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* feat(attribution): Phase 1 foundation — provenance schema + resolver (MUL-4302)
Human Attribution, Phase 1 (地基) first increment. Every agent run must be
traceable to exactly one accountable human AND record at which waterfall level
that human was resolved, so a NULL originator can be told apart from a genuine
'no human in the chain'.
- migration 149: add originator_source (waterfall label) + delegation/retry/
rerun/rule-version lineage + kind-tagged trigger evidence to agent_task_queue.
No FK, no cascade, no CHECK on the source enum (MUL-4302 §7); nullable ADD
COLUMNs = fast metadata-only change on the hot queue table.
- internal/attribution: the accountable-human vocabulary (Source, EvidenceKind,
TriggerKind) + pure, unit-tested classification rules (ClassifyComment/
ClassifyDirect). No DB, no authorization — provenance labeling only.
- service: attributionFor{IssueTask,TriggerComment} gather facts and delegate to
the pure classifier; the legacy originator resolvers now delegate here so
there is one source of truth. originator_user_id's VALUE is unchanged, so the
Composio-overlay and canInvokeAgent A2A authorization boundaries are
byte-for-byte preserved (MUL-4302 §1.3).
- enqueueIssueTask / enqueueMentionTask stamp originator_source + evidence;
CreateRetryTask carries the parent attribution forward and records
retry_of_task_id so retry and manual rerun stay separable (MUL-4302 §5).
Verified: go build ./..., go vet, gofmt clean; new attribution unit tests +
enqueue stamping integration test green; existing resolve_originator tests
unchanged.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* feat(attribution): split accountable_user_id from originator, close enqueue bypasses (MUL-4302)
Phase 1, per Bohan's decision on the MUL-4302 thread: audit and authorization
answer different questions and get different columns.
- Migration 151 adds agent_task_queue.accountable_user_id (no FK, no cascade).
Authorization keeps reading ONLY originator_user_id (canInvokeAgent A2A gate,
Composio overlay); audit/UI/usage read accountable_user_id + source + evidence.
- Invariant (finalizeAttribution, single chokepoint + §11 tests): originator
non-null ⟹ accountable equals it. The two diverge only when originator is null
(autopilot / degraded fallback), which is the deferred rule_owner/owner_fallback
increment; this lands the column + mirror-write so that split has a home.
- Close the NULL-source enqueue bypasses Elon flagged: chat, quick-create,
deferred-fallback and run_only-autopilot now stamp originator_source + evidence
(+ accountable where a human exists). Autopilot stays unattributed until the
rule-version snapshot table lands, but is no longer a silent NULL-source row.
Retry inherits accountable_user_id like the rest of the attribution lineage.
- Fix assign/promote attribution (§4): a member who assigns/promotes an existing
issue is now the accountable human (and, by the invariant, originator) ahead of
the issue creator. Threaded as an OPTIONAL actor override, so comment/rerun/
autopilot paths keep today's resolution and create-with-assignee (creator ==
actor) is unchanged. The squad leader gate already judged the same member.
Also merges origin/main: renumbers the attribution migration 149→150 (main took
149 for issue_origin_agent_create) and folds agent_create into ClassifyDirect's
origin inheritance.
go build/vet/gofmt clean; attribution unit tests + service stamp/actor tests +
handler suite pass on a fresh DB migrated through 151.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* docs(attribution): fix accountable NULL semantics + close chat/quick-create evidence boundary (MUL-4302)
Addresses Elon's 2nd-round review on PR #5150 (pre-merge doc/evidence items):
- Migration 151 no longer overclaims NULL. accountable_user_id is NULL not only
on pre-migration rows but on NEW rows whose audit source resolved no human yet
(run_only autopilot writes originator_source='unattributed' with NULL
accountable until rule_owner lands). Header + COMMENT ON COLUMN reworded so a
schema reader does not misjudge the invariant.
- Chat now uses the UNIFORM evidence pair (kind=chat, ref=chat_session_id), like
autopilot_run/issue_assignment, instead of relying only on the dedicated
chat_session_id column — new EvidenceChat kind. Added a service test asserting
chat stamps direct_human + chat evidence.
- Quick-create is documented as the ONE intentional no-antecedent-row path: no
comment/issue/session/run exists at enqueue time (the run creates the issue), so
trigger_evidence_kind/ref stay NULL while the human rides originator/accountable
and source is direct_human — not a NULL-source bypass.
No authorization behavior change. attribution + service + handler suites pass on a
DB migrated through 151.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* chore(attribution): renumber migrations 150/151 → 157/158 after merging main (MUL-4302)
main's #5162 ("unblock release migrations") renumbered the chat migrations and
took 150 (agent_task_coalesced_comments) and 151 (chat_read_cursor), colliding
with this branch's attribution migrations. Renumber them above main's new highest
(156) so TestMigrationNumericPrefixesStayUniqueAfterLegacySet passes:
- 150_agent_task_attribution → 157_agent_task_attribution
- 151_agent_task_accountable_user → 158_agent_task_accountable_user
Fixed the internal "migration 150" references in 158's header to 157. Migrations
apply cleanly through 158 on a fresh DB; migration lint green.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* feat(attribution): autopilot rule_owner — accountable = rule version publisher (MUL-4302)
Implements rule_owner (MUL-4302 §3.4), the first attribution source where the
accountable human diverges from the (NULL) authorization originator.
- Migration 159 adds the append-only autopilot_rule_version snapshot table (no FK,
no cascade); migration 160 adds its CONCURRENTLY lookup index.
- Write-on-publish: CreateAutopilot appends v1 (publisher = creator); UpdateAutopilot
appends a new version when a SUBSTANTIVE autopilot-row field changes (assignee /
status / execution_mode) — cosmetic edits (title/description/template) write none.
Both run inside the existing handler tx (atomic with the autopilot write).
- Dispatch resolution: both autopilot execution modes now resolve the active rule
version and stamp originator_source='rule_owner', accountable_user_id=publisher,
rule_version_id=<snapshot>, with originator_user_id left NULL (authorization
unchanged). run_only stamps CreateAutopilotTask directly; create_issue resolves in
attributionForIssueTask so both modes attribute identically. A missing version /
non-member publisher degrades to unattributed — never fabricates a human.
- finalizeAttribution now enforces the invariant ONE-WAY: it mirrors originator onto
accountable only when originator is valid, leaving an explicitly-set accountable
(rule_owner / future owner_fallback) intact when originator is NULL. Added
rule_version_id to CreateAgentTask so the create_issue path persists it too.
Also merges origin/main and renumbers this branch's attribution migrations
150/151 → 157/158 (main's #5162 took 150/151); rule_version table is 159/160.
Tests: attribution unit RuleOwner + one-way invariant table; service integration
tests proving an autopilot-origin issue stamps rule_owner + rule_version_id (and
degrades to unattributed with no version). Full service/attribution/handler/
migration suites pass on a DB migrated through 160; build/vet/gofmt clean.
Deferred (same PR): trigger-table republish (cron/webhook/event_filters) and
system-pause/archive versioning; owner_fallback + fail-closed; manual rerun.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(attribution): manual autopilot trigger → direct_human to the triggering member (MUL-4302)
Elon's blocking finding: a member manually triggering an autopilot was attributed
rule_owner (accountable = rule publisher, originator NULL) like a schedule/webhook
run, so member B triggering member A's autopilot landed accountable=A and carried
no originator authorization context for the run. Per MUL-4302 §4 a manual "run now"
is a direct human action and must attribute direct_human to the triggering member.
- Thread the triggering member from TriggerAutopilot into dispatch: new
DispatchAutopilotManual carries actorUserID (resolved via resolveActor +
memberActorUserID, so only a member actor is a human; an A2A agent actor falls
back to rule_owner). DispatchAutopilot / DispatchAutopilotForPlan keep their
public signatures (pass an invalid actor); only the internal dispatchAutopilot /
dispatchCreateIssue / dispatchRunOnly gained the param, so the many existing
callers are untouched.
- run_only: dispatchRunOnly stamps direct_human (originator == accountable ==
actor, no rule_version) for a manual actor, else rule_owner. CreateAutopilotTask
gains an originator_user_id param for the manual case.
- create_issue: dispatchCreateIssue enqueues a manual trigger via the actor-carrying
*WithHandoff entry points; attributionForIssueTask's autopilot-origin rule_owner
branch is now guarded on !actorUserID.Valid, so a valid actor falls through to the
direct_human override. Both execution modes attribute identically.
- schedule / webhook keep rule_owner (no actor). Trigger-table + system-pause/archive
versioning remain the pre-merge follow-ups.
Tests: the run_only row assertion Elon asked for (schedule → rule_owner row on
CreateAutopilotTask), plus manual direct_human on BOTH modes (run_only and
create_issue), including a manual actor distinct from the rule publisher. Full
service/attribution/handler/migration/scheduler/cmd suites pass on a DB migrated
through 160; build/vet/gofmt clean.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* feat(attribution): owner_fallback + fail-closed policy, and manual-rerun direct_human (MUL-4302)
Two of the three remaining Phase 1 items (trigger-table / system-pause versioning
is deferred — see PR description).
owner_fallback + fail-closed (§1/§3.5) — the never-null accountable guarantee:
- attribution.OwnerFallback degrades an UNATTRIBUTED result to owner_fallback:
accountable = agent owner, originator stays NULL (audit-only, authz untouched),
Source.Precise()==false. finalizeAttribution's one-way invariant already allows
accountable-set / originator-NULL divergence, so nothing else changes.
- Migration 161 adds workspace.attribution_fail_closed (default FALSE) + a lean
GetWorkspaceAttributionFailClosed read. (Also added the column to ListWorkspaces'
explicit column list so its row type stays db.Workspace.)
- applyAttributionFallback is applied at every enqueue boundary (issue, mention,
chat, quick-create, deferred-fallback, autopilot run_only): unattributed →
owner_fallback (agent owner) by default, or ErrAttributionFailClosed when the
workspace is fail-closed, which the caller surfaces to refuse the enqueue (the
run does not start). So no run is left without an accountable human, and a
compliance workspace can block unattributable runs instead.
manual rerun (§5) — a rerun is a NEW direct_human trigger to the rerunning member:
- RerunIssue threads the acting member (resolved in the handler via resolveActor)
down to enqueueRerunTask, and attributionForIssueTask is now actor-first so the
actor wins over an INHERITED trigger comment (a rerun keeps the comment for the
daemon's prompt context but must attribute to whoever clicked rerun, not the
original comment's human).
- rerun_of_task_id lineage is recorded via a targeted SetAgentTaskRerunOf update on
the rerun path only (keeping the shared CreateAgentTask insert untouched), so
system retry (retry_of_task_id) and human rerun stay separable in reporting.
Tests: OwnerFallback unit test; owner_fallback + fail-closed-refusal + manual-rerun
(direct_human + rerun_of_task_id) service tests; the prior "degrades to unattributed"
test updated to owner_fallback. Full service/attribution/handler/migration/scheduler/
cmd suites pass on a DB migrated through 161; build/vet/gofmt clean.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(attribution): close fail-open holes + move rerun_of_task_id into creation snapshot (MUL-4302)
Addresses Elon's two must-fixes on PR #5150.
