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Merge pull request #6085

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b05a89b Non-grammatical language improvements (Luke Dashjr)
7e6d23b Bugfix: Grammar fixes (Corinne Dashjr)
This commit is contained in:
Wladimir J. van der Laan
2015-05-04 07:56:03 +02:00
parent aa9fa938d9 b05a89b2de
commit 00e76db8c2
36 changed files with 111 additions and 109 deletions
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45
src/main.cpp
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@@ -142,8 +142,9 @@ namespace {
uint32_t nBlockSequenceId = 1;
/**
* Sources of received blocks, to be able to send them reject messages or ban
* them, if processing happens afterwards. Protected by cs_main.
* Sources of received blocks, saved to be able to send them reject
* messages or ban them when processing happens afterwards. Protected by
* cs_main.
*/
map<uint256, NodeId> mapBlockSource;
@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ void FindNextBlocksToDownload(NodeId nodeid, unsigned int count, std::vector<CBl
}
// If the peer reorganized, our previous pindexLastCommonBlock may not be an ancestor
// of their current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that.
// of its current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that.
state->pindexLastCommonBlock = LastCommonAncestor(state->pindexLastCommonBlock, state->pindexBestKnownBlock);
if (state->pindexLastCommonBlock == state->pindexBestKnownBlock)
return;
@@ -941,7 +942,7 @@ bool AcceptToMemoryPool(CTxMemPool& pool, CValidationState &state, const CTransa
// do all inputs exist?
// Note that this does not check for the presence of actual outputs (see the next check for that),
// only helps filling in pfMissingInputs (to determine missing vs spent).
// and only helps with filling in pfMissingInputs (to determine missing vs spent).
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn txin, tx.vin) {
if (!view.HaveCoins(txin.prevout.hash)) {
if (pfMissingInputs)
@@ -1277,8 +1278,8 @@ void CheckForkWarningConditionsOnNewFork(CBlockIndex* pindexNewForkTip)
pfork = pfork->pprev;
}
// We define a condition which we should warn the user about as a fork of at least 7 blocks
// who's tip is within 72 blocks (+/- 12 hours if no one mines it) of ours
// We define a condition where we should warn the user about as a fork of at least 7 blocks
// with a tip within 72 blocks (+/- 12 hours if no one mines it) of ours
// We use 7 blocks rather arbitrarily as it represents just under 10% of sustained network
// hash rate operating on the fork.
// or a chain that is entirely longer than ours and invalid (note that this should be detected by both)
@@ -1719,9 +1720,9 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin
// See BIP30 and http://r6.ca/blog/20120206T005236Z.html for more information.
// This logic is not necessary for memory pool transactions, as AcceptToMemoryPool
// already refuses previously-known transaction ids entirely.
// This rule was originally applied all blocks whose timestamp was after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC.
// This rule was originally applied to all blocks with a timestamp after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC.
// Now that the whole chain is irreversibly beyond that time it is applied to all blocks except the
// two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes in their
// two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes during their
// initial block download.
bool fEnforceBIP30 = (!pindex->phashBlock) || // Enforce on CreateNewBlock invocations which don't have a hash.
!((pindex->nHeight==91842 && pindex->GetBlockHash() == uint256S("0x00000000000a4d0a398161ffc163c503763b1f4360639393e0e4c8e300e0caec")) ||
@@ -1984,7 +1985,7 @@ void static UpdateTip(CBlockIndex *pindexNew) {
if (nUpgraded > 100/2)
{
// strMiscWarning is read by GetWarnings(), called by Qt and the JSON-RPC code to warn the user:
strMiscWarning = _("Warning: This version is obsolete, upgrade required!");
strMiscWarning = _("Warning: This version is obsolete; upgrade required!");
CAlert::Notify(strMiscWarning, true);
fWarned = true;
}
@@ -2315,7 +2316,7 @@ bool InvalidateBlock(CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex *pindex) {
}
// The resulting new best tip may not be in setBlockIndexCandidates anymore, so
// add them again.
// add it again.
