Files
multica/server/internal/handler/runtime.go
LinYushen cb68669c73 feat(composio): gate MCP apps behind feature flag (#4876)
* feat(composio): server-side connect flow + connections REST (Notion MVP) (MUL-3720) (#4608)

* feat(composio): server-side connect flow + connections REST (Notion MVP) (MUL-3720)

Compose the merged server/pkg/composio SDK into a user-facing connection
manager: signed-state connect handshake, local user_composio_connection
mirror, idempotent disconnect, and a per-user MCP session helper (not yet
wired into task dispatch).

- migration 127_user_composio_connection (no FK/cascade, per DB rules)
- sqlc queries: upsert (idempotent on user_id+connected_account_id), list
  active, owner-scoped get, mark revoked
- internal/integrations/composio: signed HMAC-SHA256 state, BeginConnect,
  CompleteCallback (idempotent upsert), ListConnections, Disconnect
  (upstream 404 = idempotent success), CreateMCPSession (no-op when empty,
  pins connected_accounts per toolkit), CallbackRedirect
- REST handlers under /api/integrations/composio (user-scoped, 503 when
  COMPOSIO_API_KEY unset): connect/init, callback (302), connections list,
  delete
- router wiring gated by COMPOSIO_API_KEY; COMPOSIO_AUTH_CONFIGS_JSON maps
  toolkit->auth_config (MVP: notion); state secret from COMPOSIO_STATE_SECRET
  or derived from JWT_SECRET; callback base from COMPOSIO_CALLBACK_BASE_URL
  or MULTICA_PUBLIC_URL
- tests: state (expire/tamper/wrong-secret), service (mapping, callback
  idempotency, non-success, disconnect owner/404 idempotency, MCP pin),
  handlers (httptest), redact regression for Bearer mcp_ tokens

MVP scope: Notion only; no task-dispatch overlay, sharing, or webhook
event handling (later stages).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): bind callback account to user + idempotent revoked disconnect (MUL-3720)

Address PR 4608 review (CHANGES_REQUESTED):

- callback: verify connected_account_id with Composio before mirroring it.
  The signed state only proved user/toolkit/exp, so a valid state paired with
  a tampered connected_account_id would be written verbatim. CompleteCallback
  now calls ListConnectedAccounts and fails closed (ErrAccountVerification)
  unless the account belongs to the state's user (composio_user_id == multica
  user id) and was created under the toolkit's auth config. No row is written
  on mismatch / unknown account / upstream error.

- disconnect: short-circuit to a no-op when the local row is already revoked,
  before touching upstream. Previously a second DELETE re-hit Composio and a
  non-404 upstream error surfaced as a 502, breaking the 204-idempotent
  contract.

- CreateMCPSession: document the v1 single-active-connection-per-(user,toolkit)
  constraint and make duplicate selection deterministic (newest-wins, rows are
  connected_at DESC) instead of order-dependent map overwrite. Stage 3 owns the
  real single-account-enforcement vs multi-account-shape decision.

Tests: tampered/wrong-auth-config/unknown-account callback rejection, revoked-row
disconnect no-op (asserts upstream not re-hit). composio pkg 85% coverage; all
green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): list all toolkits + dynamic auth-config resolution (MUL-3720)

Yushen's follow-up to the Notion MVP: surface the full Composio toolkit
catalog, render it in Settings, and drop the static env mapping in favor of
dynamic auth-config discovery.

Config correctness (per Composio docs):
- Remove COMPOSIO_AUTH_CONFIGS_JSON entirely. The toolkit→auth_config mapping
  is now resolved at request time from the project's /auth_configs (cached,
  5-min TTL), so enabling a toolkit is a dashboard action, not a redeploy.
- Do NOT add COMPOSIO_PROJECT_ID. The project API key (x-api-key) authenticates
  to exactly one project; the project is resolved from the key. Only org-level
  endpoints use x-org-api-key, which this integration never calls.

Backend:
- SDK: server/pkg/composio/auth_configs.go — ListAuthConfigs (toolkit_slug,
  is_composio_managed, show_disabled, limit, cursor).
- service: dynamic resolver (authConfigMap cache; betterAuthConfig prefers a
  custom/white-label config over Composio-managed, newest wins); BeginConnect
  and CompleteCallback resolve via it; ListToolkits fetches the full catalog
  (paginated, capped) annotated with connectable = has an enabled auth config,
  connectable-first ordering.
- handler + route: GET /api/integrations/composio/toolkits (user-scoped, 503
  when COMPOSIO_API_KEY unset) returning slug/name/logo/category/connectable.

Frontend:
- core: ComposioToolkit/ComposioConnection types, api client methods, and
  composio query options (@multica/core/composio).
- views: Settings → Integrations now has a Composio section rendering every
  toolkit as a card with search. Connect is gated on `connectable`;
  non-connectable toolkits show a muted "not configured" hint instead of a
  dead button. Connected toolkits show a badge + Disconnect (with confirm).
- i18n: composio block added to en/zh-Hans/ja/ko settings.

Tests: SDK + service (dynamic resolution, custom-over-managed preference,
connectable flag, resolver-error soft-degrade) and handler toolkits endpoint;
composio pkg 85.7% coverage. go build/vet/gofmt clean; core+views typecheck,
core+views lint, and core tests (691) all green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): close cross-toolkit callback fail-open by signing auth_config_id into state (MUL-3720)

Re-review blocker: CompleteCallback resolved the toolkit's auth config at
callback time and ignored a resolve error/empty result, while
verifyAccountOwnership skipped the auth-config comparison when the expected
value was empty. A user could then pass another toolkit's connected_account_id
into this toolkit's callback — the owner check passed and it was written under
the wrong toolkit_slug/account binding.

Fix: the auth_config_id is already resolved in BeginConnect (before the state
is signed), so sign it into the state and compare it exactly at callback. No
re-resolve, no fail-open. verifyAccountOwnership now fails closed when the
expected auth config is empty (rejects instead of skipping) and requires an
exact match — closing the cross-toolkit binding gap.

Tests: state round-trips auth_config_id; BeginConnect signs it; callback
rejects wrong/cross-toolkit auth config and an empty (no-mapping) auth config
fails closed. composio pkg 85.2% coverage, all green.

Frontend (non-blocking): the Composio settings tab now surfaces an error when
the connections query fails instead of silently rendering everything as
unconnected.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): hide Settings section entirely when integration unconfigured (MUL-3720)

Decision (option 2, hide-then-merge): don't show a card that leaks the internal
COMPOSIO_API_KEY env-var name to every end user. IntegrationsTab now gates the
whole Composio section (heading + body) on the toolkits query — a 503 means the
key is unset, so the section is withheld instead of rendering the not-configured
card. Admin-only setup guidance is a later, role-gated affordance.

