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Closes the open hardening items from the SVG XSS disclosure (security-findings-2026-06-02). The primary chain (PR #3023 / #3050) is intact; this PR addresses every remaining recommendation from the disclosure's hardening list except 'serve uploads from a separate origin' (a structural change beyond this fix). Changes: - /uploads/* now requires authentication. The route is wrapped in middleware.Auth so anonymous internet users can no longer fetch workspace attachments by guessing the URL. A new ServeLocalUpload handler then enforces the second layer: - workspaces/{wsID}/* paths require membership in wsID (uses MembershipCache for the hot path); - users/{userID}/* paths allow any authenticated user (avatars are referenced cross-workspace); - any other prefix returns 404, so a future feature cannot drop content under /uploads/<other-prefix>/ and inherit a relaxed policy by accident. Non-members see 404 (not 403) so the route does not act as an IDOR oracle for workspace IDs. - Directory listing on /uploads/* is rejected at the storage layer: empty keys, trailing-slash keys, and any key that resolves to a directory return 404 before http.ServeFile would render an HTML index. UUID filenames were obscurity, but enumerating them shouldn't be free. - Every successful /uploads/* response carries X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and a tight per-response CSP (default-src 'none'; sandbox; frame-ancestors 'none'), overriding the application-wide CSP. This is belt-and-suspenders if a future regression weakens the Content-Disposition: attachment path. - UploadFile rejects HTML-family uploads at the edge (.html, .htm, .xhtml, .shtml, .xht, .phtml, plus a content-type denylist for text/html and application/xhtml+xml so renamed payloads cannot bypass the extension check). SVG and JS remain allowed because their existing serve-side defenses neutralize them and source-code attachments preview as text/plain via /api/attachments/{id}/content. Tests: - storage: TestLocalStorage_ServeFile_RejectsDirectoryListing, TestLocalStorage_ServeFile_HardeningHeaders. - handler: TestIsUploadDenied (pure), TestUploadFile_RejectsHTMLByExtension, TestUploadFile_RejectsHTMLByContentType, TestUploadFile_AllowsLegitimateImage, and the full ServeLocalUpload matrix (RequiresAuth, MemberCanRead, NonMemberDenied, RejectsDirectoryInPath, UnknownPrefixDenied, UserPrefixAllowsAnyAuthedUser). - Full server test suite passes. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>