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* feat(autopilots): webhook delivery layer + idempotency / signature / replay (MUL-2334)
Splits "inbound webhook receipt" from "autopilot run creation" so we can
record duplicate attempts, signature outcomes, and ignored/skipped
deliveries — and replay a delivery on demand. v1 ingress wrote straight
into autopilot_run.trigger_payload, which collapsed the two concerns and
left run_only autopilots vulnerable to provider retry storms.
Backend only (PR1). UI Deliveries tab follows in PR2.
Schema (migration 093):
- autopilot_trigger.provider: 'generic' | 'github' (default 'generic').
- autopilot_trigger.signing_secret: nullable plaintext (HMAC needs it
cleartext; mirrors how webhook_token is stored).
- webhook_delivery: one row per inbound POST. Carries raw_body,
selected_headers, dedupe_key/source, signature_status,
autopilot_run_id, replayed_from_delivery_id, response_status / body.
- Partial unique index on (trigger_id, dedupe_key) excludes NULL and
'rejected' rows, so a wrong-secret 401 does NOT permanently block a
future retry with the same X-GitHub-Delivery once the operator fixes
the secret.
Ingress flow (autopilot_webhook.go), persist-first + sync dispatch:
1. IP rate limit -> 2. token lookup -> 3. token rate limit ->
4. read raw body -> 5. autopilot/workspace cross-check ->
6. normalize JSON (400 without persistence on parse failure) ->
7. compute dedupe key + signature status ->
8. INSERT delivery (status=queued). On (trigger_id, dedupe_key)
unique-violation: bump attempt_count on existing row and return
the original delivery_id + autopilot_run_id with 200 ->
9. invalid/missing signature: UPDATE -> rejected, return 401 with
delivery_id (no dispatch, not replayable) ->
10. trigger disabled / autopilot paused/archived: UPDATE -> ignored,
return 200 ->
11. DispatchAutopilot synchronously, UPDATE -> dispatched/skipped/failed
with autopilot_run_id and the response body we returned ->
12. TouchAutopilotTriggerFiredAt and return 200.
No new long-running worker. A stale 'queued' row only happens if the
process dies between INSERT and UPDATE; that's a follow-up sweeper, not
this PR.
Authenticated API:
- GET /api/autopilots/{id}/deliveries (slim list)
- GET /api/autopilots/{id}/deliveries/{deliveryId} (with raw_body)
- POST /api/autopilots/{id}/deliveries/{deliveryId}/replay -> creates
a new delivery row (replayed_from_delivery_id set), dispatches a
new run, never collapses onto the original via dedupe.
- PUT /api/autopilots/{id}/triggers/{triggerId}/signing-secret
Write-only; trigger response surfaces has_signing_secret +
signing_secret_hint (last 4 chars), never the secret itself.
Signature verification reuses the GitHub-compatible
X-Hub-Signature-256: sha256=<hex(hmac(body, secret))> scheme; the
HMAC helper is constant-time. Invalid/missing signatures still count
against per-IP and per-token rate limits.
autopilot_run.trigger_payload is intentionally preserved — delivery
records the HTTP receipt; run records the normalized envelope handed
to the agent. They are two different views.
Tests (Postgres-backed):
- delivery persistence on accept
- dedupe via Idempotency-Key and X-GitHub-Delivery; run_only retry
storm pin (3 retries -> 1 run)
- invalid signature: 401 + rejected row + no run linkage
- missing signature when secret configured: 401 + 'missing' state
- valid signature dispatches
- signing secret never echoed in trigger responses; hint shows last 4
- min-length and clear-by-empty for signing secret PUT
- replay creates a NEW delivery + new run; rejected deliveries cannot
be replayed
- list omits raw_body; detail includes it; cross-autopilot ID returns
404 (workspace isolation defense in depth)
- provider validation: unknown -> 400, github -> 201 round-trips
- bad-signature stream still counts against per-token rate limit
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(autopilots): address PR review on webhook delivery layer (MUL-2334)
- Exclude `failed` from the (trigger_id, dedupe_key) partial unique index
alongside `rejected`, so a transient ingress failure does not strand the
provider's stable X-GitHub-Delivery / Idempotency-Key retry. Update the
dedupe lookup to prefer non-terminal rows under the same predicate.
- Tighten delivery status enum: drop `skipped` from the CHECK constraint
and from the handler. A run that was admission-skipped (e.g. runtime
offline) is now recorded as delivery=`dispatched` linked to the
skipped run, with the response payload carrying status=`skipped`.
Source of truth for skipped-ness is autopilot_run.status, not the
delivery row — keeps the Deliveries UI enum unambiguous.
- On dispatch error, link the (possibly non-nil) autopilot_run returned
by DispatchAutopilot to the failed delivery so Deliveries UI can
navigate to the run row for debugging.
- Slim list projection: ListWebhookDeliveriesByAutopilot no longer pulls
raw_body / selected_headers / response_body — a 100-row page × 256 KiB
would otherwise round-trip ~25 MiB from Postgres per Deliveries reload.
Detail endpoint continues to return the full row.
- Fix backend CI: TestGetDelivery_ReturnsFullPayload now decodes the
response and asserts on the parsed raw_body instead of substring-
matching against an escaped JSON string; raise the test-suite default
webhook rate limits in TestMain so the shared 192.0.2.1 IP bucket
doesn't fill across the suite and leak 429s into unrelated tests.
- Add regression coverage for the dedupe-after-failure path.
cd server && go test ./... is green locally.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
---------
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
6 lines
148 B
SQL
6 lines
148 B
SQL
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS webhook_delivery;
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ALTER TABLE autopilot_trigger
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DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS signing_secret,
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DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS provider;
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