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* feat(agents): gate private-agent surfaces with allowed_principals predicate
Tighten chat/@-mention, history, edit, and delete entry points so private
agents are only reachable by their owner or workspace owner/admin. Agent-to-
agent traffic still bypasses the gate so A2A collaboration keeps working.
- New canAccessPrivateAgent predicate in handler/agent_access.go; used by
comment.enqueueMentionedAgentTasks (replacing the inline check), GetAgent,
ListAgents (filter), ListAgentTasks, GetWorkspaceAgentRunCounts /
Activity30d / TaskSnapshot (workspace-wide aggregations no longer leak
private-agent existence + counts), chat.CreateChatSession,
chat.SendChatMessage (re-checks on every send so role changes can't leave
a stale session as a back-door), and autopilot.shouldSkipDispatch
(caller = autopilot creator).
- allowed_principals is computed inline as {agent.owner_id} ∪ workspace
owner/admin members. No new table — manual config is intentionally not
exposed in v1; the predicate is the extension seam.
- Front-end agent detail page distinguishes 403 (private agent the caller
can't access) from 404 (deleted/missing) and renders a "no access"
placeholder with a back-to-agents button.
- Go tests cover the pure predicate matrix + the four protected surfaces;
vitest passes for the affected views.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* feat(agents): gate issue assignment with the private-agent predicate
Refactor validateAssigneePair to call the shared canAccessPrivateAgent
helper. This closes the back door where a plain member could assign a
private agent to an issue and let normal task dispatch run it, side-
stepping the chat / @-mention gate. Agent callers (X-Agent-ID) bypass
so A2A delegation onto a private assignee still works.
Add an integration test covering all three callers (workspace owner,
agent owner, plain member).
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(agents): close three private-agent gate bypasses found in PR review
1. X-Agent-ID forgery (resolveActor): require X-Task-ID alongside
X-Agent-ID before trusting the agent identity. Without this a plain
workspace member could set X-Agent-ID to any visible agent UUID and
short-circuit the gate to "actor=agent, allow". Daemons already
pair the two headers, so legitimate A2A traffic is unaffected.
2. Chat history read path (chat.go): GetChatSession / ListChatMessages /
GetPendingChatTask / MarkChatSessionRead now go through a new
gateChatSessionForUser helper that re-applies canAccessPrivateAgent
after the ownership check, so a session creator whose role was later
downgraded loses transcript access. ListChatSessions and
ListPendingChatTasks filter their result sets by the same predicate.
3. Cross-workspace @mention (comment.enqueueMentionedAgentTasks):
resolve the mentioned agent via GetAgentInWorkspace scoped to the
issue's workspace so a UUID belonging to a different workspace's
private agent can't slip past the gate (the gate was being applied
against the current workspace's role table, which is the wrong
one).
Regression tests cover each bypass, plus an update to the resolveActor
unit test to reflect the new "X-Agent-ID without X-Task-ID falls back
to member" contract.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* test(handler): seed X-Task-ID alongside X-Agent-ID in existing agent-caller tests
After tightening resolveActor to require both headers (X-Agent-ID +
X-Task-ID) for the "agent" actor identity, three existing tests that
set only X-Agent-ID started failing because their requests now resolve
to "member" instead of "agent". Add createHandlerTestTaskForAgent
helper and seed a task per agent-caller assertion. Also patch
TestAgentExplicitMentionStillTriggers — it still passed only because
the @mention path doesn't care about author type for member callers,
but the test claims to exercise the agent path, so make it faithful.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* test(handler): finish X-Task-ID seeding + fix cross-workspace mention test schema
The previous CI run still failed in two places:
1. server/cmd/server integration tests — postCommentAsAgent → authRequestWithAgent
only set X-Agent-ID, so resolveActor downgraded the request to "member"
and the on_comment chain produced the wrong task counts. Fix:
authRequestWithAgent now also sets X-Task-ID, fetched or seeded by a new
ensureAgentTask(agentID) helper.
2. TestMentionAgent_RejectsCrossWorkspaceAgentUUID's hand-crafted comment
INSERT was missing comment.workspace_id, which migration 025 made
NOT NULL. Pass testWorkspaceID into the seed row.
Build + vet clean locally; both packages compile.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
---------
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
602 lines
20 KiB
Go
602 lines
20 KiB
Go
package handler
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgconn"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/analytics"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/auth"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/daemonws"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/events"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/middleware"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/realtime"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/service"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/storage"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/util"
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db "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/db/generated"
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)
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// randomID returns a random 16-byte hex string used as a request ID for
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// in-memory stores (model list, local skills, CLI update, etc.).
