Files
bitcoin/src/group_impl.h
Pieter Wuille bdca9bcb6c Squashed 'src/secp256k1/' changes from 3967d96bf1..efad3506a8
efad3506a8 Merge #906: Use modified divsteps with initial delta=1/2 for constant-time
cc2c09e3a7 Merge #918: Clean up configuration in gen_context
07067967ee add ECMULT_GEN_PREC_BITS to basic_config.h
a3aa2628c7 gen_context: Don't include basic-config.h
be0609fd54 Add unit tests for edge cases with delta=1/2 variant of divsteps
cd393ce228 Optimization: only do 59 hddivsteps per iteration instead of 62
277b224b6a Use modified divsteps with initial delta=1/2 for constant-time
376ca366db Fix typo in explanation
1e5d50fa93 Merge #889: fix uninitialized read in tests
c083cc6e52 Merge #903: Make argument of fe_normalizes_to_zero{_var} const
6e898534ff Merge #907: changed import to use brackets <> for openssl
4504472269 changed import to use brackets <> for openssl as they are not local to the project
26de4dfeb1 Merge #831: Safegcd inverses, drop Jacobi symbols, remove libgmp
23c3fb629b Make argument of fe_normalizes_to_zero{_var} const
24ad04fc06 Make scalar_inverse{,_var} benchmark scale with SECP256K1_BENCH_ITERS
ebc1af700f Optimization: track f,g limb count and pass to new variable-time update_fg_var
b306935ac1 Optimization: use formulas instead of lookup tables for cancelling g bits
9164a1b658 Optimization: special-case zero modulus limbs in modinv64
1f233b3fa0 Remove num/gmp support
20448b8d09 Remove unused Jacobi symbol support
5437e7bdfb Remove unused scalar_sqr
aa9cc52180 Improve field/scalar inverse tests
1e0e885c8a Make field/scalar code use the new modinv modules for inverses
436281afdc Move secp256k1_fe_inverse{_var} to per-impl files
aa404d53be Move secp256k1_scalar_{inverse{_var},is_even} to per-impl files
08d54964e5 Improve bounds checks in modinv modules
151aac00d3 Add tests for modinv modules
d8a92fcc4c Add extensive comments on the safegcd algorithm and implementation
8e415acba2 Add safegcd based modular inverse modules
de0a643c3d Add secp256k1_ctz{32,64}_var functions
4c3ba88c3a Merge #901: ci: Switch all Linux builds to Debian and more improvements
9361f360bb ci: Select number of parallel make jobs depending on CI environment
28eccdf806 ci: Split output of logs into multiple sections
c7f754fe4d ci: Run PRs on merge result instead of on the source branch
b994a8be3c ci: Print information about binaries using "file"
f24e122d13 ci: Switch all Linux builds to Debian
ebdba03cb5 Merge #891: build: Add workaround for automake 1.13 and older
3a8b47bc6d Merge #894: ctime_test: move context randomization test to the end
7d3497cdc4 ctime_test: move context randomization test to the end
99a1cfec17 print warnings for conditional-uninitialized
3d2cf6c5bd initialize variable in tests
f329bba244 build: Add workaround for automake 1.13 and older
24d1656c32 Merge #882: Use bit ops instead of int mult for constant-time logic in gej_add_ge
e491d06b98 Use bit ops instead of int mult for constant-time logic in gej_add_ge
f8c0b57e6b Merge #864: Add support for Cirrus CI
cc2a5451dc ci: Refactor Nix shell files
2480e55c8f ci: Remove support for Travis CI
2b359f1c1d ci: Enable simple cache for brewing valgrind on macOS
8c02e465c5 ci: Add support for Cirrus CI
659d0d4798 Merge #880: Add parens around ROUND_TO_ALIGN's parameter.
b6f649889a Add parens around ROUND_TO_ALIGN's parameter. This makes the macro robust against a hypothetical ROUND_TO_ALIGN(foo ? sizeA : size B) invocation.
a4abaab793 Merge #877: Add missing secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var decl.
5671e5f3fd Merge #874: Remove underscores from header defs.
db726782fa Merge #878: Remove unused secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var
b732701faa Merge #875: Avoid casting (void**) values.
75d2ae149e Remove unused secp256k1_fe_inv_all_var
482e4a9cfc Add missing secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var decl.
