Files
Bohan Jiang ce28d0aa0e feat(integrations): add platform-agnostic channel foundation (MUL-3515) (#4412)
* feat(integrations): add platform-agnostic channel foundation

Introduce server/internal/integrations/channel — the contract every
inbound IM integration implements, so the core never learns a platform's
event JSON. Four pieces:

- Channel interface (Type/Connect/Disconnect/Send/Capabilities) + Factory
  + Config (channel_type + opaque JSON blob, maps to channel_installation).
- Normalized InboundMessage/OutboundMessage envelopes + Source/MediaRef/
  ReplyCtx/MsgType/ChatType. Envelope holds only cross-platform-true
  fields; platform specifics live in Raw, read only by the adapter.
- Capability bitmask: declaration only, no degrade logic in core.
- Registry: Type->Factory map, last-writer-wins, concurrency-safe.

Pure package (no DB/network/platform deps). Foundation for MUL-3515; the
lark cutover + lark_*->channel_* generalization land in follow-up PRs.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(channel): generalize lark_* tables into channel_* (DB layer)

Migration 123 creates channel_installation / channel_user_binding /
channel_chat_session_binding / channel_inbound_message_dedup /
channel_inbound_audit / channel_outbound_card_message /
channel_binding_token. Each carries a channel_type discriminator and a
JSONB config for platform-specific identifiers/credentials; cross-platform
columns stay flat. Existing Feishu rows are backfilled (channel_type=
'feishu', app_secret_encrypted via base64). NO foreign keys / cascades
(MUL-3515 §4) — integrity moves to the app layer in the cutover.

queries/channel.sql ports the lark query surface to channel_*, JSONB-aware,
plus DeleteChannelUserBindingsByWorkspaceMember /
DeleteChannelChatSessionBindingBySession for the app-layer cleanup that
replaces the removed cascades.

lark_* tables/queries are left in place here and removed once the Go
cutover lands, so this commit ships green on its own.

Verified: sqlc generate, go build ./..., full migrate chain (1..123) on
Postgres 17, and a real-data backfill spot-check (base64 round-trip,
NULL-strip, functional unique index on (channel_type, app_id)).

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(channel): name app_id query param + multi-IM install key + null-safe binding merge

Addresses review on MUL-3515 (PR #4412):

- GetChannelInstallationByAppID: explicitly name params and cast app_id to
  ::text so sqlc emits AppID string. A bare $2 next to `config ->> 'app_id'`
  was mis-attributed to the JSONB config column, generating Config []byte.

- channel_installation uniqueness -> (workspace_id, agent_id, channel_type),
  with the UpsertChannelInstallation conflict key matched. Lets one agent
  hold one installation per IM (feishu + slack + ...) instead of a later
  install clobbering an earlier one. Behaviorally identical in the current
  feishu-only world; "one agent, at most one IM overall" stays an app-layer
  rule per MUL-3515 §4, not a DB constraint.

- CreateChannelUserBinding merges jsonb_strip_nulls(EXCLUDED.config) so a
  re-bind carrying {"union_id": null} no longer erases an already-captured
  union_id, restoring the old COALESCE(EXCLUDED.union_id, ...) semantics.

Regenerated with sqlc v1.31.1. Verified on PG17: re-install replaces in
place, feishu+slack coexist, null re-bind keeps union_id, real union_id wins.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(lark): channel-backed Feishu store + fix base64 backfill wrapping

Cutover step 1 of switching the lark Go code from lark_* onto the channel_*
tables (MUL-3515). Introduces the JSONB config boundary the rest of the
cutover sits on, and fixes a latent backfill bug surfaced while building it.

- migration 123: strip newlines from the app_secret_encrypted base64 backfill.
  PostgreSQL encode(...,'base64') MIME-wraps at 76 chars, and a secretbox-
  sealed ~72-byte secret exceeds that. Go's encoding/json decodes a JSON
  string into []byte with base64.StdEncoding, which rejects embedded newlines,
  so without the strip every migrated installation would fail to decrypt its
  app secret once reads move to channel_installation.config.

