feishu)
|
|
// so the split-CTA UI's "wrong entry" path recovers
|
|
// regardless of which CTA the user picked. The new region
|
|
// rides on the same PollResult so we never have to
|
|
// re-derive it from the host string here — staging / mock
|
|
// accounts hosts then classify correctly without
|
|
// hostname-prefix matching.
|
|
domain = res.SwitchedDomain
|
|
region = res.SwitchedRegion
|
|
s.cfg.Logger.Info("lark registration: switched cloud after tenant-brand mismatch",
|
|
"session_id", sess.id, "domain", domain, "region", string(region))
|
|
continue
|
|
case res.ClientID != "" && res.ClientSecret != "":
|
|
s.finishSuccess(ctx, sess, res, region)
|
|
return
|
|
case res.Err != nil:
|
|
reason := RegistrationReasonProtocol
|
|
if res.Err.Code == "access_denied" {
|
|
reason = RegistrationReasonAccessDenied
|
|
} else if res.Err.Code == "expired_token" {
|
|
reason = RegistrationReasonExpired
|
|
}
|
|
s.cfg.Logger.Info("lark registration: terminal error",
|
|
"session_id", sess.id, "code", res.Err.Code, "desc", res.Err.Description)
|
|
sess.markError(reason, res.Err.Error(), s.gcDeadline())
|
|
return
|
|
case res.Status == "slow_down":
|
|
// Honor Lark's back-off — bump by 5s, per RFC 8628 §3.5.
|
|
interval += 5 * time.Second
|
|
default:
|
|
// authorization_pending — keep the interval, loop.
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// finishSuccess runs the post-poll finalization: bot info lookup +
|
|
// installation insert + installer binding, all in a single DB
|
|
// transaction.
|
|
func (s *RegistrationService) finishSuccess(ctx context.Context, sess *registrationSession, res *PollResult, region Region) {
|
|
// Carry the detected region onto the credentials so the GetBotInfo
|
|
// call below hits the right open-platform host: a Lark-international
|
|
// install must reach open.larksuite.com, not the Feishu default.
|
|
creds := InstallationCredentials{AppID: res.ClientID, AppSecret: res.ClientSecret, Region: region}
|
|
info, err := s.api.GetBotInfo(ctx, creds)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
s.cfg.Logger.Warn("lark registration: bot info failed",
|
|
"session_id", sess.id, "err", err)
|
|
sess.markError(RegistrationReasonBotInfoFailed, err.Error(), s.gcDeadline())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if info.OpenID == "" {
|
|
sess.markError(RegistrationReasonBotInfoFailed, "bot info missing open_id", s.gcDeadline())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Encrypt the app_secret before the transaction so the seal cost
|
|
// doesn't sit inside the DB lock. The InstallationService's Upsert
|
|
// would do this for us, but we need the encrypted blob inside the
|
|
// transaction-scoped queries handle so the installer-bind commits
|
|
// alongside the installation insert — replicate the Seal here.
|
|
sealed, err := s.installs.box.Seal([]byte(res.ClientSecret))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
s.cfg.Logger.Error("lark registration: seal app_secret",
|
|
"session_id", sess.id, "err", err)
|
|
sess.markError(RegistrationReasonInternalError, err.Error(), s.gcDeadline())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tx, err := s.tx.Begin(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
s.cfg.Logger.Error("lark registration: begin tx",
|
|
"session_id", sess.id, "err", err)
|
|
sess.markError(RegistrationReasonInternalError, err.Error(), s.gcDeadline())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
defer tx.Rollback(ctx)
|
|
qtx := s.queries.WithTx(tx)
|
|
|
|
// If the same Feishu app (app_id) is held by a DEAD prior owner — a revoked
|
|
// placeholder left by a DIFFERENT agent in this workspace, or an orphan whose
|
|
// workspace/agent was deleted (#4810) — that row still occupies the
|
|
// (channel_type, config->>'app_id') unique slot and blocks the
|
|
// UpsertChannelInstallation INSERT below. Reclaim it first — the transaction
|
|
// wraps both the delete and the upsert so a failure between them rolls back
|
|
// cleanly. A live owner is left in place (the SAME agent's own revoked row is
|
|
// reactivated in place by the upsert; an active/archived agent stays owned),
|
|
// so the upsert surfaces the conflict below instead of stealing the bot.
|
|
if err := qtx.ReclaimDeadInstallationByAppID(ctx, sess.workspaceID, sess.agentID, res.ClientID); err != nil {
|
|
s.cfg.Logger.Warn("lark registration: reclaim dead installation",
|
|
"session_id", sess.id, "err", err)
|
|
sess.markError(RegistrationReasonInternalError, err.Error(), s.gcDeadline())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
inst, err := qtx.UpsertLarkInstallation(ctx, UpsertInstallationParams{
|
|
WorkspaceID: sess.workspaceID,
|
|
AgentID: sess.agentID,
|
|
AppID: res.ClientID,
|
|
AppSecretEncrypted: sealed,
|
|
BotOpenID: string(info.OpenID),
|
|
BotUnionID: textOrNull(info.UnionID),
|
|
InstallerUserID: sess.initiatorID,
|
|
Region: string(region),
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
s.cfg.Logger.Warn("lark registration: upsert installation",
|
|
"session_id", sess.id, "err", err)
|
|
// A unique violation here means the app_id slot is held by a LIVE owner
|
|
// (the reclaim above already cleared every dead one). Surface who holds
|
|
// it — another agent in this workspace, an archived agent, or a different
|
|
// workspace — instead of leaking the raw Postgres error.