2730618604 Avoid casting (void**) values. Replaced with an expression that only casts (void*) values.
fb390c5299 Remove underscores from header defs. This makes them consistent with other files and avoids reserved identifiers.
f2d9aeae6d Merge #862: Autoconf improvements
328aaef22a Merge #845: Extract the secret key from a keypair
3c15130709 Improve CC_FOR_BUILD detection
47802a4762 Restructure and tidy configure.ac
252c19dfc6 Ask brew for valgrind include path
8c727b9087 Merge #860: fixed trivial typo
b7bc3a4aaa fixed typo
33cb3c2b1f Add secret key extraction from keypair to constant time tests
36d9dc1e8e Add seckey extraction from keypair to the extrakeys tests
fc96aa73f5 Add a function to extract the secretkey from a keypair
98dac87839 Merge #858: Fix insecure links
07aa4c70ff Fix insecure links
b61f9da54e Merge #857: docs: fix simple typo, dependecy -> dependency
18aadf9d28 docs: fix simple typo, dependecy -> dependency
2d9e7175c6 Merge #852: Add sage script for generating scalar_split_lambda constants
dc6e5c3a5c Merge #854: Rename msg32 to msghash32 in ecdsa_sign/verify and add explanation
6e85d675aa Rename tweak to tweak32 in public API
f587f04e35 Rename msg32 to msghash32 in ecdsa_sign/verify and add explanation
329a2e0a3f sage: Add script for generating scalar_split_lambda constants
8f0c6f1545 Merge #851: make test count iteration configurable by environment variable
f4fa8d226a forbid a test iteration of 0 or less
f554dfc708 sage: Reorganize files
3a106966aa Merge #849: Convert Sage code to Python 3 (as used by Sage >= 9)
13c88efed0 Convert Sage code to Python 3 (as used by Sage >= 9)
0ce4554881 make test count iteration configurable by environment variable
9e5939d284 Merge #835: Don't use reserved identifiers memczero and benchmark_verify_t
d0a83f7328 Merge #839: Prevent arithmetic on NULL pointer if the scratch space is too small
903b16aa6c Merge #840: Return NULL early in context_preallocated_create if flags invalid
1f4dd03838 Typedef (u)int128_t only when they're not provided by the compiler
ebfa2058e9 Return NULL early in context_preallocated_create if flags invalid
29a299e373 Run the undefined behaviour sanitizer on Travis
7506e064d7 Prevent arithmetic on NULL pointer if the scratch space is too small
e89278f211 Don't use reserved identifiers memczero and benchmark_verify_t

git-subtree-dir: src/secp256k1
git-subtree-split: efad3506a8937162e8010f5839fdf3771dfcf516
2021-04-23 11:35:15 -07:00

675 lines
26 KiB
C

/***********************************************************************
* Copyright (c) 2013, 2014 Pieter Wuille *
* Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying *
* file COPYING or https://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.*
***********************************************************************/
#ifndef SECP256K1_GROUP_IMPL_H
#define SECP256K1_GROUP_IMPL_H
#include "field.h"
#include "group.h"
/* These exhaustive group test orders and generators are chosen such that:
* - The field size is equal to that of secp256k1, so field code is the same.
* - The curve equation is of the form y^2=x^3+B for some constant B.
* - The subgroup has a generator 2*P, where P.x=1.
* - The subgroup has size less than 1000 to permit exhaustive testing.
* - The subgroup admits an endomorphism of the form lambda*(x,y) == (beta*x,y).
*
* These parameters are generated using sage/gen_exhaustive_groups.sage.
*/
#if defined(EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER)
# if EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 13
static const secp256k1_ge secp256k1_ge_const_g = SECP256K1_GE_CONST(
0xc3459c3d, 0x35326167, 0xcd86cce8, 0x07a2417f,
0x5b8bd567, 0xde8538ee, 0x0d507b0c, 0xd128f5bb,
0x8e467fec, 0xcd30000a, 0x6cc1184e, 0x25d382c2,
0xa2f4494e, 0x2fbe9abc, 0x8b64abac, 0xd005fb24
);
static const secp256k1_fe secp256k1_fe_const_b = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(
0x3d3486b2, 0x159a9ca5, 0xc75638be, 0xb23a69bc,
0x946a45ab, 0x24801247, 0xb4ed2b8e, 0x26b6a417
);
# elif EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER == 199
static const secp256k1_ge secp256k1_ge_const_g = SECP256K1_GE_CONST(
0x226e653f, 0xc8df7744, 0x9bacbf12, 0x7d1dcbf9,
0x87f05b2a, 0xe7edbd28, 0x1f564575, 0xc48dcf18,
0xa13872c2, 0xe933bb17, 0x5d9ffd5b, 0xb5b6e10c,
0x57fe3c00, 0xbaaaa15a, 0xe003ec3e, 0x9c269bae
);
static const secp256k1_fe secp256k1_fe_const_b = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(
0x2cca28fa, 0xfc614b80, 0x2a3db42b, 0x00ba00b1,
0xbea8d943, 0xdace9ab2, 0x9536daea, 0x0074defb
);