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func randomID() string {
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b := make([]byte, 16)
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rand.Read(b)
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return hex.EncodeToString(b)
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}
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type txStarter interface {
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Begin(ctx context.Context) (pgx.Tx, error)
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}
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type dbExecutor interface {
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Exec(ctx context.Context, sql string, arguments ...any) (pgconn.CommandTag, error)
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Query(ctx context.Context, sql string, args ...any) (pgx.Rows, error)
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QueryRow(ctx context.Context, sql string, args ...any) pgx.Row
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}
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type Config struct {
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AllowSignup bool
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AllowedEmails []string
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AllowedEmailDomains []string
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// UseDailyRollupForRuntimeUsage routes ListRuntimeUsage to the
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// task_usage_daily rollup table when true. Default false: the read
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// path stays on the raw task_usage stream so rollup-related issues
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// (pg_cron not running, backfill not yet performed, watermark stuck)
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// can never make the dashboard return empty/stale data. Operators
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// flip this on per environment AFTER:
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// 1) migrations 072..076 applied,
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// 2) backfill_task_usage_daily ran successfully,
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// 3) cron job scheduled and task_usage_rollup_lag_seconds() < 900.
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UseDailyRollupForRuntimeUsage bool
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}
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type Handler struct {
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Queries *db.Queries
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DB dbExecutor
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TxStarter txStarter
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Hub *realtime.Hub
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DaemonHub *daemonws.Hub
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Bus *events.Bus
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TaskService *service.TaskService
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AutopilotService *service.AutopilotService
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EmailService *service.EmailService
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UpdateStore UpdateStore
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ModelListStore ModelListStore
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LocalSkillListStore LocalSkillListStore
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LocalSkillImportStore LocalSkillImportStore
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LivenessStore LivenessStore
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HeartbeatScheduler HeartbeatScheduler
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Storage storage.Storage
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CFSigner *auth.CloudFrontSigner
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Analytics analytics.Client
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PATCache *auth.PATCache
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DaemonTokenCache *auth.DaemonTokenCache
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cfg Config
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}
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func New(queries *db.Queries, txStarter txStarter, hub *realtime.Hub, bus *events.Bus, emailService *service.EmailService, store storage.Storage, cfSigner *auth.CloudFrontSigner, analyticsClient analytics.Client, cfg Config, daemonHubs ...*daemonws.Hub) *Handler {
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var executor dbExecutor
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if candidate, ok := txStarter.(dbExecutor); ok {
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executor = candidate
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}
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if analyticsClient == nil {
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analyticsClient = analytics.NoopClient{}
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}
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var daemonHub *daemonws.Hub
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if len(daemonHubs) > 0 {
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daemonHub = daemonHubs[0]
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}
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taskSvc := service.NewTaskService(queries, txStarter, hub, bus, daemonHub)
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taskSvc.Analytics = analyticsClient
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return &Handler{
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Queries: queries,
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DB: executor,
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TxStarter: txStarter,
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Hub: hub,
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DaemonHub: daemonHub,
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Bus: bus,
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TaskService: taskSvc,
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AutopilotService: service.NewAutopilotService(queries, txStarter, bus, taskSvc),
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EmailService: emailService,
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UpdateStore: NewInMemoryUpdateStore(),
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ModelListStore: NewInMemoryModelListStore(),
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LocalSkillListStore: NewInMemoryLocalSkillListStore(),
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LocalSkillImportStore: NewInMemoryLocalSkillImportStore(),
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LivenessStore: NewNoopLivenessStore(),
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HeartbeatScheduler: NewPassthroughHeartbeatScheduler(queries),
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Storage: store,
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CFSigner: cfSigner,
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Analytics: analyticsClient,
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cfg: cfg,
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}
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}
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func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(status)
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json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
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}
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func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, msg string) {
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writeJSON(w, status, map[string]string{"error": msg})
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}
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// Thin wrappers around util functions.
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//
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// parseUUID is intentionally the panicking variant: any handler call site
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// reachable here is expected to feed a UUID that is either (a) a sqlc round-trip
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// of a DB-sourced value, or (b) a raw request input that has already been
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// validated upstream. A panic here means an unguarded user-input string slipped
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// in — that is a real bug we want surfaced loudly (chi's middleware.Recoverer
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// converts it to a 500) instead of silently corrupting data via a zero UUID.
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//
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// For unvalidated user input at request boundaries, use parseUUIDOrBadRequest
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// (writes 400) — never feed raw chi.URLParam / request-body strings into
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// parseUUID directly when the call writes to the database.
