Files
multica/server/pkg/db/generated/chat.sql.go
Bohan Jiang 4fac8d772f feat(attribution): Human Attribution Phase 1 (MUL-4302) (#5150)
* feat(attribution): Phase 1 foundation — provenance schema + resolver (MUL-4302)

Human Attribution, Phase 1 (地基) first increment. Every agent run must be
traceable to exactly one accountable human AND record at which waterfall level
that human was resolved, so a NULL originator can be told apart from a genuine
'no human in the chain'.

- migration 149: add originator_source (waterfall label) + delegation/retry/
  rerun/rule-version lineage + kind-tagged trigger evidence to agent_task_queue.
  No FK, no cascade, no CHECK on the source enum (MUL-4302 §7); nullable ADD
  COLUMNs = fast metadata-only change on the hot queue table.
- internal/attribution: the accountable-human vocabulary (Source, EvidenceKind,
  TriggerKind) + pure, unit-tested classification rules (ClassifyComment/
  ClassifyDirect). No DB, no authorization — provenance labeling only.
- service: attributionFor{IssueTask,TriggerComment} gather facts and delegate to
  the pure classifier; the legacy originator resolvers now delegate here so
  there is one source of truth. originator_user_id's VALUE is unchanged, so the
  Composio-overlay and canInvokeAgent A2A authorization boundaries are
  byte-for-byte preserved (MUL-4302 §1.3).
- enqueueIssueTask / enqueueMentionTask stamp originator_source + evidence;
  CreateRetryTask carries the parent attribution forward and records
  retry_of_task_id so retry and manual rerun stay separable (MUL-4302 §5).

Verified: go build ./..., go vet, gofmt clean; new attribution unit tests +
enqueue stamping integration test green; existing resolve_originator tests
unchanged.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(attribution): split accountable_user_id from originator, close enqueue bypasses (MUL-4302)

Phase 1, per Bohan's decision on the MUL-4302 thread: audit and authorization
answer different questions and get different columns.

- Migration 151 adds agent_task_queue.accountable_user_id (no FK, no cascade).
  Authorization keeps reading ONLY originator_user_id (canInvokeAgent A2A gate,
  Composio overlay); audit/UI/usage read accountable_user_id + source + evidence.
- Invariant (finalizeAttribution, single chokepoint + §11 tests): originator
  non-null ⟹ accountable equals it. The two diverge only when originator is null
  (autopilot / degraded fallback), which is the deferred rule_owner/owner_fallback
  increment; this lands the column + mirror-write so that split has a home.

- Close the NULL-source enqueue bypasses Elon flagged: chat, quick-create,
  deferred-fallback and run_only-autopilot now stamp originator_source + evidence
  (+ accountable where a human exists). Autopilot stays unattributed until the
  rule-version snapshot table lands, but is no longer a silent NULL-source row.
  Retry inherits accountable_user_id like the rest of the attribution lineage.

- Fix assign/promote attribution (§4): a member who assigns/promotes an existing
  issue is now the accountable human (and, by the invariant, originator) ahead of
  the issue creator. Threaded as an OPTIONAL actor override, so comment/rerun/
  autopilot paths keep today's resolution and create-with-assignee (creator ==
  actor) is unchanged. The squad leader gate already judged the same member.

Also merges origin/main: renumbers the attribution migration 149→150 (main took
149 for issue_origin_agent_create) and folds agent_create into ClassifyDirect's
origin inheritance.

go build/vet/gofmt clean; attribution unit tests + service stamp/actor tests +
handler suite pass on a fresh DB migrated through 151.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* docs(attribution): fix accountable NULL semantics + close chat/quick-create evidence boundary (MUL-4302)

Addresses Elon's 2nd-round review on PR #5150 (pre-merge doc/evidence items):

- Migration 151 no longer overclaims NULL. accountable_user_id is NULL not only
  on pre-migration rows but on NEW rows whose audit source resolved no human yet
  (run_only autopilot writes originator_source='unattributed' with NULL
  accountable until rule_owner lands). Header + COMMENT ON COLUMN reworded so a
  schema reader does not misjudge the invariant.

- Chat now uses the UNIFORM evidence pair (kind=chat, ref=chat_session_id), like
  autopilot_run/issue_assignment, instead of relying only on the dedicated
  chat_session_id column — new EvidenceChat kind. Added a service test asserting
  chat stamps direct_human + chat evidence.

- Quick-create is documented as the ONE intentional no-antecedent-row path: no
  comment/issue/session/run exists at enqueue time (the run creates the issue), so
  trigger_evidence_kind/ref stay NULL while the human rides originator/accountable
  and source is direct_human — not a NULL-source bypass.

No authorization behavior change. attribution + service + handler suites pass on a
DB migrated through 151.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* chore(attribution): renumber migrations 150/151 → 157/158 after merging main (MUL-4302)

main's #5162 ("unblock release migrations") renumbered the chat migrations and
took 150 (agent_task_coalesced_comments) and 151 (chat_read_cursor), colliding
with this branch's attribution migrations. Renumber them above main's new highest
(156) so TestMigrationNumericPrefixesStayUniqueAfterLegacySet passes:

- 150_agent_task_attribution      → 157_agent_task_attribution
- 151_agent_task_accountable_user → 158_agent_task_accountable_user

Fixed the internal "migration 150" references in 158's header to 157. Migrations
apply cleanly through 158 on a fresh DB; migration lint green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(attribution): autopilot rule_owner — accountable = rule version publisher (MUL-4302)

Implements rule_owner (MUL-4302 §3.4), the first attribution source where the
accountable human diverges from the (NULL) authorization originator.

- Migration 159 adds the append-only autopilot_rule_version snapshot table (no FK,
  no cascade); migration 160 adds its CONCURRENTLY lookup index.
- Write-on-publish: CreateAutopilot appends v1 (publisher = creator); UpdateAutopilot
  appends a new version when a SUBSTANTIVE autopilot-row field changes (assignee /
  status / execution_mode) — cosmetic edits (title/description/template) write none.
  Both run inside the existing handler tx (atomic with the autopilot write).
- Dispatch resolution: both autopilot execution modes now resolve the active rule
  version and stamp originator_source='rule_owner', accountable_user_id=publisher,
  rule_version_id=<snapshot>, with originator_user_id left NULL (authorization
  unchanged). run_only stamps CreateAutopilotTask directly; create_issue resolves in
  attributionForIssueTask so both modes attribute identically. A missing version /
  non-member publisher degrades to unattributed — never fabricates a human.
- finalizeAttribution now enforces the invariant ONE-WAY: it mirrors originator onto
  accountable only when originator is valid, leaving an explicitly-set accountable
  (rule_owner / future owner_fallback) intact when originator is NULL. Added
  rule_version_id to CreateAgentTask so the create_issue path persists it too.

Also merges origin/main and renumbers this branch's attribution migrations
150/151 → 157/158 (main's #5162 took 150/151); rule_version table is 159/160.

Tests: attribution unit RuleOwner + one-way invariant table; service integration
tests proving an autopilot-origin issue stamps rule_owner + rule_version_id (and
degrades to unattributed with no version). Full service/attribution/handler/
migration suites pass on a DB migrated through 160; build/vet/gofmt clean.

Deferred (same PR): trigger-table republish (cron/webhook/event_filters) and
system-pause/archive versioning; owner_fallback + fail-closed; manual rerun.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): manual autopilot trigger → direct_human to the triggering member (MUL-4302)

Elon's blocking finding: a member manually triggering an autopilot was attributed
rule_owner (accountable = rule publisher, originator NULL) like a schedule/webhook
run, so member B triggering member A's autopilot landed accountable=A and carried
no originator authorization context for the run. Per MUL-4302 §4 a manual "run now"
is a direct human action and must attribute direct_human to the triggering member.

- Thread the triggering member from TriggerAutopilot into dispatch: new
  DispatchAutopilotManual carries actorUserID (resolved via resolveActor +
  memberActorUserID, so only a member actor is a human; an A2A agent actor falls
  back to rule_owner). DispatchAutopilot / DispatchAutopilotForPlan keep their
  public signatures (pass an invalid actor); only the internal dispatchAutopilot /
  dispatchCreateIssue / dispatchRunOnly gained the param, so the many existing
  callers are untouched.
- run_only: dispatchRunOnly stamps direct_human (originator == accountable ==
  actor, no rule_version) for a manual actor, else rule_owner. CreateAutopilotTask
  gains an originator_user_id param for the manual case.
- create_issue: dispatchCreateIssue enqueues a manual trigger via the actor-carrying
  *WithHandoff entry points; attributionForIssueTask's autopilot-origin rule_owner
  branch is now guarded on !actorUserID.Valid, so a valid actor falls through to the
  direct_human override. Both execution modes attribute identically.
- schedule / webhook keep rule_owner (no actor). Trigger-table + system-pause/archive
  versioning remain the pre-merge follow-ups.

Tests: the run_only row assertion Elon asked for (schedule → rule_owner row on
CreateAutopilotTask), plus manual direct_human on BOTH modes (run_only and
create_issue), including a manual actor distinct from the rule publisher. Full
service/attribution/handler/migration/scheduler/cmd suites pass on a DB migrated
through 160; build/vet/gofmt clean.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(attribution): owner_fallback + fail-closed policy, and manual-rerun direct_human (MUL-4302)

Two of the three remaining Phase 1 items (trigger-table / system-pause versioning
is deferred — see PR description).

owner_fallback + fail-closed (§1/§3.5) — the never-null accountable guarantee:
- attribution.OwnerFallback degrades an UNATTRIBUTED result to owner_fallback:
  accountable = agent owner, originator stays NULL (audit-only, authz untouched),
  Source.Precise()==false. finalizeAttribution's one-way invariant already allows
  accountable-set / originator-NULL divergence, so nothing else changes.
- Migration 161 adds workspace.attribution_fail_closed (default FALSE) + a lean
  GetWorkspaceAttributionFailClosed read. (Also added the column to ListWorkspaces'
  explicit column list so its row type stays db.Workspace.)
- applyAttributionFallback is applied at every enqueue boundary (issue, mention,
  chat, quick-create, deferred-fallback, autopilot run_only): unattributed →
  owner_fallback (agent owner) by default, or ErrAttributionFailClosed when the
  workspace is fail-closed, which the caller surfaces to refuse the enqueue (the
  run does not start). So no run is left without an accountable human, and a
  compliance workspace can block unattributable runs instead.

manual rerun (§5) — a rerun is a NEW direct_human trigger to the rerunning member:
- RerunIssue threads the acting member (resolved in the handler via resolveActor)
  down to enqueueRerunTask, and attributionForIssueTask is now actor-first so the
  actor wins over an INHERITED trigger comment (a rerun keeps the comment for the
  daemon's prompt context but must attribute to whoever clicked rerun, not the
  original comment's human).
- rerun_of_task_id lineage is recorded via a targeted SetAgentTaskRerunOf update on
  the rerun path only (keeping the shared CreateAgentTask insert untouched), so
  system retry (retry_of_task_id) and human rerun stay separable in reporting.