- store.go: flat domain types (Installation / UserBinding / ChatSessionBinding)
  with field parity to the retired db.Lark* rows, plus the feishu config codec.
  Row->domain mappers decode the JSONB config; the secret decoder is
  whitespace-tolerant so legacy MIME-wrapped data still round-trips, while the
  encoder emits unwrapped base64. Binding config encodes an absent union_id as
  "{}" so the upsert's jsonb_strip_nulls merge never clobbers a stored union_id.

- store_test.go: 72-byte secret round-trip, MIME-wrapped tolerance, optional
  null-strip, and flat-column preservation. Verified on PG17.

Field parity keeps the upcoming ~190 db.LarkInstallation call sites a
mechanical rename. No call sites switched yet; behavior unchanged.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(lark): route inbound integration onto channel_* + explicit membership checks

Cutover step 2 (MUL-3515): switch the Feishu Go code from the lark_* queries to
channel_* via a ChannelStore adapter, and replace the removed member foreign key
with explicit application-layer membership checks. No user-visible behavior change.

- channel_store.go: ChannelStore embeds *db.Queries and SHADOWS the ~24 lark
  query methods with channel_*-backed equivalents, keeping the db.Lark*
  signatures so the dispatcher/hub/services and their ~20k lines of tests stay
  untouched; the feishu JSONB config is (de)coded by store.go. Adds
  IsWorkspaceMember and a tx-aware WithTx. Only production wiring swaps
  *db.Queries for *ChannelStore.

- Membership re-check (§4 removed the lark_user_binding -> member FK, so a
  binding row no longer proves current membership):
  * the dispatcher inbound identity step verifies membership after the binding
    lookup; a former member's stale binding is dropped as non_workspace_member
    + audited and never reaches chat_session (§4.3 safety property).
  * RedeemAndBind and BindInstallerTx replace the now-dead FK (23503) branch
    with an explicit IsWorkspaceMember gate, preserving the existing
    ErrBindingNotWorkspaceMember outcome without burning the token.

- router wires the ChannelStore into the patcher, typing indicator, dispatcher,
  hub, and the union_id/region backfills; constructor-based services wrap
  *db.Queries internally so their signatures and nil-check tests are unchanged.

Verified: go build ./... ; go vet ; gofmt ; go test -race ./internal/integrations/...
(full lark suite green unchanged + new membership drop/error tests). Adapter
field mappings (secret base64, union_id RMW, chat-id/open-id remaps, dedup,
token, card) checked end-to-end against a PG17 channel_* schema.

lark_* tables and queries remain (unused at runtime) until the S3 cleanup-hooks
and S4 drop-tables/rename commits.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(channel): renumber generalization migration 123 -> 124

main merged 123_issue_stage after this branch forked, so the branch's 123_channel_generalization now collides on the migration number. The runner keys schema_migrations by full version string and would still apply both, but a duplicate number is a merge hazard and convention violation, so move the channel migration to the next free slot (124).

issue_stage (ALTER issue ADD COLUMN stage) and the channel generalization touch disjoint tables; verified on PG17 that 123_issue_stage applies cleanly on a DB already carrying 124_channel_generalization, so the two are order-independent. sqlc regenerated (v1.31.1): only the migration-number comment changed.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(channel): prune channel bindings on member removal + chat session delete

MUL-3515 §4 dropped every channel_* foreign key, so the old ON DELETE CASCADE that cleared a user's channel_user_binding when they left a workspace, and a chat's channel_chat_session_binding when its chat_session was deleted, no longer fires. Re-establish that integrity in the application layer, inside the existing transactions: revokeAndRemoveMember -> DeleteChannelUserBindingsByWorkspaceMember, DeleteChatSession -> DeleteChannelChatSessionBindingBySession.

Adds real-DB tests for both paths, including a scoping check that a remaining member's binding survives the prune. Verified on PG17: both new tests plus the existing revocation tests and the full handler package pass.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(channel): scope Lark/Feishu store reads to channel_type='feishu'

The S2 cutover routed the Feishu integration onto channel_*, but the Lark-facing ChannelStore wrappers read installation / chat-session-binding / outbound-card rows across ALL channel_type values. Once a second IM exists, that would let the Lark hub supervise a non-Feishu installation, the Lark install list show it, /lark/installations/{id} revoke another channel's row, and the outbound patcher / typing indicator act on a non-Feishu chat binding or card.