# else
# error No known generator for the specified exhaustive test group order.
# endif
#else
/** Generator for secp256k1, value 'g' defined in
* "Standards for Efficient Cryptography" (SEC2) 2.7.1.
*/
static const secp256k1_ge secp256k1_ge_const_g = SECP256K1_GE_CONST(
0x79BE667EUL, 0xF9DCBBACUL, 0x55A06295UL, 0xCE870B07UL,
0x029BFCDBUL, 0x2DCE28D9UL, 0x59F2815BUL, 0x16F81798UL,
0x483ADA77UL, 0x26A3C465UL, 0x5DA4FBFCUL, 0x0E1108A8UL,
0xFD17B448UL, 0xA6855419UL, 0x9C47D08FUL, 0xFB10D4B8UL
);
static const secp256k1_fe secp256k1_fe_const_b = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7);
#endif
static void secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zi) {
secp256k1_fe zi2;
secp256k1_fe zi3;
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&zi2, zi);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&zi3, &zi2, zi);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->x, &a->x, &zi2);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &a->y, &zi3);
r->infinity = a->infinity;
}
static void secp256k1_ge_set_xy(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x, const secp256k1_fe *y) {
r->infinity = 0;
r->x = *x;
r->y = *y;
}
static int secp256k1_ge_is_infinity(const secp256k1_ge *a) {
return a->infinity;
}
static void secp256k1_ge_neg(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge *a) {
*r = *a;
secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&r->y);
secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->y, 1);
}
static void secp256k1_ge_set_gej(secp256k1_ge *r, secp256k1_gej *a) {
secp256k1_fe z2, z3;
r->infinity = a->infinity;
secp256k1_fe_inv(&a->z, &a->z);
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2, &a->z);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&z3, &a->z, &z2);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&a->x, &a->x, &z2);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&a->y, &a->y, &z3);
secp256k1_fe_set_int(&a->z, 1);
r->x = a->x;
r->y = a->y;
}
static void secp256k1_ge_set_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, secp256k1_gej *a) {
secp256k1_fe z2, z3;
r->infinity = a->infinity;
if (a->infinity) {
return;
}
secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&a->z, &a->z);
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z2, &a->z);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&z3, &a->z, &z2);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&a->x, &a->x, &z2);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&a->y, &a->y, &z3);
secp256k1_fe_set_int(&a->z, 1);
r->x = a->x;
r->y = a->y;
}
static void secp256k1_ge_set_all_gej_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, size_t len) {
secp256k1_fe u;
size_t i;
size_t last_i = SIZE_MAX;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (!a[i].infinity) {
/* Use destination's x coordinates as scratch space */
if (last_i == SIZE_MAX) {
r[i].x = a[i].z;
} else {
secp256k1_fe_mul(&r[i].x, &r[last_i].x, &a[i].z);
}
last_i = i;
}
}
if (last_i == SIZE_MAX) {
return;
}
secp256k1_fe_inv_var(&u, &r[last_i].x);
i = last_i;
while (i > 0) {
i--;
if (!a[i].infinity) {
secp256k1_fe_mul(&r[last_i].x, &r[i].x, &u);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&u, &u, &a[last_i].z);
last_i = i;
}
}
VERIFY_CHECK(!a[last_i].infinity);
r[last_i].x = u;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
r[i].infinity = a[i].infinity;
if (!a[i].infinity) {
secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(&r[i], &a[i], &r[i].x);
}
}
}
static void secp256k1_ge_globalz_set_table_gej(size_t len, secp256k1_ge *r, secp256k1_fe *globalz, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_fe *zr) {
size_t i = len - 1;
secp256k1_fe zs;
if (len > 0) {
/* The z of the final point gives us the "global Z" for the table. */