Tests: OwnerFallback unit test; owner_fallback + fail-closed-refusal + manual-rerun
(direct_human + rerun_of_task_id) service tests; the prior "degrades to unattributed"
test updated to owner_fallback. Full service/attribution/handler/migration/scheduler/
cmd suites pass on a DB migrated through 161; build/vet/gofmt clean.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): close fail-open holes + move rerun_of_task_id into creation snapshot (MUL-4302)

Addresses Elon's two must-fixes on PR #5150.

1. accountable-never-null / fail-closed had fail-open holes. applyAttributionFallback
   now, for an UNATTRIBUTED run, refuses the enqueue (ErrAttributionFailClosed) in
   THREE cases instead of silently degrading to a runnable NULL-accountable task:
   - workspace policy read fails (or no workspace) → fail closed; we cannot confirm
     fallback is permitted, so we don't run an unattributable task on a DB hiccup.
     (Only the rare unattributed path pays this; precise runs never read the policy.)
   - workspace is fail-closed → refuse (unchanged).
   - owner_fallback has no valid agent owner → refuse rather than enqueue a task with
     a NULL accountable_user_id.
   ErrAttributionFailClosed's doc now covers all three "cannot guarantee an
   accountable human" refusals. Added missing-owner / policy-read-failure /
   precise-passthrough tests.

2. manual rerun rerun_of_task_id was a post-notify UPDATE (race: the queued event /
   daemon claim could see rerun_of_task_id = NULL, and a failed update degraded the
   run to a plain direct_human). It now rides the CreateAgentTask insert — threaded
   through enqueueIssueTask / enqueueMentionTask as a creation param (like
   retry_of_task_id) so it is written in the same statement before the daemon is
   notified. Removed the SetAgentTaskRerunOf follow-up query.

Also merges origin/main (unrelated CLI fix #5167, no conflict). Full service /
attribution / handler / migration / scheduler / cmd suites pass on a DB migrated
through 161; build / vet / gofmt clean.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(attribution): rule_owner versioning on trigger edits + system-pause/archive (MUL-4302)

The final remaining Phase 1 item: substantive publishes beyond the autopilot row now
republish the rule version, so a run's rule_owner accountable follows whoever last
changed what the rule does.

- Extracted the config-summary + insert into service.RecordAutopilotRuleVersion so
  the handler and the (different-package) failure monitor share one writer; the
  handler's recordAutopilotRuleVersion is now a thin wrapper.
- Trigger edits: UpdateAutopilotTrigger and DeleteAutopilotTrigger republish the rule
  version with the acting member as publisher, ATOMICALLY (tx-wrapped mutation +
  version write, mirroring CreateAutopilot/UpdateAutopilot). CreateAutopilotTrigger
  republishes best-effort — the webhook path mints its token with a retry loop that
  cannot share one tx, and a create is usually initial setup already covered by v1;
  a failed write there is benign (active version stays the current publisher, the new
  trigger fires under it, no immediate daemon claim rides it).
- Archive (DeleteAutopilot) republishes (member, status=archived), tx-wrapped.
- System auto-pause (failure monitor) republishes with a 'system' publisher,
  best-effort — a background sweep to a non-dispatching state (a paused autopilot
  never dispatches; a later member resume supersedes).
- RotateWebhookToken / SetSigningSecret deliberately do NOT version: they rotate
  credentials, not the rule's behavior (not §3.4 substantive).

Semantics: a system-published (no-member) active version degrades dispatch to
unattributed → owner_fallback, never fabricating a human.

Tests: republish-reattributes (member A → member B supersedes → dispatch resolves to
B; system publisher → unattributed). Full service/attribution/handler/migration/
scheduler/cmd suites pass on a DB migrated through 161; build/vet/gofmt clean.
Also merges origin/main (unrelated frontend feature #5074).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): make trigger-create rule-version republish atomic (MUL-4302)

Addresses Elon's final Phase 1 blocking finding: CreateAutopilotTrigger recorded the
rule-version republish best-effort AFTER the trigger insert. If member B added a
schedule/webhook trigger to member A's autopilot and the version write failed, future
schedule/webhook dispatches would keep attributing to A — violating the rule_owner
invariant that the last member to substantively change the rule owns future runs
("no immediate daemon claim" doesn't save it, since the miss surfaces at the LATER
trigger firing).

Both create paths now write the version in the SAME tx as the trigger INSERT:
- schedule create: wrap CreateAutopilotTrigger + recordAutopilotRuleVersion in one tx.
- webhook create: each mint-with-retry attempt runs in its own tx (insert + version
  commit together; a token collision rolls that attempt back and retries with a fresh
  token; a version-write failure rolls the trigger back). Passes ap + the acting
  member id into the helper.
- removed the best-effort recordTriggerRuleVersionBestEffort helper (and the now-unused
  slog import).

Test: TestCreateTrigger_RepublishesRuleVersionAtomically drives both create paths
through the handler and asserts a rule version is published by the acting member.
Existing webhook/trigger/archive handler tests still pass. Also merges origin/main
(unrelated avatar feature #5074). Full service/attribution/handler/migration/
scheduler/cmd suites pass on a DB migrated through 161; build/vet/gofmt clean.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(attribution): Phase 2.1 — surface run attribution on the task API (MUL-4302 §9)

First Phase 2 (visibility) increment: the agent-task API now returns the resolved
accountable-human provenance so the UI can render an "on behalf of" badge.

- AgentTaskResponse gains an `attribution` object: source label (never blank —
  pre-migration NULL renders "unattributed") + `precise` flag (false for the degraded
  owner_fallback / backfill / unattributed sources), the initiator (accountable) and
  originator (authorization) user refs, the evidence {kind, ref_id} pointer, and the
  rule_version / delegated / retry / rerun lineage ids.
- The label + evidence + raw ids are built in the PURE taskToResponse (no DB), so
  every task response carries them. Names are hydrated separately, only on the
  user-facing surfaces (ListAgentTasks, ListWorkspaceAgentTaskSnapshot, RerunIssue,
  CancelTaskByUser) — daemon-claim paths stay lean.
- Hydration resolves initiator/originator from the GLOBAL user table (departed-member
  safe) via a new batch GetUsersByIDs query (no N+1); best-effort, so a lookup hiccup
  leaves the raw ids intact.

Tests: pure taskAttributionBase (direct_human / rule_owner NULL-originator /
owner_fallback degraded / pre-migration→unattributed) + DB hydration (fills known
ref, leaves unknown id un-filled, skips nil). Full handler/service/attribution/
migration/scheduler/cmd suites pass on a DB migrated through 161; build/vet/gofmt
clean. The field is additive — the frontend's parseWithFallback ignores unknown keys,
so nothing breaks until the UI increment consumes it.

Also merges origin/main (unrelated editor feature #5090).

Remaining Phase 2 (next increments, same PR): frontend zod schema + "on behalf of"
badge + evidence-chain jump; append-only correction events (write + display).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(attribution): Phase 2.2 — on-behalf-of badge in the execution log (MUL-4302 §9)

Surface the accountable human on every agent run row:
- AttributionBadge composes Badge + ActorAvatar, shows "on behalf of <member>"
  with the resolution source as a tooltip; degraded (non-precise) attribution
  gets a warning tone, and an unresolved initiator renders an explicit
  "no responsible member" chip.
- Wire the badge into both active and past rows of the execution log.
- Mirror the attribution shape into AgentTaskResponseSchema (defensive, .loose())
  so the cancel-task path carries it through zod; add parse tests.
- Export TaskAttribution/AttributionUser/TaskEvidence from @multica/core/types
  and add the attribution block to all four issues.json locales.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): hydrate initiator names on issue-facing task endpoints + bound the badge (MUL-4302 §9)

Address Elon's PR #5150 review:
- ListTasksByIssue (the execution-log data source), GetActiveTaskForIssue and the
  issue-scoped CancelTask now call hydrateTaskAttributions, so the "on behalf of
  <member>" badge shows the real member name on issue detail instead of falling
  back to "someone". Mirrors the existing ListAgentTasks / snapshot behavior.
- AttributionBadge: cap width (max-w-40, min-w-0) and truncate the name span so a
  long name / narrow right column can't squeeze out trigger/status/actions; keep
  the avatar shrink-0.
- Add a handler test asserting the issue task list returns a hydrated
  attribution.initiator.name.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): use semantic AvatarSize 'xs' for the badge avatar

main refactored ActorAvatar.size from a raw pixel number to the semantic
AvatarSize union (packages/ui/lib/avatar-size). Switch the on-behalf-of badge
avatar from size={14} to size="xs" (16px) after merging main.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): stage-cascade falls back to parent-issue provenance, not agent owner (MUL-4302)

When closing the last sub-issue in a Stage wakes the parent's assignee agent, the
run was enqueued via a system-authored child-done comment with no actor, which the
resolver classified as unattributed and then degraded to owner_fallback (the agent's
own owner). That is the wrong accountable human: the woken run should be accountable
to whoever caused the parent issue to exist.

attributionForIssueTask now detects a system-authored trigger comment and falls
through to the parent issue's own provenance — the same creator / agent_create-origin
/ autopilot-origin chain a direct enqueue resolves (so an agent-decomposed parent
attributes via delegation to the human who drove it; a member-created parent to that
member; an autopilot parent to the rule publisher). owner_fallback is now only the
last resort when the parent provenance itself has no human.

- Extract attributionFromComment so attributionForIssueTask can inspect author_type
  without a second GetComment; authorization resolution stays byte-identical.
- Add a DB-backed test asserting a system child-done comment resolves to the parent
  issue's origin human (delegation), not owner_fallback.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(attribution): autopilot runs attribute to the firing trigger's creator (MUL-4302)

Per Bohan: an autopilot schedule/webhook run should be accountable to the human
who created the SPECIFIC trigger that fired it, not the rule publisher. (Manual
triggers already attribute to the invoking member via direct_human — unchanged.)

- Migration 162: add autopilot_trigger.created_by_type/created_by_id (nullable, no
  FK/cascade). Capture the creating member at both trigger-create sites (schedule +
  webhook).
- New precise source trigger_owner: originator stays NULL (an autonomous fire
  carries no human authorization — same authz-safe divergence as rule_owner),
  accountable = the trigger's member creator.
- triggerOwnerAttribution resolves run.trigger_id → creator; wired into run_only
  dispatch and the create_issue path (bridging issue → active run → trigger_id).
  Legacy triggers with no recorded creator, and agent-created triggers, degrade to
  rule_owner then owner_fallback — nothing regresses.
- Frontend: trigger_owner source label in all four locales + badge switch case.
- Tests: attribution TriggerOwner unit + Precise/invariant; DB-backed resolver
  tests (member creator → trigger_owner; creatorless → rule_owner fallback).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* chore(attribution): re-trigger CI (dropped synchronize event on 249090260)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): mirror accountable_user_id on comment-coalescing merge (MUL-4302)

The one-way invariant is 'originator_user_id IS NOT NULL ⟹ accountable_user_id =
originator_user_id', enforced at finalizeAttribution for enqueues and preserved by
the retry-clone (copies both columns). But MergeCommentIntoPendingTask (main #5192)
re-stamps originator_user_id to the newly-coalesced comment's human WITHOUT touching
accountable_user_id — so folding member B's comment into member A's queued task left
originator=B / accountable=A, violating the invariant. Re-stamp accountable to mirror
the new originator (same thing finalizeAttribution does). Add a DB-backed regression
test.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): Elon's 3 must-fixes + DB cross-column invariant CHECK (MUL-4302)

Bohan approved Elon's plan; this closes the three attribution boundaries he flagged
and locks the one-way invariant at the DB.

