Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#25704: refactor: Remove almost all validation option globals

aaaa7bd0ba iwyu: Add missing includes (MacroFake)
fa9ebec096 Remove g_parallel_script_checks (MacroFake)
fa7c834b9f Move ::fCheckBlockIndex into ChainstateManager (MacroFake)
fa43188d86 Move ::fCheckpointsEnabled into ChainstateManager (MacroFake)
cccca83099 Move ::nMinimumChainWork into ChainstateManager (MacroFake)
fa29d0b57c Move ::hashAssumeValid into ChainstateManager (MacroFake)
faf44876db Move ::nMaxTipAge into ChainstateManager (MacroFake)

Pull request description:

  It seems preferable to assign globals to a class (in this case `ChainstateManager`), than to leave them dangling. This should clarify scope for code-readers, as well as clarifying unit test behaviour.

ACKs for top commit:
  dergoegge:
    Code review ACK aaaa7bd0ba
  ryanofsky:
    Code review ACK aaaa7bd0ba. No changes since last review, other than rebase
  aureleoules:
    reACK aaaa7bd0ba

Tree-SHA512: 83ec3ba0fb4f1dad95810d4bd4e578454e0718dc1bdd3a794cc4e48aa819b6f5dad4ac4edab3719bdfd5f89cbe23c2740a50fd56c1ff81c99e521c5f6d4e898d
This commit is contained in:
MacroFake
2022-10-26 11:41:42 +02:00
13 changed files with 151 additions and 81 deletions

View File

@@ -1291,7 +1291,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::FindNextBlocksToDownload(const Peer& peer, unsigned int co
// Make sure pindexBestKnownBlock is up to date, we'll need it.
ProcessBlockAvailability(peer.m_id);
if (state->pindexBestKnownBlock == nullptr || state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->nChainWork || state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < nMinimumChainWork) {
if (state->pindexBestKnownBlock == nullptr || state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->nChainWork || state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < m_chainman.MinimumChainWork()) {
// This peer has nothing interesting.
return;
}
@@ -2392,7 +2392,7 @@ arith_uint256 PeerManagerImpl::GetAntiDoSWorkThreshold()
// near our tip.
near_chaintip_work = tip->nChainWork - std::min<arith_uint256>(144*GetBlockProof(*tip), tip->nChainWork);
}
return std::max(near_chaintip_work, arith_uint256(nMinimumChainWork));
return std::max(near_chaintip_work, m_chainman.MinimumChainWork());
}
/**
@@ -2710,14 +2710,14 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::UpdatePeerStateForReceivedHeaders(CNode& pfrom,
if (m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload() && !may_have_more_headers) {
// If the peer has no more headers to give us, then we know we have
// their tip.
if (nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < nMinimumChainWork) {
if (nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < m_chainman.MinimumChainWork()) {
// This peer has too little work on their headers chain to help
// us sync -- disconnect if it is an outbound disconnection
// candidate.
// Note: We compare their tip to nMinimumChainWork (rather than
// Note: We compare their tip to the minumum chain work (rather than
// m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()) because we won't start block download
// until we have a headers chain that has at least
// nMinimumChainWork, even if a peer has a chain past our tip,
// the minimum chain work, even if a peer has a chain past our tip,
// as an anti-DoS measure.
if (pfrom.IsOutboundOrBlockRelayConn()) {
LogPrintf("Disconnecting outbound peer %d -- headers chain has insufficient work\n", pfrom.GetId());
@@ -3901,12 +3901,12 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
// Note that if we were to be on a chain that forks from the checkpointed
// chain, then serving those headers to a peer that has seen the
// checkpointed chain would cause that peer to disconnect us. Requiring
// that our chainwork exceed nMinimumChainWork is a protection against
// that our chainwork exceed the mimimum chain work is a protection against
// being fed a bogus chain when we started up for the first time and
// getting partitioned off the honest network for serving that chain to
// others.
if (m_chainman.ActiveTip() == nullptr ||
(m_chainman.ActiveTip()->nChainWork < nMinimumChainWork && !pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::Download))) {
(m_chainman.ActiveTip()->nChainWork < m_chainman.MinimumChainWork() && !pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::Download))) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Ignoring getheaders from peer=%d because active chain has too little work; sending empty response\n", pfrom.GetId());
// Just respond with an empty headers message, to tell the peer to
// go away but not treat us as unresponsive.
@@ -4370,7 +4370,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
// (eg disk space). Because we only try to reconstruct blocks when
// we're close to caught up (via the CanDirectFetch() requirement
// above, combined with the behavior of not requesting blocks until
// we have a chain with at least nMinimumChainWork), and we ignore
// we have a chain with at least the minimum chain work), and we ignore
// compact blocks with less work than our tip, it is safe to treat
// reconstructed compact blocks as having been requested.
ProcessBlock(pfrom, pblock, /*force_processing=*/true, /*min_pow_checked=*/true);
@@ -5236,7 +5236,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::MaybeSendSendHeaders(CNode& node, Peer& peer)
LOCK(cs_main);
CNodeState &state = *State(node.GetId());
if (state.pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr &&
state.pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork > nMinimumChainWork) {
state.pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork > m_chainman.MinimumChainWork()) {
// Tell our peer we prefer to receive headers rather than inv's
// We send this to non-NODE NETWORK peers as well, because even
// non-NODE NETWORK peers can announce blocks (such as pruning