Files
multica/server/pkg/db/generated/runtime.sql.go
LinYushen cb68669c73 feat(composio): gate MCP apps behind feature flag (#4876)
* feat(composio): server-side connect flow + connections REST (Notion MVP) (MUL-3720) (#4608)

* feat(composio): server-side connect flow + connections REST (Notion MVP) (MUL-3720)

Compose the merged server/pkg/composio SDK into a user-facing connection
manager: signed-state connect handshake, local user_composio_connection
mirror, idempotent disconnect, and a per-user MCP session helper (not yet
wired into task dispatch).

- migration 127_user_composio_connection (no FK/cascade, per DB rules)
- sqlc queries: upsert (idempotent on user_id+connected_account_id), list
  active, owner-scoped get, mark revoked
- internal/integrations/composio: signed HMAC-SHA256 state, BeginConnect,
  CompleteCallback (idempotent upsert), ListConnections, Disconnect
  (upstream 404 = idempotent success), CreateMCPSession (no-op when empty,
  pins connected_accounts per toolkit), CallbackRedirect
- REST handlers under /api/integrations/composio (user-scoped, 503 when
  COMPOSIO_API_KEY unset): connect/init, callback (302), connections list,
  delete
- router wiring gated by COMPOSIO_API_KEY; COMPOSIO_AUTH_CONFIGS_JSON maps
  toolkit->auth_config (MVP: notion); state secret from COMPOSIO_STATE_SECRET
  or derived from JWT_SECRET; callback base from COMPOSIO_CALLBACK_BASE_URL
  or MULTICA_PUBLIC_URL
- tests: state (expire/tamper/wrong-secret), service (mapping, callback
  idempotency, non-success, disconnect owner/404 idempotency, MCP pin),
  handlers (httptest), redact regression for Bearer mcp_ tokens

MVP scope: Notion only; no task-dispatch overlay, sharing, or webhook
event handling (later stages).

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): bind callback account to user + idempotent revoked disconnect (MUL-3720)

Address PR 4608 review (CHANGES_REQUESTED):

- callback: verify connected_account_id with Composio before mirroring it.
  The signed state only proved user/toolkit/exp, so a valid state paired with
  a tampered connected_account_id would be written verbatim. CompleteCallback
  now calls ListConnectedAccounts and fails closed (ErrAccountVerification)
  unless the account belongs to the state's user (composio_user_id == multica
  user id) and was created under the toolkit's auth config. No row is written
  on mismatch / unknown account / upstream error.

- disconnect: short-circuit to a no-op when the local row is already revoked,
  before touching upstream. Previously a second DELETE re-hit Composio and a
  non-404 upstream error surfaced as a 502, breaking the 204-idempotent
  contract.

- CreateMCPSession: document the v1 single-active-connection-per-(user,toolkit)
  constraint and make duplicate selection deterministic (newest-wins, rows are
  connected_at DESC) instead of order-dependent map overwrite. Stage 3 owns the
  real single-account-enforcement vs multi-account-shape decision.

Tests: tampered/wrong-auth-config/unknown-account callback rejection, revoked-row
disconnect no-op (asserts upstream not re-hit). composio pkg 85% coverage; all
green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): list all toolkits + dynamic auth-config resolution (MUL-3720)

Yushen's follow-up to the Notion MVP: surface the full Composio toolkit
catalog, render it in Settings, and drop the static env mapping in favor of
dynamic auth-config discovery.

Config correctness (per Composio docs):
- Remove COMPOSIO_AUTH_CONFIGS_JSON entirely. The toolkit→auth_config mapping
  is now resolved at request time from the project's /auth_configs (cached,
  5-min TTL), so enabling a toolkit is a dashboard action, not a redeploy.
- Do NOT add COMPOSIO_PROJECT_ID. The project API key (x-api-key) authenticates
  to exactly one project; the project is resolved from the key. Only org-level
  endpoints use x-org-api-key, which this integration never calls.