1. accountable-never-null / fail-closed had fail-open holes. applyAttributionFallback
now, for an UNATTRIBUTED run, refuses the enqueue (ErrAttributionFailClosed) in
THREE cases instead of silently degrading to a runnable NULL-accountable task:
- workspace policy read fails (or no workspace) → fail closed; we cannot confirm
fallback is permitted, so we don't run an unattributable task on a DB hiccup.
(Only the rare unattributed path pays this; precise runs never read the policy.)
- workspace is fail-closed → refuse (unchanged).
- owner_fallback has no valid agent owner → refuse rather than enqueue a task with
a NULL accountable_user_id.
ErrAttributionFailClosed's doc now covers all three "cannot guarantee an
accountable human" refusals. Added missing-owner / policy-read-failure /
precise-passthrough tests.
2. manual rerun rerun_of_task_id was a post-notify UPDATE (race: the queued event /
daemon claim could see rerun_of_task_id = NULL, and a failed update degraded the
run to a plain direct_human). It now rides the CreateAgentTask insert — threaded
through enqueueIssueTask / enqueueMentionTask as a creation param (like
retry_of_task_id) so it is written in the same statement before the daemon is
notified. Removed the SetAgentTaskRerunOf follow-up query.
Also merges origin/main (unrelated CLI fix #5167, no conflict). Full service /
attribution / handler / migration / scheduler / cmd suites pass on a DB migrated
through 161; build / vet / gofmt clean.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* feat(attribution): rule_owner versioning on trigger edits + system-pause/archive (MUL-4302)
The final remaining Phase 1 item: substantive publishes beyond the autopilot row now
republish the rule version, so a run's rule_owner accountable follows whoever last
changed what the rule does.
- Extracted the config-summary + insert into service.RecordAutopilotRuleVersion so
the handler and the (different-package) failure monitor share one writer; the
handler's recordAutopilotRuleVersion is now a thin wrapper.
- Trigger edits: UpdateAutopilotTrigger and DeleteAutopilotTrigger republish the rule
version with the acting member as publisher, ATOMICALLY (tx-wrapped mutation +
version write, mirroring CreateAutopilot/UpdateAutopilot). CreateAutopilotTrigger
republishes best-effort — the webhook path mints its token with a retry loop that
cannot share one tx, and a create is usually initial setup already covered by v1;
a failed write there is benign (active version stays the current publisher, the new
trigger fires under it, no immediate daemon claim rides it).
- Archive (DeleteAutopilot) republishes (member, status=archived), tx-wrapped.
- System auto-pause (failure monitor) republishes with a 'system' publisher,
best-effort — a background sweep to a non-dispatching state (a paused autopilot
never dispatches; a later member resume supersedes).
- RotateWebhookToken / SetSigningSecret deliberately do NOT version: they rotate
credentials, not the rule's behavior (not §3.4 substantive).
Semantics: a system-published (no-member) active version degrades dispatch to
unattributed → owner_fallback, never fabricating a human.
Tests: republish-reattributes (member A → member B supersedes → dispatch resolves to
B; system publisher → unattributed). Full service/attribution/handler/migration/
scheduler/cmd suites pass on a DB migrated through 161; build/vet/gofmt clean.
Also merges origin/main (unrelated frontend feature #5074).
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(attribution): make trigger-create rule-version republish atomic (MUL-4302)
Addresses Elon's final Phase 1 blocking finding: CreateAutopilotTrigger recorded the
rule-version republish best-effort AFTER the trigger insert. If member B added a
schedule/webhook trigger to member A's autopilot and the version write failed, future
schedule/webhook dispatches would keep attributing to A — violating the rule_owner
invariant that the last member to substantively change the rule owns future runs
("no immediate daemon claim" doesn't save it, since the miss surfaces at the LATER
trigger firing).
Both create paths now write the version in the SAME tx as the trigger INSERT:
- schedule create: wrap CreateAutopilotTrigger + recordAutopilotRuleVersion in one tx.
- webhook create: each mint-with-retry attempt runs in its own tx (insert + version
commit together; a token collision rolls that attempt back and retries with a fresh
token; a version-write failure rolls the trigger back). Passes ap + the acting
member id into the helper.
- removed the best-effort recordTriggerRuleVersionBestEffort helper (and the now-unused
slog import).
Test: TestCreateTrigger_RepublishesRuleVersionAtomically drives both create paths
through the handler and asserts a rule version is published by the acting member.
Existing webhook/trigger/archive handler tests still pass. Also merges origin/main
(unrelated avatar feature #5074). Full service/attribution/handler/migration/
scheduler/cmd suites pass on a DB migrated through 161; build/vet/gofmt clean.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* feat(attribution): Phase 2.1 — surface run attribution on the task API (MUL-4302 §9)
First Phase 2 (visibility) increment: the agent-task API now returns the resolved
accountable-human provenance so the UI can render an "on behalf of" badge.
- AgentTaskResponse gains an `attribution` object: source label (never blank —
pre-migration NULL renders "unattributed") + `precise` flag (false for the degraded
owner_fallback / backfill / unattributed sources), the initiator (accountable) and
originator (authorization) user refs, the evidence {kind, ref_id} pointer, and the
rule_version / delegated / retry / rerun lineage ids.
- The label + evidence + raw ids are built in the PURE taskToResponse (no DB), so
every task response carries them. Names are hydrated separately, only on the
user-facing surfaces (ListAgentTasks, ListWorkspaceAgentTaskSnapshot, RerunIssue,
CancelTaskByUser) — daemon-claim paths stay lean.
- Hydration resolves initiator/originator from the GLOBAL user table (departed-member
safe) via a new batch GetUsersByIDs query (no N+1); best-effort, so a lookup hiccup
leaves the raw ids intact.
Tests: pure taskAttributionBase (direct_human / rule_owner NULL-originator /
owner_fallback degraded / pre-migration→unattributed) + DB hydration (fills known
ref, leaves unknown id un-filled, skips nil). Full handler/service/attribution/
migration/scheduler/cmd suites pass on a DB migrated through 161; build/vet/gofmt
clean. The field is additive — the frontend's parseWithFallback ignores unknown keys,
so nothing breaks until the UI increment consumes it.
Also merges origin/main (unrelated editor feature #5090).
Remaining Phase 2 (next increments, same PR): frontend zod schema + "on behalf of"
badge + evidence-chain jump; append-only correction events (write + display).
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* feat(attribution): Phase 2.2 — on-behalf-of badge in the execution log (MUL-4302 §9)
Surface the accountable human on every agent run row:
- AttributionBadge composes Badge + ActorAvatar, shows "on behalf of <member>"
with the resolution source as a tooltip; degraded (non-precise) attribution
gets a warning tone, and an unresolved initiator renders an explicit
"no responsible member" chip.
- Wire the badge into both active and past rows of the execution log.
- Mirror the attribution shape into AgentTaskResponseSchema (defensive, .loose())
so the cancel-task path carries it through zod; add parse tests.
- Export TaskAttribution/AttributionUser/TaskEvidence from @multica/core/types
and add the attribution block to all four issues.json locales.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(attribution): hydrate initiator names on issue-facing task endpoints + bound the badge (MUL-4302 §9)
Address Elon's PR #5150 review:
- ListTasksByIssue (the execution-log data source), GetActiveTaskForIssue and the
issue-scoped CancelTask now call hydrateTaskAttributions, so the "on behalf of
<member>" badge shows the real member name on issue detail instead of falling
back to "someone". Mirrors the existing ListAgentTasks / snapshot behavior.
- AttributionBadge: cap width (max-w-40, min-w-0) and truncate the name span so a
long name / narrow right column can't squeeze out trigger/status/actions; keep
the avatar shrink-0.
- Add a handler test asserting the issue task list returns a hydrated
attribution.initiator.name.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(attribution): use semantic AvatarSize 'xs' for the badge avatar
main refactored ActorAvatar.size from a raw pixel number to the semantic
AvatarSize union (packages/ui/lib/avatar-size). Switch the on-behalf-of badge
avatar from size={14} to size="xs" (16px) after merging main.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(attribution): stage-cascade falls back to parent-issue provenance, not agent owner (MUL-4302)
When closing the last sub-issue in a Stage wakes the parent's assignee agent, the
run was enqueued via a system-authored child-done comment with no actor, which the
resolver classified as unattributed and then degraded to owner_fallback (the agent's
own owner). That is the wrong accountable human: the woken run should be accountable
to whoever caused the parent issue to exist.
attributionForIssueTask now detects a system-authored trigger comment and falls
through to the parent issue's own provenance — the same creator / agent_create-origin
/ autopilot-origin chain a direct enqueue resolves (so an agent-decomposed parent
attributes via delegation to the human who drove it; a member-created parent to that
member; an autopilot parent to the rule publisher). owner_fallback is now only the
last resort when the parent provenance itself has no human.
- Extract attributionFromComment so attributionForIssueTask can inspect author_type
without a second GetComment; authorization resolution stays byte-identical.
- Add a DB-backed test asserting a system child-done comment resolves to the parent
issue's origin human (delegation), not owner_fallback.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* feat(attribution): autopilot runs attribute to the firing trigger's creator (MUL-4302)
Per Bohan: an autopilot schedule/webhook run should be accountable to the human
who created the SPECIFIC trigger that fired it, not the rule publisher. (Manual
triggers already attribute to the invoking member via direct_human — unchanged.)
- Migration 162: add autopilot_trigger.created_by_type/created_by_id (nullable, no
FK/cascade). Capture the creating member at both trigger-create sites (schedule +
webhook).
- New precise source trigger_owner: originator stays NULL (an autonomous fire
carries no human authorization — same authz-safe divergence as rule_owner),
accountable = the trigger's member creator.
- triggerOwnerAttribution resolves run.trigger_id → creator; wired into run_only
dispatch and the create_issue path (bridging issue → active run → trigger_id).
Legacy triggers with no recorded creator, and agent-created triggers, degrade to
rule_owner then owner_fallback — nothing regresses.
- Frontend: trigger_owner source label in all four locales + badge switch case.
- Tests: attribution TriggerOwner unit + Precise/invariant; DB-backed resolver
tests (member creator → trigger_owner; creatorless → rule_owner fallback).
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* chore(attribution): re-trigger CI (dropped synchronize event on 249090260)
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(attribution): mirror accountable_user_id on comment-coalescing merge (MUL-4302)
The one-way invariant is 'originator_user_id IS NOT NULL ⟹ accountable_user_id =
originator_user_id', enforced at finalizeAttribution for enqueues and preserved by
the retry-clone (copies both columns). But MergeCommentIntoPendingTask (main #5192)
re-stamps originator_user_id to the newly-coalesced comment's human WITHOUT touching
accountable_user_id — so folding member B's comment into member A's queued task left
originator=B / accountable=A, violating the invariant. Re-stamp accountable to mirror
the new originator (same thing finalizeAttribution does). Add a DB-backed regression
test.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(attribution): Elon's 3 must-fixes + DB cross-column invariant CHECK (MUL-4302)
Bohan approved Elon's plan; this closes the three attribution boundaries he flagged
and locks the one-way invariant at the DB.
1. Delegation now inherits the parent's ACCOUNTABLE, not just its originator. An
autopilot-rooted chain (parent originator NULL, accountable = trigger creator)
@mentioning an agent / creating a sub-issue used to drop to unattributed →
owner_fallback and fail-closed workspaces wrongly rejected the fan-out. Added
ParentAccountable/OriginAccountable to CommentFacts/DirectFacts; ClassifyComment/
ClassifyDirect copy accountable down (source=delegation, precise, originator NULL)
so the chain root stays stable at any depth (§3.2).