1. Delegation now inherits the parent's ACCOUNTABLE, not just its originator. An
   autopilot-rooted chain (parent originator NULL, accountable = trigger creator)
   @mentioning an agent / creating a sub-issue used to drop to unattributed →
   owner_fallback and fail-closed workspaces wrongly rejected the fan-out. Added
   ParentAccountable/OriginAccountable to CommentFacts/DirectFacts; ClassifyComment/
   ClassifyDirect copy accountable down (source=delegation, precise, originator NULL)
   so the chain root stays stable at any depth (§3.2).
2. The direct-chat send path (SendDirectChatMessage, MUL-4351) wrote only
   originator_user_id — no accountable/source/evidence, a NULL-source bypass. It now
   stamps the full direct_human attribution like EnqueueChatTask.
3. Comment-coalescing merge re-attribution is now ATOMIC: MergeCommentIntoPendingTask
   re-stamps the whole snapshot (person columns + source + delegation lineage + rule
   version + evidence) of the new comment, not just the two person fields, so a merged
   run never shows B accountable while pointing at A's stale source/evidence.
4. Migration 169: NOT VALID CHECK (originator_user_id IS NULL OR (accountable_user_id
   IS NOT NULL AND accountable_user_id = originator_user_id)). Enforces the invariant
   on every new write (the class of bug #5192 introduced); historical rows not blocked,
   VALIDATE after Phase 3 backfill. Updated test fixtures that seeded originator-only
   rows to also set accountable.

Merged latest main (renumbered attribution migrations 163–168 after main took 161/162;
merged the retry-clone chat_input_task_id + attribution columns). Verified: go build/
vet, attribution/service/handler/cmd-server tests on a migrated DB, frontend
typecheck/lint/tests.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): trigger responsibility transfers to effective publisher; fail-closed comment merge

Elon final-review must-fix 1 (MUL-4302): trigger_owner now resolves to the
member CURRENTLY responsible for the firing trigger's effective config, not the
fixed creator. Per-trigger published_by on autopilot_trigger, seeded to the
creator and re-stamped to the editor on a substantive edit — a trigger-scoped
edit bumps only that row (UpdateAutopilotTrigger), an autopilot-level edit bumps
all its triggers (UpdateAutopilot). Editing one trigger never reassigns another.
Adds real dispatchRunOnly transfer test + resolver-level isolation test.

Must-fix 3: AttributionForMergedComment reuses applyAttributionFallback and
returns ErrAttributionFailClosed; the merge caller refuses on fail-closed,
keeping the queued task's original precise snapshot instead of degrading it to
owner_fallback. Adds regression test.

Renumbered attribution migrations to 166-172 after merging main.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): make migration 172 invariant CHECK upgrade-safe (Option A)

Elon final-review must-fix 2 (MUL-4302), rollout chosen by Bohan. The NOT VALID
CHECK still checks a pre-existing row on any later UPDATE (even one not touching
attribution columns), so cross-deployment stale queued/running tasks (originator
set, accountable NULL from before migration 167) would fail on their next
claim/complete/cancel. Exempt exactly those legacy rows via 'originator_source
IS NULL' — that column was added in 166 with no backfill, so it is NULL only on
pre-migration rows and non-NULL on every attribution-aware write. New writes
stay fully enforced; the #5192 bypass class (source always set) is unaffected.
Phase 3 backfills legacy rows then drops+re-adds the strict form + VALIDATE.

Adds TestAttributionInvariantCheck_ExemptsLegacyRows (legacy row survives a
status UPDATE) and updates the reject-bypass test to the enforced regime.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(attribution): pin substantive/cosmetic edit boundary for trigger transfer

Elon re-review must-fix 1: an autopilot-level edit only transfers trigger_owner
responsibility when it changes what the automation instructs or who/whether it
runs. autopilotRuleSubstantiveChange now includes description (the run Prompt)
and issue_title_template; title and project_id stay cosmetic/routing.
UpdateAutopilotTrigger no longer transfers on every PATCH — it compares the
persisted before/after and transfers only on a real cron/timezone/enabled/
event_filters change, not a label-only or no-op PATCH. Adds real handler tests
(prompt->all, title->none, cron->one+isolation, label->none, no-op->none).

Must-fix 3: real merge-path regression (TestMergeCommentIntoPendingTask_
FailClosedKeepsOriginalSnapshot) drives mergeCommentIntoPendingTask and asserts
a fail-closed workspace preserves the queued task's full snapshot; fail-open
control completes the owner_fallback merge.

Docs: migration 172 comment reworded to legacy-writer/unbackfilled-lineage
semantics (source NULL is not strictly pre-migration); PR description synced.

Migration renumber vs latest main (must-fix 2) deferred to pre-launch per Bohan.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* chore(attribution): renumber migrations to 167-173 after syncing main

Merged latest main (which took 166_project_dates) and shifted the attribution
migration series off the 166 collision: 166->167 agent_task_attribution,
167->168 accountable_user, 168->169 rule_version, 169->170 rule_version_index,
170->171 fail_closed, 171->172 trigger_publisher, 172->173 invariant_check.
Updated the internal cross-references in the migration comments accordingly.
Fixes TestMigrationNumericPrefixesStayUniqueAfterLegacySet on the merge tree.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(admission): unify dispatch outcome + close rerun/chat/autopilot invoke holes (MUL-4525)

P0 first increment toward a platform-wide execution-admission contract so a
user who names an execution target always gets a definite result and never a
silent no-op, and so blocked targets are reported without leaking private-agent
details.

Backend:
- New shared contract (handler/admission.go): DispatchOutcome / DispatchStatus
  (queued/coalesced/deferred/blocked) + stable, enumeration-safe
  DispatchReasonCode set, plus writeDispatchBlocked() whose legacy `error`
  string never reveals target existence.
- Rerun (task.go / task_lifecycle.go): re-validate the operator can invoke the
  RESOLVED target agent (historical agent for a task_id rerun) before any
  cancel/enqueue; blocked returns a structured 403 and mutates nothing
  (ErrRerunInvokeNotAllowed).
- Chat send (chat.go): re-run canInvokeAgent on every send, not just the softer
  canAccessPrivateAgent view gate; a revoked permission blocks before the
  message/attachments/task persist.
- Autopilot manual "run now" (service/autopilot.go): admission now keys on the
  current CLICKER, not the autopilot creator — clicker admission and clicker
  attribution no longer fork. Automation (schedule/webhook) still falls back to
  the creator gate. Added reason_code to the run response for the UI.

Frontend:
- triggerAutopilot response is schema-parsed; handleRunNow branches on run
  status and shows a localized, reason_code-based warning for skipped/failed
  instead of a false-success toast.
- Chat send and rerun surface the structured 403 reason_code as localized
  toasts (dispatchReasonCode helper) instead of a generic failure.
- Additive fields only; older clients keep working. i18n added to all 4 locales.

Tests: rerun fail-before-mutation gate, autopilot clicker-vs-creator fork
(service + handler), reason-code classification, and a malformed-response
schema test. Backend handler+service suites and FE typecheck/lint green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* test(cmd/server): thread nil invoke gate through RerunIssue call sites (MUL-4525)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(admission): typed reason codes + run-now whitelist + real security tests (MUL-4525)

Addresses Elon's review of the P0 first increment (must-fix 1–3).

1. Run now no longer has a false-success branch. handleRunNow now classifies on
   a whitelist via a pure runNowToastKind(): only issue_created/running →
   success; skipped → warning; failed and any unknown/future status → error. Add
   run-now-toast unit test over all five status classes plus reason-code → key
   mapping.

2. reason_code is a typed value decided at the admission source, not
   reverse-engineered from English failure text. New leaf package
   internal/dispatch holds the canonical ReasonCode enum (shared by handler +
   service so they can never drift). shouldSkipDispatch / errDispatchSkipped /
   the fail path now carry a typed code through DispatchAutopilotManual straight
   into the response; the substring classifier is deleted. Fixes the two missed
   branches: attribution fail-closed → attribution_blocked (typed errors.Is),
   "agent has no runtime bound" → runtime_offline. Regression tests for both.

3. Security acceptance tests exercise the REAL handlers, not injected callbacks:
   - Chat: create session while invokable → revoke invoke (flip to private, keep
     owner-view) → send returns 403 + reason_code with zero chat_message / task
     writes.
   - Rerun: private historical agent through RerunIssue + canInvokeAgent — a
     non-invoking workspace owner is refused 403 + reason_code and mutates
     nothing (fail-before-mutation); the agent owner is allowed 202.

No migration; reason_code is a decision-time value only the manual "run now"
response carries. Additive on the wire. Backend build/vet/handler+service
suites and FE typecheck/lint/vitest green. (Migration-prefix collision with main
remains the deferred pre-merge renumber.)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* test(admission): make must-fix 3 acceptance tests prove the invariant (MUL-4525)

Addresses Elon's round-3 narrow review — the two security tests were not yet
falsifiable against the bugs they must catch.

- Rerun: after enqueuing the historical task, reassign the issue to a SECOND
  agent that the denied user CAN invoke. Now the current assignee and the
  task_id agent differ, so a rerun that wrongly validated the current assignee
  would let the denied user through — the 403 proves the gate is keyed on the
  historical private agent. The allow case now asserts the reran task's agent_id
  is the historical agent, not the current assignee.

- Chat: the blocked send now carries a valid, still-unbound attachment. After
  the 403 the test asserts the attachment's chat_session_id and chat_message_id
  are both still NULL, guarding against anyone moving attachment binding ahead
  of the invoke gate.

Test-only. Full internal/handler Go suite green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(comments): surface blocked @mention trigger_outcomes instead of silent no-op (MUL-4525 §2)

A comment that @mentions an agent/squad the author cannot invoke used to save
with zero feedback — the user assumed a bug. Now the explicit-mention path
reports a per-target outcome on both preview and create/edit.

Backend (server/internal/handler/comment.go):
- resolveMentionedAgentCommentTriggers collects blocked outcomes instead of a
  silent `continue`. The invoke gate is evaluated BEFORE any archived/runtime
  state is read, so a caller who cannot invoke a private target only ever sees
  the generic invocation_not_allowed and can never enumerate its existence.
- enqueueCommentAgentTriggers returns queued/coalesced/deferred/blocked per
  explicit mention; enqueue errors are typed (attribution_blocked via
  errors.Is), not swallowed. Implicit routing (assignee/thread/conversation)
  carries no outcome — the user never named those targets.
- trigger-preview returns `blocked[]`; create/edit return additive
  `trigger_outcomes[]`. One blocked mention never fails the comment.

Frontend:
- Composer shows a warning chip for blocked mentions before sending; after
  sending, a "posted, but N not triggered" toast (blocked-only; coalesced/
  deferred are success-shaped). Additive schema + defensive parse; i18n ×4.