Backend:
- SDK: server/pkg/composio/auth_configs.go — ListAuthConfigs (toolkit_slug,
  is_composio_managed, show_disabled, limit, cursor).
- service: dynamic resolver (authConfigMap cache; betterAuthConfig prefers a
  custom/white-label config over Composio-managed, newest wins); BeginConnect
  and CompleteCallback resolve via it; ListToolkits fetches the full catalog
  (paginated, capped) annotated with connectable = has an enabled auth config,
  connectable-first ordering.
- handler + route: GET /api/integrations/composio/toolkits (user-scoped, 503
  when COMPOSIO_API_KEY unset) returning slug/name/logo/category/connectable.

Frontend:
- core: ComposioToolkit/ComposioConnection types, api client methods, and
  composio query options (@multica/core/composio).
- views: Settings → Integrations now has a Composio section rendering every
  toolkit as a card with search. Connect is gated on `connectable`;
  non-connectable toolkits show a muted "not configured" hint instead of a
  dead button. Connected toolkits show a badge + Disconnect (with confirm).
- i18n: composio block added to en/zh-Hans/ja/ko settings.

Tests: SDK + service (dynamic resolution, custom-over-managed preference,
connectable flag, resolver-error soft-degrade) and handler toolkits endpoint;
composio pkg 85.7% coverage. go build/vet/gofmt clean; core+views typecheck,
core+views lint, and core tests (691) all green.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): close cross-toolkit callback fail-open by signing auth_config_id into state (MUL-3720)

Re-review blocker: CompleteCallback resolved the toolkit's auth config at
callback time and ignored a resolve error/empty result, while
verifyAccountOwnership skipped the auth-config comparison when the expected
value was empty. A user could then pass another toolkit's connected_account_id
into this toolkit's callback — the owner check passed and it was written under
the wrong toolkit_slug/account binding.

Fix: the auth_config_id is already resolved in BeginConnect (before the state
is signed), so sign it into the state and compare it exactly at callback. No
re-resolve, no fail-open. verifyAccountOwnership now fails closed when the
expected auth config is empty (rejects instead of skipping) and requires an
exact match — closing the cross-toolkit binding gap.

Tests: state round-trips auth_config_id; BeginConnect signs it; callback
rejects wrong/cross-toolkit auth config and an empty (no-mapping) auth config
fails closed. composio pkg 85.2% coverage, all green.

Frontend (non-blocking): the Composio settings tab now surfaces an error when
the connections query fails instead of silently rendering everything as
unconnected.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): hide Settings section entirely when integration unconfigured (MUL-3720)

Decision (option 2, hide-then-merge): don't show a card that leaks the internal
COMPOSIO_API_KEY env-var name to every end user. IntegrationsTab now gates the
whole Composio section (heading + body) on the toolkits query — a 503 means the
key is unset, so the section is withheld instead of rendering the not-configured
card. Admin-only setup guidance is a later, role-gated affordance.

Removed the notConfigured card (and now-unused ApiError import) from
ComposioTab; it only mounts when configured. views typecheck + lint clean.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): Stage 2 frontend polish — callback toast, last_used & expired UI, e2e (MUL-3718) (#4688)

* feat(composio): callback toast + refresh, last_used & expired UI, e2e (MUL-3718)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): real callback redirect route + StrictMode-safe toast dedup (MUL-3718 review)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): callback endpoint should not require Multica auth (MUL-3843) (#4709)

* fix(composio): move OAuth callback out of the Auth group (MUL-3843)

Composio 302-redirects the browser to /api/integrations/composio/callback
at the end of the OAuth flow, but PR #4608 mounted it inside the cookie-auth
middleware group. When the session cookie is absent (expired session,
SameSite=Strict / Safari ITP, private window, self-hosted callback subdomain)
the Auth middleware returned a hard 401 and a JSON blob instead of the
settings redirect, breaking the flow.

Identity never came from the cookie anyway: it is carried by the HMAC-signed
state param that CompleteCallback verifies (signature, expiry, replay) and
cross-checked by verifyAccountOwnership; h.Composio == nil still 503s. So the
callback is registered alongside the other public OAuth/webhook routes; the
other four composio endpoints stay session-gated.