r[i].x = a[i].x;
r[i].y = a[i].y;
/* Ensure all y values are in weak normal form for fast negation of points */
secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&r[i].y);
*globalz = a[i].z;
r[i].infinity = 0;
zs = zr[i];
/* Work our way backwards, using the z-ratios to scale the x/y values. */
while (i > 0) {
if (i != len - 1) {
secp256k1_fe_mul(&zs, &zs, &zr[i]);
}
i--;
secp256k1_ge_set_gej_zinv(&r[i], &a[i], &zs);
}
}
}
static void secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(secp256k1_gej *r) {
r->infinity = 1;
secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->x);
secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->y);
secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->z);
}
static void secp256k1_ge_set_infinity(secp256k1_ge *r) {
r->infinity = 1;
secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->x);
secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->y);
}
static void secp256k1_gej_clear(secp256k1_gej *r) {
r->infinity = 0;
secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->x);
secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->y);
secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->z);
}
static void secp256k1_ge_clear(secp256k1_ge *r) {
r->infinity = 0;
secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->x);
secp256k1_fe_clear(&r->y);
}
static int secp256k1_ge_set_xo_var(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_fe *x, int odd) {
secp256k1_fe x2, x3;
r->x = *x;
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x2, x);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, x, &x2);
r->infinity = 0;
secp256k1_fe_add(&x3, &secp256k1_fe_const_b);
if (!secp256k1_fe_sqrt(&r->y, &x3)) {
return 0;
}
secp256k1_fe_normalize_var(&r->y);
if (secp256k1_fe_is_odd(&r->y) != odd) {
secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->y, 1);
}
return 1;
}
static void secp256k1_gej_set_ge(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_ge *a) {
r->infinity = a->infinity;
r->x = a->x;
r->y = a->y;
secp256k1_fe_set_int(&r->z, 1);
}
static int secp256k1_gej_eq_x_var(const secp256k1_fe *x, const secp256k1_gej *a) {
secp256k1_fe r, r2;
VERIFY_CHECK(!a->infinity);
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&r, &a->z); secp256k1_fe_mul(&r, &r, x);
r2 = a->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&r2);
return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&r, &r2);
}
static void secp256k1_gej_neg(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a) {
r->infinity = a->infinity;
r->x = a->x;
r->y = a->y;
r->z = a->z;
secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&r->y);
secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->y, 1);
}
static int secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(const secp256k1_gej *a) {
return a->infinity;
}
static int secp256k1_ge_is_valid_var(const secp256k1_ge *a) {
secp256k1_fe y2, x3;
if (a->infinity) {
return 0;
}
/* y^2 = x^3 + 7 */
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&y2, &a->y);
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&x3, &a->x); secp256k1_fe_mul(&x3, &x3, &a->x);
secp256k1_fe_add(&x3, &secp256k1_fe_const_b);
secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&x3);
return secp256k1_fe_equal_var(&y2, &x3);
}
static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_gej_double(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a) {
/* Operations: 3 mul, 4 sqr, 0 normalize, 12 mul_int/add/negate.
*
* Note that there is an implementation described at
* https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-0.html#doubling-dbl-2009-l
* which trades a multiply for a square, but in practice this is actually slower,
* mainly because it requires more normalizations.