Tests: handler partial-success + enumeration-safety acceptance tests; core
outcome-parse + preview-schema tests; hook/parity updated. Backend
handler+service suites and FE typecheck/lint/vitest green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* i18n(admission): clearer, consistent blocked-trigger copy (MUL-4525)

Reword the awkward "you are not allowed to run this autopilot's assignee" and
polish all MUL-4525 blocked/partial copy across en/zh-Hans/ja/ko:

- Unify on "you don't have permission to use this <agent|target>" (zh: 没有…的
  使用权限) for autopilot Run now, comment mentions, rerun, and chat send —
  replacing the various "not allowed to run/trigger" phrasings.
- Align zh to the glossary term 智能体 (was mixed "Agent"), matching the
  surrounding UI voice (e.g. agent_link_no_access).
- Drop jargon: "blocked by an admission policy"/"被准入策略拦截" → "the run was
  blocked"/"本次运行已被拦截"; "attributed"/"归因" → plainer wording.
- Comment copy counts "mentions" (was "targets") for consistency with the chip.

Backend dispatchBlockedFallbackMessage (old-client English fallback) reworded to
match; its enumeration-safety test assertion updated. Copy-only — no key/logic
changes; parity + typecheck green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(comments): one outcome per explicit mention + FE success whitelist (MUL-4525)

Addresses Elon's round-2 review of the §2 comment trigger_outcomes.

1. Separate execution dedup from per-target outcomes. resolveMentionedAgent-
   CommentTriggers now returns triggers (deduped by executing agent) AND one
   commentMentionTarget per EXPLICIT mention. enqueueCommentAgentTriggers returns
   a per-executing-agent result map; commentTriggerOutcomes fans each agent's
   status to every target that resolved to it. So @Agent A + @Squad S(leader=A)
   coalesces to ONE task but yields TWO outcomes. The squad-leader self-suppress
   branch now returns a definite `deferred` outcome instead of no result. New
   CreateComment test asserts 1 task, 2 outcomes.

2. Frontend no longer treats an unknown status as success. unhandledComment-
   TriggerOutcomes whitelists queued/coalesced/deferred as handled; blocked and
   any unknown/future/empty status warn (mirrors the Run now whitelist). The
   preview schema's `blocked` now drops malformed entries INDIVIDUALLY instead of
   z.array(...).catch([]) discarding the whole set. Regression tests for the
   unknown status and the per-item drop.

Backend handler suite + go vet, FE typecheck/lint/vitest green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(comments): honest role + status in trigger_outcomes fan-out (MUL-4525)

Addresses Elon's round-3 review of the §2 fan-out.

1. Execution merge preserves the squad-leader role instead of first-mention-
   wins. The dedup now UPGRADES an already-added plain @agent trigger to a
   @squad-leader trigger for the same agent, so @Agent A + @Squad S(leader=A)
   always runs as a leader task (is_leader_task + squad_id=S) regardless of
   mention order — the daemon still injects S's briefing. When two DIFFERENT
   squads share one leader, the single run carries one squad's context and the
   other squad is reported `coalesced` (folded), never a second `queued`. The
   enqueue result now records the executed squad so the fan-out can tell them
   apart. Tests assert the task role in both orders and the two-squad split.

2. Squad-leader self-suppression no longer fakes success. The self-trigger
   guard keys on the latest task ROLE with no status filter, so a long-completed
   task also suppresses; reporting `deferred/already_active` when nothing is
   active was a false success. The branch now reports `deferred` only when a
   real non-terminal task is active (its reconcile covers the comment), else a
   non-success `blocked` + new `already_handled` reason. Fixed the reversed
   helper-semantics comment. New handler test covers the completed-task branch.

Backend handler+service suites and go vet green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(comments): fail-closed active-task check, never fake deferred (MUL-4525)

Elon round-4 must-fix: hasActiveTaskForIssueAndAgent swallowed DB errors by
returning true, so both call sites could turn a query failure into a
success-shaped `deferred/already_active` — a silent false success, exactly what
this issue forbids for admission-query failures.

- hasActiveTaskForIssueAndAgent now returns (bool, error).
- Two pure decision helpers govern the branches, fail closed on error:
  - decidePostMergeMiss: on query error, do NOT enqueue a fresh task (duplicate
    concurrent-run risk) AND report non-success blocked/internal_error; a
    confirmed active task defers; a confirmed-none enqueues fresh.
  - decideSuppressedLeaderOutcome: on query error, blocked/internal_error; a
    confirmed active run defers; else self_trigger_suppressed. Never a fabricated
    deferred.
- Renamed reason already_handled -> self_trigger_suppressed (Elon non-blocking
  note): the old name implied the new comment was already processed, but the
  real meaning is a suppressed self-trigger.

Deterministic unit tests cover the query-failure branch at both call sites
(no fresh enqueue, non-success outcome) — a real DB fault can't be forced
through valid handler inputs, and the decision is what governs the behavior.
Backend handler+service suites and go vet green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(comments): honest merge outcome — refused merge is blocked, not fake coalesced (MUL-4525)

A pending-task merge previously reported success (coalesced) even when it
was refused or failed: attribution fail-closed and unknown DB errors both
returned handled=true, so the caller recorded coalesced for a merge that
never happened. mergeCommentIntoPendingTask now returns a distinguishable
commentMergeResult; commentMergeTerminalOutcome maps a real merge to
coalesced, a fail-closed refusal to blocked/attribution_blocked, and any
other failure to blocked/internal_error. Only "no queued task to fold"
falls through to the active-task decision. Adds pure coverage of the
mapping plus a fail-closed regression asserting the non-success outcome
and unchanged task count.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(comments): name blocked @mentions in preview + toast instead of a vague count (MUL-4525)

The blocked-trigger preview showed a red "1 mention won't trigger" with no
name, and the post-send toast said "but 1 mention wasn't triggered" — the
user can't tell which target or why. Now each blocked mention renders its own
chip named from the mention markup the user typed ("Go · No permission"),
with an error indicator and a short reason; the toast names the single target
too. The wire outcome still omits the target name (enumeration-safety) — the
label comes from the user's own draft, so nothing new is disclosed.

Shares a blocked-trigger-copy module (long + short reason labels) between the
chip and the toast, and a pure mentionLabelsByTarget/parseMentions helper in
core (fresh regex per call — a shared global leaked lastIndex). Adds core +
chip tests; drops the now-unused trigger_blocked_count keys across locales.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(attribution): accountable-member avatar on agent task rows + transcript header (MUL-4302)

Surface who each agent run is on behalf of where runs are actually
browsed:
- Agent detail activity tab: an avatar-only AttributionBadge on every
  task row's meta line (Now + Recent work), tooltip carries the name +
  resolution source.
- Execution-record (transcript) dialog header: the full on-behalf-of
  badge next to the status pill.

Adds a compact variant="avatar" mode to AttributionBadge, reusing its
source-label mapping and degraded-attribution tone. Renders nothing when
a run has no resolved accountable member.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: J <j@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-07-15 03:09:56 +08:00