Refs MUL-3843, MUL-3715.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): correct stale callback routing comments (MUL-3843)

The package header and ComposioCallback doc comments still described the
callback as sitting under the Auth middleware group. After the route was
moved out (this PR), update both to state it is a public route whose identity
comes from the signed state — addressing review nit from 张大彪.

Refs MUL-3843.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): inject MCP overlay into agent runtime at task dispatch (MUL-3721) (#4704)

Stage 3 of the Composio epic. Wires the per-user Composio MCP session into
every agent task so the agent process sees the initiator's connected tools
without any prompt-time plumbing.

Server side
  - Migration 128 adds agent_task_queue.runtime_mcp_overlay JSONB plus a
    BEFORE-UPDATE trigger that wipes the column on any transition into a
    terminal status (completed / failed / cancelled). A trigger is the single
    source of truth — future queries that flip status cannot bypass it.
  - composio.Service.BuildTaskOverlay(userID) reuses CreateMCPSession and
    emits the Claude-style { mcpServers: { composio: { type: http, url,
    headers } } } shape the daemon's existing sidecar generators consume.
    Returns (nil, nil) on zero active connections so we never burn a
    Composio session for a user with nothing to call.
  - TaskService grows a Composio ComposioOverlayBuilder seam, wired in
    router.go after composiointeg.NewService succeeds. Five enqueue paths
    (issue / mention / quick-create / chat / auto-retry) attach the overlay
    after CreateAgentTask returns and before the daemon is notified — so
    every claim reads a settled row, with no second daemon hop. Best-effort:
    a builder failure logs and proceeds with no overlay.
  - resolveInitiatorFromTriggerComment derives the initiator user from the
    trigger comment when it was authored by a member. Agent-authored
    triggers are not treated as initiators (their connected-apps view is
    empty by construction).

Daemon side
  - handler/daemon.go claim path merges task.runtime_mcp_overlay onto
    agent.mcp_config via mergeMCPOverlay before populating
    TaskAgentData.McpConfig. Overlay wins on server-name collisions
    because it carries the live user-scoped session URL. Errors fall back
    to the agent config unchanged — a bad overlay must not surprise-disable
    saved MCP tools. The existing execenv sidecar generators (cursor /
    codex / openclaw / opencode / hermes-kiro) need no changes: they keep
    consuming the merged result through TaskAgentData.McpConfig.

Tests
  - 9 merge cases (mcp_overlay_test): both-nil short-circuit, agent-only
    pass-through, overlay-only canonicalization, two-side merge, name
    collision (overlay wins), top-level key preservation, malformed agent
    fallback, malformed overlay fallback, non-object server rejection.
  - 4 dispatch cases (composio): zero-connections returns nil without
    CreateSession, happy-path emits the right shape with the right user
    id, empty-URL defensive branch, SDK error surfacing.
  - 4 TaskService helper cases: nil Composio is a no-op (Queries-safe),
    invalid initiator does not call the builder, nil overlay skips the
    UPDATE, builder error swallowed without panic.
  - Migration 128 verified to roll up + down + up cleanly against the test
    database.

Out of scope (deferred): assignment-triggered enqueue paths with no
trigger comment get no overlay attached today (no initiator UUID flows
through enqueueIssueTask in that case). Retry paths recompute the overlay
fresh from the parent's initiator_user_id instead of inheriting the bearer
from the parent row, so a stale token can never resurface on a retry.

Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): per-agent allowlist + originator-scoped MCP overlay (MUL-3869) (#4736)

* feat(composio): per-agent allowlist + originator-scoped MCP overlay (MUL-3869)

Stage 3.1 of the Composio epic (MUL-3721 parent). PR #4704 wired in the
runtime_mcp_overlay column and a per-task dispatch hook; this change
inverts the default from "all-on" to opt-in and locks the overlay to the
agent owner's own connected apps:

- Agents carry composio_toolkit_allowlist TEXT[]. NULL or [] => no MCP.
  Owner-only read/write; non-owner GET/PUT silently redacts/drops the
  field (same shape as mcp_config).
- agent_task_queue carries originator_user_id UUID. Set from the
  top-of-chain HUMAN at every enqueue path:
    * issue/mention comment by member  -> author_id
    * issue/mention comment by agent   -> inherit via comment.source_task_id
                                          -> parent task originator_user_id
    * quick-create                     -> requester_id
    * chat                             -> initiator_user_id
    * retry                            -> SQL-inherited from parent row
    * autopilot                        -> NULL (system-driven)
- BuildTaskOverlay (composio dispatch) now takes (ctx, originatorUserID,
  agent) and short-circuits on five gates: invalid originator,
  originator != agent.owner_id, empty allowlist, empty intersection of
  allowlist ∩ active connections, defensive empty session URL. Composio
  CreateSession is called with BOTH `toolkits.slugs` (the intersection)
  AND `connected_accounts` (the pinned account ids), narrowing the
  tool-router twice.
- The originator-vs-owner gate closes the agent-fanout privacy hole: any
  workspace member who can @-mention a public agent used to project the
  owner's connected apps into their run. Now the overlay only mounts
  when the human at the top of the chain IS the agent owner.

Tests:
- dispatch_test.go covers all 5 gates plus uppercase/whitespace slug
  normalisation.
- task_runtime_mcp_overlay_test.go covers the no-op gates of the new
  applyRuntimeMCPOverlay signature.
- agent_composio_allowlist_test.go (handler): owner roundtrip
  (list/empty/null), workspace-admin silent-drop, owner-only GET
  visibility, pure normaliseComposioToolkitAllowlist.
- resolve_originator_test.go (service, DB-backed): member-authored,
  agent-authored inherits via comment.source_task_id, invalid id.

Migration 129 up/down/up verified against docker postgres.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* chore(composio): gofmt + regenerate sqlc with v1.31.1 (MUL-3869 review nits)

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): accept nested connected account auth config

* feat(views): creator-only MCP tab for per-agent Composio allowlist (MUL-3870) (#4743)

Stage 3.2 frontend on top of the Stage 3.1 backend (MUL-3869, 4708dba97).
Adds an agent-detail tab that lets the agent owner pick which of their own
active Composio connections this agent may mount as MCP servers, writing the
selection to agent.composio_toolkit_allowlist via the existing PUT /api/agents.

- core/types: composio_toolkit_allowlist (+ _redacted) on Agent; tri-state
  composio_toolkit_allowlist on UpdateAgentRequest (omit/no-change, null/clear,
  array/replace), matching the backend contract.
- core/agents: useUpdateAgentAllowlist - optimistic mutation hook (patches the
  cached workspace agent list, rolls back on error, invalidates on settle).
- views: AgentMcpTab renders the owner's active connections as checkboxes;
  empty state links to Settings -> Integrations; defensive redacted state.
- views: wired into AgentOverviewPane as tab "composio_mcp", labeled "MCP Apps"
  to disambiguate from the existing raw-JSON "MCP" (mcp_config) tab. The entry
  is gated to the creator (currentUserId === agent.owner_id), matching the
  backend's owner-only read/write of the allowlist.
- i18n: tabs.composio_mcp + tab_body.composio_mcp.* in en/ja/ko/zh-Hans.
- tests: agent-mcp-tab.test.tsx (gating, toggle->allowlist body, active-only,
  empty, redacted); e2e/agent-mcp.spec.ts (creator sees tab + PUT body,
  non-creator hidden) with Composio + agent endpoints mocked at the boundary.

Note: the product spec says "creator"; the schema has no creator_id - the
backend gate and redaction are keyed on owner_id, so the tab uses owner_id.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(composio): mount remote MCP for codex

* feat(agents): agent invocation permission system (MUL-3963) (#4844)

* feat(agents): agent invocation permission system (permission_mode + invocation targets)

MUL-3963: split who may INVOKE an agent out of the overloaded visibility
column into an explicit, extensible model on feature/composio-integration.