|
|
msg := err.Error()
|
|
var pgErr *pgconn.PgError
|
|
if errors.As(err, &pgErr) && pgErr.Code == pgUniqueViolation {
|
|
msg = s.liveOwnerConflictMessage(ctx, sess.workspaceID, res.ClientID)
|
|
}
|
|
sess.markError(RegistrationReasonInstallationConflict, msg, s.gcDeadline())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := s.binder.BindInstallerTx(ctx, qtx, InstallerBindParams{
|
|
WorkspaceID: sess.workspaceID,
|
|
InstallationID: inst.ID,
|
|
MulticaUserID: sess.initiatorID,
|
|
LarkOpenID: res.OpenID,
|
|
}); err != nil {
|
|
s.cfg.Logger.Warn("lark registration: bind installer",
|
|
"session_id", sess.id, "err", err)
|
|
sess.markError(RegistrationReasonInstallerBindFailed, err.Error(), s.gcDeadline())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
|
|
s.cfg.Logger.Error("lark registration: commit",
|
|
"session_id", sess.id, "err", err)
|
|
sess.markError(RegistrationReasonInternalError, err.Error(), s.gcDeadline())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
sess.markSuccess(inst.ID, s.gcDeadline())
|
|
// Publish at the commit point so the connection badge updates on every
|
|
// workspace client without a page refresh — not only on the tab that
|
|
// happens to poll the status endpoint to success.
|
|
s.publishInstalled(sess.workspaceID, inst.ID)
|
|
s.cfg.Logger.Info("lark registration: install complete",
|
|
"session_id", sess.id,
|
|
"workspace_id", uuidString(sess.workspaceID),
|
|
"agent_id", uuidString(sess.agentID),
|
|
"installation_id", uuidString(inst.ID))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// liveOwnerConflictMessage builds the user-facing copy for a rebind refused
|
|
// because the Feishu app's routing slot is held by a LIVE owner. It names which
|
|
// kind of owner so the user knows how to recover, instead of the old catch-all
|
|
// "connected to a different Multica workspace" that lied when the real owner sat
|
|
// in the SAME workspace (#4810). Looked up on the base pool, not the aborted
|
|
// upsert tx. If the slot turns out free (a concurrent disconnect between the
|
|
// upsert and this read), a generic message is enough — the user can just retry.
|
|
func (s *RegistrationService) liveOwnerConflictMessage(ctx context.Context, requestingWorkspaceID pgtype.UUID, appID string) string {
|
|
owner, err := s.queries.InstallationOwnerByAppID(ctx, appID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "This Feishu app is already connected to another agent. Disconnect it there first, then connect it here."
|
|
}
|
|
switch {
|
|
case owner.WorkspaceID != requestingWorkspaceID:
|
|
return "This Feishu app is already connected to a different Multica workspace. Disconnect it there before connecting it here."
|
|
case owner.AgentArchivedAt.Valid:
|
|
return "This Feishu app is connected to an archived agent in this workspace. Restore that agent, or disconnect its bot, before connecting it here."
|
|
default:
|
|
return "This Feishu app is already connected to another agent in this workspace. Disconnect it there first, then connect it here."
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *RegistrationService) gcDeadline() time.Time {
|
|
return s.cfg.Now().Add(s.cfg.SessionTTL)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// gcExpiredLocked drops any session whose `gcAfter` is in the past.
|
|
// Pending sessions are NOT GC'd here — runPolling will set their
|
|
// gcAfter when it terminates, and an expired-by-deadline session
|
|
// closes itself.
|
|
func (s *RegistrationService) gcExpiredLocked() {
|
|
now := s.cfg.Now()
|
|
s.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer s.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for id, sess := range s.sessions {
|
|
sess.mu.Lock()
|
|
drop := !sess.gcAfter.IsZero() && sess.gcAfter.Before(now)
|
|
sess.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if drop {
|
|
delete(s.sessions, id)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ErrRegistrationSessionNotFound is what the service returns for
|
|
// unknown / GC'd sessions. The handler maps it to 404.
|
|
var ErrRegistrationSessionNotFound = errors.New("lark registration: session not found")
|
|
|
|
func randomSessionID() (string, error) {
|
|
buf := make([]byte, 24)
|
|
if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(buf), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func uuidEqual(a, b pgtype.UUID) bool {
|
|
if !a.Valid || !b.Valid {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return a.Bytes == b.Bytes
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// botNamePreset builds the display name we pre-fill on Lark's
|
|
// PersonalAgent creation form so the installed bot reads
|
|
// "<agent> - Multica" instead of Lark's auto-generated
|
|
// "{用户姓名}的智能助手". Lark treats this as a default the installer can
|
|
// still edit; we never get to lock the final name. A blank agent name
|
|
// (defensive — Agent.Name is NOT NULL in schema) degrades to plain
|
|
// "Multica" rather than a dangling " - Multica".
|
|
func botNamePreset(agentName string) string {
|
|
name := strings.TrimSpace(agentName)
|
|
if name == "" {
|
|
return "Multica"
|
|
}
|
|
return name + " - Multica"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// uuidString is the package-local UUID-to-string helper defined in
|
|
// hub.go; redeclared `func uuidString(u pgtype.UUID) string` removed
|
|
// to avoid the symbol collision.
|
|
//
|
|
// InstallationService.box is unexported but reachable from this file
|
|
// because both live in package `lark`; we read it directly in
|
|
// finishSuccess so the Seal happens outside the DB transaction (which
|
|
// would otherwise hold a row lock across the crypto call).
|