*/
secp256k1_fe t1,t2,t3,t4;
r->infinity = a->infinity;
secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &a->z, &a->y);
secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->z, 2); /* Z' = 2*Y*Z (2) */
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t1, &a->x);
secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&t1, 3); /* T1 = 3*X^2 (3) */
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t2, &t1); /* T2 = 9*X^4 (1) */
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t3, &a->y);
secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&t3, 2); /* T3 = 2*Y^2 (2) */
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t4, &t3);
secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&t4, 2); /* T4 = 8*Y^4 (2) */
secp256k1_fe_mul(&t3, &t3, &a->x); /* T3 = 2*X*Y^2 (1) */
r->x = t3;
secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->x, 4); /* X' = 8*X*Y^2 (4) */
secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->x, &r->x, 4); /* X' = -8*X*Y^2 (5) */
secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &t2); /* X' = 9*X^4 - 8*X*Y^2 (6) */
secp256k1_fe_negate(&t2, &t2, 1); /* T2 = -9*X^4 (2) */
secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&t3, 6); /* T3 = 12*X*Y^2 (6) */
secp256k1_fe_add(&t3, &t2); /* T3 = 12*X*Y^2 - 9*X^4 (8) */
secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &t1, &t3); /* Y' = 36*X^3*Y^2 - 27*X^6 (1) */
secp256k1_fe_negate(&t2, &t4, 2); /* T2 = -8*Y^4 (3) */
secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &t2); /* Y' = 36*X^3*Y^2 - 27*X^6 - 8*Y^4 (4) */
}
static void secp256k1_gej_double_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, secp256k1_fe *rzr) {
/** For secp256k1, 2Q is infinity if and only if Q is infinity. This is because if 2Q = infinity,
* Q must equal -Q, or that Q.y == -(Q.y), or Q.y is 0. For a point on y^2 = x^3 + 7 to have
* y=0, x^3 must be -7 mod p. However, -7 has no cube root mod p.
*
* Having said this, if this function receives a point on a sextic twist, e.g. by
* a fault attack, it is possible for y to be 0. This happens for y^2 = x^3 + 6,
* since -6 does have a cube root mod p. For this point, this function will not set
* the infinity flag even though the point doubles to infinity, and the result
* point will be gibberish (z = 0 but infinity = 0).
*/
if (a->infinity) {
r->infinity = 1;
if (rzr != NULL) {
secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 1);
}
return;
}
if (rzr != NULL) {
*rzr = a->y;
secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(rzr);
secp256k1_fe_mul_int(rzr, 2);
}
secp256k1_gej_double(r, a);
}
static void secp256k1_gej_add_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_gej *b, secp256k1_fe *rzr) {
/* Operations: 12 mul, 4 sqr, 2 normalize, 12 mul_int/add/negate */
secp256k1_fe z22, z12, u1, u2, s1, s2, h, i, i2, h2, h3, t;
if (a->infinity) {
VERIFY_CHECK(rzr == NULL);
*r = *b;
return;
}
if (b->infinity) {
if (rzr != NULL) {
secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 1);
}
*r = *a;
return;
}
r->infinity = 0;
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z22, &b->z);
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z12, &a->z);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&u1, &a->x, &z22);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&u2, &b->x, &z12);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&s1, &a->y, &z22); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s1, &s1, &b->z);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &b->y, &z12); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &s2, &a->z);
secp256k1_fe_negate(&h, &u1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&h, &u2);
secp256k1_fe_negate(&i, &s1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&i, &s2);
if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&h)) {
if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&i)) {
secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, a, rzr);
} else {
if (rzr != NULL) {
secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 0);
}
secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r);
}
return;
}
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&i2, &i);
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&h2, &h);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h, &h2);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&h, &h, &b->z);
if (rzr != NULL) {
*rzr = h;
}
secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &a->z, &h);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&t, &u1, &h2);
r->x = t; secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->x, 2); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &h3); secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->x, &r->x, 3); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &i2);
secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->x, 5); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &t); secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &r->y, &i);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h3, &s1); secp256k1_fe_negate(&h3, &h3, 1);
secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &h3);
}
static void secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_ge *b, secp256k1_fe *rzr) {
/* 8 mul, 3 sqr, 4 normalize, 12 mul_int/add/negate */
secp256k1_fe z12, u1, u2, s1, s2, h, i, i2, h2, h3, t;
if (a->infinity) {
VERIFY_CHECK(rzr == NULL);
secp256k1_gej_set_ge(r, b);
return;
}
if (b->infinity) {
if (rzr != NULL) {
secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 1);
}
*r = *a;
return;
}
r->infinity = 0;
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z12, &a->z);
u1 = a->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&u1);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&u2, &b->x, &z12);
