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ad16b99232
Tighten chat/@-mention, history, edit, and delete entry points so private
agents are only reachable by their owner or workspace owner/admin. Agent-to-
agent traffic still bypasses the gate so A2A collaboration keeps working.
- New canAccessPrivateAgent predicate in handler/agent_access.go; used by
comment.enqueueMentionedAgentTasks (replacing the inline check), GetAgent,
ListAgents (filter), ListAgentTasks, GetWorkspaceAgentRunCounts /
Activity30d / TaskSnapshot (workspace-wide aggregations no longer leak
private-agent existence + counts), chat.CreateChatSession,
chat.SendChatMessage (re-checks on every send so role changes can't leave
a stale session as a back-door), and autopilot.shouldSkipDispatch
(caller = autopilot creator).
- allowed_principals is computed inline as {agent.owner_id} ∪ workspace
owner/admin members. No new table — manual config is intentionally not
exposed in v1; the predicate is the extension seam.
- Front-end agent detail page distinguishes 403 (private agent the caller
can't access) from 404 (deleted/missing) and renders a "no access"
placeholder with a back-to-agents button.
- Go tests cover the pure predicate matrix + the four protected surfaces;
vitest passes for the affected views.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>