Add a channel_type predicate to the six read/list channel queries and pass channelTypeFeishu from every wrapper: GetChannelInstallation, GetChannelInstallationInWorkspace, ListChannelInstallationsByWorkspace, ListActiveChannelInstallations, GetChannelChatSessionBindingBySession, GetChannelOutboundCardByTask.

The S3 cleanup deletes (DeleteChannelUserBindingsByWorkspaceMember / DeleteChannelChatSessionBindingBySession) stay all-channel on purpose: a member leaving or a chat_session being deleted should clear every IM's binding. Adds a real-DB test that seeds a Slack installation/binding/card next to the Feishu ones and asserts the Lark wrappers never return them.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* refactor(channel): replace db.Lark* translation layer with lark domain types

S2 introduced ChannelStore as a translation layer that read/wrote channel_* but kept the retired db.Lark* struct/param shapes so the dispatcher/hub/services and their ~20k lines of tests did not have to change. This collapses that layer: the store now takes and returns the package's flat domain types (Installation, UserBinding, ChatSessionBinding, InboundMessageDedup, BindingTokenRow, OutboundCardMessage) and the *Params types in params.go, with channel-neutral field names (ChannelUserID / ChannelChatID / ...). All call sites, fakes, and tests move to the domain types.

No behavior change: only channel_* is read/written (as before); db.Lark* is now unused, and the lark_* tables + queries/lark.sql are removed in the next commit. Verified on PG17: go build / vet / gofmt clean, go test -race ./internal/integrations/... green (the ~20k-line fake suite), and the lark + handler suites pass.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* refactor(channel): drop lark_* tables and queries (remove old path)

The Go cutover (previous commit) moved the lark package entirely onto channel_* and the domain types, leaving the lark_* tables, queries/lark.sql, and the generated db.Lark* models unused. Remove them per the design (§5: replace, do not keep both): migration 125 drops the seven lark_* tables (data already lives in channel_* since migration 124), and queries/lark.sql is deleted + sqlc regenerated, removing the db.Lark* models and lark query methods.

The 125 down recreates the authoritative pre-drop schema (bot_union_id, region, per-installation dedup PK, thread-reply columns). Verified on PG17: fresh migrate up ends with lark_* gone + channel_* present; isolated 125 down/up round-trips correctly; go build / vet / gofmt clean; go test -race ./internal/integrations/... and the handler suite pass.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(migrations): remove trailing blank line at EOF of 125 down migration

git diff --check flagged a blank line at EOF of 125_drop_lark_tables.down.sql (a pg_dump-generation artifact). Whitespace only; the recreate SQL is unchanged.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* refactor(channel): defer lark_* table drop to a follow-up migration

Preflight deploy review: dropping lark_* in the same release that cuts over (old migration 125) is not rollback/rolling-safe — the v0.3.27 release still reads lark_*, so a rolling deploy or a post-deploy code rollback would hit "relation does not exist". Remove the drop and keep the old tables for one release (standard expand/contract): migration 124 already backfilled lark_* -> channel_*, the new code reads/writes only channel_*, and the physical drop moves to a separate cleanup migration once this ships and is observed.

The lark_* tables remain in the schema, so sqlc regenerates the (now unused) db.Lark* models; queries/lark.sql stays deleted (the new code uses channel_*). No code path reads lark_* — only the destructive drop is deferred, keeping the design's no-compat-layer / no-dual-write rule while being deploy-safe.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(channel): skip orphaned installations in hub-boot active scan

Preflight deploy review: channel_installation dropped the workspace/agent FK (MUL-3515 §4), so unlike lark_installation it does not cascade away when its workspace is deleted or its agent is hard-deleted (e.g. runtime teardown). The hub-boot query then keeps opening a WebSocket for a bot whose owner is gone.

