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Move ::nMinimumChainWork into ChainstateManager
This changes the minimum chain work for the bitcoin-chainstate
executable. Previously it was uint256{}, now it is the chain's default
minimum chain work.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1291,7 +1291,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::FindNextBlocksToDownload(const Peer& peer, unsigned int co
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// Make sure pindexBestKnownBlock is up to date, we'll need it.
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ProcessBlockAvailability(peer.m_id);
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if (state->pindexBestKnownBlock == nullptr || state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->nChainWork || state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < nMinimumChainWork) {
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if (state->pindexBestKnownBlock == nullptr || state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()->nChainWork || state->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < m_chainman.MinimumChainWork()) {
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// This peer has nothing interesting.
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return;
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}
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@@ -2392,7 +2392,7 @@ arith_uint256 PeerManagerImpl::GetAntiDoSWorkThreshold()
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// near our tip.
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near_chaintip_work = tip->nChainWork - std::min<arith_uint256>(144*GetBlockProof(*tip), tip->nChainWork);
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}
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return std::max(near_chaintip_work, arith_uint256(nMinimumChainWork));
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return std::max(near_chaintip_work, m_chainman.MinimumChainWork());
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}
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/**
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@@ -2702,14 +2702,14 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::UpdatePeerStateForReceivedHeaders(CNode& pfrom,
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if (m_chainman.ActiveChainstate().IsInitialBlockDownload() && !may_have_more_headers) {
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// If the peer has no more headers to give us, then we know we have
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// their tip.
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if (nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < nMinimumChainWork) {
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if (nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock && nodestate->pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork < m_chainman.MinimumChainWork()) {
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// This peer has too little work on their headers chain to help
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// us sync -- disconnect if it is an outbound disconnection
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// candidate.
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// Note: We compare their tip to nMinimumChainWork (rather than
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// Note: We compare their tip to the minumum chain work (rather than
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// m_chainman.ActiveChain().Tip()) because we won't start block download
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// until we have a headers chain that has at least
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// nMinimumChainWork, even if a peer has a chain past our tip,
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// the minimum chain work, even if a peer has a chain past our tip,
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// as an anti-DoS measure.
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if (pfrom.IsOutboundOrBlockRelayConn()) {
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LogPrintf("Disconnecting outbound peer %d -- headers chain has insufficient work\n", pfrom.GetId());
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@@ -3893,12 +3893,12 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
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// Note that if we were to be on a chain that forks from the checkpointed
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// chain, then serving those headers to a peer that has seen the
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// checkpointed chain would cause that peer to disconnect us. Requiring
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// that our chainwork exceed nMinimumChainWork is a protection against
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// that our chainwork exceed the mimimum chain work is a protection against
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// being fed a bogus chain when we started up for the first time and
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// getting partitioned off the honest network for serving that chain to
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// others.
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if (m_chainman.ActiveTip() == nullptr ||
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(m_chainman.ActiveTip()->nChainWork < nMinimumChainWork && !pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::Download))) {
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(m_chainman.ActiveTip()->nChainWork < m_chainman.MinimumChainWork() && !pfrom.HasPermission(NetPermissionFlags::Download))) {
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LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Ignoring getheaders from peer=%d because active chain has too little work; sending empty response\n", pfrom.GetId());
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// Just respond with an empty headers message, to tell the peer to
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// go away but not treat us as unresponsive.
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@@ -4362,7 +4362,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
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// (eg disk space). Because we only try to reconstruct blocks when
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// we're close to caught up (via the CanDirectFetch() requirement
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// above, combined with the behavior of not requesting blocks until
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// we have a chain with at least nMinimumChainWork), and we ignore
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// we have a chain with at least the minimum chain work), and we ignore
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// compact blocks with less work than our tip, it is safe to treat
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// reconstructed compact blocks as having been requested.
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ProcessBlock(pfrom, pblock, /*force_processing=*/true, /*min_pow_checked=*/true);
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@@ -5228,7 +5228,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::MaybeSendSendHeaders(CNode& node, Peer& peer)
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LOCK(cs_main);
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CNodeState &state = *State(node.GetId());
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if (state.pindexBestKnownBlock != nullptr &&
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state.pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork > nMinimumChainWork) {
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state.pindexBestKnownBlock->nChainWork > m_chainman.MinimumChainWork()) {
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// Tell our peer we prefer to receive headers rather than inv's
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// We send this to non-NODE NETWORK peers as well, because even
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// non-NODE NETWORK peers can announce blocks (such as pruning
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