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* feat(server/auth): cache PAT lookups in Redis with 60s TTL
Personal access tokens used to hit Postgres on every request: a SELECT
to resolve token_hash → user_id, plus a fire-and-forget UPDATE of
last_used_at. For a CLI / daemon making many requests per second this
is wasted DB load — the token is the same and the answer hasn't changed.
Add a Redis-backed cache (auth.PATCache) keyed by token hash, TTL 60s:
- On cache hit, the auth middleware skips both the SELECT and the
last_used_at UPDATE. last_used_at is now refreshed at most once per
TTL window per token, not per request.
- On cache miss the middleware falls back to today's behavior: query
Postgres, populate the cache, async-update last_used_at.
- On revoke, the handler invalidates the cache entry so revocation
takes effect immediately rather than waiting for the TTL to expire.
This required changing RevokePersonalAccessToken from :exec to :one
RETURNING token_hash.
The cache is nil-safe: when REDIS_URL isn't configured, NewPATCache
returns nil and the middleware degrades to today's always-hit-DB
behavior. JWT validation is untouched (already DB-free).
Tested with REDIS_TEST_URL — same gating pattern the rest of the
suite uses for Redis-backed tests. New tests cover nil-safety, set/
get/invalidate, TTL, and the middleware short-circuit on cache hit.
* fix(server/auth): clamp PAT cache TTL to token's remaining lifetime
GPT-Boy review caught: a PAT expiring in <60s would still be cached
for the full PATCacheTTL window, so the token could continue passing
auth on cache hit for up to ~60s after its expires_at. The DB query
filters expired tokens (revoked = FALSE AND expires_at > now()), but
that filter never ran on a cache hit.
Make Set take an explicit ttl, and add TTLForExpiry to compute it:
- no expires_at → full PATCacheTTL
- expires_at far → full PATCacheTTL
- expires_at <60s → time until expiry
- already expired → 0, Set skips caching (TOCTOU defense between
the SELECT and the Set, since the SELECT
already filters expired rows)
Regression test pins the clamp behavior end-to-end against Redis.
* feat(server/auth): cache daemon-token + PAT lookups in DaemonAuth, bump TTL to 10m
Daemon /api/daemon/* requests (heartbeat, claim task) hit DaemonAuth
which previously did its own GetDaemonTokenByHash on every request and
*also* duplicated the PAT lookup on the mul_ fallback — bypassing the
cache added in 1cdd674c. Today's daemons authenticate via mul_ PATs
(mdt_ minting isn't wired up yet), so the duplicate PAT path is the one
that actually matters for hot-path DB load.
Three changes:
1. New auth.DaemonTokenCache mirrors PATCache for the mdt_ path
(key = mul:auth:daemon:<sha256>, JSON value = {workspace_id, daemon_id}).
Forward-looking infrastructure for when daemon tokens get minted; the
middleware short-circuits the DB SELECT on cache hit. TTL clamped to
the token's expires_at via the shared TTLForExpiry helper.
2. DaemonAuth now also consults PATCache on its mul_ fallback, sharing
the same cache as the regular Auth middleware. A daemon making 4 hb/min
collapses from 4 GetPersonalAccessTokenByHash + 4 last_used_at writes
per minute to ~1 of each per AuthCacheTTL window (~10 minutes).
3. Rename PATCacheTTL → AuthCacheTTL and bump from 60s to 10 minutes.
The constant is now shared between PAT and daemon caches; 10m matches
the user-requested longer TTL for further DB write reduction. Revoke
latency on the happy path is still instant via active invalidation;
the worst-case (Redis Del miss / direct-DB revoke) grows from ~60s to
~10m.
Tests cover nil-safety, set/get/invalidate, TTL, clamped TTL on near-
expiry tokens, and the middleware short-circuit for both cache paths
(mdt_ via DaemonTokenCache, mul_ fallback via PATCache).
* feat(server/auth): cache PAT lookups on the WebSocket auth path
The third place a PAT is resolved — patResolver.ResolveToken used by
realtime.HandleWebSocket — was still hitting Postgres on every /ws
auth and firing an unconditional last_used_at UPDATE, bypassing the
cache added in 1cdd674c. Wire it through the same shared PATCache so
revoking a token through any path (Auth middleware, DaemonAuth PAT
fallback, or WS auth) hits all three caches with one Invalidate.