JOIN ListActiveChannelInstallations to live workspace + agent so an orphaned installation is never connected, uniformly for every deletion path. The JOIN matches the old ON DELETE CASCADE semantics (row existence, not agent archival), so an archived-but-present agent's installation is still listed; the orphaned row's encrypted secret is thereby never decrypted/used.

Tests: a real-DB handler test asserts a deleted-workspace/agent installation and a non-Feishu one are both excluded; the lark scope test's active-list assertion moved there since the JOIN now needs real workspace/agent fixtures. (Physically deleting dormant orphaned channel rows on workspace/agent deletion is a separate app-layer-cleanup follow-up.)

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* docs(channel): document non-rolling cutover constraint for the lark->channel migration

Elon deploy review: keeping the lark_* tables (deferred drop) stops old v0.3.27 code from crashing, but is not full expand/contract. Migration 124 is a one-time backfill; afterwards new code runs on channel_* (lease + dedup on channel_*) while pre-cutover code runs on lark_* (lease + dedup on lark_*). If both run concurrently during a rolling deploy, each side claims the same Feishu bot's WS lease on its own table and double-processes inbound events.

This release therefore requires a NON-ROLLING cutover (stop the old hub before applying migration 124 + starting new code; rollback is not lossless once new code writes channel_*). Documented where deployers/reviewers see it: migration 124 header gains a ROLLOUT note; the channel_store.go header is corrected (lark_* tables are retained one release for rollback safety, not "gone"; the store still never touches them). Comment-only — no schema/codegen/behavior change.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(lark): add MULTICA_LARK_HUB_DISABLED switch for the channel cutover

The lark_*->channel_* cutover needs a way to make the Feishu bot briefly unavailable WITHOUT taking down the whole multica-api process — the Lark hub is a goroutine inside it, not a separate Deployment. MULTICA_LARK_HUB_DISABLED=true parks the hub at startup: the API serves HTTP normally but never claims a WS lease or opens a Feishu connection.

Rollout (see migration 124 ROLLOUT note): ship the new release with the flag SET so new pods run API-only while old pods (hub on lark_*) drain during the rolling deploy — the two hubs never overlap. After the old pods are gone and migration 124 has run, flip the flag off; the new hub comes up on channel_*. The old backend does NOT need this switch — its hub stops when k8s terminates the old pods, not via a flag. Nil-ing LarkHub reuses the existing not-configured path so both the startup start and the shutdown join skip it.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* docs(channel): point migration 124 ROLLOUT note at the hub-disable switch

Refine the rollout note to use MULTICA_LARK_HUB_DISABLED for a bot-only cutover (new pods serve API with the hub parked while old pods drain; flip the switch off after the migration), instead of the earlier whole-API recreate. Comment-only.

MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* docs(channel): fix migration 124 rollout order and document self-host cutover

The previous ROLLOUT note shipped the new (channel_*) build before
running migration 124, so the channel_*-backed HTTP paths (installation
list/install/revoke, chat-session delete, member revoke) would 500 in
the window between new-pod boot and the deferred migration. Restate the
runbook around two explicit invariants — channel_* must exist before the
new build serves those paths, and the old/new hubs must never overlap —
and order the steps so channel_* is created first (park old hub -> snapshot
-> deploy parked new build -> unpark). Document that default self-host
(entrypoint migrate + single-replica Recreate) satisfies both invariants
automatically and needs no manual steps; only prd / multi-replica rolling
self-host needs the switch procedure. Clarify in main.go that the
hub-park switch is generation-agnostic (parks whichever hub the build
carries), which is what enables the preparatory release.