2. The direct-chat send path (SendDirectChatMessage, MUL-4351) wrote only
originator_user_id — no accountable/source/evidence, a NULL-source bypass. It now
stamps the full direct_human attribution like EnqueueChatTask.
3. Comment-coalescing merge re-attribution is now ATOMIC: MergeCommentIntoPendingTask
re-stamps the whole snapshot (person columns + source + delegation lineage + rule
version + evidence) of the new comment, not just the two person fields, so a merged
run never shows B accountable while pointing at A's stale source/evidence.
4. Migration 169: NOT VALID CHECK (originator_user_id IS NULL OR (accountable_user_id
IS NOT NULL AND accountable_user_id = originator_user_id)). Enforces the invariant
on every new write (the class of bug #5192 introduced); historical rows not blocked,
VALIDATE after Phase 3 backfill. Updated test fixtures that seeded originator-only
rows to also set accountable.
Merged latest main (renumbered attribution migrations 163–168 after main took 161/162;
merged the retry-clone chat_input_task_id + attribution columns). Verified: go build/
vet, attribution/service/handler/cmd-server tests on a migrated DB, frontend
typecheck/lint/tests.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(attribution): trigger responsibility transfers to effective publisher; fail-closed comment merge
Elon final-review must-fix 1 (MUL-4302): trigger_owner now resolves to the
member CURRENTLY responsible for the firing trigger's effective config, not the
fixed creator. Per-trigger published_by on autopilot_trigger, seeded to the
creator and re-stamped to the editor on a substantive edit — a trigger-scoped
edit bumps only that row (UpdateAutopilotTrigger), an autopilot-level edit bumps
all its triggers (UpdateAutopilot). Editing one trigger never reassigns another.
Adds real dispatchRunOnly transfer test + resolver-level isolation test.
Must-fix 3: AttributionForMergedComment reuses applyAttributionFallback and
returns ErrAttributionFailClosed; the merge caller refuses on fail-closed,
keeping the queued task's original precise snapshot instead of degrading it to
owner_fallback. Adds regression test.
Renumbered attribution migrations to 166-172 after merging main.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(attribution): make migration 172 invariant CHECK upgrade-safe (Option A)
Elon final-review must-fix 2 (MUL-4302), rollout chosen by Bohan. The NOT VALID
CHECK still checks a pre-existing row on any later UPDATE (even one not touching
attribution columns), so cross-deployment stale queued/running tasks (originator
set, accountable NULL from before migration 167) would fail on their next
claim/complete/cancel. Exempt exactly those legacy rows via 'originator_source
IS NULL' — that column was added in 166 with no backfill, so it is NULL only on
pre-migration rows and non-NULL on every attribution-aware write. New writes
stay fully enforced; the #5192 bypass class (source always set) is unaffected.
Phase 3 backfills legacy rows then drops+re-adds the strict form + VALIDATE.
Adds TestAttributionInvariantCheck_ExemptsLegacyRows (legacy row survives a
status UPDATE) and updates the reject-bypass test to the enforced regime.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(attribution): pin substantive/cosmetic edit boundary for trigger transfer
Elon re-review must-fix 1: an autopilot-level edit only transfers trigger_owner
responsibility when it changes what the automation instructs or who/whether it
runs. autopilotRuleSubstantiveChange now includes description (the run Prompt)
and issue_title_template; title and project_id stay cosmetic/routing.
UpdateAutopilotTrigger no longer transfers on every PATCH — it compares the
persisted before/after and transfers only on a real cron/timezone/enabled/
event_filters change, not a label-only or no-op PATCH. Adds real handler tests
(prompt->all, title->none, cron->one+isolation, label->none, no-op->none).
Must-fix 3: real merge-path regression (TestMergeCommentIntoPendingTask_
FailClosedKeepsOriginalSnapshot) drives mergeCommentIntoPendingTask and asserts
a fail-closed workspace preserves the queued task's full snapshot; fail-open
control completes the owner_fallback merge.
Docs: migration 172 comment reworded to legacy-writer/unbackfilled-lineage
semantics (source NULL is not strictly pre-migration); PR description synced.
Migration renumber vs latest main (must-fix 2) deferred to pre-launch per Bohan.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* chore(attribution): renumber migrations to 167-173 after syncing main
Merged latest main (which took 166_project_dates) and shifted the attribution
migration series off the 166 collision: 166->167 agent_task_attribution,
167->168 accountable_user, 168->169 rule_version, 169->170 rule_version_index,
170->171 fail_closed, 171->172 trigger_publisher, 172->173 invariant_check.
Updated the internal cross-references in the migration comments accordingly.
Fixes TestMigrationNumericPrefixesStayUniqueAfterLegacySet on the merge tree.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* feat(admission): unify dispatch outcome + close rerun/chat/autopilot invoke holes (MUL-4525)
P0 first increment toward a platform-wide execution-admission contract so a
user who names an execution target always gets a definite result and never a
silent no-op, and so blocked targets are reported without leaking private-agent
details.
Backend:
- New shared contract (handler/admission.go): DispatchOutcome / DispatchStatus
(queued/coalesced/deferred/blocked) + stable, enumeration-safe
DispatchReasonCode set, plus writeDispatchBlocked() whose legacy `error`
string never reveals target existence.
- Rerun (task.go / task_lifecycle.go): re-validate the operator can invoke the
RESOLVED target agent (historical agent for a task_id rerun) before any
cancel/enqueue; blocked returns a structured 403 and mutates nothing
(ErrRerunInvokeNotAllowed).
- Chat send (chat.go): re-run canInvokeAgent on every send, not just the softer
canAccessPrivateAgent view gate; a revoked permission blocks before the
message/attachments/task persist.
- Autopilot manual "run now" (service/autopilot.go): admission now keys on the
current CLICKER, not the autopilot creator — clicker admission and clicker
attribution no longer fork. Automation (schedule/webhook) still falls back to
the creator gate. Added reason_code to the run response for the UI.
Frontend:
- triggerAutopilot response is schema-parsed; handleRunNow branches on run
status and shows a localized, reason_code-based warning for skipped/failed
instead of a false-success toast.
- Chat send and rerun surface the structured 403 reason_code as localized
toasts (dispatchReasonCode helper) instead of a generic failure.
- Additive fields only; older clients keep working. i18n added to all 4 locales.
Tests: rerun fail-before-mutation gate, autopilot clicker-vs-creator fork
(service + handler), reason-code classification, and a malformed-response
schema test. Backend handler+service suites and FE typecheck/lint green.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* test(cmd/server): thread nil invoke gate through RerunIssue call sites (MUL-4525)
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(admission): typed reason codes + run-now whitelist + real security tests (MUL-4525)
Addresses Elon's review of the P0 first increment (must-fix 1–3).
1. Run now no longer has a false-success branch. handleRunNow now classifies on
a whitelist via a pure runNowToastKind(): only issue_created/running →
success; skipped → warning; failed and any unknown/future status → error. Add
run-now-toast unit test over all five status classes plus reason-code → key
mapping.
2. reason_code is a typed value decided at the admission source, not
reverse-engineered from English failure text. New leaf package
internal/dispatch holds the canonical ReasonCode enum (shared by handler +
service so they can never drift). shouldSkipDispatch / errDispatchSkipped /
the fail path now carry a typed code through DispatchAutopilotManual straight
into the response; the substring classifier is deleted. Fixes the two missed
branches: attribution fail-closed → attribution_blocked (typed errors.Is),
"agent has no runtime bound" → runtime_offline. Regression tests for both.
3. Security acceptance tests exercise the REAL handlers, not injected callbacks:
- Chat: create session while invokable → revoke invoke (flip to private, keep
owner-view) → send returns 403 + reason_code with zero chat_message / task
writes.
- Rerun: private historical agent through RerunIssue + canInvokeAgent — a
non-invoking workspace owner is refused 403 + reason_code and mutates
nothing (fail-before-mutation); the agent owner is allowed 202.
No migration; reason_code is a decision-time value only the manual "run now"
response carries. Additive on the wire. Backend build/vet/handler+service
suites and FE typecheck/lint/vitest green. (Migration-prefix collision with main
remains the deferred pre-merge renumber.)
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* test(admission): make must-fix 3 acceptance tests prove the invariant (MUL-4525)
Addresses Elon's round-3 narrow review — the two security tests were not yet
falsifiable against the bugs they must catch.
- Rerun: after enqueuing the historical task, reassign the issue to a SECOND
agent that the denied user CAN invoke. Now the current assignee and the
task_id agent differ, so a rerun that wrongly validated the current assignee
would let the denied user through — the 403 proves the gate is keyed on the
historical private agent. The allow case now asserts the reran task's agent_id
is the historical agent, not the current assignee.
- Chat: the blocked send now carries a valid, still-unbound attachment. After
the 403 the test asserts the attachment's chat_session_id and chat_message_id
are both still NULL, guarding against anyone moving attachment binding ahead
of the invoke gate.
Test-only. Full internal/handler Go suite green.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* feat(comments): surface blocked @mention trigger_outcomes instead of silent no-op (MUL-4525 §2)
A comment that @mentions an agent/squad the author cannot invoke used to save
with zero feedback — the user assumed a bug. Now the explicit-mention path
reports a per-target outcome on both preview and create/edit.
Backend (server/internal/handler/comment.go):
- resolveMentionedAgentCommentTriggers collects blocked outcomes instead of a
silent `continue`. The invoke gate is evaluated BEFORE any archived/runtime
state is read, so a caller who cannot invoke a private target only ever sees
the generic invocation_not_allowed and can never enumerate its existence.
- enqueueCommentAgentTriggers returns queued/coalesced/deferred/blocked per
explicit mention; enqueue errors are typed (attribution_blocked via
errors.Is), not swallowed. Implicit routing (assignee/thread/conversation)
carries no outcome — the user never named those targets.
- trigger-preview returns `blocked[]`; create/edit return additive
`trigger_outcomes[]`. One blocked mention never fails the comment.
Frontend:
- Composer shows a warning chip for blocked mentions before sending; after
sending, a "posted, but N not triggered" toast (blocked-only; coalesced/
deferred are success-shaped). Additive schema + defensive parse; i18n ×4.
Tests: handler partial-success + enumeration-safety acceptance tests; core
outcome-parse + preview-schema tests; hook/parity updated. Backend
handler+service suites and FE typecheck/lint/vitest green.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* i18n(admission): clearer, consistent blocked-trigger copy (MUL-4525)
Reword the awkward "you are not allowed to run this autopilot's assignee" and
polish all MUL-4525 blocked/partial copy across en/zh-Hans/ja/ko:
- Unify on "you don't have permission to use this <agent|target>" (zh: 没有…的
使用权限) for autopilot Run now, comment mentions, rerun, and chat send —
replacing the various "not allowed to run/trigger" phrasings.
- Align zh to the glossary term 智能体 (was mixed "Agent"), matching the
surrounding UI voice (e.g. agent_link_no_access).
- Drop jargon: "blocked by an admission policy"/"被准入策略拦截" → "the run was
blocked"/"本次运行已被拦截"; "attributed"/"归因" → plainer wording.