Removed the notConfigured card (and now-unused ApiError import) from
ComposioTab; it only mounts when configured. views typecheck + lint clean.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): Stage 2 frontend polish — callback toast, last_used & expired UI, e2e (MUL-3718) (#4688)

* feat(composio): callback toast + refresh, last_used & expired UI, e2e (MUL-3718)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): real callback redirect route + StrictMode-safe toast dedup (MUL-3718 review)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): callback endpoint should not require Multica auth (MUL-3843) (#4709)

* fix(composio): move OAuth callback out of the Auth group (MUL-3843)

Composio 302-redirects the browser to /api/integrations/composio/callback
at the end of the OAuth flow, but PR #4608 mounted it inside the cookie-auth
middleware group. When the session cookie is absent (expired session,
SameSite=Strict / Safari ITP, private window, self-hosted callback subdomain)
the Auth middleware returned a hard 401 and a JSON blob instead of the
settings redirect, breaking the flow.

Identity never came from the cookie anyway: it is carried by the HMAC-signed
state param that CompleteCallback verifies (signature, expiry, replay) and
cross-checked by verifyAccountOwnership; h.Composio == nil still 503s. So the
callback is registered alongside the other public OAuth/webhook routes; the
other four composio endpoints stay session-gated.

Refs MUL-3843, MUL-3715.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): correct stale callback routing comments (MUL-3843)

The package header and ComposioCallback doc comments still described the
callback as sitting under the Auth middleware group. After the route was
moved out (this PR), update both to state it is a public route whose identity
comes from the signed state — addressing review nit from 张大彪.

Refs MUL-3843.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): inject MCP overlay into agent runtime at task dispatch (MUL-3721) (#4704)

Stage 3 of the Composio epic. Wires the per-user Composio MCP session into
every agent task so the agent process sees the initiator's connected tools
without any prompt-time plumbing.

Server side
  - Migration 128 adds agent_task_queue.runtime_mcp_overlay JSONB plus a
    BEFORE-UPDATE trigger that wipes the column on any transition into a
    terminal status (completed / failed / cancelled). A trigger is the single
    source of truth — future queries that flip status cannot bypass it.
  - composio.Service.BuildTaskOverlay(userID) reuses CreateMCPSession and
    emits the Claude-style { mcpServers: { composio: { type: http, url,
    headers } } } shape the daemon's existing sidecar generators consume.
    Returns (nil, nil) on zero active connections so we never burn a
    Composio session for a user with nothing to call.
  - TaskService grows a Composio ComposioOverlayBuilder seam, wired in
    router.go after composiointeg.NewService succeeds. Five enqueue paths
    (issue / mention / quick-create / chat / auto-retry) attach the overlay
    after CreateAgentTask returns and before the daemon is notified — so
    every claim reads a settled row, with no second daemon hop. Best-effort:
    a builder failure logs and proceeds with no overlay.
  - resolveInitiatorFromTriggerComment derives the initiator user from the
    trigger comment when it was authored by a member. Agent-authored
    triggers are not treated as initiators (their connected-apps view is
    empty by construction).

Daemon side
  - handler/daemon.go claim path merges task.runtime_mcp_overlay onto
    agent.mcp_config via mergeMCPOverlay before populating
    TaskAgentData.McpConfig. Overlay wins on server-name collisions
    because it carries the live user-scoped session URL. Errors fall back
    to the agent config unchanged — a bad overlay must not surprise-disable
    saved MCP tools. The existing execenv sidecar generators (cursor /
    codex / openclaw / opencode / hermes-kiro) need no changes: they keep
    consuming the merged result through TaskAgentData.McpConfig.

Tests
  - 9 merge cases (mcp_overlay_test): both-nil short-circuit, agent-only
    pass-through, overlay-only canonicalization, two-side merge, name
    collision (overlay wins), top-level key preservation, malformed agent
    fallback, malformed overlay fallback, non-object server rejection.
  - 4 dispatch cases (composio): zero-connections returns nil without
    CreateSession, happy-path emits the right shape with the right user
    id, empty-URL defensive branch, SDK error surfacing.
  - 4 TaskService helper cases: nil Composio is a no-op (Queries-safe),
    invalid initiator does not call the builder, nil overlay skips the
    UPDATE, builder error swallowed without panic.
  - Migration 128 verified to roll up + down + up cleanly against the test
    database.

Out of scope (deferred): assignment-triggered enqueue paths with no
trigger comment get no overlay attached today (no initiator UUID flows
through enqueueIssueTask in that case). Retry paths recompute the overlay
fresh from the parent's initiator_user_id instead of inheriting the bearer
from the parent row, so a stale token can never resurface on a retry.

Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): per-agent allowlist + originator-scoped MCP overlay (MUL-3869) (#4736)

* feat(composio): per-agent allowlist + originator-scoped MCP overlay (MUL-3869)

Stage 3.1 of the Composio epic (MUL-3721 parent). PR #4704 wired in the
runtime_mcp_overlay column and a per-task dispatch hook; this change
inverts the default from "all-on" to opt-in and locks the overlay to the
agent owner's own connected apps:

- Agents carry composio_toolkit_allowlist TEXT[]. NULL or [] => no MCP.
  Owner-only read/write; non-owner GET/PUT silently redacts/drops the
  field (same shape as mcp_config).
- agent_task_queue carries originator_user_id UUID. Set from the
  top-of-chain HUMAN at every enqueue path:
    * issue/mention comment by member  -> author_id
    * issue/mention comment by agent   -> inherit via comment.source_task_id
                                          -> parent task originator_user_id
    * quick-create                     -> requester_id
    * chat                             -> initiator_user_id
    * retry                            -> SQL-inherited from parent row
    * autopilot                        -> NULL (system-driven)
- BuildTaskOverlay (composio dispatch) now takes (ctx, originatorUserID,
  agent) and short-circuits on five gates: invalid originator,
  originator != agent.owner_id, empty allowlist, empty intersection of
  allowlist ∩ active connections, defensive empty session URL. Composio
  CreateSession is called with BOTH `toolkits.slugs` (the intersection)
  AND `connected_accounts` (the pinned account ids), narrowing the
  tool-router twice.
- The originator-vs-owner gate closes the agent-fanout privacy hole: any
  workspace member who can @-mention a public agent used to project the
  owner's connected apps into their run. Now the overlay only mounts
  when the human at the top of the chain IS the agent owner.

Tests:
- dispatch_test.go covers all 5 gates plus uppercase/whitespace slug
  normalisation.
- task_runtime_mcp_overlay_test.go covers the no-op gates of the new
  applyRuntimeMCPOverlay signature.
- agent_composio_allowlist_test.go (handler): owner roundtrip
  (list/empty/null), workspace-admin silent-drop, owner-only GET
  visibility, pure normaliseComposioToolkitAllowlist.
- resolve_originator_test.go (service, DB-backed): member-authored,
  agent-authored inherits via comment.source_task_id, invalid id.

Migration 129 up/down/up verified against docker postgres.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* chore(composio): gofmt + regenerate sqlc with v1.31.1 (MUL-3869 review nits)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): accept nested connected account auth config

* feat(views): creator-only MCP tab for per-agent Composio allowlist (MUL-3870) (#4743)

Stage 3.2 frontend on top of the Stage 3.1 backend (MUL-3869, 4708dba97).
Adds an agent-detail tab that lets the agent owner pick which of their own
active Composio connections this agent may mount as MCP servers, writing the
selection to agent.composio_toolkit_allowlist via the existing PUT /api/agents.