Also leaves a comment on DeleteDaemonTokensByWorkspaceAndDaemon —
the query has no caller today, but a future deregister/rotate flow
must remember to call DaemonTokenCache.Invalidate(hash) for each
deleted row, otherwise deleted daemon tokens stay valid until TTL.
575 lines
18 KiB
Go
575 lines
18 KiB
Go
package handler
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgconn"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/analytics"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/auth"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/daemonws"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/events"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/middleware"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/realtime"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/service"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/storage"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/util"
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db "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/db/generated"
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)
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// randomID returns a random 16-byte hex string used as a request ID for
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// in-memory stores (model list, local skills, CLI update, etc.).
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func randomID() string {
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b := make([]byte, 16)
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rand.Read(b)
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return hex.EncodeToString(b)
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}
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type txStarter interface {
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Begin(ctx context.Context) (pgx.Tx, error)
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}
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type dbExecutor interface {
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Exec(ctx context.Context, sql string, arguments ...any) (pgconn.CommandTag, error)
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Query(ctx context.Context, sql string, args ...any) (pgx.Rows, error)
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QueryRow(ctx context.Context, sql string, args ...any) pgx.Row
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}
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type Config struct {
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AllowSignup bool
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AllowedEmails []string
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AllowedEmailDomains []string
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}
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type Handler struct {
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Queries *db.Queries
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DB dbExecutor
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TxStarter txStarter
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Hub *realtime.Hub
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DaemonHub *daemonws.Hub
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Bus *events.Bus
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TaskService *service.TaskService
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AutopilotService *service.AutopilotService
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EmailService *service.EmailService
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UpdateStore *UpdateStore
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ModelListStore *ModelListStore
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LocalSkillListStore LocalSkillListStore
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LocalSkillImportStore LocalSkillImportStore
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Storage storage.Storage
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CFSigner *auth.CloudFrontSigner
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Analytics analytics.Client
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PATCache *auth.PATCache
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DaemonTokenCache *auth.DaemonTokenCache
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cfg Config
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}
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func New(queries *db.Queries, txStarter txStarter, hub *realtime.Hub, bus *events.Bus, emailService *service.EmailService, store storage.Storage, cfSigner *auth.CloudFrontSigner, analyticsClient analytics.Client, cfg Config, daemonHubs ...*daemonws.Hub) *Handler {
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var executor dbExecutor
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if candidate, ok := txStarter.(dbExecutor); ok {
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executor = candidate
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}
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if analyticsClient == nil {
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analyticsClient = analytics.NoopClient{}
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}
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var daemonHub *daemonws.Hub
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if len(daemonHubs) > 0 {
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daemonHub = daemonHubs[0]
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}
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taskSvc := service.NewTaskService(queries, txStarter, hub, bus, daemonHub)
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return &Handler{
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Queries: queries,
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DB: executor,
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TxStarter: txStarter,
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Hub: hub,
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DaemonHub: daemonHub,
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Bus: bus,
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TaskService: taskSvc,
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AutopilotService: service.NewAutopilotService(queries, txStarter, bus, taskSvc),
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EmailService: emailService,
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UpdateStore: NewUpdateStore(),
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ModelListStore: NewModelListStore(),
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LocalSkillListStore: NewInMemoryLocalSkillListStore(),
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LocalSkillImportStore: NewInMemoryLocalSkillImportStore(),
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Storage: store,
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CFSigner: cfSigner,
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Analytics: analyticsClient,
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cfg: cfg,
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}
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}
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func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(status)
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json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
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}
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func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, msg string) {
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writeJSON(w, status, map[string]string{"error": msg})
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}
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// Thin wrappers around util functions.
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//
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// parseUUID is intentionally the panicking variant: any handler call site
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// reachable here is expected to feed a UUID that is either (a) a sqlc round-trip
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// of a DB-sourced value, or (b) a raw request input that has already been
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// validated upstream. A panic here means an unguarded user-input string slipped
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// in — that is a real bug we want surfaced loudly (chi's middleware.Recoverer
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// converts it to a 500) instead of silently corrupting data via a zero UUID.
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//
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// For unvalidated user input at request boundaries, use parseUUIDOrBadRequest
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// (writes 400) — never feed raw chi.URLParam / request-body strings into
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// parseUUID directly when the call writes to the database.