- Comment copy counts "mentions" (was "targets") for consistency with the chip.
Backend dispatchBlockedFallbackMessage (old-client English fallback) reworded to
match; its enumeration-safety test assertion updated. Copy-only — no key/logic
changes; parity + typecheck green.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(comments): one outcome per explicit mention + FE success whitelist (MUL-4525)
Addresses Elon's round-2 review of the §2 comment trigger_outcomes.
1. Separate execution dedup from per-target outcomes. resolveMentionedAgent-
CommentTriggers now returns triggers (deduped by executing agent) AND one
commentMentionTarget per EXPLICIT mention. enqueueCommentAgentTriggers returns
a per-executing-agent result map; commentTriggerOutcomes fans each agent's
status to every target that resolved to it. So @Agent A + @Squad S(leader=A)
coalesces to ONE task but yields TWO outcomes. The squad-leader self-suppress
branch now returns a definite `deferred` outcome instead of no result. New
CreateComment test asserts 1 task, 2 outcomes.
2. Frontend no longer treats an unknown status as success. unhandledComment-
TriggerOutcomes whitelists queued/coalesced/deferred as handled; blocked and
any unknown/future/empty status warn (mirrors the Run now whitelist). The
preview schema's `blocked` now drops malformed entries INDIVIDUALLY instead of
z.array(...).catch([]) discarding the whole set. Regression tests for the
unknown status and the per-item drop.
Backend handler suite + go vet, FE typecheck/lint/vitest green.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(comments): honest role + status in trigger_outcomes fan-out (MUL-4525)
Addresses Elon's round-3 review of the §2 fan-out.
1. Execution merge preserves the squad-leader role instead of first-mention-
wins. The dedup now UPGRADES an already-added plain @agent trigger to a
@squad-leader trigger for the same agent, so @Agent A + @Squad S(leader=A)
always runs as a leader task (is_leader_task + squad_id=S) regardless of
mention order — the daemon still injects S's briefing. When two DIFFERENT
squads share one leader, the single run carries one squad's context and the
other squad is reported `coalesced` (folded), never a second `queued`. The
enqueue result now records the executed squad so the fan-out can tell them
apart. Tests assert the task role in both orders and the two-squad split.
2. Squad-leader self-suppression no longer fakes success. The self-trigger
guard keys on the latest task ROLE with no status filter, so a long-completed
task also suppresses; reporting `deferred/already_active` when nothing is
active was a false success. The branch now reports `deferred` only when a
real non-terminal task is active (its reconcile covers the comment), else a
non-success `blocked` + new `already_handled` reason. Fixed the reversed
helper-semantics comment. New handler test covers the completed-task branch.
Backend handler+service suites and go vet green.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(comments): fail-closed active-task check, never fake deferred (MUL-4525)
Elon round-4 must-fix: hasActiveTaskForIssueAndAgent swallowed DB errors by
returning true, so both call sites could turn a query failure into a
success-shaped `deferred/already_active` — a silent false success, exactly what
this issue forbids for admission-query failures.
- hasActiveTaskForIssueAndAgent now returns (bool, error).
- Two pure decision helpers govern the branches, fail closed on error:
- decidePostMergeMiss: on query error, do NOT enqueue a fresh task (duplicate
concurrent-run risk) AND report non-success blocked/internal_error; a
confirmed active task defers; a confirmed-none enqueues fresh.
- decideSuppressedLeaderOutcome: on query error, blocked/internal_error; a
confirmed active run defers; else self_trigger_suppressed. Never a fabricated
deferred.
- Renamed reason already_handled -> self_trigger_suppressed (Elon non-blocking
note): the old name implied the new comment was already processed, but the
real meaning is a suppressed self-trigger.
Deterministic unit tests cover the query-failure branch at both call sites
(no fresh enqueue, non-success outcome) — a real DB fault can't be forced
through valid handler inputs, and the decision is what governs the behavior.
Backend handler+service suites and go vet green.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(comments): honest merge outcome — refused merge is blocked, not fake coalesced (MUL-4525)
A pending-task merge previously reported success (coalesced) even when it
was refused or failed: attribution fail-closed and unknown DB errors both
returned handled=true, so the caller recorded coalesced for a merge that
never happened. mergeCommentIntoPendingTask now returns a distinguishable
commentMergeResult; commentMergeTerminalOutcome maps a real merge to
coalesced, a fail-closed refusal to blocked/attribution_blocked, and any
other failure to blocked/internal_error. Only "no queued task to fold"
falls through to the active-task decision. Adds pure coverage of the
mapping plus a fail-closed regression asserting the non-success outcome
and unchanged task count.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* fix(comments): name blocked @mentions in preview + toast instead of a vague count (MUL-4525)
The blocked-trigger preview showed a red "1 mention won't trigger" with no
name, and the post-send toast said "but 1 mention wasn't triggered" — the
user can't tell which target or why. Now each blocked mention renders its own
chip named from the mention markup the user typed ("Go · No permission"),
with an error indicator and a short reason; the toast names the single target
too. The wire outcome still omits the target name (enumeration-safety) — the
label comes from the user's own draft, so nothing new is disclosed.
Shares a blocked-trigger-copy module (long + short reason labels) between the
chip and the toast, and a pure mentionLabelsByTarget/parseMentions helper in
core (fresh regex per call — a shared global leaked lastIndex). Adds core +
chip tests; drops the now-unused trigger_blocked_count keys across locales.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
* feat(attribution): accountable-member avatar on agent task rows + transcript header (MUL-4302)
Surface who each agent run is on behalf of where runs are actually
browsed:
- Agent detail activity tab: an avatar-only AttributionBadge on every
task row's meta line (Now + Recent work), tooltip carries the name +
resolution source.
- Execution-record (transcript) dialog header: the full on-behalf-of
badge next to the status pill.
Adds a compact variant="avatar" mode to AttributionBadge, reusing its
source-label mapping and degraded-attribution tone. Renders nothing when
a run has no resolved accountable member.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
---------
Co-authored-by: J <j@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
1493 lines
55 KiB
Go
1493 lines
55 KiB
Go
package handler
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/analytics"
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obsmetrics "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/metrics"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/middleware"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/service"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/util"
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db "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/db/generated"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/protocol"
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)
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// chatSessionTitleMaxLen caps the rename input. Long enough to fit a
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// meaningful summary, short enough to keep the dropdown row scannable.
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const chatSessionTitleMaxLen = 200
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Chat Sessions
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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type CreateChatSessionRequest struct {
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AgentID string `json:"agent_id"`
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Title string `json:"title"`
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}
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func (h *Handler) CreateChatSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
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var req CreateChatSessionRequest
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
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return
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}
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if req.AgentID == "" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "agent_id is required")
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return
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}
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agentID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, req.AgentID, "agent_id")
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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workspaceUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, workspaceID, "workspace id")
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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// Verify agent exists in workspace.
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agent, err := h.Queries.GetAgentInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetAgentInWorkspaceParams{
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ID: agentID,
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WorkspaceID: workspaceUUID,
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})
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "agent not found")
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return
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}
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if agent.ArchivedAt.Valid {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "agent is archived")
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return
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}
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// Invocation gate: starting a chat produces agent runs, so it uses the
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// invoke permission (MUL-3963), not the softer view gate. Agent-to-agent
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// chat sessions are judged by the top-of-chain originator.
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actorType, actorID := h.resolveActor(r, userID, workspaceID)
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if !h.canInvokeAgent(r.Context(), agent, actorType, actorID, h.invokeOriginatorFromRequest(r, actorType, actorID), workspaceID) {
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writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "you do not have access to this agent")
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return
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}
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// Create inside a tx that first takes a FOR KEY SHARE lock on the workspace
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// row: it conflicts with DeleteWorkspace's FOR UPDATE, so a session cannot be
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// created into a workspace whose delete is in progress and then be orphaned by
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// the finalizer after the delete's sweep (#5219 create/delete protocol; see
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// LockWorkspaceForChatSessionCreate).
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tx, err := h.TxStarter.Begin(r.Context())
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to start transaction")
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return
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}
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defer tx.Rollback(r.Context())
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qtx := h.Queries.WithTx(tx)
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if _, err := qtx.LockWorkspaceForChatSessionCreate(r.Context(), workspaceUUID); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "workspace not found")
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return
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}
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to lock workspace")
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return
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}
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session, err := qtx.CreateChatSession(r.Context(), db.CreateChatSessionParams{
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WorkspaceID: workspaceUUID,
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AgentID: agentID,
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CreatorID: parseUUID(userID),
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Title: req.Title,
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})
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to create chat session")
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return
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}
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if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to commit chat session create")
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, chatSessionToResponse(session))
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}
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func (h *Handler) ListChatSessions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
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// Compute the accessible-agents set once and use it to drop sessions
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// whose target agent the caller no longer has access to — without this,
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// a member whose role was downgraded would still see the session list
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// (and transcripts via ListChatMessages) for any private agent they
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// previously had access to. Falls back to the user's role from the
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// workspace member context.
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member, ok := h.workspaceMember(w, r, workspaceID)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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actorType, actorID := h.resolveActor(r, userID, workspaceID)
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allowed, ok := h.accessibleAgentIDs(r.Context(), workspaceID, actorType, actorID, member.Role)
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if !ok {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to resolve agent access")
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return
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}
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status := r.URL.Query().Get("status")
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// Two call sites → two row types with identical shape. Collect into a
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// common response slice via small per-branch loops.
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var resp []ChatSessionResponse
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if status == "all" {
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rows, err := h.Queries.ListAllChatSessionsByCreator(r.Context(), db.ListAllChatSessionsByCreatorParams{
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WorkspaceID: parseUUID(workspaceID),
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CreatorID: parseUUID(userID),
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})
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list chat sessions")
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return
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}
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resp = make([]ChatSessionResponse, 0, len(rows))
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for _, s := range rows {
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if _, ok := allowed[uuidToString(s.AgentID)]; !ok {
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continue
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}
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resp = append(resp, ChatSessionResponse{
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ID: uuidToString(s.ID),
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WorkspaceID: uuidToString(s.WorkspaceID),
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AgentID: uuidToString(s.AgentID),
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CreatorID: uuidToString(s.CreatorID),
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Title: s.Title,
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Status: s.Status,
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HasUnread: s.UnreadCount > 0,
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UnreadCount: int(s.UnreadCount),
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LastMessage: buildChatLastMessage(s.LastMessageAt, s.LastMessageContent, s.LastMessageRole, s.LastMessageFailureReason, s.LastMessageKind),
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Pinned: s.PinnedAt.Valid,
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CreatedAt: timestampToString(s.CreatedAt),
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UpdatedAt: timestampToString(s.UpdatedAt),
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})
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}
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} else {
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rows, err := h.Queries.ListChatSessionsByCreator(r.Context(), db.ListChatSessionsByCreatorParams{
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WorkspaceID: parseUUID(workspaceID),
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CreatorID: parseUUID(userID),
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})
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list chat sessions")
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return
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}
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resp = make([]ChatSessionResponse, 0, len(rows))
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for _, s := range rows {
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if _, ok := allowed[uuidToString(s.AgentID)]; !ok {
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continue
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}
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resp = append(resp, ChatSessionResponse{
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ID: uuidToString(s.ID),
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WorkspaceID: uuidToString(s.WorkspaceID),
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AgentID: uuidToString(s.AgentID),
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CreatorID: uuidToString(s.CreatorID),
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Title: s.Title,
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Status: s.Status,
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HasUnread: s.UnreadCount > 0,
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UnreadCount: int(s.UnreadCount),
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LastMessage: buildChatLastMessage(s.LastMessageAt, s.LastMessageContent, s.LastMessageRole, s.LastMessageFailureReason, s.LastMessageKind),
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Pinned: s.PinnedAt.Valid,
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CreatedAt: timestampToString(s.CreatedAt),
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UpdatedAt: timestampToString(s.UpdatedAt),
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})
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}
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
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}
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func (h *Handler) loadChatSessionForUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, userID, workspaceID, sessionID string) (db.ChatSession, bool) {
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sessionUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, sessionID, "chat session id")
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if !ok {
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return db.ChatSession{}, false
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}
|
|
workspaceUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, workspaceID, "workspace id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return db.ChatSession{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
session, err := h.Queries.GetChatSessionInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetChatSessionInWorkspaceParams{
|
|
ID: sessionUUID,
|
|
WorkspaceID: workspaceUUID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "chat session not found")
|
|
return db.ChatSession{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
if uuidToString(session.CreatorID) != userID {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "not your chat session")
|
|
return db.ChatSession{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
return session, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// gateChatSessionForUser combines the session ownership check with the
|
|
// private-agent access gate so a member who has lost access to the target
|
|
// agent (role downgrade, ownership transfer, agent flipped to private)
|
|
// cannot continue reading the chat transcript even though they remain the
|
|
// session creator. Returns ok=false after writing the error response.
