Eve bc13629b26 fix(redact): scrub secrets nested inside tool input maps and slices ...

InputMap only passed top-level string values through Text and documented
non-string values as "preserved as-is". Any secret one level down reached
the database and the WebSocket broadcast untouched:

    flat    -> [REDACTED ...]                       (scrubbed)
    nested  -> [map[diff:token=ghp_... path:a.go]]  (leaked verbatim)

This is a prerequisite for recording structured file-edit payloads. Codex
reports an edit as changes[]{path, diff, content}, and the legacy protocol
reports a deletion as the whole outgoing file — so without this, deleting a
.env would persist its full contents in cleartext.

redactValue now walks the composite shapes json.Unmarshal produces, plus
[]string and map[string]string for argv-style inputs. Composites are copied
rather than scrubbed in place, because the caller keeps using the map it
passed in.

Nesting depth comes from daemon-supplied JSON, so the walk is bounded at 32
levels; a pathologically nested payload would otherwise recurse until the
stack blows. Hitting the bound yields a placeholder rather than the raw
value, keeping the fail-safe direction.

Verified: the five new tests each fail against the previous top-level-only
implementation and pass now; full ./pkg/redact suite green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

2026-07-30 12:25:58 +08:00

..

redact_test.go

fix(redact): scrub secrets nested inside tool input maps and slices

2026-07-30 12:25:58 +08:00

redact.go

fix(redact): scrub secrets nested inside tool input maps and slices

2026-07-30 12:25:58 +08:00