Refs MUL-3515

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: J <j@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-06-24 12:46:20 +08:00

379 lines
15 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/integrations/lark"
db "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/db/generated"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/protocol"
)
// LarkInstallationResponse is the wire shape for an installation row.
// `app_secret_encrypted` is INTENTIONALLY absent — the encrypted blob
// is server-internal and there is no product reason to expose it (the
// only consumer that needs the plaintext is the WS hub, which calls
// InstallationService.DecryptAppSecret server-side). Likewise, the WS
// lease columns are omitted; they are runtime state, not API surface.
type LarkInstallationResponse struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
WorkspaceID string `json:"workspace_id"`
AgentID string `json:"agent_id"`
AppID string `json:"app_id"`
TenantKey *string `json:"tenant_key,omitempty"`
BotOpenID string `json:"bot_open_id"`
InstallerUserID string `json:"installer_user_id"`
Status string `json:"status"`
// Region is the Lark cloud this installation lives on: "feishu"
// (mainland) or "lark" (international). The UI uses it to render a
// badge and to build the correct "Manage in Lark" dev-console host.
Region string `json:"region"`
InstalledAt string `json:"installed_at"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt string `json:"updated_at"`
}
func larkInstallationToResponse(row lark.Installation) LarkInstallationResponse {
resp := LarkInstallationResponse{
ID: uuidToString(row.ID),
WorkspaceID: uuidToString(row.WorkspaceID),
AgentID: uuidToString(row.AgentID),
AppID: row.AppID,
BotOpenID: row.BotOpenID,
InstallerUserID: uuidToString(row.InstallerUserID),
Status: row.Status,
Region: row.Region,
InstalledAt: row.InstalledAt.Time.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
CreatedAt: row.CreatedAt.Time.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
UpdatedAt: row.UpdatedAt.Time.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
}
if row.TenantKey.Valid {
tk := row.TenantKey.String
resp.TenantKey = &tk
}
return resp
}
// ListLarkInstallations (GET /api/workspaces/{id}/lark/installations)
// is member-visible — the Integrations tab should not render blank
// for non-admins. Unlike the GitHub list, we do not strip any field
// here because no API surface column doubles as a management handle:
// revocation goes by the UUID id, which is meaningless without the
// admin route's authorization, so exposing it is harmless.
//
// Response fields:
// - configured: at-rest encryption key is set (`LarkInstallations
// != nil`). When false, no install flow can succeed at all; the
// UI hides the tab.
// - install_supported: the device-flow install path is wired
// end-to-end: a RegistrationService exists (deployment supplied
// MULTICA_LARK_SECRET_KEY) AND the APIClient.IsConfigured signal
// is true (the real Lark HTTP client is in place — the stub
// cannot complete the post-poll GetBotInfo call). When false,
// the agent-detail "Bind" button stays hidden and the Settings
// tab surfaces a "coming soon" notice; already-installed bots
// still appear and remain manageable.
func (h *Handler) ListLarkInstallations(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if h.LarkInstallations == nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
"installations": []LarkInstallationResponse{},
"configured": false,
"install_supported": false,
})
return
}
wsUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, chi.URLParam(r, "id"), "workspace id")
if !ok {
return
}
rows, err := h.LarkInstallations.ListByWorkspace(r.Context(), wsUUID)
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to list lark installations")
return
}
out := make([]LarkInstallationResponse, 0, len(rows))
for _, row := range rows {
out = append(out, larkInstallationToResponse(row))
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
"installations": out,
"configured": true,
"install_supported": h.LarkRegistration != nil && h.LarkAPIClient != nil && h.LarkAPIClient.IsConfigured(),
})
}
// RevokeLarkInstallation (DELETE /api/workspaces/{id}/lark/installations/{installationId})
// flips status to 'revoked' so the WS hub drops the connection on its
// next sweep. The row itself is preserved for audit; a re-install via
// the device-flow path flips status back to 'active' atomically.
func (h *Handler) RevokeLarkInstallation(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if h.LarkInstallations == nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "lark integration not configured")
return
}
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
wsUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, chi.URLParam(r, "id"), "workspace id")
if !ok {
return
}
instUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, chi.URLParam(r, "installationId"), "installation id")