|
|
func (h *Handler) gateChatSessionForUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, userID, workspaceID, sessionID string) (db.ChatSession, bool) {
|
|
session, ok := h.loadChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return db.ChatSession{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
agent, err := h.Queries.GetAgent(r.Context(), session.AgentID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "agent not found")
|
|
return db.ChatSession{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
actorType, actorID := h.resolveActor(r, userID, workspaceID)
|
|
if !h.canAccessPrivateAgent(r.Context(), agent, actorType, actorID, workspaceID) {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "you do not have access to this agent")
|
|
return db.ChatSession{}, false
|
|
}
|
|
return session, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (h *Handler) GetChatSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
|
|
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
|
|
|
|
session, ok := h.gateChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, chatSessionToResponse(session))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type UpdateChatSessionRequest struct {
|
|
Title *string `json:"title"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// UpdateChatSession updates user-editable fields on a chat session — today
|
|
// just `title`, surfaced by the inline rename affordance in the session
|
|
// dropdown. Title is the only field accepted here: `status` has its own
|
|
// archive/unarchive endpoint (SetChatSessionArchived), `pinned` its own pin
|
|
// endpoint, agent/creator/workspace are immutable, the resume pointers
|
|
// (session_id / work_dir / runtime_id) are daemon-owned.
|
|
func (h *Handler) UpdateChatSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
|
|
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
|
|
|
|
var req UpdateChatSessionRequest
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if req.Title == nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "title is required")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
title := strings.TrimSpace(*req.Title)
|
|
if title == "" {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "title is required")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if len([]rune(title)) > chatSessionTitleMaxLen {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "title is too long")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
session, ok := h.gateChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
updated, err := h.Queries.UpdateChatSessionTitle(r.Context(), db.UpdateChatSessionTitleParams{
|
|
ID: session.ID,
|
|
Title: title,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to update chat session")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
resolvedSessionID := uuidToString(updated.ID)
|
|
h.publishChat(protocol.EventChatSessionUpdated, workspaceID, "member", userID, resolvedSessionID, protocol.ChatSessionUpdatedPayload{
|
|
ChatSessionID: resolvedSessionID,
|
|
Title: updated.Title,
|
|
UpdatedAt: timestampToString(updated.UpdatedAt),
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, chatSessionToResponse(updated))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type SetChatSessionPinnedRequest struct {
|
|
Pinned bool `json:"pinned"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetChatSessionPinned pins or unpins a chat so it sticks to the top of the
|
|
// caller's conversation list. Pin state is per-session and, since sessions are
|
|
// per-creator, inherently per-user. It never bumps updated_at (see the SQL) so
|
|
// an unpinned chat does not jump the activity-sorted list.
|
|
func (h *Handler) SetChatSessionPinned(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
|
|
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
|
|
|
|
var req SetChatSessionPinnedRequest
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
session, ok := h.gateChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
updated, err := h.Queries.SetChatSessionPinned(r.Context(), db.SetChatSessionPinnedParams{
|
|
ID: session.ID,
|
|
Pinned: req.Pinned,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to update chat session")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
resolvedSessionID := uuidToString(updated.ID)
|
|
pinned := updated.PinnedAt.Valid
|
|
h.publishChat(protocol.EventChatSessionUpdated, workspaceID, "member", userID, resolvedSessionID, protocol.ChatSessionUpdatedPayload{
|
|
ChatSessionID: resolvedSessionID,
|
|
Title: updated.Title,
|
|
Pinned: &pinned,
|
|
UpdatedAt: timestampToString(updated.UpdatedAt),
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, chatSessionToResponse(updated))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type SetChatSessionArchivedRequest struct {
|
|
Archived bool `json:"archived"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SetChatSessionArchived archives or unarchives a chat session owned by the
|
|
// caller. Archiving is the reversible sibling of delete: the row stays in the
|
|
// user's history (behind the "Archived" entry) and the conversation becomes
|
|
// read-only — SendChatMessage refuses status='archived'. Hard delete is only
|
|
// offered from the archived list, so nothing is destroyed in one hover click.
|
|
//
|
|
// Archiving also severs any external-channel binding. The web send path already
|
|
// treats status='archived' as read-only, but the channel engine (Feishu/Slack)
|
|
// resolves inbound traffic through channel_chat_session_binding without checking
|
|
// session status, so a bound session kept accumulating agent replies — and a
|
|
// stuck unread badge — after the user archived it (MUL-4372). Dropping the
|
|
// binding in the same tx makes the next inbound message for that external chat
|
|
// create a fresh chat_session under a new binding (see EnsureSession) instead of
|
|
// reviving this archived one. Unarchive deliberately does NOT recreate the
|
|
// binding: if later traffic already forked a new session, that session owns the
|
|
// channel now, and restoring the old binding would steal it back.
|
|
func (h *Handler) SetChatSessionArchived(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
|
|
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
|
|
|
|
var req SetChatSessionArchivedRequest
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
session, ok := h.gateChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tx, err := h.TxStarter.Begin(r.Context())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to start transaction")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
defer tx.Rollback(r.Context())
|
|
qtx := h.Queries.WithTx(tx)
|
|
|
|
updated, err := qtx.SetChatSessionArchived(r.Context(), db.SetChatSessionArchivedParams{
|
|
ID: session.ID,
|
|
Archived: req.Archived,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to update chat session")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if req.Archived {
|
|
if err := qtx.DeleteChannelChatSessionBindingBySession(r.Context(), session.ID); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to clear chat session channel binding")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
|
|
slog.Warn("commit chat session archive failed", "session_id", sessionID, "error", err)
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to commit chat session update")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
resolvedSessionID := uuidToString(updated.ID)
|
|
status := updated.Status
|
|
h.publishChat(protocol.EventChatSessionUpdated, workspaceID, "member", userID, resolvedSessionID, protocol.ChatSessionUpdatedPayload{
|
|
ChatSessionID: resolvedSessionID,
|
|
Title: updated.Title,
|
|
Status: &status,
|
|
UpdatedAt: timestampToString(updated.UpdatedAt),
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, chatSessionToResponse(updated))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// DeleteChatSession hard-deletes a chat session owned by the caller. The
|
|
// row lock + cancel + delete run inside a single tx so a concurrent
|
|
// SendChatMessage cannot enqueue a task that would later be orphaned by
|
|
// the FK ON DELETE SET NULL on agent_task_queue.chat_session_id. Cancel
|
|
// failure aborts the delete; events fire only after commit.
|
|
func (h *Handler) DeleteChatSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
|
|
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
|
|
|
|
session, ok := h.loadChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tx, err := h.TxStarter.Begin(r.Context())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to start transaction")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
defer tx.Rollback(r.Context())
|
|
qtx := h.Queries.WithTx(tx)
|
|
|
|
// FOR UPDATE on the chat_session row blocks any concurrent INSERT into
|
|
// agent_task_queue that references it (the FK validation needs a
|
|
// KEY SHARE lock). After we commit the delete, the blocked INSERT
|
|
// fails its FK check, so it can't land an orphaned task.
|
|
if _, err := qtx.LockChatSessionForDelete(r.Context(), session.ID); err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
|
|
// Already gone — treat as idempotent success.
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to lock chat session")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cancelled, err := qtx.CancelAgentTasksByChatSession(r.Context(), session.ID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to cancel chat session tasks")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// channel_chat_session_binding used to carry a chat_session FK with
|
|
// ON DELETE CASCADE; MUL-3515 §4 dropped every channel_* foreign key, so
|
|
// prune the binding here in the same tx that deletes its chat_session.
|
|
if err := qtx.DeleteChannelChatSessionBindingBySession(r.Context(), session.ID); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to delete chat session binding")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
// channel_outbound_card_message is also keyed by chat_session_id with no FK
|
|
// and no reaper, so prune it in the same tx or a deleted chat session leaves
|
|
// permanent orphan card rows (#4810 follow-up).
|
|
if err := qtx.DeleteChannelOutboundCardMessagesBySession(r.Context(), session.ID); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to delete chat session outbound cards")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
// chat_draft_restore is keyed by chat_session_id with no FK either, so its
|
|
// pending restores are pruned here rather than by a DB cascade (#5219). The
|
|
// LockChatSessionForDelete above doubles as the deleter half of the
|
|
// draft-restore protocol: FinalizeDeferredCancelledChat takes the same
|
|
// chat_session lock before inserting a restore, so it cannot slip one past
|
|
// this sweep (see LockChatSessionForTask in chat.sql).
|
|
if err := qtx.DeleteChatDraftRestoresBySession(r.Context(), session.ID); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to delete chat session draft restores")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := qtx.DeleteChatSession(r.Context(), db.DeleteChatSessionParams{
|
|
ID: session.ID,
|
|
WorkspaceID: session.WorkspaceID,
|
|
}); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to delete chat session")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if err := qtx.DeleteAgentLabelAssignmentsByAgent(r.Context(), session.AgentID); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to remove chat session agent label assignments")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if err := qtx.DeleteSystemAgentByID(r.Context(), session.AgentID); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to clean up chat session agent")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := tx.Commit(r.Context()); err != nil {
|
|
slog.Warn("commit chat session delete failed", "session_id", sessionID, "error", err)
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to commit chat session delete")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Post-commit broadcasts. Subscribers should never observe events for a
|
|
// tx that didn't actually persist.