1451 lines
49 KiB
Go

// Code generated by sqlc. DO NOT EDIT.
// versions:
// sqlc v1.31.1
// source: chat.sql
package db
import (
"context"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype"
)
const chatSessionHasUserMessage = `-- name: ChatSessionHasUserMessage :one
SELECT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM chat_message
WHERE chat_session_id = $1 AND role = 'user'
) AS has_user_message
`
// Reports whether a session has any human (role='user') message yet. Used to
// scope the is_agent_intro self-introduction prompt to the very first,
// server-driven turn: an intro session starts with zero user messages, so the
// opening run gets the "introduce yourself" prompt. Once the creator replies,
// later turns in the same session must fall back to the normal reply prompt
// instead of repeating the introduction every turn (MUL-4259).
func (q *Queries) ChatSessionHasUserMessage(ctx context.Context, chatSessionID pgtype.UUID) (bool, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, chatSessionHasUserMessage, chatSessionID)
var has_user_message bool
err := row.Scan(&has_user_message)
return has_user_message, err
}
const createChatDraftRestore = `-- name: CreateChatDraftRestore :one
INSERT INTO chat_draft_restore (id, chat_session_id, task_id, content, attachment_ids)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)
RETURNING id, chat_session_id, task_id, content, attachment_ids, created_at
`
type CreateChatDraftRestoreParams struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
ChatSessionID pgtype.UUID `json:"chat_session_id"`
TaskID pgtype.UUID `json:"task_id"`
Content string `json:"content"`
AttachmentIds []pgtype.UUID `json:"attachment_ids"`
}
// Persists the deferred-cancellation draft restore (#5219) in the same tx
// that deletes the triggering user message: the chat:cancel_finalized
// broadcast is best-effort, so an offline client recovers the draft from
// this row instead. id is the deleted message's id.
func (q *Queries) CreateChatDraftRestore(ctx context.Context, arg CreateChatDraftRestoreParams) (ChatDraftRestore, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, createChatDraftRestore,
arg.ID,
arg.ChatSessionID,
arg.TaskID,
arg.Content,
arg.AttachmentIds,
)
var i ChatDraftRestore
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.ChatSessionID,
&i.TaskID,
&i.Content,
&i.AttachmentIds,
&i.CreatedAt,
)
return i, err
}
const createChatMessage = `-- name: CreateChatMessage :one
INSERT INTO chat_message (chat_session_id, role, content, task_id, failure_reason, elapsed_ms, message_kind)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, COALESCE($7::text, 'message'))
RETURNING id, chat_session_id, role, content, task_id, created_at, failure_reason, elapsed_ms, message_kind
`
type CreateChatMessageParams struct {
ChatSessionID pgtype.UUID `json:"chat_session_id"`
Role string `json:"role"`
Content string `json:"content"`
TaskID pgtype.UUID `json:"task_id"`
FailureReason pgtype.Text `json:"failure_reason"`
ElapsedMs pgtype.Int8 `json:"elapsed_ms"`
MessageKind pgtype.Text `json:"message_kind"`
}
// message_kind defaults to 'message' via COALESCE so every existing caller
// (which omits it) keeps writing ordinary messages; the empty-reply path passes
// 'no_response' to mark a visible turn with no text output (MUL-4351).
func (q *Queries) CreateChatMessage(ctx context.Context, arg CreateChatMessageParams) (ChatMessage, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, createChatMessage,
arg.ChatSessionID,
arg.Role,
arg.Content,
arg.TaskID,
arg.FailureReason,
arg.ElapsedMs,
arg.MessageKind,
)
var i ChatMessage
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.ChatSessionID,
&i.Role,
&i.Content,
&i.TaskID,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.FailureReason,
&i.ElapsedMs,
&i.MessageKind,
)
return i, err
}
const createChatSession = `-- name: CreateChatSession :one
INSERT INTO chat_session (workspace_id, agent_id, creator_id, title, runtime_id, is_agent_intro)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, (SELECT runtime_id FROM agent WHERE id = $2), $5)
RETURNING id, workspace_id, agent_id, creator_id, title, session_id, work_dir, status, created_at, updated_at, unread_since, runtime_id, last_read_at, is_agent_intro, pinned_at
`
type CreateChatSessionParams struct {
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
AgentID pgtype.UUID `json:"agent_id"`
CreatorID pgtype.UUID `json:"creator_id"`
Title string `json:"title"`
IsAgentIntro bool `json:"is_agent_intro"`
}
func (q *Queries) CreateChatSession(ctx context.Context, arg CreateChatSessionParams) (ChatSession, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, createChatSession,
arg.WorkspaceID,
arg.AgentID,
arg.CreatorID,
arg.Title,
arg.IsAgentIntro,
)
var i ChatSession
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.AgentID,
&i.CreatorID,
&i.Title,
&i.SessionID,
&i.WorkDir,
&i.Status,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.UnreadSince,
&i.RuntimeID,
&i.LastReadAt,
&i.IsAgentIntro,
&i.PinnedAt,
)
return i, err
}
const createChatTask = `-- name: CreateChatTask :one
INSERT INTO agent_task_queue (
agent_id, runtime_id, issue_id, status, priority, chat_session_id,
initiator_user_id, originator_user_id, accountable_user_id, force_fresh_session, runtime_mcp_overlay,
runtime_connected_apps, originator_source, trigger_evidence_kind, trigger_evidence_ref_id
)
VALUES (
$1, $2, NULL, 'queued', $3, $4, $5,
$6,
$7,
COALESCE($8::boolean, FALSE),
$9,
$10,
$11,
$12,
$13
)
RETURNING id, agent_id, issue_id, status, priority, dispatched_at, started_at, completed_at, result, error, created_at, context, runtime_id, session_id, work_dir, trigger_comment_id, chat_session_id, autopilot_run_id, attempt, max_attempts, parent_task_id, failure_reason, trigger_summary, force_fresh_session, is_leader_task, wait_reason, initiator_user_id, handoff_note, prepare_lease_expires_at, squad_id, runtime_mcp_overlay, escalation_for_task_id, fire_at, originator_user_id, runtime_connected_apps, coalesced_comment_ids, delivered_comment_ids, chat_input_task_id, chat_finalize_deferred_at, originator_source, delegated_from_task_id, retry_of_task_id, rerun_of_task_id, rule_version_id, trigger_evidence_kind, trigger_evidence_ref_id, accountable_user_id
`
type CreateChatTaskParams struct {
AgentID pgtype.UUID `json:"agent_id"`
RuntimeID pgtype.UUID `json:"runtime_id"`
Priority int32 `json:"priority"`
ChatSessionID pgtype.UUID `json:"chat_session_id"`
InitiatorUserID pgtype.UUID `json:"initiator_user_id"`
OriginatorUserID pgtype.UUID `json:"originator_user_id"`
AccountableUserID pgtype.UUID `json:"accountable_user_id"`
ForceFreshSession pgtype.Bool `json:"force_fresh_session"`
RuntimeMcpOverlay []byte `json:"runtime_mcp_overlay"`
RuntimeConnectedApps []byte `json:"runtime_connected_apps"`
OriginatorSource pgtype.Text `json:"originator_source"`
TriggerEvidenceKind pgtype.Text `json:"trigger_evidence_kind"`
TriggerEvidenceRefID pgtype.UUID `json:"trigger_evidence_ref_id"`
}
// The chat sender (initiator) is a direct_human originator and accountable;
// attribution provenance is stamped so this path is not a NULL-source enqueue
// bypass (MUL-4302 §2).
func (q *Queries) CreateChatTask(ctx context.Context, arg CreateChatTaskParams) (AgentTaskQueue, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, createChatTask,
arg.AgentID,
arg.RuntimeID,
arg.Priority,
arg.ChatSessionID,
arg.InitiatorUserID,
arg.OriginatorUserID,
arg.AccountableUserID,
arg.ForceFreshSession,
arg.RuntimeMcpOverlay,
arg.RuntimeConnectedApps,
arg.OriginatorSource,
arg.TriggerEvidenceKind,
arg.TriggerEvidenceRefID,
)
var i AgentTaskQueue
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.AgentID,
&i.IssueID,
&i.Status,
&i.Priority,
&i.DispatchedAt,
&i.StartedAt,
&i.CompletedAt,
&i.Result,
&i.Error,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.Context,
&i.RuntimeID,
&i.SessionID,
&i.WorkDir,
&i.TriggerCommentID,
&i.ChatSessionID,
&i.AutopilotRunID,
&i.Attempt,
&i.MaxAttempts,
&i.ParentTaskID,
&i.FailureReason,
&i.TriggerSummary,
&i.ForceFreshSession,
&i.IsLeaderTask,
&i.WaitReason,
&i.InitiatorUserID,
&i.HandoffNote,
&i.PrepareLeaseExpiresAt,
&i.SquadID,
&i.RuntimeMcpOverlay,
&i.EscalationForTaskID,
&i.FireAt,
&i.OriginatorUserID,
&i.RuntimeConnectedApps,
&i.CoalescedCommentIds,
&i.DeliveredCommentIds,
&i.ChatInputTaskID,
&i.ChatFinalizeDeferredAt,
&i.OriginatorSource,
&i.DelegatedFromTaskID,
&i.RetryOfTaskID,
&i.RerunOfTaskID,
&i.RuleVersionID,
&i.TriggerEvidenceKind,
&i.TriggerEvidenceRefID,
&i.AccountableUserID,
)
return i, err
}
const deleteChatDraftRestore = `-- name: DeleteChatDraftRestore :execrows
DELETE FROM chat_draft_restore
WHERE id = $1 AND chat_session_id = $2
`
type DeleteChatDraftRestoreParams struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
ChatSessionID pgtype.UUID `json:"chat_session_id"`
}
// Idempotent consume: deleting an already-consumed restore matches no row.
func (q *Queries) DeleteChatDraftRestore(ctx context.Context, arg DeleteChatDraftRestoreParams) (int64, error) {
result, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, deleteChatDraftRestore, arg.ID, arg.ChatSessionID)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return result.RowsAffected(), nil
}
const deleteChatDraftRestoresByArchivedRuntimeAgents = `-- name: DeleteChatDraftRestoresByArchivedRuntimeAgents :exec
DELETE FROM chat_draft_restore
WHERE chat_session_id IN (
SELECT cs.id FROM chat_session cs
JOIN agent a ON a.id = cs.agent_id
WHERE a.runtime_id = $1 AND a.archived_at IS NOT NULL
)
`
// chat_session cascades from agent, so hard-deleting a runtime's archived agents
// silently drops their sessions — and, without an FK, would strand the pending
// restores (which still hold the user's prompt text) forever. Prune them in the
// same tx, BEFORE the agent rows go: the join below needs them. Mirrors
// DeleteChannelInstallationsByArchivedRuntimeAgents.
func (q *Queries) DeleteChatDraftRestoresByArchivedRuntimeAgents(ctx context.Context, runtimeID pgtype.UUID) error {
_, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, deleteChatDraftRestoresByArchivedRuntimeAgents, runtimeID)
return err
}
const deleteChatDraftRestoresBySession = `-- name: DeleteChatDraftRestoresBySession :exec
DELETE FROM chat_draft_restore
WHERE chat_session_id = $1
`
// chat_draft_restore carries no chat_session FK (MUL-3515), so DeleteChatSession
// prunes its pending restores in the same tx that deletes the session.
func (q *Queries) DeleteChatDraftRestoresBySession(ctx context.Context, chatSessionID pgtype.UUID) error {
_, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, deleteChatDraftRestoresBySession, chatSessionID)
return err
}
const deleteChatDraftRestoresBySystemRuntimeAgents = `-- name: DeleteChatDraftRestoresBySystemRuntimeAgents :exec
DELETE FROM chat_draft_restore
WHERE chat_session_id IN (
SELECT cs.id FROM chat_session cs
JOIN agent a ON a.id = cs.agent_id
WHERE a.runtime_id = $1 AND a.kind = 'system'
)
`
// Same cascade, for the system agents a runtime teardown also hard-deletes
// (DeleteSystemAgentsByRuntime). Split from the archived-agent prune because the
// runtime-profile teardown deletes only archived agents: pruning system-agent
// sessions there would destroy restores whose session survives.
func (q *Queries) DeleteChatDraftRestoresBySystemRuntimeAgents(ctx context.Context, runtimeID pgtype.UUID) error {
_, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, deleteChatDraftRestoresBySystemRuntimeAgents, runtimeID)
return err
}
const deleteChatSession = `-- name: DeleteChatSession :exec
DELETE FROM chat_session WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2
`
type DeleteChatSessionParams struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
}
// Hard delete. chat_message rows cascade via FK ON DELETE CASCADE; the
// chat_session_id on agent_task_queue is set NULL by FK so completed/failed
// task history survives the session being removed. Callers MUST run inside
// the same transaction that holds LockChatSessionForDelete and that has
