The test framework's p2p implementation currently sends out it's VERSION
message immediately after an inbound connection (i.e. TestNode outbound
connection) is made. This doesn't follow the usual protocol flow where
the initiator sends a version first, and the responders processes that
and only then responds with its own version message. Change that
accordingly by only sending immediate VERSION message for outbound
connections (or after v2 handshake for v2 connections, respectively),
and sending out VERSION messages as response for incoming VERSION
messages (i.e. in the function `on_version`) for inbound connections.
Note that some of the overruled `on_version` methods in functional tests
needed to be changed to send the version explicitly.
Check that within 24h addr of a given node is forwarded
to the same peer(s), and then the destination is
rotated every 24h.
Co-authored-by: Jon Atack <jon@atack.com>
This combines the addr generation helper functions setup_addr_msg
and setup_rand_addr_msg.
It also changes the way addr.time is filled to random, because before,
if too many addresses (>600) were created in a batch, they would stop
being relayed because their timestamp would be too far in the future.
The previous diff touched most files in ./test/, so bump the headers to
avoid having to touch them again for a bump later.
-BEGIN VERIFY SCRIPT-
./contrib/devtools/copyright_header.py update ./test/
-END VERIFY SCRIPT-
Previously, Add() would return true if the function created a new
AddressInfo object, even if that object could not be successfully
entered into the new table and was deleted. That would happen if the new
table position was already taken and the existing entry could not be
removed.
Instead, return true if the new AddressInfo object is successfully
entered into the new table. This fixes a bug in the "Added %i addresses"
log, which would not always accurately log how many addresses had been
added.
p2p_addrv2_relay.py and p2p_addr_relay.py need to be updated since they
were incorrectly asserting on the buggy log (assuming that addresses are
added to addrman, when there could in fact be new table position
collisions that prevent some of those address records from being added).
d930c7f5b0 p2p, rpc, test: address rate-limiting follow-ups (Jon Atack)
Pull request description:
Incorporates review feedback in #22387.
Edit, could be considered separately: should a release note (or two) be added for 22.0? e.g. the new getpeerinfo fields in `Updated RPCs` and the rate-limiting itself in `P2P and network changes`.
ACKs for top commit:
MarcoFalke:
review ACK d930c7f5b0
theStack:
re-ACK d930c7f5b0🌮
Zero-1729:
crACK d930c7f
Tree-SHA512: b2101cad87f59c238603f38bd8e8df7a4d48929794e4de9e0e0ff2afa935a68475c2d369aa669d124a0bec2f50280fb47e8b980bde6ad812db08cf67b71c066a
This test checks that we only relay addresses with inbound peers who have sent
us an addr related message. Uses a combination of GETADDR and ADDR to verify
when peers are eligible.
Use SetupAddressRelay to only initialize `m_addr_known` as needed. For outbound
peers, we initialize the filter before sending our self announcement (not
applicable for block-relay-only connections). For inbound peers, we initialize
the filter when we get an addr related message (ADDR, ADDRV2, GETADDR).
These changes intend to mitigate address blackholes. Since an inbound peer has
to send us an addr related message to become eligible as a candidate for addr
relay, this should reduce our likelihood of sending them self-announcements.
Use an init param to make clear whether a getaddr message should be sent when
the P2PConnection receives a version message. These changes are in preparation
for upcoming commits that modify the behavior of a bitcoind node and the test
framework.
While limitations on the influence of attackers on addrman already
exist (affected buckets are restricted to a subset based on incoming
IP / network group), there is no reason to permit them to let them
feed us addresses at more than a multiple of the normal network
rate.
This commit introduces a "token bucket" rate limiter for the
processing of addresses in incoming ADDR and ADDRV2 messages.
Every connection gets an associated token bucket. Processing an
address in an ADDR or ADDRV2 message from non-whitelisted peers
consumes a token from the bucket. If the bucket is empty, the
address is ignored (it is not forwarded or processed). The token
counter increases at a rate of 0.1 tokens per second, and will
accrue up to a maximum of 1000 tokens (the maximum we accept in a
single ADDR or ADDRV2). When a GETADDR is sent to a peer, it
immediately gets 1000 additional tokens, as we actively desire many
addresses from such peers (this may temporarily cause the token
count to exceed 1000).
The rate limit of 0.1 addr/s was chosen based on observation of
honest nodes on the network. Activity in general from most nodes
is either 0, or up to a maximum around 0.025 addr/s for recent
Bitcoin Core nodes. A few (self-identified, through subver) crawler
nodes occasionally exceed 0.1 addr/s.
The `on_addr` functionality of `AddrReceiver` tests logic specific to how the
addr messages are set up in the test bodies. To allow other callers to also use
`AddrReceiver`, only apply the assertion logic if the caller indicates
desirability by setting `test_addr_contents` to true when initializing the
class.
For each address to be relayed we "randomly" pick 2 nodes to send the
address to (in `RelayAddress()`). However we do not take into
consideration that it does not make sense to relay the address back to
its originator (`CNode::PushAddress()` will do nothing in that case).
This means that if the originator is among the "randomly" picked nodes,
then we will relay to one node less than intended.
Fix this by skipping the originating node when choosing candidates to
relay to.