|
|
h.TaskService.BroadcastCancelledTasks(r.Context(), cancelled)
|
|
|
|
resolvedSessionID := uuidToString(session.ID)
|
|
h.publishChat(protocol.EventChatSessionDeleted, workspaceID, "member", userID, resolvedSessionID, protocol.ChatSessionDeletedPayload{
|
|
ChatSessionID: resolvedSessionID,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Chat Messages
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
type SendChatMessageRequest struct {
|
|
Content string `json:"content"`
|
|
AttachmentIDs []string `json:"attachment_ids"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type SendChatMessageResponse struct {
|
|
MessageID string `json:"message_id"`
|
|
TaskID string `json:"task_id"`
|
|
// AttachmentIDs are the attachment rows actually bound to this message by
|
|
// the server. The client diffs these against the ids it requested so it
|
|
// can warn the user when an attachment silently failed to bind — no extra
|
|
// round-trip needed. No `omitempty`: a send that requested attachments but
|
|
// bound none must serialize `[]` (not be omitted), otherwise the client
|
|
// can't tell "all binds failed" from "older server without this field" and
|
|
// would silently skip the very warning this exists for. When no
|
|
// attachments were requested the value is nil → `null`, which the client's
|
|
// guard short-circuits on the requested-ids check.
|
|
AttachmentIDs []string `json:"attachment_ids"`
|
|
// CreatedAt anchors the chat StatusPill timer the instant the user
|
|
// hits send. Without it the front-end falls back to its local clock
|
|
// and the timer "snaps backwards" later when WS events deliver the
|
|
// real created_at. Returning it here means the pill renders 0s from
|
|
// the start with a stable anchor.
|
|
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (h *Handler) SendChatMessage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
|
|
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
|
|
|
|
var req SendChatMessageRequest
|
|
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if req.Content == "" {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "content is required")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Pre-validate attachment ids early so invalid input returns 400 before
|
|
// any state mutation. The actual link runs after CreateChatMessage so we
|
|
// have a message_id to back-fill into the attachment rows.
|
|
attachmentIDs, ok := parseUUIDSliceOrBadRequest(w, req.AttachmentIDs, "attachment_ids")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Load chat session and re-check the private-agent gate on every send.
|
|
// The session's creator passed the gate at create time, but their
|
|
// workspace role (or the agent's owner) may have changed since — keep
|
|
// stale sessions from being a back-door into a private agent the user
|
|
// can no longer reach. Agent senders bypass to preserve A2A collaboration.
|
|
session, ok := h.gateChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
// Archived sessions are read-only: refuse to enqueue new agent work for
|
|
// them (see SetChatSessionArchived). The frontend disables the composer
|
|
// for status='archived' and only offers unarchive/delete there. Legacy
|
|
// soft-archived rows from before the feature are covered by the same check.
|
|
if session.Status != "active" {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "chat session is archived")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Preflight the agent's enqueue preconditions BEFORE persisting the user
|
|
// message. EnqueueChatTask (below) rejects an archived or runtime-less agent
|
|
// with an error; without this check a stale client (agent archived in
|
|
// another tab) would land the user message, then get a 500, leaving an
|
|
// orphan message with no task or reply. Fail fast with a 4xx and mutate
|
|
// nothing. See EnqueueChatTask's ErrChatTaskAgentArchived / NoRuntime.
|
|
agent, err := h.Queries.GetAgent(r.Context(), session.AgentID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load chat agent")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if agent.ArchivedAt.Valid {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "chat agent is archived")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if !agent.RuntimeID.Valid {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "chat agent has no runtime")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Re-run the INVOKE gate on every send, not just the softer view gate in
|
|
// gateChatSessionForUser (MUL-4525). canAccessPrivateAgent lets a workspace
|
|
// admin keep reading a transcript, but sending a message enqueues a run and
|
|
// must satisfy canInvokeAgent — which has no admin bypass. A session created
|
|
// while the user could invoke the agent must stop enqueuing work the instant
|
|
// that permission is revoked (agent flipped private, ownership moved, target
|
|
// removed from the allow-list), and it must fail BEFORE we persist the user
|
|
// message / attachments / task. Blocked returns a structured, enumeration-safe
|
|
// reason so the composer can explain it without leaking private-agent details.
|
|
actorType, actorID := h.resolveActor(r, userID, workspaceID)
|
|
if !h.canInvokeAgent(r.Context(), agent, actorType, actorID, h.invokeOriginatorFromRequest(r, actorType, actorID), workspaceID) {
|
|
h.writeDispatchBlocked(w, http.StatusForbidden, ReasonInvocationNotAllowed)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Detect whether this is the very first human message in the session,
|
|
// BEFORE we insert the new row. This scopes LLM auto-titling (MUL-4295) to
|
|
// the opening turn: we upgrade the default/original title exactly once, off
|
|
// the first user message, and never re-run it on every subsequent send. A
|
|
// query error here is treated as "not first" so we simply skip generation
|
|
// (best-effort — never block the send).
|
|
hadUserMessage := true
|
|
if existed, err := h.Queries.ChatSessionHasUserMessage(r.Context(), session.ID); err == nil {
|
|
hadUserMessage = existed
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Persist the whole turn atomically (MUL-4351): the owning task, the user
|
|
// message bound to that task (so it belongs to the task's immutable input
|
|
// batch the instant it exists), attachment bindings, and the session touch
|
|
// all commit together, and the daemon is only notified after the commit. For
|
|
// web chat the sender is the authenticated request user (sessions are
|
|
// creator-only), so they are the task initiator — surfaced to the agent
|
|
// under `## Task Initiator`. actorType/actorID were resolved above for the
|
|
// invoke gate.
|
|
sent, err := h.TaskService.SendDirectChatMessage(r.Context(), session, agent, parseUUID(userID), req.Content, attachmentIDs, actorType, parseUUID(actorID))
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to send chat message: "+err.Error())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
msg := sent.Message
|
|
task := sent.Task
|
|
|
|
// AttachmentIDs actually bound by the server. Requested-but-unbound ids are
|
|
// surfaced to the client so it can warn the user (see SendChatMessageResponse).
|
|
var boundAttachmentIDs []string
|
|
if len(attachmentIDs) > 0 {
|
|
boundAttachmentIDs = make([]string, 0, len(sent.BoundAttachmentIDs))
|
|
for _, id := range sent.BoundAttachmentIDs {
|
|
boundAttachmentIDs = append(boundAttachmentIDs, uuidToString(id))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
taskContext := h.TaskService.AnalyticsContextForTask(r.Context(), task)
|
|
platform, _, _ := middleware.ClientMetadataFromContext(r.Context())
|
|
obsmetrics.RecordEvent(h.Analytics, h.Metrics, analytics.ChatMessageSent(
|
|
userID,
|
|
workspaceID,
|
|
uuidToString(session.ID),
|
|
uuidToString(task.ID),
|
|
uuidToString(session.AgentID),
|
|
taskContext.RuntimeMode,
|
|
taskContext.Provider,
|
|
platform,
|
|
))
|
|
|
|
// Broadcast the user message.
|
|
resolvedSessionID := uuidToString(session.ID)
|
|
h.publishChat(protocol.EventChatMessage, workspaceID, "member", userID, resolvedSessionID, protocol.ChatMessagePayload{
|
|
ChatSessionID: resolvedSessionID,
|
|
MessageID: uuidToString(msg.ID),
|
|
Role: "user",
|
|
Content: req.Content,
|
|
TaskID: uuidToString(task.ID),
|
|
CreatedAt: timestampToString(msg.CreatedAt),
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// First user message → kick off best-effort LLM auto-titling (MUL-4295).
|
|
// Fire-and-forget and non-blocking: the response below is written whether
|
|
// or not a title is ever generated, and a disabled/failing LLM layer
|
|
// silently keeps the original first-message-derived title. session.Title
|
|
// is the default/original title observed here and drives the CAS so a
|
|
// manual rename mid-generation is never clobbered.
|
|
if !hadUserMessage {
|
|
h.maybeGenerateChatTitleAsync(workspaceID, userID, session.ID, session.Title, req.Content)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, SendChatMessageResponse{
|
|
MessageID: uuidToString(msg.ID),
|
|
TaskID: uuidToString(task.ID),
|
|
CreatedAt: timestampToString(task.CreatedAt),
|
|
AttachmentIDs: boundAttachmentIDs,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type ChatMessagesCursorResponse struct {
|
|
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
|
|
ID string `json:"id"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type ChatMessagesPageResponse struct {
|
|
Messages []ChatMessageResponse `json:"messages"`
|
|
Limit int `json:"limit"`
|
|
HasMore bool `json:"has_more"`
|
|
NextCursor *ChatMessagesCursorResponse `json:"next_cursor,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func parseChatMessagesPageParams(r *http.Request) (int, pgtype.Timestamptz, pgtype.UUID, error) {
|
|
limit := 50
|
|
if raw := r.URL.Query().Get("limit"); raw != "" {
|
|
parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(raw)
|
|
if err != nil || parsed < 1 || parsed > 100 {
|
|
return 0, pgtype.Timestamptz{}, pgtype.UUID{}, errors.New("invalid limit")
|
|
}
|
|
limit = parsed
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rawBeforeCreatedAt := r.URL.Query().Get("before_created_at")
|
|
rawBeforeID := r.URL.Query().Get("before_id")
|
|
if rawBeforeCreatedAt == "" && rawBeforeID == "" {
|
|
return limit, pgtype.Timestamptz{}, pgtype.UUID{}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
if rawBeforeCreatedAt == "" || rawBeforeID == "" {
|
|
return 0, pgtype.Timestamptz{}, pgtype.UUID{}, errors.New("invalid cursor")
|
|
}
|
|
beforeTime, err := time.Parse(time.RFC3339Nano, rawBeforeCreatedAt)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return 0, pgtype.Timestamptz{}, pgtype.UUID{}, errors.New("invalid cursor")
|
|
}
|
|
beforeID, err := util.ParseUUID(rawBeforeID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return 0, pgtype.Timestamptz{}, pgtype.UUID{}, errors.New("invalid cursor")
|
|
}
|
|
return limit, pgtype.Timestamptz{Time: beforeTime, Valid: true}, beforeID, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (h *Handler) ListChatMessages(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
|
|
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
|
|
|
|
session, ok := h.gateChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
messages, err := h.Queries.ListChatMessages(r.Context(), session.ID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list chat messages")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
messageIDs := make([]pgtype.UUID, len(messages))
|
|
for i, m := range messages {
|
|
messageIDs[i] = m.ID
|
|
}
|
|
groupedAtt := h.groupChatMessageAttachments(r.Context(), workspaceID, messageIDs)
|
|
|
|
resp := make([]ChatMessageResponse, len(messages))
|
|
for i, m := range messages {
|
|
resp[i] = chatMessageToResponse(m, groupedAtt[uuidToString(m.ID)])
|
|
}
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (h *Handler) ListChatMessagesPage(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
|
|
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
|
|
|
|
session, ok := h.gateChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
limit, beforeCreatedAt, beforeID, err := parseChatMessagesPageParams(r)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
messages, err := h.Queries.ListChatMessagesPage(r.Context(), db.ListChatMessagesPageParams{
|
|
ChatSessionID: session.ID,
|
|
Limit: int32(limit + 1),
|
|
BeforeCreatedAt: beforeCreatedAt,
|
|
BeforeID: beforeID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list chat messages")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
hasMore := len(messages) > limit
|
|
if hasMore {
|
|
messages = messages[:limit]
|
|
}
|
|
var nextCursor *ChatMessagesCursorResponse
|
|
if hasMore && len(messages) > 0 {
|
|
oldest := messages[len(messages)-1]
|
|
nextCursor = &ChatMessagesCursorResponse{
|
|
CreatedAt: oldest.CreatedAt.Time.Format(time.RFC3339Nano),
|
|
ID: uuidToString(oldest.ID),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// SQL fetches newest windows first so the empty cursor opens at the recent
|
|
// tail. Reverse each cursor page before serializing to keep message order
|
|
// chronological within the viewport.