// already cancelled any in-flight tasks (see CancelAgentTasksByChatSession)
// so the daemon does not keep running work whose result has nowhere to
// land. workspace_id in the WHERE clause is a SQL-layer tenant guard; see
// DeleteIssue.
func (q *Queries) DeleteChatSession(ctx context.Context, arg DeleteChatSessionParams) error {
_, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, deleteChatSession, arg.ID, arg.WorkspaceID)
return err
}
const deleteUserChatMessageByTask = `-- name: DeleteUserChatMessageByTask :one
DELETE FROM chat_message
WHERE task_id = $1 AND role = 'user'
RETURNING id, chat_session_id, role, content, task_id, created_at, failure_reason, elapsed_ms, message_kind
`
func (q *Queries) DeleteUserChatMessageByTask(ctx context.Context, taskID pgtype.UUID) (ChatMessage, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, deleteUserChatMessageByTask, taskID)
var i ChatMessage
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.ChatSessionID,
&i.Role,
&i.Content,
&i.TaskID,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.FailureReason,
&i.ElapsedMs,
&i.MessageKind,
)
return i, err
}
const getChatMessage = `-- name: GetChatMessage :one
SELECT id, chat_session_id, role, content, task_id, created_at, failure_reason, elapsed_ms, message_kind FROM chat_message
WHERE id = $1
`
func (q *Queries) GetChatMessage(ctx context.Context, id pgtype.UUID) (ChatMessage, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, getChatMessage, id)
var i ChatMessage
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.ChatSessionID,
&i.Role,
&i.Content,
&i.TaskID,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.FailureReason,
&i.ElapsedMs,
&i.MessageKind,
)
return i, err
}
const getChatSession = `-- name: GetChatSession :one
SELECT id, workspace_id, agent_id, creator_id, title, session_id, work_dir, status, created_at, updated_at, unread_since, runtime_id, last_read_at, is_agent_intro, pinned_at FROM chat_session
WHERE id = $1
`
func (q *Queries) GetChatSession(ctx context.Context, id pgtype.UUID) (ChatSession, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, getChatSession, id)
var i ChatSession
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.AgentID,
&i.CreatorID,
&i.Title,
&i.SessionID,
&i.WorkDir,
&i.Status,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.UnreadSince,
&i.RuntimeID,
&i.LastReadAt,
&i.IsAgentIntro,
&i.PinnedAt,
)
return i, err
}
const getChatSessionInWorkspace = `-- name: GetChatSessionInWorkspace :one
SELECT id, workspace_id, agent_id, creator_id, title, session_id, work_dir, status, created_at, updated_at, unread_since, runtime_id, last_read_at, is_agent_intro, pinned_at FROM chat_session
WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2
`
type GetChatSessionInWorkspaceParams struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
}
func (q *Queries) GetChatSessionInWorkspace(ctx context.Context, arg GetChatSessionInWorkspaceParams) (ChatSession, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, getChatSessionInWorkspace, arg.ID, arg.WorkspaceID)
var i ChatSession
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.AgentID,
&i.CreatorID,
&i.Title,
&i.SessionID,
&i.WorkDir,
&i.Status,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.UnreadSince,
&i.RuntimeID,
&i.LastReadAt,
&i.IsAgentIntro,
&i.PinnedAt,
)
return i, err
}
const getLastChatTaskSession = `-- name: GetLastChatTaskSession :one
SELECT session_id, work_dir, runtime_id FROM agent_task_queue
WHERE chat_session_id = $1
AND (
status = 'completed'
OR (
status = 'failed'
AND COALESCE(failure_reason, '') NOT IN ('iteration_limit', 'agent_fallback_message', 'api_invalid_request', 'codex_semantic_inactivity')
AND NOT (COALESCE(error, '') ILIKE '%400%' AND COALESCE(error, '') ILIKE '%invalid_request_error%')
)
)
AND session_id IS NOT NULL
ORDER BY completed_at DESC
LIMIT 1
`
type GetLastChatTaskSessionRow struct {
SessionID pgtype.Text `json:"session_id"`
WorkDir pgtype.Text `json:"work_dir"`
RuntimeID pgtype.UUID `json:"runtime_id"`
}
// Returns the most recent task in this chat session that managed to record a
// session_id. Includes both completed and failed tasks: even a failed task
// may have established a real agent session before failing, and we'd rather
// resume there than start over and lose conversation memory. Used as a
// fallback when chat_session.session_id is NULL. Resume-unsafe failures are
// excluded because replaying those sessions deterministically reproduces the
// same terminal state.
func (q *Queries) GetLastChatTaskSession(ctx context.Context, chatSessionID pgtype.UUID) (GetLastChatTaskSessionRow, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, getLastChatTaskSession, chatSessionID)
var i GetLastChatTaskSessionRow
err := row.Scan(&i.SessionID, &i.WorkDir, &i.RuntimeID)
return i, err
}
const getMostRecentUserChatMessage = `-- name: GetMostRecentUserChatMessage :one
SELECT id, chat_session_id, role, content, task_id, created_at, failure_reason, elapsed_ms, message_kind FROM chat_message
WHERE chat_session_id = $1 AND role = 'user'
ORDER BY created_at DESC
LIMIT 1
`
// Returns the most recent role='user' message in a session. Used by the
// Lark `/issue` command parser: when the user types `/issue` with no
// title, the spec falls back to "use the previous user message as the
// title". Bot replies (role='assistant') are excluded — only human
// input qualifies as a fallback title source.
func (q *Queries) GetMostRecentUserChatMessage(ctx context.Context, chatSessionID pgtype.UUID) (ChatMessage, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, getMostRecentUserChatMessage, chatSessionID)
var i ChatMessage
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.ChatSessionID,
&i.Role,
&i.Content,
&i.TaskID,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.FailureReason,
&i.ElapsedMs,
&i.MessageKind,
)
return i, err
}
const getPendingChatTask = `-- name: GetPendingChatTask :one
SELECT id, status, created_at FROM agent_task_queue
WHERE chat_session_id = $1 AND status IN ('queued', 'dispatched', 'running', 'waiting_local_directory')
ORDER BY created_at DESC
LIMIT 1
`
type GetPendingChatTaskRow struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
Status string `json:"status"`
CreatedAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"created_at"`
}
// Returns the most recent in-flight task for a chat session, if any.
// Used by the frontend to recover pending state after refresh / reopen.
// created_at is the anchor for the chat StatusPill timer (it computes
// elapsed = now - task.created_at), so the pill survives refresh / reopen
// without "resetting to 0s".
func (q *Queries) GetPendingChatTask(ctx context.Context, chatSessionID pgtype.UUID) (GetPendingChatTaskRow, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, getPendingChatTask, chatSessionID)
var i GetPendingChatTaskRow
err := row.Scan(&i.ID, &i.Status, &i.CreatedAt)
return i, err
}
const hasPendingChatTasksByCreator = `-- name: HasPendingChatTasksByCreator :one
SELECT EXISTS (
SELECT 1
FROM agent_task_queue atq
JOIN chat_session cs ON cs.id = atq.chat_session_id
WHERE atq.chat_session_id IS NOT NULL
AND atq.status IN ('queued', 'dispatched', 'running', 'waiting_local_directory')
AND cs.workspace_id = $1
AND cs.creator_id = $2
AND cs.agent_id = ANY($3::uuid[])
) AS has_pending
`
type HasPendingChatTasksByCreatorParams struct {
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
CreatorID pgtype.UUID `json:"creator_id"`
AgentIds []pgtype.UUID `json:"agent_ids"`
}
// Boolean fast-path for the FAB's "running" indicator. Returns a single
// EXISTS row instead of the full task list, so the planner can stop at the
// first matching in-flight task (LIMIT 1 semantics via EXISTS).
//
// Permission filtering is baked into the query: agent_id = ANY($3) restricts
// the result to the agents the caller may currently see, so a member who lost
// access to a private agent never gets a true from a task they can no longer
// reach. The handler must pass its resolved accessible-agent id set as $3;
// an empty array yields false.
func (q *Queries) HasPendingChatTasksByCreator(ctx context.Context, arg HasPendingChatTasksByCreatorParams) (bool, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, hasPendingChatTasksByCreator, arg.WorkspaceID, arg.CreatorID, arg.AgentIds)
var has_pending bool
err := row.Scan(&has_pending)
return has_pending, err
}
const linkChatMessageToTask = `-- name: LinkChatMessageToTask :exec
UPDATE chat_message
SET task_id = $2
WHERE id = $1 AND role = 'user'
`
type LinkChatMessageToTaskParams struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
TaskID pgtype.UUID `json:"task_id"`
}
func (q *Queries) LinkChatMessageToTask(ctx context.Context, arg LinkChatMessageToTaskParams) error {
_, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, linkChatMessageToTask, arg.ID, arg.TaskID)
return err
}
const listAllChatSessionsByCreator = `-- name: ListAllChatSessionsByCreator :many
SELECT cs.id, cs.workspace_id, cs.agent_id, cs.creator_id, cs.title, cs.session_id, cs.work_dir, cs.status, cs.created_at, cs.updated_at, cs.unread_since, cs.runtime_id, cs.last_read_at, cs.is_agent_intro, cs.pinned_at,
CASE WHEN cs.status = 'archived' THEN 0
ELSE (SELECT count(*) FROM chat_message m
WHERE m.chat_session_id = cs.id
AND m.role = 'assistant'
AND m.created_at > cs.last_read_at)
END::int AS unread_count,
COALESCE(lm.content, '') AS last_message_content,
COALESCE(lm.role, '') AS last_message_role,
lm.created_at AS last_message_at,
lm.failure_reason AS last_message_failure_reason,
COALESCE(lm.message_kind, '') AS last_message_kind
FROM chat_session cs
LEFT JOIN LATERAL (
SELECT content, role, created_at, failure_reason, message_kind
FROM chat_message m
WHERE m.chat_session_id = cs.id
ORDER BY m.created_at DESC
LIMIT 1
) lm ON true
WHERE cs.workspace_id = $1 AND cs.creator_id = $2
ORDER BY (cs.pinned_at IS NOT NULL) DESC, cs.pinned_at DESC, COALESCE(lm.created_at, cs.updated_at) DESC
`
type ListAllChatSessionsByCreatorParams struct {
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
CreatorID pgtype.UUID `json:"creator_id"`
}
type ListAllChatSessionsByCreatorRow struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
AgentID pgtype.UUID `json:"agent_id"`
CreatorID pgtype.UUID `json:"creator_id"`
Title string `json:"title"`
SessionID pgtype.Text `json:"session_id"`
WorkDir pgtype.Text `json:"work_dir"`
Status string `json:"status"`
CreatedAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"updated_at"`
UnreadSince pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"unread_since"`
RuntimeID pgtype.UUID `json:"runtime_id"`
LastReadAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"last_read_at"`
IsAgentIntro bool `json:"is_agent_intro"`
PinnedAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"pinned_at"`
UnreadCount int32 `json:"unread_count"`
LastMessageContent string `json:"last_message_content"`
LastMessageRole string `json:"last_message_role"`
LastMessageAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"last_message_at"`
LastMessageFailureReason pgtype.Text `json:"last_message_failure_reason"`
LastMessageKind string `json:"last_message_kind"`
}
// Unlike ListChatSessionsByCreator this returns archived sessions too (for the
// "Archived" view), so unread must be forced to 0 for archived rows: archiving
// deliberately does NOT advance last_read_at (so unarchive can restore the true
// unread state), but an archived session is read-only and hidden from history,
// so any residual unread is uncleanable and must not light up any badge. Gating
// on status here is the single source of truth for all unread surfaces (FAB,
// sidebar Chat tab, chat-window header) — see MUL-4360.
func (q *Queries) ListAllChatSessionsByCreator(ctx context.Context, arg ListAllChatSessionsByCreatorParams) ([]ListAllChatSessionsByCreatorRow, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, listAllChatSessionsByCreator, arg.WorkspaceID, arg.CreatorID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []ListAllChatSessionsByCreatorRow{}
for rows.Next() {