s1 = a->y; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&s1);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &b->y, &z12); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &s2, &a->z);
secp256k1_fe_negate(&h, &u1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&h, &u2);
secp256k1_fe_negate(&i, &s1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&i, &s2);
if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&h)) {
if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&i)) {
secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, a, rzr);
} else {
if (rzr != NULL) {
secp256k1_fe_set_int(rzr, 0);
}
secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r);
}
return;
}
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&i2, &i);
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&h2, &h);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h, &h2);
if (rzr != NULL) {
*rzr = h;
}
secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &a->z, &h);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&t, &u1, &h2);
r->x = t; secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->x, 2); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &h3); secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->x, &r->x, 3); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &i2);
secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->x, 5); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &t); secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &r->y, &i);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h3, &s1); secp256k1_fe_negate(&h3, &h3, 1);
secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &h3);
}
static void secp256k1_gej_add_zinv_var(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_ge *b, const secp256k1_fe *bzinv) {
/* 9 mul, 3 sqr, 4 normalize, 12 mul_int/add/negate */
secp256k1_fe az, z12, u1, u2, s1, s2, h, i, i2, h2, h3, t;
if (b->infinity) {
*r = *a;
return;
}
if (a->infinity) {
secp256k1_fe bzinv2, bzinv3;
r->infinity = b->infinity;
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&bzinv2, bzinv);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&bzinv3, &bzinv2, bzinv);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->x, &b->x, &bzinv2);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &b->y, &bzinv3);
secp256k1_fe_set_int(&r->z, 1);
return;
}
r->infinity = 0;
/** We need to calculate (rx,ry,rz) = (ax,ay,az) + (bx,by,1/bzinv). Due to
* secp256k1's isomorphism we can multiply the Z coordinates on both sides
* by bzinv, and get: (rx,ry,rz*bzinv) = (ax,ay,az*bzinv) + (bx,by,1).
* This means that (rx,ry,rz) can be calculated as
* (ax,ay,az*bzinv) + (bx,by,1), when not applying the bzinv factor to rz.
* The variable az below holds the modified Z coordinate for a, which is used
* for the computation of rx and ry, but not for rz.
*/
secp256k1_fe_mul(&az, &a->z, bzinv);
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&z12, &az);
u1 = a->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&u1);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&u2, &b->x, &z12);
s1 = a->y; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&s1);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &b->y, &z12); secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &s2, &az);
secp256k1_fe_negate(&h, &u1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&h, &u2);
secp256k1_fe_negate(&i, &s1, 1); secp256k1_fe_add(&i, &s2);
if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&h)) {
if (secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero_var(&i)) {
secp256k1_gej_double_var(r, a, NULL);
} else {
secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(r);
}
return;
}
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&i2, &i);
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&h2, &h);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h, &h2);
r->z = a->z; secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &r->z, &h);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&t, &u1, &h2);
r->x = t; secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->x, 2); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &h3); secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->x, &r->x, 3); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->x, &i2);
secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &r->x, 5); secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &t); secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &r->y, &i);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&h3, &h3, &s1); secp256k1_fe_negate(&h3, &h3, 1);
secp256k1_fe_add(&r->y, &h3);
}
static void secp256k1_gej_add_ge(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_gej *a, const secp256k1_ge *b) {
/* Operations: 7 mul, 5 sqr, 4 normalize, 21 mul_int/add/negate/cmov */
static const secp256k1_fe fe_1 = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1);
secp256k1_fe zz, u1, u2, s1, s2, t, tt, m, n, q, rr;
secp256k1_fe m_alt, rr_alt;
int infinity, degenerate;
VERIFY_CHECK(!b->infinity);
VERIFY_CHECK(a->infinity == 0 || a->infinity == 1);
/** In:
* Eric Brier and Marc Joye, Weierstrass Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks.
* In D. Naccache and P. Paillier, Eds., Public Key Cryptography, vol. 2274 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 335-345. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
* we find as solution for a unified addition/doubling formula:
* lambda = ((x1 + x2)^2 - x1 * x2 + a) / (y1 + y2), with a = 0 for secp256k1's curve equation.
* x3 = lambda^2 - (x1 + x2)
* 2*y3 = lambda * (x1 + x2 - 2 * x3) - (y1 + y2).
*
* Substituting x_i = Xi / Zi^2 and yi = Yi / Zi^3, for i=1,2,3, gives:
* U1 = X1*Z2^2, U2 = X2*Z1^2
* S1 = Y1*Z2^3, S2 = Y2*Z1^3
* Z = Z1*Z2
* T = U1+U2
* M = S1+S2
* Q = T*M^2
* R = T^2-U1*U2
* X3 = 4*(R^2-Q)
* Y3 = 4*(R*(3*Q-2*R^2)-M^4)
* Z3 = 2*M*Z
* (Note that the paper uses xi = Xi / Zi and yi = Yi / Zi instead.)
