mirror of
https://github.com/multica-ai/multica.git
synced 2026-07-17 15:19:00 +02:00
a67bf81225
* fix(agent): surface host OAuth token via env var on macOS isolation (MUL-2603) Claude Code 2.x scopes the macOS keychain credentials entry by sha256(CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR)[:8], so the MUL-2603 isolation path strands the child at "Not logged in" even after #3261 mirrored .claude.json: the child looks up `Claude Code-credentials-<scratch-hash>`, the host token is sitting in the no-suffix `Claude Code-credentials` entry. Read the host OAuth token from the keychain via /usr/bin/security and inject it as CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN, which bypasses keychain lookup entirely. Linux/Windows continue to use the .credentials.json mirror (no-op there). Operator-pinned tokens and ANTHROPIC_API_KEY both take precedence over the keychain reader. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> * fix(agent): tighten empty-value auth gate, pin Claude CLI env-scrub assumption (MUL-2603) Empty-value gate - `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=` inherited from a login shell that conditionally exports auth previously posed as an "operator pinned API-key auth" choice and disabled the keychain reader, stranding the isolated child at "Not logged in" even though no auth was actually selected. - Custom_env `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=""` (stale agent config) had the same effect, plus would have shadowed a keychain-injected token in libc env lookups that pick the first match. - Both are now treated as noise: the empty entry is dropped from the child env and the keychain reader runs unchanged. Two new unit tests cover the os.Environ side (`...TreatsEmptyAnthropicAPIKeyAsUnpinned`, `...HonorsNonEmptyAnthropicAPIKey`) and the custom_env side (`...EmptyOAuthTokenInCustomEnvAsUnpinned`). Env-scrub boundary - Surfacing `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` to the isolated child is only safe because Claude Code itself drops that variable from the env it hands to Bash / hook subprocesses, so a model-driven `printenv` can never echo the secret into the agent transcript. - Empirically verified against `claude` 2.1.121: printf '...test -n "$CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN" && echo SET || echo UNSET...' \ | CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN=sk-canary-XYZ \ MUL2603_CONTROL=control-value \ claude --print --output-format text \ --allow-dangerously-skip-permissions --allowedTools Bash returned `UNSET` for the OAuth token while the non-sensitive `MUL2603_CONTROL` control returned `CONTROL-SET`, proving the CLI scrubs only the auth env, not the env in general. - Pinned this assumption in a new skip-gated regression test (`TestClaudeCLIScrubsOAuthTokenFromBashSubprocess`) that boots the real CLI with a canary token; failing the test means upstream Claude Code stopped scrubbing and the passthrough must move off env vars before MUL-2603 can ship. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> * fix(agent): gate keychain passthrough on default host dir, harden scrub test (MUL-2603) Two follow-ups from the round-2 review on #3267: 1. Custom CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR no longer pulls the default OAuth token. Claude Code 2.x maps each config dir to its own suffixed `Claude Code-credentials-<hash>` keychain entry, so an operator that pins a managed/custom CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR via custom_env or the daemon-host env was getting the *daemon user's* default unsuffixed entry injected into the isolated child — silently crossing accounts, exactly the boundary mirrorHostClaudeJSONIfMissing already protects for `.claude.json`. buildClaudeEnvWith now threads the effective hostConfigDir through and only calls the reader when that dir is the default `$HOME/.claude`. The new gate has a unit-level truth table (TestIsDefaultHostClaudeConfigDir) plus a regression (TestBuildClaudeEnvIsolatedSkipsKeychainForCustomHostConfigDir) that makes a t.Fatal-armed reader prove the gate keeps the read off for custom dirs. 2. Scrub e2e now asserts the control prong and the proof-of-execution marker, not just "canary absent". The previous assertion would false-pass on a model refusal, paraphrase, or "Bash gets no env at all" upstream change. The strengthened version sets a non-secret MUL2603_CONTROL alongside the canary OAuth token and asserts (a) canary is NOT in the transcript, (b) CONTROL-SET IS in the transcript (env propagation works for non-secrets — proves a targeted scrub), (c) UNSET IS in the transcript (the Bash tool actually ran AND saw the OAuth var as empty/unset). Code comment in buildClaudeEnvWith and the test docstring now narrow the security contract to the Bash tool subprocess only; hook subprocess env-scrub is no longer claimed because it has not been verified. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> * test(agent): use per-run nonces in Claude scrub e2e to kill false-pass (MUL-2603) Elon's round-3 review flagged that TestClaudeCLIScrubsOAuthTokenFromBashSubprocess still false-passed: the proof markers "UNSET" / "CONTROL-SET" were literal strings in the prompt, so strings.Contains matched them even when the model only paraphrased the prompt without spawning Bash. Replace the hard-coded markers with two per-run random hex nonces passed *only* via env vars (MUL2603_UNSET_NONCE, MUL2603_CONTROL_NONCE). The prompt now references the variable names, not the values, so the nonces can land in the transcript only if a real Bash subprocess inherits the env vars and echoes them. A paraphrasing or refusing model cannot fake nonces it never saw. Also update the security-boundary comment in buildClaudeEnvWith to describe the nonce-based proof. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai> --------- Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>