var i ListAllChatSessionsByCreatorRow
if err := rows.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.AgentID,
&i.CreatorID,
&i.Title,
&i.SessionID,
&i.WorkDir,
&i.Status,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.UnreadSince,
&i.RuntimeID,
&i.LastReadAt,
&i.IsAgentIntro,
&i.PinnedAt,
&i.UnreadCount,
&i.LastMessageContent,
&i.LastMessageRole,
&i.LastMessageAt,
&i.LastMessageFailureReason,
&i.LastMessageKind,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const listChatDraftRestoresBySession = `-- name: ListChatDraftRestoresBySession :many
SELECT id, chat_session_id, task_id, content, attachment_ids, created_at FROM chat_draft_restore
WHERE chat_session_id = $1
ORDER BY created_at ASC
`
func (q *Queries) ListChatDraftRestoresBySession(ctx context.Context, chatSessionID pgtype.UUID) ([]ChatDraftRestore, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, listChatDraftRestoresBySession, chatSessionID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []ChatDraftRestore{}
for rows.Next() {
var i ChatDraftRestore
if err := rows.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.ChatSessionID,
&i.TaskID,
&i.Content,
&i.AttachmentIds,
&i.CreatedAt,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const listChatInputMessages = `-- name: ListChatInputMessages :many
SELECT id, chat_session_id, role, content, task_id, created_at, failure_reason, elapsed_ms, message_kind FROM chat_message
WHERE task_id = $1 AND role = 'user'
ORDER BY created_at ASC, id ASC
`
// Loads the immutable user-message input batch owned by a direct-chat task.
// The caller passes the task's chat_input_task_id (itself for an original send,
// the root task for an auto-retry child), so a claim reads exactly the messages
// the user sent for this turn — and never absorbs a message that arrived after
// the batch was sealed, no matter what the assistant wrote or when. Only used
// for new task-owned direct-chat tasks; legacy/channel (chat_input_task_id
// NULL) tasks keep using ListChatMessages + trailingUserMessages.
func (q *Queries) ListChatInputMessages(ctx context.Context, taskID pgtype.UUID) ([]ChatMessage, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, listChatInputMessages, taskID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []ChatMessage{}
for rows.Next() {
var i ChatMessage
if err := rows.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.ChatSessionID,
&i.Role,
&i.Content,
&i.TaskID,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.FailureReason,
&i.ElapsedMs,
&i.MessageKind,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const listChatMessages = `-- name: ListChatMessages :many
SELECT id, chat_session_id, role, content, task_id, created_at, failure_reason, elapsed_ms, message_kind FROM chat_message
WHERE chat_session_id = $1
ORDER BY created_at ASC
`
func (q *Queries) ListChatMessages(ctx context.Context, chatSessionID pgtype.UUID) ([]ChatMessage, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, listChatMessages, chatSessionID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []ChatMessage{}
for rows.Next() {
var i ChatMessage
if err := rows.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.ChatSessionID,
&i.Role,
&i.Content,
&i.TaskID,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.FailureReason,
&i.ElapsedMs,
&i.MessageKind,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const listChatMessagesPage = `-- name: ListChatMessagesPage :many
SELECT id, chat_session_id, role, content, task_id, created_at, failure_reason, elapsed_ms, message_kind FROM chat_message
WHERE chat_session_id = $1
AND (
$3::timestamptz IS NULL
OR (created_at, id) < ($3::timestamptz, $4::uuid)
)
ORDER BY created_at DESC, id DESC
LIMIT $2
`
type ListChatMessagesPageParams struct {
ChatSessionID pgtype.UUID `json:"chat_session_id"`
Limit int32 `json:"limit"`
BeforeCreatedAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"before_created_at"`
BeforeID pgtype.UUID `json:"before_id"`
}
func (q *Queries) ListChatMessagesPage(ctx context.Context, arg ListChatMessagesPageParams) ([]ChatMessage, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, listChatMessagesPage,
arg.ChatSessionID,
arg.Limit,
arg.BeforeCreatedAt,
arg.BeforeID,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []ChatMessage{}
for rows.Next() {
var i ChatMessage
if err := rows.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.ChatSessionID,
&i.Role,
&i.Content,
&i.TaskID,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.FailureReason,
&i.ElapsedMs,
&i.MessageKind,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const listChatSessionsByCreator = `-- name: ListChatSessionsByCreator :many
SELECT cs.id, cs.workspace_id, cs.agent_id, cs.creator_id, cs.title, cs.session_id, cs.work_dir, cs.status, cs.created_at, cs.updated_at, cs.unread_since, cs.runtime_id, cs.last_read_at, cs.is_agent_intro, cs.pinned_at,
(SELECT count(*) FROM chat_message m
WHERE m.chat_session_id = cs.id
AND m.role = 'assistant'
AND m.created_at > cs.last_read_at)::int AS unread_count,
COALESCE(lm.content, '') AS last_message_content,
COALESCE(lm.role, '') AS last_message_role,
lm.created_at AS last_message_at,
lm.failure_reason AS last_message_failure_reason,
COALESCE(lm.message_kind, '') AS last_message_kind
FROM chat_session cs
LEFT JOIN LATERAL (
SELECT content, role, created_at, failure_reason, message_kind
FROM chat_message m
WHERE m.chat_session_id = cs.id
ORDER BY m.created_at DESC
LIMIT 1
) lm ON true
WHERE cs.workspace_id = $1 AND cs.creator_id = $2 AND cs.status = 'active'
ORDER BY (cs.pinned_at IS NOT NULL) DESC, cs.pinned_at DESC, COALESCE(lm.created_at, cs.updated_at) DESC
`
type ListChatSessionsByCreatorParams struct {
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
CreatorID pgtype.UUID `json:"creator_id"`
}
type ListChatSessionsByCreatorRow struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
AgentID pgtype.UUID `json:"agent_id"`
CreatorID pgtype.UUID `json:"creator_id"`
Title string `json:"title"`
SessionID pgtype.Text `json:"session_id"`
WorkDir pgtype.Text `json:"work_dir"`
Status string `json:"status"`
CreatedAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"updated_at"`
UnreadSince pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"unread_since"`
RuntimeID pgtype.UUID `json:"runtime_id"`
LastReadAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"last_read_at"`
IsAgentIntro bool `json:"is_agent_intro"`
PinnedAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"pinned_at"`
UnreadCount int32 `json:"unread_count"`
LastMessageContent string `json:"last_message_content"`
LastMessageRole string `json:"last_message_role"`
LastMessageAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"last_message_at"`
LastMessageFailureReason pgtype.Text `json:"last_message_failure_reason"`
LastMessageKind string `json:"last_message_kind"`
}
// IM-style list: each active session with its unread *count* (assistant
// messages after the read cursor), a preview of the latest message, and
// ordered by most-recent activity so a new reply bumps a session to the top.
func (q *Queries) ListChatSessionsByCreator(ctx context.Context, arg ListChatSessionsByCreatorParams) ([]ListChatSessionsByCreatorRow, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, listChatSessionsByCreator, arg.WorkspaceID, arg.CreatorID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []ListChatSessionsByCreatorRow{}
for rows.Next() {
var i ListChatSessionsByCreatorRow
if err := rows.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.AgentID,
&i.CreatorID,
&i.Title,
&i.SessionID,
&i.WorkDir,
&i.Status,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.UnreadSince,
&i.RuntimeID,
&i.LastReadAt,
&i.IsAgentIntro,
&i.PinnedAt,
&i.UnreadCount,
&i.LastMessageContent,
&i.LastMessageRole,
&i.LastMessageAt,
&i.LastMessageFailureReason,
&i.LastMessageKind,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const listPendingChatTasksByCreator = `-- name: ListPendingChatTasksByCreator :many
SELECT atq.id AS task_id, atq.status, atq.chat_session_id, cs.agent_id
FROM agent_task_queue atq
JOIN chat_session cs ON cs.id = atq.chat_session_id
WHERE atq.chat_session_id IS NOT NULL
AND atq.status IN ('queued', 'dispatched', 'running', 'waiting_local_directory')
AND cs.workspace_id = $1
AND cs.creator_id = $2
ORDER BY atq.created_at DESC
`
type ListPendingChatTasksByCreatorParams struct {
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
CreatorID pgtype.UUID `json:"creator_id"`
}
type ListPendingChatTasksByCreatorRow struct {
TaskID pgtype.UUID `json:"task_id"`
Status string `json:"status"`
ChatSessionID pgtype.UUID `json:"chat_session_id"`
AgentID pgtype.UUID `json:"agent_id"`
}
// Aggregate view of all in-flight chat tasks owned by a given creator in a
// workspace. Drives the FAB's "running" indicator when the chat window is
// closed and no single session's query is active.
//
// Returns cs.agent_id so the handler can filter tasks belonging to private
// agents the caller has lost access to using the already-loaded `allowed`
// set — no second ListAllChatSessionsByCreator scan on the hot path.
//
// atq.chat_session_id IS NOT NULL is redundant given the JOIN, but stated
// explicitly so the planner can prove the query predicate is a subset of the
// idx_agent_task_queue_chat_pending_v2 partial-index predicate and use it.
func (q *Queries) ListPendingChatTasksByCreator(ctx context.Context, arg ListPendingChatTasksByCreatorParams) ([]ListPendingChatTasksByCreatorRow, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, listPendingChatTasksByCreator, arg.WorkspaceID, arg.CreatorID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []ListPendingChatTasksByCreatorRow{}
for rows.Next() {
var i ListPendingChatTasksByCreatorRow
if err := rows.Scan(
&i.TaskID,
&i.Status,
&i.ChatSessionID,
&i.AgentID,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const lockChatSessionForDelete = `-- name: LockChatSessionForDelete :one
SELECT id FROM chat_session
WHERE id = $1
FOR UPDATE
`
// Acquires an exclusive (FOR UPDATE) row lock on chat_session(id). Used by
// the delete path so that a concurrent SendChatMessage cannot enqueue a new
// agent_task_queue row referencing this session between our cancel and
// delete steps. The FK from agent_task_queue.chat_session_id takes a
// KEY SHARE lock on the parent row during INSERT validation, which
// conflicts with FOR UPDATE — concurrent inserts block here and then fail
// their FK check after we commit the delete.
func (q *Queries) LockChatSessionForDelete(ctx context.Context, id pgtype.UUID) (pgtype.UUID, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, lockChatSessionForDelete, id)
var id_2 pgtype.UUID
err := row.Scan(&id_2)
return id_2, err
}
const lockChatSessionForTask = `-- name: LockChatSessionForTask :one
SELECT cs.id
FROM agent_task_queue t
JOIN chat_session cs ON cs.id = t.chat_session_id
WHERE t.id = $1
FOR UPDATE OF cs
`
// The chat_session row lock is the mutual-exclusion protocol between the
// draft-restore writer (FinalizeDeferredCancelledChat) and every deleter of a
// chat_session or one of its cascade parents. Without an FK, an INSERT into
// chat_draft_restore takes no lock on its session, so a prune-then-delete would
// otherwise miss a restore committed after its snapshot and strand it — with the
// user's prompt in it — forever (#5219).
//
// The contract, held by all five paths below:
//
// deleter: lock the sessions FOR UPDATE -> prune restores -> delete the parent
// finalizer: lock the session FOR UPDATE -> insert the restore
//
// Whoever locks first wins: a finalizer that got there first commits its row
// before the deleter's prune statement takes its snapshot, so the prune sweeps
// it; a deleter that got there first leaves no session for the finalizer to
// lock, so it never inserts.
//
// Lock order is chat_session -> agent_task_queue everywhere (the finalizer locks
// the session before claiming its task) so the deleters' cascade into
// agent_task_queue cannot deadlock against it.
//
// The single-session delete path needs no new query: it already holds