*
* This formula has the benefit of being the same for both addition
* of distinct points and doubling. However, it breaks down in the
* case that either point is infinity, or that y1 = -y2. We handle
* these cases in the following ways:
*
* - If b is infinity we simply bail by means of a VERIFY_CHECK.
*
* - If a is infinity, we detect this, and at the end of the
* computation replace the result (which will be meaningless,
* but we compute to be constant-time) with b.x : b.y : 1.
*
* - If a = -b, we have y1 = -y2, which is a degenerate case.
* But here the answer is infinity, so we simply set the
* infinity flag of the result, overriding the computed values
* without even needing to cmov.
*
* - If y1 = -y2 but x1 != x2, which does occur thanks to certain
* properties of our curve (specifically, 1 has nontrivial cube
* roots in our field, and the curve equation has no x coefficient)
* then the answer is not infinity but also not given by the above
* equation. In this case, we cmov in place an alternate expression
* for lambda. Specifically (y1 - y2)/(x1 - x2). Where both these
* expressions for lambda are defined, they are equal, and can be
* obtained from each other by multiplication by (y1 + y2)/(y1 + y2)
* then substitution of x^3 + 7 for y^2 (using the curve equation).
* For all pairs of nonzero points (a, b) at least one is defined,
* so this covers everything.
*/
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&zz, &a->z); /* z = Z1^2 */
u1 = a->x; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&u1); /* u1 = U1 = X1*Z2^2 (1) */
secp256k1_fe_mul(&u2, &b->x, &zz); /* u2 = U2 = X2*Z1^2 (1) */
s1 = a->y; secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&s1); /* s1 = S1 = Y1*Z2^3 (1) */
secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &b->y, &zz); /* s2 = Y2*Z1^2 (1) */
secp256k1_fe_mul(&s2, &s2, &a->z); /* s2 = S2 = Y2*Z1^3 (1) */
t = u1; secp256k1_fe_add(&t, &u2); /* t = T = U1+U2 (2) */
m = s1; secp256k1_fe_add(&m, &s2); /* m = M = S1+S2 (2) */
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&rr, &t); /* rr = T^2 (1) */
secp256k1_fe_negate(&m_alt, &u2, 1); /* Malt = -X2*Z1^2 */
secp256k1_fe_mul(&tt, &u1, &m_alt); /* tt = -U1*U2 (2) */
secp256k1_fe_add(&rr, &tt); /* rr = R = T^2-U1*U2 (3) */
/** If lambda = R/M = 0/0 we have a problem (except in the "trivial"
* case that Z = z1z2 = 0, and this is special-cased later on). */
degenerate = secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(&m) &
secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(&rr);
/* This only occurs when y1 == -y2 and x1^3 == x2^3, but x1 != x2.
* This means either x1 == beta*x2 or beta*x1 == x2, where beta is
* a nontrivial cube root of one. In either case, an alternate
* non-indeterminate expression for lambda is (y1 - y2)/(x1 - x2),
* so we set R/M equal to this. */
rr_alt = s1;
secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&rr_alt, 2); /* rr = Y1*Z2^3 - Y2*Z1^3 (2) */
secp256k1_fe_add(&m_alt, &u1); /* Malt = X1*Z2^2 - X2*Z1^2 */
secp256k1_fe_cmov(&rr_alt, &rr, !degenerate);
secp256k1_fe_cmov(&m_alt, &m, !degenerate);
/* Now Ralt / Malt = lambda and is guaranteed not to be 0/0.