if !ok {
return
}
// Workspace-scoped lookup ensures one workspace cannot revoke
// another's installation by guessing the UUID.
if _, err := h.LarkInstallations.GetInWorkspace(r.Context(), instUUID, wsUUID); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, lark.ErrInstallationNotFound) {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "lark installation not found")
return
}
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load installation")
return
}
if err := h.LarkInstallations.Revoke(r.Context(), instUUID); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to revoke installation")
return
}
h.publish(protocol.EventLarkInstallationRevoked, uuidToString(wsUUID), "user", userID, map[string]any{
"id": uuidToString(instUUID),
})
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// RedeemLarkBindingTokenRequest carries the raw token the user
// clicked through from the Bot's "you need to bind" reply card.
type RedeemLarkBindingTokenRequest struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
}
// RedeemLarkBindingTokenResponse is the post-redemption shape. We
// echo the workspace/installation/open_id so the frontend can render
// "you are now bound to <workspace> via <agent>" without a second
// fetch.
type RedeemLarkBindingTokenResponse struct {
WorkspaceID string `json:"workspace_id"`
InstallationID string `json:"installation_id"`
LarkOpenID string `json:"lark_open_id"`
}
// RedeemLarkBindingToken (POST /api/lark/binding/redeem) is the only
// path that writes a lark_user_binding row from user-driven action.
// The redeemer's identity is taken from the session, not the token,
// so a stolen token cannot bind a Lark open_id to an attacker's
// Multica account. The token only proves "this open_id requested
// binding" — combining it with the logged-in user is what creates
// the (open_id ↔ user) mapping.
//
// Consume + bind happen inside a single DB transaction (see
// lark.BindingTokenService.RedeemAndBind). The three failure modes
// each map to a distinct status code so the frontend can render the
// appropriate copy without a separate probe:
// - 410 Gone: token unknown / consumed / expired
// - 409 Conflict: open_id is already bound to a different user
// - 403 Forbidden: redeemer is not a workspace member
func (h *Handler) RedeemLarkBindingToken(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if h.LarkBindingTokens == nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "lark integration not configured")
return
}
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
var req RedeemLarkBindingTokenRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "invalid request body")
return
}
if req.Token == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "token is required")
return
}
userUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, userID, "user id")
if !ok {
return
}
redeemed, err := h.LarkBindingTokens.RedeemAndBind(r.Context(), req.Token, userUUID)
if err != nil {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, lark.ErrBindingTokenInvalid):
writeError(w, http.StatusGone, "binding token invalid or expired")
case errors.Is(err, lark.ErrBindingAlreadyAssigned):
writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, "this Lark account is already bound to a different Multica user")
case errors.Is(err, lark.ErrBindingNotWorkspaceMember):
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "binding refused (are you a workspace member?)")
default:
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to redeem token")
}
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, RedeemLarkBindingTokenResponse{
WorkspaceID: uuidToString(redeemed.WorkspaceID),
InstallationID: uuidToString(redeemed.InstallationID),
LarkOpenID: string(redeemed.LarkOpenID),
})
}
// BeginLarkInstallResponse is the payload the QR-code dialog consumes.
// The frontend renders `qr_code_url` as a QR image (and as a tap-to-
// open link fallback) and starts polling
// /lark/install/{session_id}/status at the supplied cadence.
type BeginLarkInstallResponse struct {
SessionID string `json:"session_id"`
QRCodeURL string `json:"qr_code_url"`
ExpiresInSeconds int `json:"expires_in_seconds"`
PollIntervalSeconds int `json:"poll_interval_seconds"`
}
// BeginLarkInstall (POST /api/workspaces/{id}/lark/install/begin)
// opens a new device-flow registration session against Lark. Admin-only
// at the router. The agent_id query param picks which Multica Agent
// the new Bot will be bound to; the agent must belong to this
// workspace (RegistrationService re-checks that defense-in-depth).
//
// Returns 503 when the integration is not wired (no at-rest key, no
// HTTP client, no RegistrationService); the UI hides the bind button
// in that case so this should not be reached through the normal flow.
func (h *Handler) BeginLarkInstall(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if h.LarkRegistration == nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "lark install not configured")