- core/types: composio_toolkit_allowlist (+ _redacted) on Agent; tri-state
  composio_toolkit_allowlist on UpdateAgentRequest (omit/no-change, null/clear,
  array/replace), matching the backend contract.
- core/agents: useUpdateAgentAllowlist - optimistic mutation hook (patches the
  cached workspace agent list, rolls back on error, invalidates on settle).
- views: AgentMcpTab renders the owner's active connections as checkboxes;
  empty state links to Settings -> Integrations; defensive redacted state.
- views: wired into AgentOverviewPane as tab "composio_mcp", labeled "MCP Apps"
  to disambiguate from the existing raw-JSON "MCP" (mcp_config) tab. The entry
  is gated to the creator (currentUserId === agent.owner_id), matching the
  backend's owner-only read/write of the allowlist.
- i18n: tabs.composio_mcp + tab_body.composio_mcp.* in en/ja/ko/zh-Hans.
- tests: agent-mcp-tab.test.tsx (gating, toggle->allowlist body, active-only,
  empty, redacted); e2e/agent-mcp.spec.ts (creator sees tab + PUT body,
  non-creator hidden) with Composio + agent endpoints mocked at the boundary.

Note: the product spec says "creator"; the schema has no creator_id - the
backend gate and redaction are keyed on owner_id, so the tab uses owner_id.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): mount remote MCP for codex

* feat(agents): agent invocation permission system (MUL-3963) (#4844)

* feat(agents): agent invocation permission system (permission_mode + invocation targets)

MUL-3963: split who may INVOKE an agent out of the overloaded visibility
column into an explicit, extensible model on feature/composio-integration.

- DB: agent.permission_mode (private|public_to) + agent_invocation_target
  table (workspace/member/team targets) + lossless backfill from visibility
  (migration 130).
- canInvokeAgent: owner-only for private (NO admin bypass, NO A2A bypass);
  public_to honours the allow-list; A2A judged by the top-of-chain originator.
- All trigger paths rewired: issue assign, comment @agent/@squad, chat,
  quick-create, autopilot, squad leader, child-done.
- Agent API: permission_mode + invocation_targets on responses and
  create/update (owner-only writes); legacy visibility kept as a derived field
  so old clients never see a permission widening.
- Composio: BuildTaskOverlay now FOLLOWS invocation permission and uses the
  agent OWNER connection (removed the originator==owner gate); front-end warns
  when a shared agent enables Composio apps.
- CLI: --permission-mode / --public-to-workspace / --public-to-member (legacy
  --visibility still mapped).
- Frontend: AccessPicker (Private / workspace / specific people / team soon),
  permission rules mirror canInvokeAgent, Composio warning banner.
- Tests: migration backfill, admin cannot invoke others private, public_to
  workspace/member whitelist, A2A by originator, Composio overlay uses owner
  connection.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(agents): stackable, mixed public_to invocation targets (MUL-3963)

Follow-up on PR #4844: public_to now supports selecting MULTIPLE, MIXED
targets on one agent (e.g. Public to workspace + specific people + team),
with canInvokeAgent admitting on ANY matching target (OR).

- Frontend AccessPicker: reworked from a single exclusive kind into a
  stackable multi-select — an "Everyone in workspace" toggle, a member
  multi-select checklist, and a (disabled, v1) team placeholder can be
  combined freely. Emits the full union of selected targets; empty union
  collapses to Private. Existing team targets are preserved across saves.
  Added the access.public_group locale string (en/zh-Hans/ja/ko).
- Backend already supported this (agent_invocation_target is multi-row per
  agent; create/update take a target ARRAY and batch-replace the whole
  allow-list; canInvokeAgent OR-matches). Added tests to lock it in:
  mixed member+team targets, overlapping-member batch replace, and
  workspace+member stacking then narrowing.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): address review on invocation permission (MUL-3963)

张大彪 review on PR #4844 — three blockers + product ruling + nits:

1. Migration 130: drop the FK/cascade on agent_invocation_target
   (agent_id, created_by) per the Multica no-FK rule; relationships are now
   maintained in the app layer (matching MUL-3515 §4). Added
   DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByArchivedRuntimeAgents and call it before
   DeleteArchivedAgentsByRuntime in all three runtime-delete paths
   (runtime.go x2, runtime_profile.go) so hard-deleting agents can't orphan
   target rows.
2. revokeAndRemoveMember: prune the leaving member's member-target grants
   (DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByMember) in the same tx as the member-row
   delete, so a re-invited user can't reclaim a stale invocation grant.
3. Empty public_to is a phantom — parsePermissionInput now normalises a
   public_to with no resolvable targets to a single workspace target, so
   `--permission-mode public_to` alone (and any empty target array) means
   "public to workspace" instead of "shared but nobody can run it".

Product ruling: the system/no-human-originator → workspace-target path in
canInvokeAgent is a deliberate, documented exception (webhook/system/
workspace-wide automation); member/team targets still fail closed without a
resolved originator. Documented in code + locked with a test.

Nits: refreshed the stale "originator must be owner" comments — models.go
(via migration 130 COMMENT ON COLUMN + sqlc regen for composio_toolkit_allowlist
and originator_user_id) and agent-mcp-tab.tsx — to the owner-connection +
invocation-permission rules.

Tests: member remove/re-add regression, system workspace exception + member
fail-closed, empty public_to → workspace (plus the earlier mixed/overlap/
batch-replace suite). Migration 130 applied to the test DB; Go handler/service/
composio suites green; views typecheck clean.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): scope member invocation-target cleanup to one workspace (MUL-3963)

张大彪 3rd review — cross-workspace permission bug + comment nits:

- DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByMember was a GLOBAL delete by user id, so
  removing a user from workspace A also wiped their member-target grants on
  agents in workspace B. Scoped it to a single workspace by joining through
  agent.workspace_id; revokeAndRemoveMember now passes (workspaceID, userID).
- Regression test TestRevokeMember_InvocationTargetCleanupIsWorkspaceScoped:
  same user allow-listed by agents in two workspaces; removal from one leaves
  the other workspace's target intact.
- Nits: refreshed the remaining stale "originator == agent.owner_id" /
  "owner-vs-originator" comments — CreateRetryTask (agent.sql, regenerated),
  and the AgentResponse allowlist doc + ListAgents/UpdateAgent redaction
  rationale in agent.go — to the owner-connection + invocation-permission rule.

Migration 130 applied to the test DB; Go handler/service/composio suites green;
go vet clean.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): agent access owner-only editable, read-only for others (MUL-3963) (#4853)

* fix(agents): make agent access owner-only editable, read-only for others (MUL-3963)

Interaction bug: a non-owner (incl. workspace admin) could open the AccessPicker
and set an agent public — the backend silently ignored it and the UI bounced
back to private. Access is owner-only, so non-owners must see a read-only state
and the backend must reject real changes explicitly.