- DB: agent.permission_mode (private|public_to) + agent_invocation_target
  table (workspace/member/team targets) + lossless backfill from visibility
  (migration 130).
- canInvokeAgent: owner-only for private (NO admin bypass, NO A2A bypass);
  public_to honours the allow-list; A2A judged by the top-of-chain originator.
- All trigger paths rewired: issue assign, comment @agent/@squad, chat,
  quick-create, autopilot, squad leader, child-done.
- Agent API: permission_mode + invocation_targets on responses and
  create/update (owner-only writes); legacy visibility kept as a derived field
  so old clients never see a permission widening.
- Composio: BuildTaskOverlay now FOLLOWS invocation permission and uses the
  agent OWNER connection (removed the originator==owner gate); front-end warns
  when a shared agent enables Composio apps.
- CLI: --permission-mode / --public-to-workspace / --public-to-member (legacy
  --visibility still mapped).
- Frontend: AccessPicker (Private / workspace / specific people / team soon),
  permission rules mirror canInvokeAgent, Composio warning banner.
- Tests: migration backfill, admin cannot invoke others private, public_to
  workspace/member whitelist, A2A by originator, Composio overlay uses owner
  connection.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(agents): stackable, mixed public_to invocation targets (MUL-3963)

Follow-up on PR #4844: public_to now supports selecting MULTIPLE, MIXED
targets on one agent (e.g. Public to workspace + specific people + team),
with canInvokeAgent admitting on ANY matching target (OR).

- Frontend AccessPicker: reworked from a single exclusive kind into a
  stackable multi-select — an "Everyone in workspace" toggle, a member
  multi-select checklist, and a (disabled, v1) team placeholder can be
  combined freely. Emits the full union of selected targets; empty union
  collapses to Private. Existing team targets are preserved across saves.
  Added the access.public_group locale string (en/zh-Hans/ja/ko).
- Backend already supported this (agent_invocation_target is multi-row per
  agent; create/update take a target ARRAY and batch-replace the whole
  allow-list; canInvokeAgent OR-matches). Added tests to lock it in:
  mixed member+team targets, overlapping-member batch replace, and
  workspace+member stacking then narrowing.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): address review on invocation permission (MUL-3963)

张大彪 review on PR #4844 — three blockers + product ruling + nits:

1. Migration 130: drop the FK/cascade on agent_invocation_target
   (agent_id, created_by) per the Multica no-FK rule; relationships are now
   maintained in the app layer (matching MUL-3515 §4). Added
   DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByArchivedRuntimeAgents and call it before
   DeleteArchivedAgentsByRuntime in all three runtime-delete paths
   (runtime.go x2, runtime_profile.go) so hard-deleting agents can't orphan
   target rows.
2. revokeAndRemoveMember: prune the leaving member's member-target grants
   (DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByMember) in the same tx as the member-row
   delete, so a re-invited user can't reclaim a stale invocation grant.
3. Empty public_to is a phantom — parsePermissionInput now normalises a
   public_to with no resolvable targets to a single workspace target, so
   `--permission-mode public_to` alone (and any empty target array) means
   "public to workspace" instead of "shared but nobody can run it".

Product ruling: the system/no-human-originator → workspace-target path in
canInvokeAgent is a deliberate, documented exception (webhook/system/
workspace-wide automation); member/team targets still fail closed without a
resolved originator. Documented in code + locked with a test.

Nits: refreshed the stale "originator must be owner" comments — models.go
(via migration 130 COMMENT ON COLUMN + sqlc regen for composio_toolkit_allowlist
and originator_user_id) and agent-mcp-tab.tsx — to the owner-connection +
invocation-permission rules.

