multica

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Files

Bohan Jiang a71aa6c544 fix(email): sanitize invitation Subject and lock behavior with tests (#1140 )

Follow-up to #1126 (which closed the HTML-injection vector in the Body).

The Subject line is not HTML-rendered, so html.EscapeString would leak
literal entities into recipient inboxes. Instead:

- Strip control characters from workspace/inviter names (defense in depth
  even though Resend also filters CR/LF).
- Cap each field at 60 runes so an attacker can't stuff a full phishing
  pitch into a workspace name that gets sent from noreply@multica.ai.

Also extracts buildInvitationParams to make the sanitization logic
testable without mocking the Resend SDK, and adds a test covering:
  - HTML escape behavior for script/attribute/anchor injection payloads
  - Subject stripping of \r\n\t and other unicode controls
  - Subject NOT being HTML-escaped (so "Acme & Co." stays literal)
  - Subject length bounds
  - Benign inputs pass through unchanged

Adds a note on SendVerificationCode that its body uses only
server-generated content, to prevent the same pitfall from creeping in.

Refs #1117

2026-04-16 13:02:12 +08:00

cmd

Revert "feat: workspace URL refactor v2 + rollback-safe compat layer (#1138 )" (#1139 )

2026-04-16 12:26:40 +08:00

internal

fix(email): sanitize invitation Subject and lock behavior with tests (#1140 )

2026-04-16 13:02:12 +08:00

migrations

Revert "feat: workspace URL refactor v2 + rollback-safe compat layer (#1138 )" (#1139 )

2026-04-16 12:26:40 +08:00

pkg

feat(agent): log full command line at debug level when spawning agents (#1071 )