* From here on out Ralt and Malt represent the numerator
* and denominator of lambda; R and M represent the explicit
* expressions x1^2 + x2^2 + x1x2 and y1 + y2. */
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&n, &m_alt); /* n = Malt^2 (1) */
secp256k1_fe_mul(&q, &n, &t); /* q = Q = T*Malt^2 (1) */
/* These two lines use the observation that either M == Malt or M == 0,
* so M^3 * Malt is either Malt^4 (which is computed by squaring), or
* zero (which is "computed" by cmov). So the cost is one squaring
* versus two multiplications. */
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&n, &n);
secp256k1_fe_cmov(&n, &m, degenerate); /* n = M^3 * Malt (2) */
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&t, &rr_alt); /* t = Ralt^2 (1) */
secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &a->z, &m_alt); /* r->z = Malt*Z (1) */
infinity = secp256k1_fe_normalizes_to_zero(&r->z) & ~a->infinity;
secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->z, 2); /* r->z = Z3 = 2*Malt*Z (2) */
secp256k1_fe_negate(&q, &q, 1); /* q = -Q (2) */
secp256k1_fe_add(&t, &q); /* t = Ralt^2-Q (3) */
secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&t);
r->x = t; /* r->x = Ralt^2-Q (1) */
secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&t, 2); /* t = 2*x3 (2) */
secp256k1_fe_add(&t, &q); /* t = 2*x3 - Q: (4) */
secp256k1_fe_mul(&t, &t, &rr_alt); /* t = Ralt*(2*x3 - Q) (1) */
secp256k1_fe_add(&t, &n); /* t = Ralt*(2*x3 - Q) + M^3*Malt (3) */
secp256k1_fe_negate(&r->y, &t, 3); /* r->y = Ralt*(Q - 2x3) - M^3*Malt (4) */
secp256k1_fe_normalize_weak(&r->y);
secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->x, 4); /* r->x = X3 = 4*(Ralt^2-Q) */
secp256k1_fe_mul_int(&r->y, 4); /* r->y = Y3 = 4*Ralt*(Q - 2x3) - 4*M^3*Malt (4) */
/** In case a->infinity == 1, replace r with (b->x, b->y, 1). */
secp256k1_fe_cmov(&r->x, &b->x, a->infinity);
secp256k1_fe_cmov(&r->y, &b->y, a->infinity);
secp256k1_fe_cmov(&r->z, &fe_1, a->infinity);
r->infinity = infinity;
}
static void secp256k1_gej_rescale(secp256k1_gej *r, const secp256k1_fe *s) {
/* Operations: 4 mul, 1 sqr */
secp256k1_fe zz;
VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_fe_is_zero(s));
secp256k1_fe_sqr(&zz, s);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->x, &r->x, &zz); /* r->x *= s^2 */
secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &r->y, &zz);
secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->y, &r->y, s); /* r->y *= s^3 */
secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->z, &r->z, s); /* r->z *= s */
}
static void secp256k1_ge_to_storage(secp256k1_ge_storage *r, const secp256k1_ge *a) {
secp256k1_fe x, y;
VERIFY_CHECK(!a->infinity);
x = a->x;
secp256k1_fe_normalize(&x);
y = a->y;
secp256k1_fe_normalize(&y);
secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&r->x, &x);
secp256k1_fe_to_storage(&r->y, &y);
}
static void secp256k1_ge_from_storage(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge_storage *a) {
secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&r->x, &a->x);
secp256k1_fe_from_storage(&r->y, &a->y);
r->infinity = 0;
}
static SECP256K1_INLINE void secp256k1_ge_storage_cmov(secp256k1_ge_storage *r, const secp256k1_ge_storage *a, int flag) {
secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&r->x, &a->x, flag);
secp256k1_fe_storage_cmov(&r->y, &a->y, flag);
}
static void secp256k1_ge_mul_lambda(secp256k1_ge *r, const secp256k1_ge *a) {
static const secp256k1_fe beta = SECP256K1_FE_CONST(
0x7ae96a2bul, 0x657c0710ul, 0x6e64479eul, 0xac3434e9ul,
0x9cf04975ul, 0x12f58995ul, 0xc1396c28ul, 0x719501eeul
);
*r = *a;
secp256k1_fe_mul(&r->x, &r->x, &beta);
}
static int secp256k1_ge_is_in_correct_subgroup(const secp256k1_ge* ge) {
#ifdef EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER
secp256k1_gej out;
int i;
/* A very simple EC multiplication ladder that avoids a dependency on ecmult. */
secp256k1_gej_set_infinity(&out);
for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
secp256k1_gej_double_var(&out, &out, NULL);
if ((((uint32_t)EXHAUSTIVE_TEST_ORDER) >> (31 - i)) & 1) {
secp256k1_gej_add_ge_var(&out, &out, ge, NULL);
}
}
return secp256k1_gej_is_infinity(&out);
#else
(void)ge;
/* The real secp256k1 group has cofactor 1, so the subgroup is the entire curve. */
return 1;
#endif
}
#endif /* SECP256K1_GROUP_IMPL_H */