Frontend:
- AccessPicker renders a static, non-interactive read-only state when the
  viewer is not the owner: the current access value + a lock affordance + a
  tooltip "Only the agent owner can change who can run this agent." No clickable
  trigger is rendered, so a non-owner can never open a control the backend would
  reject (the GitHub/Notion pattern for permission settings you can see but not
  edit). The editable multi-select picker is unchanged for the owner.
- agent-detail-inspector gates the picker on ownership specifically
  (currentUserId === agent.owner_id), NOT the general canEdit (which also admits
  admins, who may edit other fields but not access).
- New locale key access.owner_only_readonly (en/zh-Hans/ja/ko).

Backend:
- UpdateAgent now returns an explicit 403 when a non-owner submits a REAL
  permission change (permissionInputChangesAgent compares requested mode +
  target set against the persisted state); a no-op resubmit (admin PATCH-as-PUT
  echoing unchanged permission) is still tolerated so admin edits of other
  fields keep working. Replaces the previous silent-drop that caused the bounce.

Tests:
- access-picker.test.tsx: non-owner gets a non-interactive read-only display
  with the owner-only tooltip; owner gets an interactive picker; owner can pick
  a member and stack workspace + member.
- TestUpdateAgent_AccessChangeIsOwnerOnly: admin real change → 403; admin no-op
  resubmit → 200; admin editing other fields → 200; owner change → 200.

Incidental: fixed a pre-existing base typecheck break in
slash-command-suggestion.test.tsx (stray `signal` arg not in the suggestion
items type) that otherwise fails the whole @multica/views typecheck.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): compare legacy visibility, not expanded permission, for no-op detection (MUL-3963)

PR #4853 review: permissionInputChangesAgent expanded a legacy-only
visibility:"private" into a real private permission and compared it against the
agent's actual permission. A member-only public_to agent derives legacy
visibility "private", so an admin PATCH-as-PUT echoing visibility:"private"
while editing another field was misread as a public_to→private downgrade and
rejected with 403 — contradicting the "unchanged permission no-op is allowed"
contract.

Fix (per review): when a request carries ONLY legacy `visibility` (no
permission_mode / invocation_targets), derive the agent's CURRENT legacy
visibility from its real targets and compare the legacy string values. Equal =
no-op (allowed); a real legacy change (e.g. "workspace") still returns 403.
Requests that carry permission_mode / invocation_targets keep the precise
mode+target comparison.

Regression test TestUpdateAgent_LegacyVisibilityNoOpForMemberOnlyPublicTo:
member-only public_to agent — admin submitting visibility:"private" + a
non-permission field → 200 with targets unchanged; admin submitting
visibility:"workspace" → 403.

Go handler/composio suites green; migration 130 applied; go vet clean.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): brief agents on connected apps

* feat(composio): gate MCP apps behind feature flag

* fix(mobile): parse agent invocation permissions

* fix(tests): update agent fixtures for access fields

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: Multica Eve <eve@devv.ai>
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local>
2026-07-03 14:18:43 +08:00