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func parseUUID(s string) pgtype.UUID { return util.MustParseUUID(s) }
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func uuidToString(u pgtype.UUID) string { return util.UUIDToString(u) }
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func textToPtr(t pgtype.Text) *string { return util.TextToPtr(t) }
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func ptrToText(s *string) pgtype.Text { return util.PtrToText(s) }
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func strToText(s string) pgtype.Text { return util.StrToText(s) }
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func timestampToString(t pgtype.Timestamptz) string { return util.TimestampToString(t) }
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func timestampToPtr(t pgtype.Timestamptz) *string { return util.TimestampToPtr(t) }
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func uuidToPtr(u pgtype.UUID) *string { return util.UUIDToPtr(u) }
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func int8ToPtr(v pgtype.Int8) *int64 { return util.Int8ToPtr(v) }
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// parseUUIDOrBadRequest validates a UUID string sourced from user input
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// (URL params, request body, headers). On invalid input it writes a 400
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// response and returns ok=false; callers must return immediately.
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//
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// Use this anywhere a malformed UUID would otherwise reach a write query
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// (DELETE / UPDATE) — the silent zero-UUID behavior of the old ParseUUID
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// caused real silent-data-loss bugs (#1661).
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func parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, s, fieldName string) (pgtype.UUID, bool) {
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u, err := util.ParseUUID(s)
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid "+fieldName)
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return pgtype.UUID{}, false
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}
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return u, true
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}
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func parseUUIDSliceOrBadRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, ids []string, fieldName string) ([]pgtype.UUID, bool) {
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uuids := make([]pgtype.UUID, len(ids))
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for i, id := range ids {
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u, err := util.ParseUUID(id)
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid "+fieldName)
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return nil, false
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}
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uuids[i] = u
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}
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return uuids, true
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}
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// publish sends a domain event through the event bus.
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func (h *Handler) publish(eventType, workspaceID, actorType, actorID string, payload any) {
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h.Bus.Publish(events.Event{
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Type: eventType,
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WorkspaceID: workspaceID,
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ActorType: actorType,
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ActorID: actorID,
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Payload: payload,
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})
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}
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// publishTask is publish() plus a TaskID hint so the realtime layer can route
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// the event to the per-task scope rather than the whole workspace.
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func (h *Handler) publishTask(eventType, workspaceID, actorType, actorID, taskID string, payload any) {
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h.Bus.Publish(events.Event{
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Type: eventType,
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WorkspaceID: workspaceID,
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ActorType: actorType,
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ActorID: actorID,
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TaskID: taskID,
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Payload: payload,
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})
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}
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// publishChat is publish() plus a ChatSessionID hint so the realtime layer
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// can route the event to the per-chat-session scope.
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func (h *Handler) publishChat(eventType, workspaceID, actorType, actorID, chatSessionID string, payload any) {
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h.Bus.Publish(events.Event{
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Type: eventType,
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WorkspaceID: workspaceID,
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ActorType: actorType,
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ActorID: actorID,
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ChatSessionID: chatSessionID,
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Payload: payload,
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})
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}
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func isNotFound(err error) bool {
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return errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows)
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}
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func isUniqueViolation(err error) bool {
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var pgErr *pgconn.PgError
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return errors.As(err, &pgErr) && pgErr.Code == "23505"
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}
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func requestUserID(r *http.Request) string {
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return r.Header.Get("X-User-ID")
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}
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// resolveActor determines whether the request is from an agent or a human member.
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// To claim "agent" identity the request MUST carry both X-Agent-ID and a valid
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// X-Task-ID, and the task must belong to the claimed agent. Otherwise we fall
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// back to "member" using the user ID from the session.
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//
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// X-Agent-ID alone is not trusted: any workspace member can guess or observe
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// an agent's UUID, and a member-supplied X-Agent-ID would otherwise let that
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// member impersonate the agent and bypass the private-agent gate (#2359
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// review). The daemon always pairs the two headers — X-Agent-ID names the
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// agent claiming the request, X-Task-ID names the in-flight task that
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// authorizes it — so requiring both has no effect on legitimate agent
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// callers but closes the impersonation path.
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//
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// Returns ("agent", agentID) on success, ("member", userID) otherwise.
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func (h *Handler) resolveActor(r *http.Request, userID, workspaceID string) (actorType, actorID string) {
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agentID := r.Header.Get("X-Agent-ID")
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if agentID == "" {
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return "member", userID
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}
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taskID := r.Header.Get("X-Task-ID")
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if taskID == "" {
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slog.Debug("resolveActor: X-Agent-ID present but X-Task-ID missing, refusing to trust agent identity", "agent_id", agentID)
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return "member", userID
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}
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agentUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(agentID)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Debug("resolveActor: X-Agent-ID is not a valid UUID, falling back to member", "agent_id", agentID)
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return "member", userID
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}
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// Validate the agent exists in the target workspace.