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func parseUUID(s string) pgtype.UUID { return util.MustParseUUID(s) }
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func uuidToString(u pgtype.UUID) string { return util.UUIDToString(u) }
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func textToPtr(t pgtype.Text) *string { return util.TextToPtr(t) }
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func ptrToText(s *string) pgtype.Text { return util.PtrToText(s) }
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func strToText(s string) pgtype.Text { return util.StrToText(s) }
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func timestampToString(t pgtype.Timestamptz) string { return util.TimestampToString(t) }
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func timestampToPtr(t pgtype.Timestamptz) *string { return util.TimestampToPtr(t) }
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func uuidToPtr(u pgtype.UUID) *string { return util.UUIDToPtr(u) }
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// parseUUIDOrBadRequest validates a UUID string sourced from user input
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// (URL params, request body, headers). On invalid input it writes a 400
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// response and returns ok=false; callers must return immediately.
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//
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// Use this anywhere a malformed UUID would otherwise reach a write query
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// (DELETE / UPDATE) — the silent zero-UUID behavior of the old ParseUUID
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// caused real silent-data-loss bugs (#1661).
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func parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, s, fieldName string) (pgtype.UUID, bool) {
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u, err := util.ParseUUID(s)
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid "+fieldName)
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return pgtype.UUID{}, false
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}
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return u, true
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}
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func parseUUIDSliceOrBadRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, ids []string, fieldName string) ([]pgtype.UUID, bool) {
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uuids := make([]pgtype.UUID, len(ids))
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for i, id := range ids {
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u, err := util.ParseUUID(id)
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid "+fieldName)
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return nil, false
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}
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uuids[i] = u
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}
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return uuids, true
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}
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// publish sends a domain event through the event bus.
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func (h *Handler) publish(eventType, workspaceID, actorType, actorID string, payload any) {
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h.Bus.Publish(events.Event{
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Type: eventType,
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WorkspaceID: workspaceID,
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ActorType: actorType,
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ActorID: actorID,
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Payload: payload,
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})
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}
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// publishTask is publish() plus a TaskID hint so the realtime layer can route
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// the event to the per-task scope rather than the whole workspace.
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func (h *Handler) publishTask(eventType, workspaceID, actorType, actorID, taskID string, payload any) {
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h.Bus.Publish(events.Event{
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Type: eventType,
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WorkspaceID: workspaceID,
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ActorType: actorType,
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ActorID: actorID,
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TaskID: taskID,
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Payload: payload,
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})
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}
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// publishChat is publish() plus a ChatSessionID hint so the realtime layer
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// can route the event to the per-chat-session scope.
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func (h *Handler) publishChat(eventType, workspaceID, actorType, actorID, chatSessionID string, payload any) {
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h.Bus.Publish(events.Event{
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Type: eventType,
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WorkspaceID: workspaceID,
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ActorType: actorType,
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ActorID: actorID,
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ChatSessionID: chatSessionID,
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Payload: payload,
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})
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}
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func isNotFound(err error) bool {
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return errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows)
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}
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func isUniqueViolation(err error) bool {
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var pgErr *pgconn.PgError
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return errors.As(err, &pgErr) && pgErr.Code == "23505"
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}
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func requestUserID(r *http.Request) string {
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return r.Header.Get("X-User-ID")
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}
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// resolveActor determines whether the request is from an agent or a human member.
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// If X-Agent-ID and X-Task-ID headers are both set, validates that the task
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// belongs to the claimed agent (defense-in-depth against manual header spoofing).
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// If only X-Agent-ID is set, validates that the agent belongs to the workspace.
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// Returns ("agent", agentID) on success, ("member", userID) otherwise.
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func (h *Handler) resolveActor(r *http.Request, userID, workspaceID string) (actorType, actorID string) {
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agentID := r.Header.Get("X-Agent-ID")
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if agentID == "" {
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return "member", userID
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}
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agentUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(agentID)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Debug("resolveActor: X-Agent-ID is not a valid UUID, falling back to member", "agent_id", agentID)
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return "member", userID
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}
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// Validate the agent exists in the target workspace.
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agent, err := h.Queries.GetAgent(r.Context(), agentUUID)
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if err != nil || uuidToString(agent.WorkspaceID) != workspaceID {
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slog.Debug("resolveActor: X-Agent-ID rejected, agent not found or workspace mismatch", "agent_id", agentID, "workspace_id", workspaceID)
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return "member", userID
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}
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// When X-Task-ID is provided, cross-check that the task belongs to this agent.