960 lines
35 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/util"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/agent"
db "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/db/generated"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/protocol"
)
type AgentRuntimeResponse struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
WorkspaceID string `json:"workspace_id"`
DaemonID *string `json:"daemon_id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
RuntimeMode string `json:"runtime_mode"`
Provider string `json:"provider"`
LaunchHeader string `json:"launch_header"`
Status string `json:"status"`
DeviceInfo string `json:"device_info"`
Metadata any `json:"metadata"`
OwnerID *string `json:"owner_id"`
// Visibility is "private" (default — only the owner / workspace admins
// can bind agents) or "public" (any workspace member can). See migration
// 083 and canUseRuntimeForAgent.
Visibility string `json:"visibility"`
// ProfileID is set when this runtime is an instance of a custom
// runtime_profile (MUL-3284); null for built-in runtimes.
ProfileID *string `json:"profile_id"`
LastSeenAt *string `json:"last_seen_at"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt string `json:"updated_at"`
}
func runtimeToResponse(rt db.AgentRuntime) AgentRuntimeResponse {
var metadata any
if rt.Metadata != nil {
json.Unmarshal(rt.Metadata, &metadata)
}
if metadata == nil {
metadata = map[string]any{}
}
return AgentRuntimeResponse{
ID: uuidToString(rt.ID),
WorkspaceID: uuidToString(rt.WorkspaceID),
DaemonID: textToPtr(rt.DaemonID),
Name: rt.Name,
RuntimeMode: rt.RuntimeMode,
Provider: rt.Provider,
LaunchHeader: agent.LaunchHeader(rt.Provider),
Status: rt.Status,
DeviceInfo: rt.DeviceInfo,
Metadata: metadata,
OwnerID: uuidToPtr(rt.OwnerID),
Visibility: rt.Visibility,
ProfileID: uuidToPtr(rt.ProfileID),
LastSeenAt: timestampToPtr(rt.LastSeenAt),
CreatedAt: timestampToString(rt.CreatedAt),
UpdatedAt: timestampToString(rt.UpdatedAt),
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Runtime Usage
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
type RuntimeUsageResponse struct {
RuntimeID string `json:"runtime_id"`
Date string `json:"date"`
Provider string `json:"provider"`
Model string `json:"model"`
InputTokens int64 `json:"input_tokens"`
OutputTokens int64 `json:"output_tokens"`
CacheReadTokens int64 `json:"cache_read_tokens"`
CacheWriteTokens int64 `json:"cache_write_tokens"`
}
// GetRuntimeUsage returns daily token usage for a runtime, aggregated from
// per-task usage records captured by the daemon. This is scoped to
// Daemon-executed tasks only (i.e. excludes users' local CLI usage of the
// same tool).
func (h *Handler) GetRuntimeUsage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
runtimeID := chi.URLParam(r, "runtimeId")
runtimeUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, runtimeID, "runtime_id")
if !ok {
return
}
rt, err := h.Queries.GetAgentRuntime(r.Context(), runtimeUUID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "runtime not found")
return
}
if _, ok := h.requireWorkspaceMember(w, r, uuidToString(rt.WorkspaceID), "runtime not found"); !ok {
return
}
// All runtime reports render in the viewer's tz.
viewTZ := h.resolveViewingTZ(r)
since := parseSinceParamInTZ(r, 90, viewTZ)
resp, err := h.listRuntimeUsage(r.Context(), rt.ID, viewTZ, since)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list usage")
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
// listRuntimeUsage reads the daily-bucketed trend from task_usage_hourly,
// applying the viewer's tz to project bucket_hour into local days.
func (h *Handler) listRuntimeUsage(ctx context.Context, runtimeID pgtype.UUID, tz string, since pgtype.Timestamptz) ([]RuntimeUsageResponse, error) {
resolvedRuntimeID := uuidToString(runtimeID)
rows, err := h.Queries.ListRuntimeUsage(ctx, db.ListRuntimeUsageParams{
RuntimeID: runtimeID,
Since: since,
Tz: tz,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
resp := make([]RuntimeUsageResponse, len(rows))
for i, row := range rows {
resp[i] = RuntimeUsageResponse{
RuntimeID: resolvedRuntimeID,
Date: row.Date.Time.Format("2006-01-02"),
Provider: row.Provider,
Model: row.Model,
InputTokens: row.InputTokens,
OutputTokens: row.OutputTokens,
CacheReadTokens: row.CacheReadTokens,
CacheWriteTokens: row.CacheWriteTokens,
}
}
return resp, nil
}
// GetRuntimeTaskActivity returns hourly task activity distribution for a runtime.
func (h *Handler) GetRuntimeTaskActivity(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
runtimeID := chi.URLParam(r, "runtimeId")
runtimeUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, runtimeID, "runtime_id")
if !ok {
return
}
rt, err := h.Queries.GetAgentRuntime(r.Context(), runtimeUUID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "runtime not found")
return
}
if _, ok := h.requireWorkspaceMember(w, r, uuidToString(rt.WorkspaceID), "runtime not found"); !ok {
return
}
viewTZ := h.resolveViewingTZ(r)
rows, err := h.Queries.GetRuntimeTaskHourlyActivity(r.Context(), db.GetRuntimeTaskHourlyActivityParams{
RuntimeID: rt.ID,
Tz: viewTZ,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to get task activity")
return
}
type HourlyActivity struct {
Hour int `json:"hour"`
Count int `json:"count"`
}
resp := make([]HourlyActivity, len(rows))
for i, row := range rows {
resp[i] = HourlyActivity{Hour: int(row.Hour), Count: int(row.Count)}
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
// RuntimeUsageByAgentResponse is one (agent, provider, model) row of "Cost by
// agent". provider + model stay on the wire because cost is computed
// client-side from a model pricing table (intentionally not stored server-side
// so pricing changes don't require a back-fill); provider disambiguates bare
// model ids that collide across providers. The client groups by agent_id and sums.
type RuntimeUsageByAgentResponse struct {
AgentID string `json:"agent_id"`
Provider string `json:"provider"`
Model string `json:"model"`
InputTokens int64 `json:"input_tokens"`
OutputTokens int64 `json:"output_tokens"`
CacheReadTokens int64 `json:"cache_read_tokens"`
CacheWriteTokens int64 `json:"cache_write_tokens"`
TaskCount int32 `json:"task_count"`
}
// GetRuntimeUsageByAgent returns per-agent token aggregates for a runtime
// since the cutoff window. Drives the runtime-detail "Cost by agent" tab.
func (h *Handler) GetRuntimeUsageByAgent(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
runtimeID := chi.URLParam(r, "runtimeId")
runtimeUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, runtimeID, "runtime_id")
if !ok {
return
}
rt, err := h.Queries.GetAgentRuntime(r.Context(), runtimeUUID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "runtime not found")
return
}
if _, ok := h.requireWorkspaceMember(w, r, uuidToString(rt.WorkspaceID), "runtime not found"); !ok {
return
}
// No date bucketing — tz only sets the cutoff boundary so "last 30
// days" means 30 of the viewer's days.
viewTZ := h.resolveViewingTZ(r)
since := parseSinceParamInTZ(r, 30, viewTZ)
rows, err := h.Queries.ListRuntimeUsageByAgent(r.Context(), db.ListRuntimeUsageByAgentParams{
RuntimeID: rt.ID,
Since: since,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list usage by agent")
return
}
resp := make([]RuntimeUsageByAgentResponse, len(rows))
for i, row := range rows {
resp[i] = RuntimeUsageByAgentResponse{
AgentID: uuidToString(row.AgentID),
Provider: row.Provider,
Model: row.Model,
InputTokens: row.InputTokens,
OutputTokens: row.OutputTokens,
CacheReadTokens: row.CacheReadTokens,
CacheWriteTokens: row.CacheWriteTokens,
TaskCount: row.TaskCount,
}
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
// RuntimeUsageByHourResponse is one (hour, model) row. Hours with zero
// activity are omitted by the SQL — clients fill the gap to render a
// continuous 0..23 axis. Model is preserved for client-side cost math.
type RuntimeUsageByHourResponse struct {
Hour int `json:"hour"`
Model string `json:"model"`
InputTokens int64 `json:"input_tokens"`
OutputTokens int64 `json:"output_tokens"`
CacheReadTokens int64 `json:"cache_read_tokens"`
CacheWriteTokens int64 `json:"cache_write_tokens"`
TaskCount int32 `json:"task_count"`
}
// GetRuntimeUsageByHour returns hourly (0..23) token aggregates for a
// runtime since the cutoff window. Drives the "By hour" tab.
//
// The hour-of-day axis is bucketed in the viewer's tz like every other
// report — the same timezone resolved by resolveViewingTZ from the request's
// `?tz=` param or the authenticated user's stored user.timezone.