// LockChatSessionForDelete (same FOR UPDATE row lock) across its prune.
// The finalizer's half of the protocol. No rows means the session is already
// gone (its cascade NULLs agent_task_queue.chat_session_id), so there is nothing
// to lock and nothing to restore into.
func (q *Queries) LockChatSessionForTask(ctx context.Context, id pgtype.UUID) (pgtype.UUID, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, lockChatSessionForTask, id)
var id_2 pgtype.UUID
err := row.Scan(&id_2)
return id_2, err
}
const lockChatSessionsByArchivedRuntimeAgents = `-- name: LockChatSessionsByArchivedRuntimeAgents :many
SELECT cs.id FROM chat_session cs
JOIN agent a ON a.id = cs.agent_id
WHERE a.runtime_id = $1 AND a.archived_at IS NOT NULL
ORDER BY cs.id
FOR UPDATE OF cs
`
func (q *Queries) LockChatSessionsByArchivedRuntimeAgents(ctx context.Context, runtimeID pgtype.UUID) ([]pgtype.UUID, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, lockChatSessionsByArchivedRuntimeAgents, runtimeID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []pgtype.UUID{}
for rows.Next() {
var id pgtype.UUID
if err := rows.Scan(&id); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, id)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const lockChatSessionsBySystemRuntimeAgents = `-- name: LockChatSessionsBySystemRuntimeAgents :many
SELECT cs.id FROM chat_session cs
JOIN agent a ON a.id = cs.agent_id
WHERE a.runtime_id = $1 AND a.kind = 'system'
ORDER BY cs.id
FOR UPDATE OF cs
`
func (q *Queries) LockChatSessionsBySystemRuntimeAgents(ctx context.Context, runtimeID pgtype.UUID) ([]pgtype.UUID, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, lockChatSessionsBySystemRuntimeAgents, runtimeID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []pgtype.UUID{}
for rows.Next() {
var id pgtype.UUID
if err := rows.Scan(&id); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, id)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const lockChatSessionsByWorkspace = `-- name: LockChatSessionsByWorkspace :many
SELECT id FROM chat_session
WHERE workspace_id = $1
ORDER BY id
FOR UPDATE
`
// ORDER BY id: a stable lock order keeps two concurrent deleters from
// deadlocking against each other.
func (q *Queries) LockChatSessionsByWorkspace(ctx context.Context, workspaceID pgtype.UUID) ([]pgtype.UUID, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, lockChatSessionsByWorkspace, workspaceID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []pgtype.UUID{}
for rows.Next() {
var id pgtype.UUID
if err := rows.Scan(&id); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, id)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const markChatSessionRead = `-- name: MarkChatSessionRead :exec
UPDATE chat_session SET last_read_at = now()
WHERE id = $1
`
// Advances the read cursor to now, dropping the session's unread_count to 0.
func (q *Queries) MarkChatSessionRead(ctx context.Context, id pgtype.UUID) error {
_, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, markChatSessionRead, id)
return err
}
const setChatSessionArchived = `-- name: SetChatSessionArchived :one
UPDATE chat_session
SET status = CASE WHEN $2::bool THEN 'archived' ELSE 'active' END,
updated_at = now()
WHERE id = $1
RETURNING id, workspace_id, agent_id, creator_id, title, session_id, work_dir, status, created_at, updated_at, unread_since, runtime_id, last_read_at, is_agent_intro, pinned_at
`
type SetChatSessionArchivedParams struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
Archived bool `json:"archived"`
}
// Archive/unarchive a chat session by flipping status between 'active' and
// 'archived'. Bumps updated_at so the row re-sorts on the receiving list. The
// send-message path refuses archived sessions (see SendChatMessage), so the
// conversation is effectively read-only until it is unarchived.
func (q *Queries) SetChatSessionArchived(ctx context.Context, arg SetChatSessionArchivedParams) (ChatSession, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, setChatSessionArchived, arg.ID, arg.Archived)
var i ChatSession
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.AgentID,
&i.CreatorID,
&i.Title,
&i.SessionID,
&i.WorkDir,
&i.Status,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.UnreadSince,
&i.RuntimeID,
&i.LastReadAt,
&i.IsAgentIntro,
&i.PinnedAt,
)
return i, err
}
const setChatSessionPinned = `-- name: SetChatSessionPinned :one
UPDATE chat_session
SET pinned_at = CASE WHEN $2::bool THEN COALESCE(pinned_at, now()) ELSE NULL END
WHERE id = $1
RETURNING id, workspace_id, agent_id, creator_id, title, session_id, work_dir, status, created_at, updated_at, unread_since, runtime_id, last_read_at, is_agent_intro, pinned_at
`
type SetChatSessionPinnedParams struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
Pinned bool `json:"pinned"`
}
// Pin/unpin a chat. Deliberately does NOT touch updated_at: pinning is a
// list-ordering preference, not activity, so it must not bump the session's
// last-activity sort key (which would make an unpinned chat jump the list).
// pinned = true stamps pinned_at only when it was NULL, so re-pinning keeps
// the original pin order; pinned = false clears it.
func (q *Queries) SetChatSessionPinned(ctx context.Context, arg SetChatSessionPinnedParams) (ChatSession, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, setChatSessionPinned, arg.ID, arg.Pinned)
var i ChatSession
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.AgentID,
&i.CreatorID,
&i.Title,
&i.SessionID,
&i.WorkDir,
&i.Status,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.UnreadSince,
&i.RuntimeID,
&i.LastReadAt,
&i.IsAgentIntro,
&i.PinnedAt,
)
return i, err
}
const setChatTaskInputOwnerSelf = `-- name: SetChatTaskInputOwnerSelf :one
UPDATE agent_task_queue
SET chat_input_task_id = id
WHERE id = $1
RETURNING id, agent_id, issue_id, status, priority, dispatched_at, started_at, completed_at, result, error, created_at, context, runtime_id, session_id, work_dir, trigger_comment_id, chat_session_id, autopilot_run_id, attempt, max_attempts, parent_task_id, failure_reason, trigger_summary, force_fresh_session, is_leader_task, wait_reason, initiator_user_id, handoff_note, prepare_lease_expires_at, squad_id, runtime_mcp_overlay, escalation_for_task_id, fire_at, originator_user_id, runtime_connected_apps, coalesced_comment_ids, delivered_comment_ids, chat_input_task_id, chat_finalize_deferred_at, originator_source, delegated_from_task_id, retry_of_task_id, rerun_of_task_id, rule_version_id, trigger_evidence_kind, trigger_evidence_ref_id, accountable_user_id
`
// Stamps a freshly-created direct-chat task as the owner of its own input batch
// (chat_input_task_id = id), so a later claim loads exactly the user messages
// tagged with this task id (ListChatInputMessages) rather than scanning trailing
// history. Runs in the same transaction as CreateChatTask + the user message
// insert on the direct-send path. Channel and legacy tasks skip this call and
// keep chat_input_task_id NULL, so a rolling deploy never replays their history.
func (q *Queries) SetChatTaskInputOwnerSelf(ctx context.Context, id pgtype.UUID) (AgentTaskQueue, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, setChatTaskInputOwnerSelf, id)
var i AgentTaskQueue
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.AgentID,
&i.IssueID,
&i.Status,
&i.Priority,
&i.DispatchedAt,
&i.StartedAt,
&i.CompletedAt,
&i.Result,
&i.Error,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.Context,
&i.RuntimeID,
&i.SessionID,
&i.WorkDir,
&i.TriggerCommentID,
&i.ChatSessionID,
&i.AutopilotRunID,
&i.Attempt,
&i.MaxAttempts,
&i.ParentTaskID,
&i.FailureReason,
&i.TriggerSummary,
&i.ForceFreshSession,
&i.IsLeaderTask,
&i.WaitReason,
&i.InitiatorUserID,
&i.HandoffNote,
&i.PrepareLeaseExpiresAt,
&i.SquadID,
&i.RuntimeMcpOverlay,
&i.EscalationForTaskID,
&i.FireAt,
&i.OriginatorUserID,
&i.RuntimeConnectedApps,
&i.CoalescedCommentIds,
&i.DeliveredCommentIds,
&i.ChatInputTaskID,
&i.ChatFinalizeDeferredAt,
&i.OriginatorSource,
&i.DelegatedFromTaskID,
&i.RetryOfTaskID,
&i.RerunOfTaskID,
&i.RuleVersionID,
&i.TriggerEvidenceKind,
&i.TriggerEvidenceRefID,
&i.AccountableUserID,
)
return i, err
}
const touchChatSession = `-- name: TouchChatSession :exec
UPDATE chat_session SET updated_at = now()
WHERE id = $1
`
func (q *Queries) TouchChatSession(ctx context.Context, id pgtype.UUID) error {
_, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, touchChatSession, id)
return err
}
const updateChatSessionSession = `-- name: UpdateChatSessionSession :exec
UPDATE chat_session
SET session_id = COALESCE($1, session_id),
work_dir = COALESCE($2, work_dir),
runtime_id = COALESCE($3, runtime_id),
updated_at = now()
WHERE id = $4
`
type UpdateChatSessionSessionParams struct {
SessionID pgtype.Text `json:"session_id"`
WorkDir pgtype.Text `json:"work_dir"`
RuntimeID pgtype.UUID `json:"runtime_id"`
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
}
// Updates the resume pointer for a chat session. Empty/NULL inputs are
// ignored via COALESCE so a task that completes without a session_id (e.g.
// the agent crashed before establishing one) cannot wipe out a previously
// recorded resume pointer. This makes the chat memory robust against
// intermittent agent failures.
func (q *Queries) UpdateChatSessionSession(ctx context.Context, arg UpdateChatSessionSessionParams) error {
_, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, updateChatSessionSession,
arg.SessionID,
arg.WorkDir,
arg.RuntimeID,
arg.ID,
)
return err
}
const updateChatSessionTitle = `-- name: UpdateChatSessionTitle :one
UPDATE chat_session SET title = $2, updated_at = now()
WHERE id = $1
RETURNING id, workspace_id, agent_id, creator_id, title, session_id, work_dir, status, created_at, updated_at, unread_since, runtime_id, last_read_at, is_agent_intro, pinned_at
`
type UpdateChatSessionTitleParams struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
Title string `json:"title"`
}
func (q *Queries) UpdateChatSessionTitle(ctx context.Context, arg UpdateChatSessionTitleParams) (ChatSession, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, updateChatSessionTitle, arg.ID, arg.Title)
var i ChatSession
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.AgentID,
&i.CreatorID,
&i.Title,
&i.SessionID,
&i.WorkDir,
&i.Status,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.UnreadSince,
&i.RuntimeID,
&i.LastReadAt,
&i.IsAgentIntro,
&i.PinnedAt,
)
return i, err
}
const updateChatSessionTitleIfCurrent = `-- name: UpdateChatSessionTitleIfCurrent :one
UPDATE chat_session SET title = $1, updated_at = now()
WHERE id = $2 AND title = $3
RETURNING id, workspace_id, agent_id, creator_id, title, session_id, work_dir, status, created_at, updated_at, unread_since, runtime_id, last_read_at, is_agent_intro, pinned_at
`
type UpdateChatSessionTitleIfCurrentParams struct {
NewTitle string `json:"new_title"`
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
ExpectedTitle string `json:"expected_title"`
}
// Compare-and-swap the title: only overwrite it when it still equals the
// value the caller observed (@expected_title). This is the idempotency /
// no-clobber guard behind LLM auto-titling (MUL-4295): the async generator
// captures the session's current (default/original) title before calling the
// model, and this write lands only if a manual rename or a competing writer
// has not changed the title in the meantime. A mismatch returns pgx.ErrNoRows
// (zero rows updated), which the caller treats as "someone renamed it — leave
// it alone", NOT as an error.
func (q *Queries) UpdateChatSessionTitleIfCurrent(ctx context.Context, arg UpdateChatSessionTitleIfCurrentParams) (ChatSession, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, updateChatSessionTitleIfCurrent, arg.NewTitle, arg.ID, arg.ExpectedTitle)
var i ChatSession
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.AgentID,
&i.CreatorID,
&i.Title,
&i.SessionID,
&i.WorkDir,
&i.Status,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.UnreadSince,
&i.RuntimeID,
&i.LastReadAt,
&i.IsAgentIntro,
&i.PinnedAt,
)
return i, err
}