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agent, err := h.Queries.GetAgent(r.Context(), agentUUID)
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if err != nil || uuidToString(agent.WorkspaceID) != workspaceID {
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slog.Debug("resolveActor: X-Agent-ID rejected, agent not found or workspace mismatch", "agent_id", agentID, "workspace_id", workspaceID)
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return "member", userID
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}
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taskUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(taskID)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Debug("resolveActor: X-Task-ID is not a valid UUID, falling back to member", "task_id", taskID)
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return "member", userID
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}
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task, err := h.Queries.GetAgentTask(r.Context(), taskUUID)
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if err != nil || uuidToString(task.AgentID) != agentID {
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slog.Debug("resolveActor: X-Task-ID rejected, task not found or agent mismatch", "agent_id", agentID, "task_id", taskID)
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return "member", userID
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}
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return "agent", agentID
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}
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func requireUserID(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (string, bool) {
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userID := requestUserID(r)
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if userID == "" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "user not authenticated")
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return "", false
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}
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return userID, true
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}
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// resolveWorkspaceID returns the workspace UUID for this request. Delegates
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// to middleware.ResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest so middleware-protected routes
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// and middleware-less routes (e.g. /api/upload-file) share identical
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// resolution behavior — including slug → UUID translation via the DB.
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//
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// Returns "" when no workspace identifier was provided or a slug was provided
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// but doesn't match any workspace.
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func (h *Handler) resolveWorkspaceID(r *http.Request) string {
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return middleware.ResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest(r, h.Queries)
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}
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// ctxMember returns the workspace member from context (set by workspace middleware).
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func ctxMember(ctx context.Context) (db.Member, bool) {
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return middleware.MemberFromContext(ctx)
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}
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// ctxWorkspaceID returns the workspace ID from context (set by workspace middleware).
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func ctxWorkspaceID(ctx context.Context) string {
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return middleware.WorkspaceIDFromContext(ctx)
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}
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// workspaceIDFromURL returns the workspace ID from context (preferred) or chi URL param (fallback).
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func workspaceIDFromURL(r *http.Request, param string) string {
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if id := middleware.WorkspaceIDFromContext(r.Context()); id != "" {
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return id
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}
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return chi.URLParam(r, param)
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}
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// workspaceMember returns the member from middleware context, or falls back to a DB
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// lookup when the handler is called directly (e.g. in tests).
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func (h *Handler) workspaceMember(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, workspaceID string) (db.Member, bool) {
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if m, ok := ctxMember(r.Context()); ok {
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return m, true
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}
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return h.requireWorkspaceMember(w, r, workspaceID, "workspace not found")
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}
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func roleAllowed(role string, roles ...string) bool {
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for _, candidate := range roles {
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if role == candidate {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func countOwners(members []db.Member) int {
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owners := 0
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for _, member := range members {
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if member.Role == "owner" {
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owners++
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}
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}
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return owners
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}
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func (h *Handler) getWorkspaceMember(ctx context.Context, userID, workspaceID string) (db.Member, error) {
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userUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(userID)
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if err != nil {
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return db.Member{}, err
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}
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wsUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(workspaceID)
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if err != nil {
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return db.Member{}, err
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}
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return h.Queries.GetMemberByUserAndWorkspace(ctx, db.GetMemberByUserAndWorkspaceParams{
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UserID: userUUID,
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WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
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})
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}
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func (h *Handler) requireWorkspaceMember(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, workspaceID, notFoundMsg string) (db.Member, bool) {
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if workspaceID == "" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "workspace_id is required")
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return db.Member{}, false
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}
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userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
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if !ok {
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return db.Member{}, false
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}
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member, err := h.getWorkspaceMember(r.Context(), userID, workspaceID)
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, notFoundMsg)
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return db.Member{}, false
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}
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return member, true
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}
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func (h *Handler) requireWorkspaceRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, workspaceID, notFoundMsg string, roles ...string) (db.Member, bool) {
|
|
member, ok := h.requireWorkspaceMember(w, r, workspaceID, notFoundMsg)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return db.Member{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
if !roleAllowed(member.Role, roles...) {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "insufficient permissions")
|
|
return db.Member{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
return member, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// isWorkspaceEntity checks whether a user_id belongs to the given workspace,
|
|
// as either a member or an agent depending on userType.