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if taskID := r.Header.Get("X-Task-ID"); taskID != "" {
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taskUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(taskID)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Debug("resolveActor: X-Task-ID is not a valid UUID, falling back to member", "task_id", taskID)
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return "member", userID
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}
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task, err := h.Queries.GetAgentTask(r.Context(), taskUUID)
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if err != nil || uuidToString(task.AgentID) != agentID {
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slog.Debug("resolveActor: X-Task-ID rejected, task not found or agent mismatch", "agent_id", agentID, "task_id", taskID)
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return "member", userID
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}
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}
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return "agent", agentID
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}
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func requireUserID(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
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userID := requestUserID(r)
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if userID == "" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "user not authenticated")
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return "", false
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}
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return userID, true
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}
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// resolveWorkspaceID returns the workspace UUID for this request. Delegates
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// to middleware.ResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest so middleware-protected routes
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// and middleware-less routes (e.g. /api/upload-file) share identical
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// resolution behavior — including slug → UUID translation via the DB.
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//
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// Returns "" when no workspace identifier was provided or a slug was provided
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// but doesn't match any workspace.
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func (h *Handler) resolveWorkspaceID(r *http.Request) string {
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return middleware.ResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest(r, h.Queries)
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}
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// ctxMember returns the workspace member from context (set by workspace middleware).
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func ctxMember(ctx context.Context) (db.Member, bool) {
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return middleware.MemberFromContext(ctx)
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}
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// ctxWorkspaceID returns the workspace ID from context (set by workspace middleware).
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func ctxWorkspaceID(ctx context.Context) string {
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return middleware.WorkspaceIDFromContext(ctx)
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}
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// workspaceIDFromURL returns the workspace ID from context (preferred) or chi URL param (fallback).
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func workspaceIDFromURL(r *http.Request, param string) string {
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if id := middleware.WorkspaceIDFromContext(r.Context()); id != "" {
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return id
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}
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return chi.URLParam(r, param)
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}
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// workspaceMember returns the member from middleware context, or falls back to a DB
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// lookup when the handler is called directly (e.g. in tests).
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func (h *Handler) workspaceMember(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, workspaceID string) (db.Member, bool) {
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if m, ok := ctxMember(r.Context()); ok {
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return m, true
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}
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return h.requireWorkspaceMember(w, r, workspaceID, "workspace not found")
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}
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func roleAllowed(role string, roles ...string) bool {
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for _, candidate := range roles {
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if role == candidate {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func countOwners(members []db.Member) int {
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owners := 0
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for _, member := range members {
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if member.Role == "owner" {
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owners++
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}
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}
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return owners
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}
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func (h *Handler) getWorkspaceMember(ctx context.Context, userID, workspaceID string) (db.Member, error) {
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userUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(userID)
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if err != nil {
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return db.Member{}, err
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}
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wsUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(workspaceID)
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if err != nil {
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return db.Member{}, err
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}
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return h.Queries.GetMemberByUserAndWorkspace(ctx, db.GetMemberByUserAndWorkspaceParams{
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UserID: userUUID,
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WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
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})
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}
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func (h *Handler) requireWorkspaceMember(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, workspaceID, notFoundMsg string) (db.Member, bool) {
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if workspaceID == "" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "workspace_id is required")
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return db.Member{}, false
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}
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userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
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if !ok {
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return db.Member{}, false
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}
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member, err := h.getWorkspaceMember(r.Context(), userID, workspaceID)
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, notFoundMsg)
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return db.Member{}, false
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}
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return member, true
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}
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func (h *Handler) requireWorkspaceRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, workspaceID, notFoundMsg string, roles ...string) (db.Member, bool) {
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member, ok := h.requireWorkspaceMember(w, r, workspaceID, notFoundMsg)
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if !ok {
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return db.Member{}, false
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}
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if !roleAllowed(member.Role, roles...) {
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writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "insufficient permissions")
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return db.Member{}, false
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}
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return member, true
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}
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// isWorkspaceEntity checks whether a user_id belongs to the given workspace,
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// as either a member or an agent depending on userType.