BlockMap::iterator it = mapBlockIndex.begin();
while (it != mapBlockIndex.end()) {
if (it->second->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) && it->second->nChainTx && !setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(it->second, chainActive.Tip())) {
@@ -3733,7 +3734,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom)
pfrom->PushMessage("merkleblock", merkleBlock);
// CMerkleBlock just contains hashes, so also push any transactions in the block the client did not see
// This avoids hurting performance by pointlessly requiring a round-trip
// Note that there is currently no way for a node to request any single transactions we didnt send here -
// Note that there is currently no way for a node to request any single transactions we didn't send here -
// they must either disconnect and retry or request the full block.
// Thus, the protocol spec specified allows for us to provide duplicate txn here,
// however we MUST always provide at least what the remote peer needs
@@ -3746,7 +3747,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom)
// no response
}
// Trigger them to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory
// Trigger the peer node to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory
if (inv.hash == pfrom->hashContinue)
{
// Bypass PushInventory, this must send even if redundant,
@@ -4060,7 +4061,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
if (inv.type == MSG_BLOCK) {
UpdateBlockAvailability(pfrom->GetId(), inv.hash);
if (!fAlreadyHave && !fImporting && !fReindex && !mapBlocksInFlight.count(inv.hash)) {
// First request the headers preceeding the announced block. In the normal fully-synced
// First request the headers preceding the announced block. In the normal fully-synced
// case where a new block is announced that succeeds the current tip (no reorganization),
// there are no such headers.
// Secondly, and only when we are close to being synced, we request the announced block directly,
@@ -4142,8 +4143,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
pfrom->PushInventory(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, pindex->GetBlockHash()));
if (--nLimit <= 0)
{
// When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll make them
// getblocks the next batch of inventory.
// When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll
// trigger the peer to getblocks the next batch of inventory.
LogPrint("net", " getblocks stopping at limit %d %s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
pfrom->hashContinue = pindex->GetBlockHash();
break;
@@ -4380,9 +4381,9 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
// This asymmetric behavior for inbound and outbound connections was introduced
// to prevent a fingerprinting attack: an attacker can send specific fake addresses
// to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages.
// Making users (which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections) ignore
// getaddr message mitigates the attack.
// to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages.
// Making nodes which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections ignore
// the getaddr message mitigates the attack.
else if ((strCommand == "getaddr") && (pfrom->fInbound))
{
pfrom->vAddrToSend.clear();
@@ -4467,7 +4468,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
// Nonce mismatches are normal when pings are overlapping
sProblem = "Nonce mismatch";
if (nonce == 0) {
// This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere, cancel this ping
// This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere; cancel this ping
bPingFinished = true;
sProblem = "Nonce zero";
}
@@ -4476,7 +4477,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
sProblem = "Unsolicited pong without ping";
}
} else {
// This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere, cancel this ping
// This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere; cancel this ping
bPingFinished = true;
sProblem = "Short payload";
}
@@ -4735,7 +4736,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle)
{
const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = Params().GetConsensus();
{
// Don't send anything until we get their version message
// Don't send anything until we get its version message
if (pto->nVersion == 0)
return true;
@@ -4919,7 +4920,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle)
// In case there is a block that has been in flight from this peer for (2 + 0.5 * N) times the block interval
// (with N the number of validated blocks that were in flight at the time it was requested), disconnect due to
// timeout. We compensate for in-flight blocks to prevent killing off peers due to our own downstream link
// being saturated. We only count validated in-flight blocks so peers can't advertize nonexisting block hashes
// being saturated. We only count validated in-flight blocks so peers can't advertise non-existing block hashes
// to unreasonably increase our timeout.
if (!pto->fDisconnect && state.vBlocksInFlight.size() > 0 && state.vBlocksInFlight.front().nTime < nNow - 500000 * consensusParams.nPowTargetSpacing * (4 + state.vBlocksInFlight.front().nValidatedQueuedBefore)) {
LogPrintf("Timeout downloading block %s from peer=%d, disconnecting\n", state.vBlocksInFlight.front().hash.ToString(), pto->id);