return
}
userID, ok := requireUserID(w, r)
if !ok {
return
}
wsUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, chi.URLParam(r, "id"), "workspace id")
if !ok {
return
}
agentIDStr := strings.TrimSpace(r.URL.Query().Get("agent_id"))
if agentIDStr == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "agent_id is required")
return
}
agentUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, agentIDStr, "agent_id")
if !ok {
return
}
// region is the cloud the user explicitly chose to bind against —
// "feishu" (mainland, accounts.feishu.cn) or "lark" (international,
// accounts.larksuite.com). The frontend now exposes two CTAs ("Bind
// to Feishu" / "Bind to Lark") so the QR is rendered against the
// right cloud up front rather than relying on the mid-poll
// tenant-brand auto-switch from a Feishu-first begin. We accept
// "feishu", "lark", and the empty string (for back-compat with
// callers that pre-date the split CTA, which RegionOrDefault inside
// the service maps to Feishu); any other value is a 400 — the
// service would normalize an unknown value to Feishu silently and
// that would mask a frontend regression where a typo'd region
// landed users on the wrong cloud without telling them.
regionParam := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(r.URL.Query().Get("region")))
switch regionParam {
case "", "feishu", "lark":
// ok — empty defaults to feishu downstream.
default:
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "region must be 'feishu' or 'lark'")
return
}
// Ownership pre-check at the HTTP boundary so a malformed
// agent_id surfaces 404 here (not an opaque service error from
// inside the service's own re-check).
if _, err := h.Queries.GetAgentInWorkspace(r.Context(), db.GetAgentInWorkspaceParams{
ID: agentUUID,
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
}); err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "agent not found in this workspace")
return
}
initiatorUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, userID, "user id")
if !ok {
return
}
res, err := h.LarkRegistration.BeginInstall(r.Context(), lark.BeginInstallParams{
WorkspaceID: wsUUID,
AgentID: agentUUID,
InitiatorID: initiatorUUID,
Region: lark.Region(regionParam),
})
if err != nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadGateway, "failed to start install: "+err.Error())
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, BeginLarkInstallResponse{
SessionID: res.SessionID,
QRCodeURL: res.QRCodeURL,
ExpiresInSeconds: res.ExpiresInSeconds,
PollIntervalSeconds: res.PollIntervalSeconds,
})
}
// LarkInstallStatusResponse is the polling payload. `status` is one
// of "pending" | "success" | "error"; on success `installation_id`
// is populated, on error `error_reason` is a stable code (see
// lark.RegistrationReason*).
type LarkInstallStatusResponse struct {
Status string `json:"status"`
InstallationID string `json:"installation_id,omitempty"`
ErrorReason string `json:"error_reason,omitempty"`
ErrorMessage string `json:"error_message,omitempty"`
}
// GetLarkInstallStatus (GET /api/workspaces/{id}/lark/install/{sessionId}/status)
// returns the current state of an in-flight install session. Admin-
// only at the router. Unknown / cross-workspace / GC'd sessions return
// 404 — the frontend treats it as "session lost, please restart".
//
// On success this handler does NOT clean up the session — the
// frontend may poll once more after the dialog closes to confirm
// before the in-process GC sweep retires the entry; reading is
// idempotent.
func (h *Handler) GetLarkInstallStatus(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if h.LarkRegistration == nil {
writeError(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, "lark install not configured")
return
}
wsUUID, ok := parseUUIDOrBadRequest(w, chi.URLParam(r, "id"), "workspace id")
if !ok {
return
}
sessionID := strings.TrimSpace(chi.URLParam(r, "sessionId"))
if sessionID == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "session id is required")
return
}
state, err := h.LarkRegistration.GetSession(wsUUID, sessionID)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, lark.ErrRegistrationSessionNotFound) {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "install session not found")
return
}
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load install session")
return
}
resp := LarkInstallStatusResponse{
Status: string(state.Status),
ErrorReason: state.ErrorReason,
ErrorMessage: state.ErrorMessage,
}
if state.InstallationID.Valid {
resp.InstallationID = uuidToString(state.InstallationID)
// The lark_installation:created event is published by the
// RegistrationService at the row-commit point (see
// registration_service.go finishSuccess), not here — that keeps
// the connection-badge refresh independent of whether any browser
// polls this status endpoint to success.
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, resp)
}