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func (h *Handler) isWorkspaceEntity(ctx context.Context, userType, userID, workspaceID string) bool {
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switch userType {
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case "member":
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_, err := h.getWorkspaceMember(ctx, userID, workspaceID)
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return err == nil
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case "agent":
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userUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(userID)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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wsUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(workspaceID)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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_, err = h.Queries.GetAgentInWorkspace(ctx, db.GetAgentInWorkspaceParams{
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ID: userUUID,
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WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
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})
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return err == nil
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default:
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return false
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}
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}
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|
func (h *Handler) loadIssueForUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, issueID string) (db.Issue, bool) {
|
|
if _, ok := requireUserID(w, r); !ok {
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
workspaceID := h.resolveWorkspaceID(r)
|
|
if workspaceID == "" {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "workspace_id is required")
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Try identifier format first (e.g., "JIA-42"). resolveIssueByIdentifier
|
|
// silently returns false for non-identifier strings, falling through to
|
|
// the UUID path below.
|
|
if issue, ok := h.resolveIssueByIdentifier(r.Context(), issueID, workspaceID); ok {
|
|
return issue, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
issueUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(issueID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Not a valid UUID and didn't match identifier format → 404 (consistent
|
|
// with previous silent-zero behavior, which would also have produced 404).
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "issue not found")
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
wsUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(workspaceID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid workspace_id")
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
issue, err := h.Queries.GetIssueInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetIssueInWorkspaceParams{
|
|
ID: issueUUID,
|
|
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "issue not found")
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
return issue, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// resolveIssueByIdentifier tries to look up an issue by "PREFIX-NUMBER" format.
|
|
func (h *Handler) resolveIssueByIdentifier(ctx context.Context, id, workspaceID string) (db.Issue, bool) {
|
|
parts := splitIdentifier(id)
|
|
if parts == nil {
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
if workspaceID == "" {
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
wsUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(workspaceID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
issue, err := h.Queries.GetIssueByNumber(ctx, db.GetIssueByNumberParams{
|
|
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
|
|
Number: parts.number,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
return issue, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type identifierParts struct {
|
|
prefix string
|
|
number int32
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func splitIdentifier(id string) *identifierParts {
|
|
idx := -1
|
|
for i := len(id) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
|
|
if id[i] == '-' {
|
|
idx = i
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if idx <= 0 || idx >= len(id)-1 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
numStr := id[idx+1:]
|
|
num := 0
|
|
for _, c := range numStr {
|
|
if c < '0' || c > '9' {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
num = num*10 + int(c-'0')
|
|
}
|
|
if num <= 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return &identifierParts{prefix: id[:idx], number: int32(num)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// getIssuePrefix fetches the issue_prefix for a workspace.
|
|
// Falls back to generating a prefix from the workspace name if the stored
|
|
// prefix is empty (e.g. workspaces created before the prefix was introduced).
|
|
func (h *Handler) getIssuePrefix(ctx context.Context, workspaceID pgtype.UUID) string {
|
|
ws, err := h.Queries.GetWorkspace(ctx, workspaceID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
if ws.IssuePrefix != "" {
|
|
return ws.IssuePrefix
|
|
}
|
|
return generateIssuePrefix(ws.Name)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (h *Handler) loadAgentForUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, agentID string) (db.Agent, bool) {
|
|
if _, ok := requireUserID(w, r); !ok {
|
|
return db.Agent{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
workspaceID := h.resolveWorkspaceID(r)
|
|
if workspaceID == "" {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "workspace_id is required")
|
|
return db.Agent{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
agentUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, agentID, "agent id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return db.Agent{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
wsUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, workspaceID, "workspace id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return db.Agent{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
agent, err := h.Queries.GetAgentInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetAgentInWorkspaceParams{
|
|
ID: agentUUID,
|
|
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "agent not found")
|
|
return db.Agent{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
return agent, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (h *Handler) loadInboxItemForUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, itemID string) (db.InboxItem, bool) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return db.InboxItem{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
workspaceID := h.resolveWorkspaceID(r)
|
|
if workspaceID == "" {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "workspace_id is required")
|
|
return db.InboxItem{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
itemUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, itemID, "inbox item id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return db.InboxItem{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
wsUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, workspaceID, "workspace id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return db.InboxItem{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
item, err := h.Queries.GetInboxItemInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetInboxItemInWorkspaceParams{
|
|
ID: itemUUID,
|
|
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "inbox item not found")
|
|
return db.InboxItem{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if item.RecipientType != "member" || uuidToString(item.RecipientID) != userID {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "inbox item not found")
|
|
return db.InboxItem{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
return item, true
|
|
}
|