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Merge branch 'optimize'

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This commit is contained in:
Gavin Andresen
2012-05-22 11:05:46 -04:00
parent eef7c4a773 62922c8ab0
commit d0e4051cd8
6 changed files with 544 additions and 286 deletions
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88
src/main.cpp
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@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ map<uint256, CBlock*> mapOrphanBlocks;
multimap<uint256, CBlock*> mapOrphanBlocksByPrev;
map<uint256, CDataStream*> mapOrphanTransactions;
multimap<uint256, CDataStream*> mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev;
map<uint256, map<uint256, CDataStream*> > mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev;
// Constant stuff for coinbase transactions we create:
CScript COINBASE_FLAGS;
@@ -161,17 +161,37 @@ void static ResendWalletTransactions()
// mapOrphanTransactions
//
void AddOrphanTx(const CDataStream& vMsg)
bool AddOrphanTx(const CDataStream& vMsg)
{
CTransaction tx;
CDataStream(vMsg) >> tx;
uint256 hash = tx.GetHash();
if (mapOrphanTransactions.count(hash))
return;
return false;
CDataStream* pvMsg = mapOrphanTransactions[hash] = new CDataStream(vMsg);
CDataStream* pvMsg = new CDataStream(vMsg);
// Ignore big transactions, to avoid a
// send-big-orphans memory exhaustion attack. If a peer has a legitimate
// large transaction with a missing parent then we assume
// it will rebroadcast it later, after the parent transaction(s)
// have been mined or received.
// 10,000 orphans, each of which is at most 5,000 bytes big is
// at most 500 megabytes of orphans:
if (pvMsg->size() > 5000)
{
delete pvMsg;
printf("ignoring large orphan tx (size: %u, hash: %s)\n", pvMsg->size(), hash.ToString().substr(0,10).c_str());
return false;
}
mapOrphanTransactions[hash] = pvMsg;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, tx.vin)
mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.insert(make_pair(txin.prevout.hash, pvMsg));
mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev[txin.prevout.hash].insert(make_pair(hash, pvMsg));
printf("stored orphan tx %s (mapsz %u)\n", hash.ToString().substr(0,10).c_str(),
mapOrphanTransactions.size());
return true;
}
void static EraseOrphanTx(uint256 hash)
@@ -183,14 +203,9 @@ void static EraseOrphanTx(uint256 hash)
CDataStream(*pvMsg) >> tx;
BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, tx.vin)
{
for (multimap<uint256, CDataStream*>::iterator mi = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.lower_bound(txin.prevout.hash);
mi != mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.upper_bound(txin.prevout.hash);)
{
if ((*mi).second == pvMsg)
mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.erase(mi++);
else
mi++;
}
mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev[txin.prevout.hash].erase(hash);
if (mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev[txin.prevout.hash].empty())
mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.erase(txin.prevout.hash);
}
delete pvMsg;
mapOrphanTransactions.erase(hash);
@@ -202,9 +217,7 @@ unsigned int LimitOrphanTxSize(unsigned int nMaxOrphans)
while (mapOrphanTransactions.size() > nMaxOrphans)
{
// Evict a random orphan:
std::vector<unsigned char> randbytes(32);
RAND_bytes(&randbytes[0], 32);
uint256 randomhash(randbytes);
uint256 randomhash = GetRandHash();
map<uint256, CDataStream*>::iterator it = mapOrphanTransactions.lower_bound(randomhash);
if (it == mapOrphanTransactions.end())
it = mapOrphanTransactions.begin();
@@ -1155,17 +1168,28 @@ bool CTransaction::ConnectInputs(MapPrevTx inputs,
if (pindex->nBlockPos == txindex.pos.nBlockPos && pindex->nFile == txindex.pos.nFile)
return error("ConnectInputs() : tried to spend coinbase at depth %d", pindexBlock->nHeight - pindex->nHeight);
// Check for negative or overflow input values
nValueIn += txPrev.vout[prevout.n].nValue;
if (!MoneyRange(txPrev.vout[prevout.n].nValue) || !MoneyRange(nValueIn))
return DoS(100, error("ConnectInputs() : txin values out of range"));
}
// The first loop above does all the inexpensive checks.
// Only if ALL inputs pass do we perform expensive ECDSA signature checks.
