Make RPC password resistant to timing attacks

Fixes issue#2838; this is a tweaked version of pull#2845 that
should not leak the length of the password and is more generic,
in case we run into other situations where we need
timing-attack-resistant comparisons.
This commit is contained in:
Gavin Andresen
2013-08-08 19:58:57 +10:00
parent 6cc766fa55
commit 42656ea2e5
3 changed files with 27 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@@ -291,4 +291,15 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(util_seed_insecure_rand)
}
}
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(util_TimingResistantEqual)
{
BOOST_CHECK(TimingResistantEqual(std::string(""), std::string("")));
BOOST_CHECK(!TimingResistantEqual(std::string("abc"), std::string("")));
BOOST_CHECK(!TimingResistantEqual(std::string(""), std::string("abc")));
BOOST_CHECK(!TimingResistantEqual(std::string("a"), std::string("aa")));
BOOST_CHECK(!TimingResistantEqual(std::string("aa"), std::string("a")));
BOOST_CHECK(TimingResistantEqual(std::string("abc"), std::string("abc")));
BOOST_CHECK(!TimingResistantEqual(std::string("abc"), std::string("aba")));
}
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE_END()