rand_cache is unused since commit
16329224e70d0525208f6b0ba00c5e1531a4f5ea, so it can be removed
rand_seed is wrong since commit
022cf47dd7ef8f46e32a184e84f94d1e9f3a495c, because it is no longer
printing the seed that was used to seed the global random context in
tests. Instead, it prints a (random-ish) value derived from the global
random context via InsecureRand256().
Finally, the for loop creating new prevector_tester objects will always
use the same seed since commit fae43a97ca947cd0802392e9bb86d9d0572c0fba,
because repeated calls to SeedInsecureRand/SeedRandomForTest will always
reseed the global with the same "static const" seed.
Fix all issues by
* removing the unused rand_cache,
* removing the call to SeedRandomForTest which restored the same seed on
every call in the process, and
* Reseeding the global random context with the (random-ish) rand_seed.
917e70a6206c62c4c492fa922425fc8e00d3f328 test: assumeutxo: check that UTXO-querying RPCs operate on snapshot chainstate (Sebastian Falbesoner)
Pull request description:
Inspired by some manual testing I did for #28553, this PR checks that RPCs which explicitly query the UTXO set database (i.e. `gettxoutsetinfo`, `scantxoutset` and `gettxout`) operate on the snapshot chainstate as expected.
ACKs for top commit:
fjahr:
utACK 917e70a6206c62c4c492fa922425fc8e00d3f328
achow101:
ACK 917e70a6206c62c4c492fa922425fc8e00d3f328
tdb3:
ACK 917e70a6206c62c4c492fa922425fc8e00d3f328
Tree-SHA512: 40ecd1c5dd879234df1667fa5444a1fbbee9b7c456f597dc982d1a2bce46fe9107711b005ab829e570ef919a4914792f72f342d71d92bad2ae9434b5e68d5bd3
Handle the Block height out of range error gracefully by checking if
the node has synchronized to or beyond the required block height,
otherwise without this validation the node would keep the network
disabled if the user selected that option.
Provide a user-friendly message if the block height is out of range
and exit the script cleanly.
fa899fb7aa8a14acecadd8936ad5824fa0f697ff fuzz: Speed up utxo_snapshot fuzz target (MarcoFalke)
fa386642b4dfd88f74488c288c7886494d69f4ed fuzz: Speed up utxo_snapshot by lazy re-init (MarcoFalke)
fa645c7a861ffa83a53a459263b6a620defe31f9 fuzz: Remove unused DataStream object (MarcoFalke)
fae8c73d9e4eba4603447bb52b6e3e760fbf15f8 test: Disallow fee_estimator construction in ChainTestingSetup (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Two commits to speed up unit and fuzz tests.
Can be tested by running the fuzz target and looking at the time it took, or by looking at the flamegraph. For example:
```
FUZZ=utxo_snapshot perf record -g --call-graph dwarf ./src/test/fuzz/fuzz -runs=100
hotspot ./perf.data
ACKs for top commit:
TheCharlatan:
Re-ACK fa899fb7aa8a14acecadd8936ad5824fa0f697ff
marcofleon:
Re ACK fa899fb7aa8a14acecadd8936ad5824fa0f697ff
brunoerg:
ACK fa899fb7aa8a14acecadd8936ad5824fa0f697ff
Tree-SHA512: d3a771bb12d7ef491eee61ca47325dd1cea5c20b6ad42554babf13ec98d03bef8e7786159d077e59cc7ab8112495037b0f6e55edae65b871c7cf1708687cf717
The flags SECP256K1_CONTEXT_{SIGN,VERIFY} have been deprecated since
libsecp256k1 version 0.2 (released in December 2022), with the
recommendation to use SECP256K1_CONTEXT_NONE instead.
This currently has no effect due to fPowNoRetargeting,
except for the getnetworkhashps when called with -1.
It will when the next commit enforces the timewarp attack mitigation on regtest.
16e95bda86302af20cfb314a2c0252256d01f750 Move maximum timewarp attack threshold back to 600s from 7200s (Matt Corallo)
Pull request description:
In 6bfa26048dbafb91e9ca63ea8d3960271e798098 the testnet4 timewarp attack fix block time variation was increased from the Great Consensus Cleanup value of 600s to 7200s on the thesis that this allows miners to always create blocks with the current time. Sadly, doing so does allow for some nonzero inflation, even if not a huge amount.
While it could be that some hardware ignores the timestamp provided to it over Stratum and forces the block header timestamp to the current time, I'm not aware of any such hardware, and it would also likely suffer from random invalid blocks due to relying on NTP anyway, making its existence highly unlikely.
This leaves the only concern being pools, but most of those rely on work generated by Bitcoin Core (in one way or another, though when spy mining possibly not), and it seems likely that they will also not suffer any lost work. While its possible that a pool does generate invalid work due to spy mining or otherwise custom logic, it seems unlikely that a substantial portion of hashrate would do so, making the difference somewhat academic (any pool that screws this up will only do so once and the network would come out just fine).
Further, while we may end up deciding these assumptions were invalid and we should instead use 7200s, it seems prudent to try with the value we "want" on testnet4, giving us the ability to learn if the compatibility concerns are an issue before we go to mainnet.
ACKs for top commit:
fjahr:
tACK 16e95bda86302af20cfb314a2c0252256d01f750
achow101:
ACK 16e95bda86302af20cfb314a2c0252256d01f750
murchandamus:
crACK 16e95bda86302af20cfb314a2c0252256d01f750
Tree-SHA512: ae46d03b728b6e23cb6ace64c9813bc01c01e38dd7f159cf0fab53b331ef84b3b811edab225453ccdfedb53b242f55b0efd69829782657490fe393d24dacbeb2