// Helps prevent CPU exhaustion attacks.
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vin.size(); i++)
{
COutPoint prevout = vin[i].prevout;
assert(inputs.count(prevout.hash) > 0);
CTxIndex& txindex = inputs[prevout.hash].first;
CTransaction& txPrev = inputs[prevout.hash].second;
// Check for conflicts (double-spend)
// This doesn't trigger the DoS code on purpose; if it did, it would make it easier
// for an attacker to attempt to split the network.
if (!txindex.vSpent[prevout.n].IsNull())
return fMiner ? false : error("ConnectInputs() : %s prev tx already used at %s", GetHash().ToString().substr(0,10).c_str(), txindex.vSpent[prevout.n].ToString().c_str());
// Check for negative or overflow input values
nValueIn += txPrev.vout[prevout.n].nValue;
if (!MoneyRange(txPrev.vout[prevout.n].nValue) || !MoneyRange(nValueIn))
return DoS(100, error("ConnectInputs() : txin values out of range"));
// Skip ECDSA signature verification when connecting blocks (fBlock=true)
// before the last blockchain checkpoint. This is safe because block merkle hashes are
// still computed and checked, and any change will be caught at the next checkpoint.
@@ -2460,7 +2484,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv)
// at a time so the setAddrKnowns of the chosen nodes prevent repeats
static uint256 hashSalt;
if (hashSalt == 0)
RAND_bytes((unsigned char*)&hashSalt, sizeof(hashSalt));
hashSalt = GetRandHash();
int64 hashAddr = addr.GetHash();
uint256 hashRand = hashSalt ^ (hashAddr<<32) ^ ((GetTime()+hashAddr)/(24*60*60));
hashRand = Hash(BEGIN(hashRand), END(hashRand));
@@ -2676,6 +2700,7 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv)
else if (strCommand == "tx")
{
vector<uint256> vWorkQueue;
vector<uint256> vEraseQueue;
CDataStream vMsg(vRecv);
CTxDB txdb("r");
CTransaction tx;
@@ -2691,32 +2716,41 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv)
RelayMessage(inv, vMsg);
mapAlreadyAskedFor.erase(inv);
vWorkQueue.push_back(inv.hash);
vEraseQueue.push_back(inv.hash);
// Recursively process any orphan transactions that depended on this one
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < vWorkQueue.size(); i++)
{
uint256 hashPrev = vWorkQueue[i];
for (multimap<uint256, CDataStream*>::iterator mi = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.lower_bound(hashPrev);
mi != mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev.upper_bound(hashPrev);
for (map<uint256, CDataStream*>::iterator mi = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev[hashPrev].begin();
mi != mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev[hashPrev].end();
++mi)
{
const CDataStream& vMsg = *((*mi).second);
CTransaction tx;
CDataStream(vMsg) >> tx;
CInv inv(MSG_TX, tx.GetHash());
bool fMissingInputs2 = false;
if (tx.AcceptToMemoryPool(txdb, true))
if (tx.AcceptToMemoryPool(txdb, true, &fMissingInputs2))
{
printf(" accepted orphan tx %s\n", inv.hash.ToString().substr(0,10).c_str());
SyncWithWallets(tx, NULL, true);
RelayMessage(inv, vMsg);
mapAlreadyAskedFor.erase(inv);
vWorkQueue.push_back(inv.hash);
vEraseQueue.push_back(inv.hash);
}
else if (!fMissingInputs2)
{
// invalid orphan
vEraseQueue.push_back(inv.hash);
printf(" removed invalid orphan tx %s\n", inv.hash.ToString().substr(0,10).c_str());
}
}
}
BOOST_FOREACH(uint256 hash, vWorkQueue)
BOOST_FOREACH(uint256 hash, vEraseQueue)
EraseOrphanTx(hash);
}
else if (fMissingInputs)
@@ -3072,7 +3106,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle)
// 1/4 of tx invs blast to all immediately
static uint256 hashSalt;
if (hashSalt == 0)
RAND_bytes((unsigned char*)&hashSalt, sizeof(hashSalt));
hashSalt = GetRandHash();
uint256 hashRand = inv.hash ^ hashSalt;
hashRand = Hash(BEGIN(hashRand), END(hashRand));
bool fTrickleWait = ((hashRand & 3) != 0);