|
|
func (h *Handler) isWorkspaceEntity(ctx context.Context, userType, userID, workspaceID string) bool {
|
|
switch userType {
|
|
case "member":
|
|
_, err := h.getWorkspaceMember(ctx, userID, workspaceID)
|
|
return err == nil
|
|
case "agent":
|
|
userUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(userID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
wsUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(workspaceID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = h.Queries.GetAgentInWorkspace(ctx, db.GetAgentInWorkspaceParams{
|
|
ID: userUUID,
|
|
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
|
|
})
|
|
return err == nil
|
|
default:
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (h *Handler) loadIssueForUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, issueID string) (db.Issue, bool) {
|
|
if _, ok := requireUserID(w, r); !ok {
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
workspaceID := h.resolveWorkspaceID(r)
|
|
if workspaceID == "" {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "workspace_id is required")
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Try identifier format first (e.g., "JIA-42"). resolveIssueByIdentifier
|
|
// silently returns false for non-identifier strings, falling through to
|
|
// the UUID path below.
|
|
if issue, ok := h.resolveIssueByIdentifier(r.Context(), issueID, workspaceID); ok {
|
|
return issue, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
issueUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(issueID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// Not a valid UUID and didn't match identifier format → 404 (consistent
|
|
// with previous silent-zero behavior, which would also have produced 404).
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "issue not found")
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
wsUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(workspaceID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid workspace_id")
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
issue, err := h.Queries.GetIssueInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetIssueInWorkspaceParams{
|
|
ID: issueUUID,
|
|
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "issue not found")
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
return issue, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// resolveIssueByIdentifier tries to look up an issue by "PREFIX-NUMBER" format.
|
|
func (h *Handler) resolveIssueByIdentifier(ctx context.Context, id, workspaceID string) (db.Issue, bool) {
|
|
parts := splitIdentifier(id)
|
|
if parts == nil {
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
if workspaceID == "" {
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
wsUUID, err := util.ParseUUID(workspaceID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
issue, err := h.Queries.GetIssueByNumber(ctx, db.GetIssueByNumberParams{
|
|
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
|
|
Number: parts.number,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return db.Issue{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
return issue, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type identifierParts struct {
|
|
prefix string
|
|
number int32
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func splitIdentifier(id string) *identifierParts {
|
|
idx := -1
|
|
for i := len(id) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
|
|
if id[i] == '-' {
|
|
idx = i
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if idx <= 0 || idx >= len(id)-1 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
numStr := id[idx+1:]
|
|
num := 0
|
|
for _, c := range numStr {
|
|
if c < '0' || c > '9' {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
num = num*10 + int(c-'0')
|
|
}
|
|
if num <= 0 {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return &identifierParts{prefix: id[:idx], number: int32(num)}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// getIssuePrefix fetches the issue_prefix for a workspace.
|
|
// Falls back to generating a prefix from the workspace name if the stored
|
|
// prefix is empty (e.g. workspaces created before the prefix was introduced).
|
|
func (h *Handler) getIssuePrefix(ctx context.Context, workspaceID pgtype.UUID) string {
|
|
ws, err := h.Queries.GetWorkspace(ctx, workspaceID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
if ws.IssuePrefix != "" {
|
|
return ws.IssuePrefix
|
|
}
|
|
return generateIssuePrefix(ws.Name)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (h *Handler) loadAgentForUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, agentID string) (db.Agent, bool) {
|
|
if _, ok := requireUserID(w, r); !ok {
|
|
return db.Agent{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
workspaceID := h.resolveWorkspaceID(r)
|
|
if workspaceID == "" {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "workspace_id is required")
|
|
return db.Agent{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
agentUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, agentID, "agent id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return db.Agent{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
wsUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, workspaceID, "workspace id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return db.Agent{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
agent, err := h.Queries.GetAgentInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetAgentInWorkspaceParams{
|
|
ID: agentUUID,
|
|
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "agent not found")
|
|
return db.Agent{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
return agent, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (h *Handler) loadInboxItemForUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, itemID string) (db.InboxItem, bool) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return db.InboxItem{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
workspaceID := h.resolveWorkspaceID(r)
|
|
if workspaceID == "" {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "workspace_id is required")
|
|
return db.InboxItem{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
itemUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, itemID, "inbox item id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return db.InboxItem{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
wsUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, workspaceID, "workspace id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return db.InboxItem{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
item, err := h.Queries.GetInboxItemInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetInboxItemInWorkspaceParams{
|
|
ID: itemUUID,
|
|
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "inbox item not found")
|
|
return db.InboxItem{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if item.RecipientType != "member" || uuidToString(item.RecipientID) != userID {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "inbox item not found")
|
|
return db.InboxItem{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
return item, true
|
|
}
|