func (h *Handler) GetRuntimeUsageByHour(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
runtimeID := chi.URLParam(r, "runtimeId")
runtimeUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, runtimeID, "runtime_id")
if !ok {
return
}
rt, err := h.Queries.GetAgentRuntime(r.Context(), runtimeUUID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "runtime not found")
return
}
if _, ok := h.requireWorkspaceMember(w, r, uuidToString(rt.WorkspaceID), "runtime not found"); !ok {
return
}
viewTZ := h.resolveViewingTZ(r)
since := parseSinceParamInTZ(r, 30, viewTZ)
rows, err := h.Queries.GetRuntimeUsageByHour(r.Context(), db.GetRuntimeUsageByHourParams{
RuntimeID: rt.ID,
Since: since,
Tz: viewTZ,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to get usage by hour")
return
}
resp := make([]RuntimeUsageByHourResponse, len(rows))
for i, row := range rows {
resp[i] = RuntimeUsageByHourResponse{
Hour: int(row.Hour),
Model: row.Model,
InputTokens: row.InputTokens,
OutputTokens: row.OutputTokens,
CacheReadTokens: row.CacheReadTokens,
CacheWriteTokens: row.CacheWriteTokens,
TaskCount: row.TaskCount,
}
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
// sinceFromDays is the pure, now-injectable core of parseSinceParamInTZ.
// Given the current instant, a day count and an IANA location, it returns
// the instant of local midnight `days` days before `now`'s local calendar
// day. `now` is a parameter so the DST boundary maths can be tested at
// pinned dates (see TestSinceFromDays).
//
// The cutoff yields N+1 calendar buckets (today-days … today inclusive).
// The extra day versus a naive "-(days-1)" is deliberate headroom, not an
// off-by-one:
// - Runtime detail's sliceWindow filters `date >= today-days` (closed) and
// its prior-window delta reaches back to today-2*days, so the today-days
// bucket MUST exist or the oldest bar / KPI delta silently loses data.
// - The workspace dashboard re-filters client-side with -(days-1); the one
// extra day the backend returns is trimmed there — harmless.
//
// Do not "tighten" this to -(days-1): it would break the runtime detail page.
func sinceFromDays(now time.Time, days int, loc *time.Location) time.Time {
local := now.In(loc)
startOfToday := time.Date(local.Year(), local.Month(), local.Day(), 0, 0, 0, 0, loc)
return startOfToday.AddDate(0, 0, -days)
}
// parseSinceParamInTZ parses the "days" query parameter into a cutoff
// timestamptz. Anchors the cutoff to start-of-day-(N) in the supplied IANA zone so that
// `days=N` returns full N+1 calendar buckets in that zone (today's partial
// bucket + N prior full days). If tzName is empty or unparseable, falls back
// to UTC — never returns an error so handlers stay simple.
func parseSinceParamInTZ(r *http.Request, defaultDays int, tzName string) pgtype.Timestamptz {
days := defaultDays
if d := r.URL.Query().Get("days"); d != "" {
if parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(d); err == nil && parsed > 0 && parsed <= 365 {
days = parsed
}
}
loc, err := time.LoadLocation(tzName)
if err != nil || loc == nil {
loc = time.UTC
}
return pgtype.Timestamptz{Time: sinceFromDays(time.Now(), days, loc), Valid: true}
}
// resolveViewingTZ resolves the IANA tz to render the response in:
// `?tz=` query param, else the authenticated user's stored
// user.timezone, else "UTC". Invalid values fall through rather than
// erroring — tz is a display concern.
//
// The browser app always sends `?tz=` (resolved client-side by
// useViewingTimezone), so the `GetUser` lookup below is a COLD fallback
// hit only by API clients / older builds that omit the param — it is not
// a hot path. Do not replicate this DB-read pattern into a handler that
// runs without a `?tz=`-supplying client in front of it.
func (h *Handler) resolveViewingTZ(r *http.Request) string {
if tz := strings.TrimSpace(r.URL.Query().Get("tz")); tz != "" {
if loc, err := time.LoadLocation(tz); err == nil && loc != nil {
return tz
}
}
if userID := requestUserID(r); userID != "" {
uid, err := util.ParseUUID(userID)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("resolveViewingTZ: malformed X-User-ID, falling back to UTC",
"path", r.URL.Path, "user_id", userID)
}
if err == nil {
slog.Debug("resolveViewingTZ cold path: ?tz= missing, reading user.timezone",
"path", r.URL.Path, "user_id", userID)
if user, err := h.Queries.GetUser(r.Context(), uid); err == nil && user.Timezone.Valid {
stored := strings.TrimSpace(user.Timezone.String)
if stored != "" {
if loc, err := time.LoadLocation(stored); err == nil && loc != nil {
return stored
}
}
}
}
}
return "UTC"
}
// UpdateAgentRuntimeRequest is the JSON body accepted by PATCH /api/runtimes/:id.
// Only fields users may legitimately edit are listed; other runtime metadata
// (provider, daemon_id, status…) flows in from the daemon and is read-only here.
type UpdateAgentRuntimeRequest struct {
// Visibility flips a runtime between "private" (default — only the owner
// or workspace admins can bind agents) and "public" (any workspace
// member can). Owner / workspace admin only, gated by canEditRuntime.
Visibility *string `json:"visibility,omitempty"`
}
// UpdateAgentRuntime handles PATCH /api/runtimes/:id. Currently visibility
// is editable; the request shape is open-ended so future fields (display
// name, description) can be added without a route change.
// Workspace-membership-checked; write access is gated by canEditRuntime.
func (h *Handler) UpdateAgentRuntime(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
runtimeID := chi.URLParam(r, "runtimeId")
runtimeUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, runtimeID, "runtime_id")
if !ok {
return
}
rt, err := h.Queries.GetAgentRuntime(r.Context(), runtimeUUID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "runtime not found")
return
}
member, ok := h.requireWorkspaceMember(w, r, uuidToString(rt.WorkspaceID), "runtime not found")
if !ok {
return
}
if !canEditRuntime(member, rt) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "you can only edit your own runtimes")
return
}
var req UpdateAgentRuntimeRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid JSON body")
return
}
var (
newVisibility string
needVisibility bool
)
if req.Visibility != nil {
v := *req.Visibility
if v != "private" && v != "public" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "visibility must be 'private' or 'public'")
return
}
if v != rt.Visibility {
newVisibility = v
needVisibility = true
}
}
if needVisibility {
updated, err := h.Queries.UpdateAgentRuntimeVisibility(r.Context(), db.UpdateAgentRuntimeVisibilityParams{
ID: runtimeUUID,
Visibility: newVisibility,
})
if err != nil {
slog.Error("UpdateAgentRuntimeVisibility failed", "error", err, "runtime_id", runtimeID)
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to update runtime")
return
}
rt = updated
// Notify connected clients that runtime metadata changed so the
// list/detail pages refresh — matches the pattern used by
// DeleteAgentRuntime.
h.publish(protocol.EventDaemonRegister, uuidToString(rt.WorkspaceID), "member", uuidToString(member.UserID), map[string]any{
"action": "update",
})
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, runtimeToResponse(rt))
}
func canEditRuntime(member db.Member, rt db.AgentRuntime) bool {
if roleAllowed(member.Role, "owner", "admin") {
return true
}
return rt.OwnerID.Valid && uuidToString(rt.OwnerID) == uuidToString(member.UserID)
}
// canUseRuntimeForAgent reports whether a workspace member is allowed to
// bind a new agent to — or move an existing agent onto — the given runtime.
// Mirrors canEditRuntime but layers on the runtime's visibility flag so a
// `public` runtime is usable by anyone in the workspace while a `private`
// runtime stays bound to its owner. Workspace owners/admins keep an
// administrative override for both. See migration 083 for the visibility
// column.
func canUseRuntimeForAgent(member db.Member, rt db.AgentRuntime) bool {
if roleAllowed(member.Role, "owner", "admin") {
return true
}
if rt.Visibility == "public" {
return true
}
return rt.OwnerID.Valid && uuidToString(rt.OwnerID) == uuidToString(member.UserID)
}
func (h *Handler) ListAgentRuntimes(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
workspaceID := h.resolveWorkspaceID(r)
var runtimes []db.AgentRuntime
var err error
if ownerFilter := r.URL.Query().Get("owner"); ownerFilter == "me" {
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
runtimes, err = h.Queries.ListAgentRuntimesByOwner(r.Context(), db.ListAgentRuntimesByOwnerParams{