|
|
for i, j := 0, len(messages)-1; i < j; i, j = i+1, j-1 {
|
|
messages[i], messages[j] = messages[j], messages[i]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
messageIDs := make([]pgtype.UUID, len(messages))
|
|
for i, m := range messages {
|
|
messageIDs[i] = m.ID
|
|
}
|
|
groupedAtt := h.groupChatMessageAttachments(r.Context(), workspaceID, messageIDs)
|
|
|
|
resp := make([]ChatMessageResponse, len(messages))
|
|
for i, m := range messages {
|
|
resp[i] = chatMessageToResponse(m, groupedAtt[uuidToString(m.ID)])
|
|
}
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, ChatMessagesPageResponse{
|
|
Messages: resp,
|
|
Limit: limit,
|
|
HasMore: hasMore,
|
|
NextCursor: nextCursor,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// PendingChatTaskResponse is returned by GetPendingChatTask — either the
|
|
// current in-flight task's id/status, or an empty object when none is active.
|
|
// CreatedAt is the anchor the frontend uses to time the chat StatusPill
|
|
// (elapsed seconds = now - CreatedAt). It must come from the server because
|
|
// optimistic seeds don't have a real task created_at and the timer needs to
|
|
// survive refresh / reopen.
|
|
type PendingChatTaskResponse struct {
|
|
TaskID string `json:"task_id,omitempty"`
|
|
Status string `json:"status,omitempty"`
|
|
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// MarkChatSessionRead clears the session's unread_since (→ has_unread=false)
|
|
// and broadcasts chat:session_read so other devices of the same user drop
|
|
// their badges.
|
|
func (h *Handler) MarkChatSessionRead(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
|
|
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
|
|
|
|
session, ok := h.gateChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := h.Queries.MarkChatSessionRead(r.Context(), session.ID); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to mark session read")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
resolvedSessionID := uuidToString(session.ID)
|
|
h.publishChat(protocol.EventChatSessionRead, workspaceID, "member", userID, resolvedSessionID, protocol.ChatSessionReadPayload{
|
|
ChatSessionID: resolvedSessionID,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Deferred-cancellation draft restores (#5219)
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
// ChatDraftRestoreResponse is one recoverable composer draft: a deferred
|
|
// cancellation settled as empty-transcript after the cancel HTTP response
|
|
// returned, so the deleted prompt is persisted server-side until the
|
|
// creator's client applies and consumes it. Attachments are resolved from
|
|
// the stored ids at read time so they carry the normal handler URL policy.
|
|
type ChatDraftRestoreResponse struct {
|
|
ID string `json:"id"`
|
|
ChatSessionID string `json:"chat_session_id"`
|
|
TaskID string `json:"task_id"`
|
|
Content string `json:"content"`
|
|
Attachments []AttachmentResponse `json:"attachments,omitempty"`
|
|
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type ChatDraftRestoresResponse struct {
|
|
Restores []ChatDraftRestoreResponse `json:"restores"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ListChatDraftRestores returns the session's pending draft restores.
|
|
// Creator-only via loadChatSessionForUser — deliberately not the
|
|
// private-agent gate: the content is the caller's own deleted prompt, and
|
|
// losing agent access must not strand it server-side forever.
|
|
func (h *Handler) ListChatDraftRestores(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
|
|
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
|
|
|
|
session, ok := h.loadChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rows, err := h.Queries.ListChatDraftRestoresBySession(r.Context(), session.ID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list draft restores")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var attachmentIDs []pgtype.UUID
|
|
for _, row := range rows {
|
|
attachmentIDs = append(attachmentIDs, row.AttachmentIds...)
|
|
}
|
|
attachmentsByID := map[string]AttachmentResponse{}
|
|
if len(attachmentIDs) > 0 {
|
|
attRows, err := h.Queries.ListAttachmentsByIDs(r.Context(), db.ListAttachmentsByIDsParams{
|
|
AttachmentIds: attachmentIDs,
|
|
WorkspaceID: session.WorkspaceID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load draft restore attachments")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
for _, a := range attRows {
|
|
attachmentsByID[uuidToString(a.ID)] = h.attachmentToResponse(a)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
resp := ChatDraftRestoresResponse{Restores: make([]ChatDraftRestoreResponse, 0, len(rows))}
|
|
for _, row := range rows {
|
|
item := ChatDraftRestoreResponse{
|
|
ID: uuidToString(row.ID),
|
|
ChatSessionID: uuidToString(row.ChatSessionID),
|
|
TaskID: uuidToString(row.TaskID),
|
|
Content: row.Content,
|
|
CreatedAt: timestampToString(row.CreatedAt),
|
|
}
|
|
for _, attID := range row.AttachmentIds {
|
|
if a, ok := attachmentsByID[uuidToString(attID)]; ok {
|
|
item.Attachments = append(item.Attachments, a)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
resp.Restores = append(resp.Restores, item)
|
|
}
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ConsumeChatDraftRestore deletes one draft restore after the creator's
|
|
// client applied it. Idempotent: consuming an already-consumed (or never
|
|
// existing) restore still returns 204, so a retried consume after a lost
|
|
// response can't fail the client.
|
|
func (h *Handler) ConsumeChatDraftRestore(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
|
|
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
|
|
|
|
session, ok := h.loadChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
restoreUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, chi.URLParam(r, "restoreId"), "restore id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if _, err := h.Queries.DeleteChatDraftRestore(r.Context(), db.DeleteChatDraftRestoreParams{
|
|
ID: restoreUUID,
|
|
ChatSessionID: session.ID,
|
|
}); err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to consume draft restore")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// pruneRuntimeAgentChatDraftRestores drops the pending draft restores of every
|
|
// chat_session a runtime teardown is about to remove through the agent cascade
|
|
// (chat_session.agent_id is ON DELETE CASCADE, migration 033). chat_draft_restore
|
|
// has no FK (MUL-3515) and no reaper, so a restore left behind keeps the user's
|
|
// prompt text forever, unreachable and undeletable.
|
|
//
|
|
// Every runtime/agent teardown path must call this in its own transaction and
|
|
// BEFORE deleting the agent rows — the queries join through them. includeSystemAgents
|
|
// mirrors whether the caller also runs DeleteSystemAgentsByRuntime: the
|
|
// runtime-profile teardown deletes only archived agents, and pruning system-agent
|
|
// sessions there would destroy restores whose session survives.
|
|
//
|
|
// The sessions are locked before the sweep: that is the deleter half of the
|
|
// mutual-exclusion protocol with FinalizeDeferredCancelledChat, which would
|
|
// otherwise insert a restore this sweep can no longer see (see LockChatSession*
|
|
// in chat.sql).
|
|
//
|
|
// The workspace teardown has its own copy of this shape (locks, then sweeps
|
|
// inside the DeleteWorkspace CTE) because that statement's prune must stay in
|
|
// the same statement as the workspace row it commits with.
|
|
func pruneRuntimeAgentChatDraftRestores(ctx context.Context, q *db.Queries, runtimeID pgtype.UUID, includeSystemAgents bool) error {
|
|
if _, err := q.LockChatSessionsByArchivedRuntimeAgents(ctx, runtimeID); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := q.DeleteChatDraftRestoresByArchivedRuntimeAgents(ctx, runtimeID); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if !includeSystemAgents {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
if _, err := q.LockChatSessionsBySystemRuntimeAgents(ctx, runtimeID); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
return q.DeleteChatDraftRestoresBySystemRuntimeAgents(ctx, runtimeID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// PendingChatTasksResponse is the aggregate view consumed by the FAB.
|
|
type PendingChatTasksResponse struct {
|
|
Tasks []PendingChatTaskItem `json:"tasks"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type PendingChatTaskItem struct {
|
|
TaskID string `json:"task_id"`
|
|
Status string `json:"status"`
|
|
ChatSessionID string `json:"chat_session_id"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type CancelledChatMessageResponse struct {
|
|
ChatSessionID string `json:"chat_session_id"`
|
|
MessageID string `json:"message_id"`
|
|
Content string `json:"content"`
|
|
RestoreToInput bool `json:"restore_to_input"`
|
|
Attachments []AttachmentResponse `json:"attachments,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type CancelTaskByUserResponse struct {
|
|
AgentTaskResponse
|
|
CancelledChatMessage *CancelledChatMessageResponse `json:"cancelled_chat_message,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ListPendingChatTasks returns every in-flight chat task owned by the current
|
|
// user in this workspace. Drives the FAB's "running" indicator when the chat
|
|
// window is closed (no per-session query is subscribed). Tasks belonging to
|
|
// private agents the caller has lost access to are dropped from the response.
|
|
func (h *Handler) ListPendingChatTasks(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
|
|
|
|
member, ok := h.workspaceMember(w, r, workspaceID)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
actorType, actorID := h.resolveActor(r, userID, workspaceID)
|
|
allowed, ok := h.accessibleAgentIDs(r.Context(), workspaceID, actorType, actorID, member.Role)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to resolve agent access")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// No accessible agents → every row would be filtered out anyway. Skip the
|
|
// DB round-trip and return an empty list (mirrors HasPendingChatTasks).
|
|
if len(allowed) == 0 {
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, PendingChatTasksResponse{Tasks: []PendingChatTaskItem{}})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rows, err := h.Queries.ListPendingChatTasksByCreator(r.Context(), db.ListPendingChatTasksByCreatorParams{
|
|
WorkspaceID: parseUUID(workspaceID),
|
|
CreatorID: parseUUID(userID),
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list pending chat tasks")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The pending query now returns cs.agent_id per row, so we can filter
|
|
// out private agents the caller has lost access to directly against the
|
|
// already-loaded `allowed` set — no second ListAllChatSessionsByCreator
|
|
// scan on this hot path (MUL-4159).
|
|
items := make([]PendingChatTaskItem, 0, len(rows))
|
|
for _, row := range rows {
|
|
agentID := uuidToString(row.AgentID)
|
|
if _, ok := allowed[agentID]; !ok {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
items = append(items, PendingChatTaskItem{
|
|
TaskID: uuidToString(row.TaskID),
|
|
Status: row.Status,
|
|
ChatSessionID: uuidToString(row.ChatSessionID),
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, PendingChatTasksResponse{Tasks: items})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// HasPendingChatTasksResponse is the boolean fast-path payload consumed by the
|
|
// FAB, which only needs to know whether any in-flight chat task exists — not
|
|
// the full list.
|
|
type HasPendingChatTasksResponse struct {
|
|
HasPending bool `json:"has_pending"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// HasPendingChatTasks answers "does the current user have any in-flight chat
|
|
// task in this workspace?" with a single EXISTS query, for the FAB's running
|
|
// indicator. It is the boolean sibling of ListPendingChatTasks: the detailed
|
|
// list is reserved for the ChatWindow history / stop-task flows.
|
|
//
|
|
// Permission filtering is preserved end-to-end: the set of agents the caller
|
|
// may currently see is resolved the same way as ListPendingChatTasks and
|
|
// pushed into the query as agent_ids, so a member who lost access to a private
|
|
// agent never sees a true from a task on that agent (MUL-4159). An empty
|
|
// accessible-agent set short-circuits to false without hitting the DB.