WorkspaceID: parseUUID(workspaceID),
OwnerID: parseUUID(userID),
})
} else {
runtimes, err = h.Queries.ListAgentRuntimes(r.Context(), parseUUID(workspaceID))
}
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list runtimes")
return
}
resp := make([]AgentRuntimeResponse, len(runtimes))
for i, rt := range runtimes {
resp[i] = runtimeToResponse(rt)
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}
// DeleteAgentRuntime deletes a runtime after permission and dependency checks.
//
// The strict variant: refuses with 409 + structured `runtime_has_active_agents`
// when any non-archived agent is still bound to the runtime, and returns the
// blocking agent list in the response body so the front-end can pivot to the
// cascade dialog without an extra round-trip. The cascade itself lives at
// POST /api/runtimes/:id/archive-agents-and-delete (ArchiveAgentsAndDeleteRuntime
// below) and runs the multi-write teardown inside a single transaction.
func (h *Handler) DeleteAgentRuntime(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
runtimeID := chi.URLParam(r, "runtimeId")
runtimeUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, runtimeID, "runtime_id")
if !ok {
return
}
rt, err := h.Queries.GetAgentRuntime(r.Context(), runtimeUUID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "runtime not found")
return
}
wsID := uuidToString(rt.WorkspaceID)
member, ok := h.requireWorkspaceMember(w, r, wsID, "runtime not found")
if !ok {
return
}
// Permission: owner/admin can delete any runtime; members can only delete their own.
if !canEditRuntime(member, rt) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "you can only delete your own runtimes")
return
}
userID := uuidToString(member.UserID)
if rt.ProfileID.Valid {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusConflict, map[string]any{
"error": "cannot delete a custom runtime instance directly; delete its runtime profile instead.",
"code": "runtime_profile_instance_delete_unsupported",
})
return
}
// Check if any active (non-archived) agents are bound to this runtime.
// Surface them on the 409 so the dialog can render the cascade plan
// directly from this response — saves a second round-trip when the
// user clicked Delete from a stale list page.
activeAgents, err := h.Queries.ListActiveAgentsByRuntime(r.Context(), rt.ID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to check runtime dependencies")
return
}
if len(activeAgents) > 0 {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusConflict, runtimeHasActiveAgentsResponse(activeAgents))
return
}
// Refuse before any teardown-side effects if the runtime still has active
// squads whose leader is already archived on this runtime.
activeSquadCount, err := h.Queries.CountActiveSquadsWithArchivedLeadersByRuntime(r.Context(), rt.ID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to check runtime squad dependencies")
return
}
if activeSquadCount > 0 {
writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "cannot delete runtime: it has active squads led by archived agents. Archive those squads or assign them a new leader first.")
return
}
tx, err := h.TxStarter.Begin(r.Context())
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to delete runtime")
return
}
defer tx.Rollback(r.Context())
qtx := h.Queries.WithTx(tx)
// Pause autopilots pointing at the archived agents BEFORE we delete
// them. Migration 096 dropped the autopilot.assignee_id agent FK, so a
// hard-delete here would otherwise leave dangling rows that subsequent
// scheduler ticks would skip with "assignee agent no longer exists" —
// quiet, but burning a run record every tick until an operator notices.
// Pausing makes the breakage visible in the autopilot list so the owner
// can re-point or delete the row instead. This runs inside the teardown
// transaction so a pause that lands but is followed by a failed delete
// rolls back with everything else, matching ArchiveAgentsAndDeleteRuntime.
archivedAgentIDs, err := qtx.ListArchivedAgentIDsByRuntime(r.Context(), rt.ID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to enumerate archived agents")
return
}
if len(archivedAgentIDs) > 0 {
if err := qtx.PauseAutopilotsByAgentAssignees(r.Context(), archivedAgentIDs); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to pause autopilots")
return
}
}
// Remove archived squads whose leader is an archived agent on this runtime
// so the RESTRICT FK on squad.leader_id won't block the subsequent agent
// deletion. Active squads are handled by the 409 guard above instead.
if err := qtx.DeleteSquadsByArchivedAgentsOnRuntime(r.Context(), rt.ID); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to clean up squads referencing archived agents")
return
}
// Remove archived agents so the FK constraint (ON DELETE RESTRICT) won't block deletion.
// First drop their invocation targets — agent_invocation_target has no
// agent_id FK (MUL-3963), so cleanup is app-layer and MUST precede the
// agent hard-delete to avoid orphan rows.
if err := qtx.DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByArchivedRuntimeAgents(r.Context(), rt.ID); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to clean up agent invocation targets")
return
}
if err := qtx.DeleteArchivedAgentsByRuntime(r.Context(), rt.ID); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to clean up archived agents")
return
}
if err := qtx.DeleteAgentRuntime(r.Context(), rt.ID); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to delete runtime")
return
}
if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to delete runtime")
return
}
slog.Info("runtime deleted", "runtime_id", uuidToString(rt.ID), "deleted_by", userID)
// Notify frontend to refresh runtime list.
h.publish(protocol.EventDaemonRegister, wsID, "member", userID, map[string]any{
"action": "delete",
})
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "ok"})
}
// runtimeHasActiveAgentsResponse builds the structured 409 body shared by
// DeleteAgentRuntime (light-mode block) and ArchiveAgentsAndDeleteRuntime
// (cascade-plan-changed). The shape is:
//
// {
// "error": "...",
// "code": "runtime_has_active_agents" | "runtime_delete_plan_changed",
// "active_agents": [AgentResponse, ...]
// }
//
// Front-end branches on `code`. The caller picks which code to send; this
// helper just normalises the agent serialisation and the error string.
func runtimeHasActiveAgentsResponse(agents []db.Agent) map[string]any {
resp := make([]AgentResponse, len(agents))
for i, a := range agents {
resp[i] = agentToResponse(a)
}
return map[string]any{
"error": "cannot delete runtime: it has active agents bound to it. Archive or reassign the agents first.",
"code": "runtime_has_active_agents",
"active_agents": resp,
}
}
// archiveAgentsAndDeleteRuntimeRequest is the wire shape for the cascade
// endpoint. expected_active_agent_ids is the snapshot the user just confirmed
// in the dialog — the server compares it to the live set inside the
// transaction and refuses with runtime_delete_plan_changed if anything moved
// between dialog open and confirm. That guarantees the user is approving the
// exact agent set that will be archived, even if a teammate adds or archives
// an agent in the same window.
type archiveAgentsAndDeleteRuntimeRequest struct {
ExpectedActiveAgentIDs []string `json:"expected_active_agent_ids"`
}
// ArchiveAgentsAndDeleteRuntime is the cascade entry point: archive every
// agent currently bound to the runtime, cancel their queued/running tasks,
// pause autopilots that target them, hard-delete the now-detached archived
// rows so the agent.runtime_id FK no longer pins the runtime, and finally
// delete the runtime row itself — all inside a single transaction so a
// partial failure never leaves a runtime half-torn-down.
//
// Transaction order follows the reference revoke flow in
// revokeAndRemoveMember (workspace_revoke.go) so the two cascade paths share
// the same race-safety properties: the dispatcher can't claim a task whose
// runtime is about to vanish, autopilots can't fire onto a dead assignee,
// and post-commit publish events emit the same task:cancelled →
// agent:archived → daemon:register fan-out.
//
// The expected_active_agent_ids check is the load-bearing piece for the UX:
// the front-end snapshots the agent list when the dialog opens and presents
// the user a checkbox confirmation; if a teammate adds or archives an agent
// while that dialog is open, this endpoint refuses with
// runtime_delete_plan_changed and the latest list, so the user never confirms
// a stale plan.
func (h *Handler) ArchiveAgentsAndDeleteRuntime(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
runtimeID := chi.URLParam(r, "runtimeId")
runtimeUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, runtimeID, "runtime_id")
if !ok {
return
}
var req archiveAgentsAndDeleteRuntimeRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
return
}
expected, ok := parseExpectedActiveAgentIDs(req.ExpectedActiveAgentIDs)
if !ok {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "expected_active_agent_ids must be a list of valid UUIDs")
return
}
rt, err := h.Queries.GetAgentRuntime(r.Context(), runtimeUUID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "runtime not found")
return
}
wsID := uuidToString(rt.WorkspaceID)
member, ok := h.requireWorkspaceMember(w, r, wsID, "runtime not found")
if !ok {
return
}
if !canEditRuntime(member, rt) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "you can only delete your own runtimes")
return
}
userID := uuidToString(member.UserID)
if rt.ProfileID.Valid {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusConflict, map[string]any{
"error": "cannot delete a custom runtime instance directly; delete its runtime profile instead.",
"code": "runtime_profile_instance_delete_unsupported",
})
return
}
tx, err := h.TxStarter.Begin(r.Context())
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to start transaction")
return
}
defer tx.Rollback(r.Context())
qtx := h.Queries.WithTx(tx)
// Lock the runtime row first. PostgreSQL's FK validation on
// agent.runtime_id requires FOR KEY SHARE on the parent runtime row,
// which conflicts with FOR UPDATE — so any concurrent INSERT or
// UPDATE that would point a new/moved agent at this runtime now
// blocks until our tx finishes. This is the "兜底" lock that keeps
// new actives from appearing between our snapshot and our archive.
if _, err := qtx.LockAgentRuntime(r.Context(), rt.ID); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to lock runtime")
return
}
// Re-list active agents inside the transaction, with FOR UPDATE on
// each row so a concurrent archive/move of one of those existing
// agents also blocks until we commit. Comparing against the expected
// set here closes the dialog-open / user-confirm race: even if a
// teammate creates or archives an agent on this runtime while the
// dialog was open, the user is approving exactly the set the server
// is about to archive.
currentActive, err := qtx.ListActiveAgentsByRuntimeForUpdate(r.Context(), rt.ID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to enumerate active agents")
return
}
if !activeAgentSetMatches(currentActive, expected) {
// Refuse with the latest snapshot so the front-end can re-render
// the dialog and force a fresh user confirmation. Reuses the
// shared response helper but overrides the code to a planning
// signal so the dialog can distinguish "you opened from a stale
// page" from "the plan you confirmed just changed under you".
body := runtimeHasActiveAgentsResponse(currentActive)
body["code"] = "runtime_delete_plan_changed"
body["error"] = "the active agent set changed; please review and confirm again."
writeJSON(w, http.StatusConflict, body)
return
}
// Build the agent ID list once — it's the explicit allowlist for the
// archive UPDATE below and the runtime-or-agent task cancel further
// down. By keying the archive off this list (not off runtime_id) we
// guarantee that agents not in the user's confirmed set can never
// be silently archived, even if the row-level locks above somehow
// missed something. Defense in depth.
currentActiveIDs := make([]pgtype.UUID, len(currentActive))
for i, a := range currentActive {
currentActiveIDs[i] = a.ID
}
// 1. Archive every active agent on this runtime, narrowed to the
// user-confirmed expected_active_agent_ids set (which equals
// currentActive at this point). Returns the affected rows so the
// post-commit publish loop can fan out agent:archived per agent.
archivedAgents, err := qtx.ArchiveAgentsByIDs(r.Context(), db.ArchiveAgentsByIDsParams{
ArchivedBy: member.UserID,
AgentIds: currentActiveIDs,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to archive agents")
return
}
// 2. Cancel queued/dispatched/running tasks. Match by runtime_id AND
// by archived agent ids: agent.runtime_id can be reassigned without
// rewriting historical agent_task_queue rows, so an agent we just
// archived may still own tasks pinned to a different runtime — and
// ClaimAgentTask does not gate on agent.archived_at.
archivedIDs := make([]pgtype.UUID, len(archivedAgents))
for i, a := range archivedAgents {
archivedIDs[i] = a.ID
}
cancelledTasks, err := qtx.CancelAgentTasksByRuntimeOrAgent(r.Context(), db.CancelAgentTasksByRuntimeOrAgentParams{
RuntimeIds: []pgtype.UUID{rt.ID},
AgentIds: archivedIDs,
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to cancel tasks")
return
}
// 3. Pause autopilots whose assignee is one of the archived agents.
// Snapshots the full archived set on this runtime — including any
// that were already archived before this call — because the
// DeleteArchivedAgentsByRuntime below will hard-delete the lot, and
// a paused autopilot is much louder in the UI than a silently-
// dangling assignee_id (see migration 096 for why the FK is gone).
allArchivedIDs, err := qtx.ListArchivedAgentIDsByRuntime(r.Context(), rt.ID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to enumerate archived agents")
return
}
if len(allArchivedIDs) > 0 {
if err := qtx.PauseAutopilotsByAgentAssignees(r.Context(), allArchivedIDs); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to pause autopilots")
return
}
}
// 4. Hard-delete the archived agents so the agent.runtime_id FK
// (ON DELETE RESTRICT) no longer keeps the runtime alive.
if err := qtx.DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByArchivedRuntimeAgents(r.Context(), rt.ID); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to clean up agent invocation targets")
return
}
if err := qtx.DeleteArchivedAgentsByRuntime(r.Context(), rt.ID); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to clean up archived agents")
return
}
// 5. Finally delete the runtime row itself.
if err := qtx.DeleteAgentRuntime(r.Context(), rt.ID); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to delete runtime")
return
}
if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to commit transaction")
return
}
// Post-commit fan-out — same ordering as publishRevocation so subscribers
// observe task:cancelled before agent:archived before the runtime list
// refresh, matching the order other revocation paths use.
if h.TaskService != nil && len(cancelledTasks) > 0 {
h.TaskService.BroadcastCancelledTasks(r.Context(), cancelledTasks)
}
for _, a := range archivedAgents {
h.publish(protocol.EventAgentArchived, wsID, "member", userID, map[string]any{
"agent": agentToResponse(a),
})
}
h.publish(protocol.EventDaemonRegister, wsID, "member", userID, map[string]any{
"action": "delete",
})
slog.Info("runtime deleted via cascade",
"runtime_id", uuidToString(rt.ID),
"deleted_by", userID,
"agents_archived", len(archivedAgents),
"tasks_cancelled", len(cancelledTasks),
)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
"status": "ok",
"agents_archived": len(archivedAgents),
"tasks_cancelled": len(cancelledTasks),
})
}
// parseExpectedActiveAgentIDs validates the cascade endpoint's
// expected_active_agent_ids list. nil / empty is allowed (an empty set is a
// valid plan: "I confirmed there are no active agents" — the cascade then
// just deletes the runtime without archiving anything). Returns ok=false on
// any malformed UUID so the handler responds 400 instead of silently
// matching a different set.
func parseExpectedActiveAgentIDs(raw []string) (map[string]struct{}, bool) {
out := make(map[string]struct{}, len(raw))
for _, s := range raw {
u, err := util.ParseUUID(s)
if err != nil || !u.Valid {
return nil, false
}
out[uuidToString(u)] = struct{}{}
}
return out, true
}
// activeAgentSetMatches reports whether the live set of active agents on the
// runtime matches the snapshot the front-end confirmed. Order-insensitive
// because the front-end may render in any order; size + membership is what
// matters for "did the plan change?".
func activeAgentSetMatches(current []db.Agent, expected map[string]struct{}) bool {
if len(current) != len(expected) {
return false
}
for _, a := range current {
if _, ok := expected[uuidToString(a.ID)]; !ok {
return false
}
}
return true
}