|
|
func (h *Handler) HasPendingChatTasks(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
|
|
|
|
member, ok := h.workspaceMember(w, r, workspaceID)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
actorType, actorID := h.resolveActor(r, userID, workspaceID)
|
|
allowed, ok := h.accessibleAgentIDs(r.Context(), workspaceID, actorType, actorID, member.Role)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to resolve agent access")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// No accessible agents → nothing the caller may see can be pending.
|
|
// Skip the round-trip and return false.
|
|
if len(allowed) == 0 {
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, HasPendingChatTasksResponse{HasPending: false})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
agentIDs := make([]pgtype.UUID, 0, len(allowed))
|
|
for id := range allowed {
|
|
agentIDs = append(agentIDs, parseUUID(id))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hasPending, err := h.Queries.HasPendingChatTasksByCreator(r.Context(), db.HasPendingChatTasksByCreatorParams{
|
|
WorkspaceID: parseUUID(workspaceID),
|
|
CreatorID: parseUUID(userID),
|
|
AgentIds: agentIDs,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to check pending chat tasks")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, HasPendingChatTasksResponse{HasPending: hasPending})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetPendingChatTask returns the most recent in-flight task (queued / dispatched
|
|
// / running) for a chat session. The frontend polls this on mount / session
|
|
// switch so pending UI state survives refresh and reopen.
|
|
func (h *Handler) GetPendingChatTask(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
|
|
sessionID := chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId")
|
|
|
|
session, ok := h.gateChatSessionForUser(w, r, userID, workspaceID, sessionID)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
task, err := h.Queries.GetPendingChatTask(r.Context(), session.ID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// No in-flight task — return an empty object, not an error.
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, PendingChatTaskResponse{})
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, PendingChatTaskResponse{
|
|
TaskID: uuidToString(task.ID),
|
|
Status: task.Status,
|
|
CreatedAt: timestampToString(task.CreatedAt),
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Task cancellation (user-facing, with ownership check)
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
// CancelTaskByUser cancels a task the caller is allowed to act on within the
|
|
// current workspace.
|
|
//
|
|
// Tenancy is enforced uniformly through the task's owning agent: every
|
|
// agent_task_queue row carries a NOT NULL agent_id (ON DELETE CASCADE, so the
|
|
// agent always exists), and agents are workspace-scoped. GetAgentTaskInWorkspace
|
|
// is therefore the single tenant guard that works regardless of which optional
|
|
// source FK (issue / chat_session / autopilot_run) is set — which is what makes
|
|
// run_only autopilot tasks and quick_create tasks (whose issue does not exist
|
|
// yet) cancellable at all. Keying cancellation off issue_id / chat_session_id
|
|
// alone is exactly what 404'd these tasks before (MUL-2827).
|
|
//
|
|
// On top of tenancy, two privacy models layer on:
|
|
// - a chat task is private to the member who started the conversation, so
|
|
// only that creator may cancel it;
|
|
// - every other task surfaces on the agent Activity tab and the workspace
|
|
// task snapshot, both of which hide private agents from members without
|
|
// access. Cancellation mirrors that gate via canAccessPrivateAgent so the
|
|
// id-only endpoint is never more permissive than the surface that exposes
|
|
// the task.
|
|
func (h *Handler) CancelTaskByUser(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
workspaceID := ctxWorkspaceID(r.Context())
|
|
wsUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, workspaceID, "workspace id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
taskID := chi.URLParam(r, "taskId")
|
|
taskUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, taskID, "task id")
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
task, err := h.Queries.GetAgentTaskInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetAgentTaskInWorkspaceParams{
|
|
ID: taskUUID,
|
|
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "task not found")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if task.ChatSessionID.Valid {
|
|
// Chat privacy: only the member who opened the conversation may
|
|
// cancel its task, even though the workspace is shared.
|
|
cs, err := h.Queries.GetChatSessionInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetChatSessionInWorkspaceParams{
|
|
ID: task.ChatSessionID,
|
|
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "task not found")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if uuidToString(cs.CreatorID) != userID {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "not your task")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Issue / autopilot / quick_create tasks are all visible on the
|
|
// agent Activity tab + workspace snapshot, which gate private
|
|
// agents. Mirror that gate here.
|
|
agent, err := h.Queries.GetAgentInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetAgentInWorkspaceParams{
|
|
ID: task.AgentID,
|
|
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "task not found")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
actorType, actorID := h.resolveActor(r, userID, workspaceID)
|
|
if !h.canAccessPrivateAgent(r.Context(), agent, actorType, actorID, workspaceID) {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "you do not have access to this agent")
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cancelled, err := h.TaskService.CancelTaskWithResult(r.Context(), taskUUID, service.CancelTaskOptions{
|
|
ClientSupportsDraftRestore: requestHasClientCapability(r, protocol.AppCapabilityChatDraftRestoreV1),
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
resp := CancelTaskByUserResponse{
|
|
AgentTaskResponse: taskToResponse(cancelled.Task, workspaceID),
|
|
}
|
|
h.hydrateTaskAttributions(r.Context(), []*TaskAttribution{resp.AgentTaskResponse.Attribution})
|
|
if cancelled.CancelledChatMessage != nil {
|
|
attachments := make([]AttachmentResponse, 0, len(cancelled.CancelledChatMessage.Attachments))
|
|
for _, a := range cancelled.CancelledChatMessage.Attachments {
|
|
attachments = append(attachments, h.attachmentToResponse(a))
|
|
}
|
|
resp.CancelledChatMessage = &CancelledChatMessageResponse{
|
|
ChatSessionID: cancelled.CancelledChatMessage.ChatSessionID,
|
|
MessageID: cancelled.CancelledChatMessage.MessageID,
|
|
Content: cancelled.CancelledChatMessage.Content,
|
|
RestoreToInput: cancelled.CancelledChatMessage.RestoreToInput,
|
|
Attachments: attachments,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
// Response types & helpers
|
|
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
type ChatSessionResponse struct {
|
|
ID string `json:"id"`
|
|
WorkspaceID string `json:"workspace_id"`
|
|
AgentID string `json:"agent_id"`
|
|
CreatorID string `json:"creator_id"`
|
|
Title string `json:"title"`
|
|
Status string `json:"status"`
|
|
// Only populated by list endpoints — single-session fetches return 0/false/nil.
|
|
// HasUnread is kept as a convenience (== UnreadCount > 0) for existing consumers.
|
|
HasUnread bool `json:"has_unread"`
|
|
UnreadCount int `json:"unread_count"`
|
|
LastMessage *ChatLastMessage `json:"last_message"`
|
|
// Pinned marks a chat the user has stuck to the top of the list. Populated
|
|
// by list endpoints and by the pin/unpin + single-session responses.
|
|
Pinned bool `json:"pinned"`
|
|
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
|
|
UpdatedAt string `json:"updated_at"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ChatLastMessage is a preview of a session's most recent message, used to
|
|
// render the IM-style conversation list (name + snippet + time). nil when the
|
|
// session has no messages yet.
|
|
type ChatLastMessage struct {
|
|
Content string `json:"content"`
|
|
Role string `json:"role"`
|
|
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
|
|
FailureReason *string `json:"failure_reason"`
|
|
// MessageKind is 'message' (default) or 'no_response'. Lets the session
|
|
// list render a localized preview for a no-text-reply turn instead of the
|
|
// English fallback content the server stores (MUL-4351).
|
|
MessageKind string `json:"message_kind"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// buildChatLastMessage assembles the preview from list-row columns; returns nil
|
|
// when there is no last message (the LEFT JOIN produced a NULL timestamp).
|
|
func buildChatLastMessage(at pgtype.Timestamptz, content, role string, failure pgtype.Text, kind string) *ChatLastMessage {
|
|
if !at.Valid {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return &ChatLastMessage{
|
|
Content: content,
|
|
Role: role,
|
|
CreatedAt: timestampToString(at),
|
|
FailureReason: textToPtr(failure),
|
|
MessageKind: normalizeMessageKind(kind),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type ChatMessageResponse struct {
|
|
ID string `json:"id"`
|
|
ChatSessionID string `json:"chat_session_id"`
|
|
Role string `json:"role"`
|
|
Content string `json:"content"`
|
|
TaskID *string `json:"task_id"`
|
|
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
|
|
// FailureReason flags an assistant row synthesized by FailTask's chat
|
|
// fallback. Front-end uses it to switch to the destructive bubble.
|
|
FailureReason *string `json:"failure_reason"`
|
|
// ElapsedMs is the wall-clock duration from task creation to terminal
|
|
// state. Drives "Replied in 38s" / "Failed after 12s" captions.
|
|
ElapsedMs *int64 `json:"elapsed_ms"`
|
|
// MessageKind is 'message' (default) or 'no_response' — a completed
|
|
// direct-chat turn that produced no text reply (MUL-4351). Additive:
|
|
// clients that don't understand it fall back to the non-empty content.
|
|
MessageKind string `json:"message_kind"`
|
|
// Attachments linked to this message via chat_message_id. The chat
|
|
// bubble renders file cards from these, and the daemon claim path
|
|
// (daemon.go) pulls structured metadata from the same source so the
|
|
// agent can `multica attachment download <id>` rather than guessing
|
|
// from a markdown URL that may expire.
|
|
Attachments []AttachmentResponse `json:"attachments,omitempty"`
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func chatSessionToResponse(s db.ChatSession) ChatSessionResponse {
|
|
return ChatSessionResponse{
|
|
ID: uuidToString(s.ID),
|
|
WorkspaceID: uuidToString(s.WorkspaceID),
|
|
AgentID: uuidToString(s.AgentID),
|
|
CreatorID: uuidToString(s.CreatorID),
|
|
Title: s.Title,
|
|
Status: s.Status,
|
|
Pinned: s.PinnedAt.Valid,
|
|
CreatedAt: timestampToString(s.CreatedAt),
|
|
UpdatedAt: timestampToString(s.UpdatedAt),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func chatMessageToResponse(m db.ChatMessage, attachments []AttachmentResponse) ChatMessageResponse {
|
|
return ChatMessageResponse{
|
|
ID: uuidToString(m.ID),
|
|
ChatSessionID: uuidToString(m.ChatSessionID),
|
|
Role: m.Role,
|
|
Content: m.Content,
|
|
TaskID: uuidToPtr(m.TaskID),
|
|
CreatedAt: timestampToString(m.CreatedAt),
|
|
FailureReason: textToPtr(m.FailureReason),
|
|
ElapsedMs: int8ToPtr(m.ElapsedMs),
|
|
MessageKind: normalizeMessageKind(m.MessageKind),
|
|
Attachments: attachments,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// normalizeMessageKind maps a stored chat_message.message_kind to the value the
|
|
// API exposes. Unknown / empty kinds degrade to 'message' so a future kind
|
|
// never surprises an older client into a broken render (MUL-4351).
|
|
func normalizeMessageKind(kind string) string {
|
|
switch kind {
|
|
case protocol.ChatMessageKindNoResponse:
|
|
return protocol.ChatMessageKindNoResponse
|
|
default:
|
|
return protocol.ChatMessageKindMessage
|
|
}
|
|
}
|