Tests: member remove/re-add regression, system workspace exception + member
fail-closed, empty public_to → workspace (plus the earlier mixed/overlap/
batch-replace suite). Migration 130 applied to the test DB; Go handler/service/
composio suites green; views typecheck clean.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): scope member invocation-target cleanup to one workspace (MUL-3963)

张大彪 3rd review — cross-workspace permission bug + comment nits:

- DeleteAgentInvocationTargetsByMember was a GLOBAL delete by user id, so
  removing a user from workspace A also wiped their member-target grants on
  agents in workspace B. Scoped it to a single workspace by joining through
  agent.workspace_id; revokeAndRemoveMember now passes (workspaceID, userID).
- Regression test TestRevokeMember_InvocationTargetCleanupIsWorkspaceScoped:
  same user allow-listed by agents in two workspaces; removal from one leaves
  the other workspace's target intact.
- Nits: refreshed the remaining stale "originator == agent.owner_id" /
  "owner-vs-originator" comments — CreateRetryTask (agent.sql, regenerated),
  and the AgentResponse allowlist doc + ListAgents/UpdateAgent redaction
  rationale in agent.go — to the owner-connection + invocation-permission rule.

Migration 130 applied to the test DB; Go handler/service/composio suites green;
go vet clean.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): agent access owner-only editable, read-only for others (MUL-3963) (#4853)

* fix(agents): make agent access owner-only editable, read-only for others (MUL-3963)

Interaction bug: a non-owner (incl. workspace admin) could open the AccessPicker
and set an agent public — the backend silently ignored it and the UI bounced
back to private. Access is owner-only, so non-owners must see a read-only state
and the backend must reject real changes explicitly.

Frontend:
- AccessPicker renders a static, non-interactive read-only state when the
  viewer is not the owner: the current access value + a lock affordance + a
  tooltip "Only the agent owner can change who can run this agent." No clickable
  trigger is rendered, so a non-owner can never open a control the backend would
  reject (the GitHub/Notion pattern for permission settings you can see but not
  edit). The editable multi-select picker is unchanged for the owner.
- agent-detail-inspector gates the picker on ownership specifically
  (currentUserId === agent.owner_id), NOT the general canEdit (which also admits
  admins, who may edit other fields but not access).
- New locale key access.owner_only_readonly (en/zh-Hans/ja/ko).

Backend:
- UpdateAgent now returns an explicit 403 when a non-owner submits a REAL
  permission change (permissionInputChangesAgent compares requested mode +
  target set against the persisted state); a no-op resubmit (admin PATCH-as-PUT
  echoing unchanged permission) is still tolerated so admin edits of other
  fields keep working. Replaces the previous silent-drop that caused the bounce.

Tests:
- access-picker.test.tsx: non-owner gets a non-interactive read-only display
  with the owner-only tooltip; owner gets an interactive picker; owner can pick
  a member and stack workspace + member.
- TestUpdateAgent_AccessChangeIsOwnerOnly: admin real change → 403; admin no-op
  resubmit → 200; admin editing other fields → 200; owner change → 200.

Incidental: fixed a pre-existing base typecheck break in
slash-command-suggestion.test.tsx (stray `signal` arg not in the suggestion
items type) that otherwise fails the whole @multica/views typecheck.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(agents): compare legacy visibility, not expanded permission, for no-op detection (MUL-3963)

PR #4853 review: permissionInputChangesAgent expanded a legacy-only
visibility:"private" into a real private permission and compared it against the
agent's actual permission. A member-only public_to agent derives legacy
visibility "private", so an admin PATCH-as-PUT echoing visibility:"private"
while editing another field was misread as a public_to→private downgrade and
rejected with 403 — contradicting the "unchanged permission no-op is allowed"
contract.

Fix (per review): when a request carries ONLY legacy `visibility` (no
permission_mode / invocation_targets), derive the agent's CURRENT legacy
visibility from its real targets and compare the legacy string values. Equal =
no-op (allowed); a real legacy change (e.g. "workspace") still returns 403.
Requests that carry permission_mode / invocation_targets keep the precise
mode+target comparison.

Regression test TestUpdateAgent_LegacyVisibilityNoOpForMemberOnlyPublicTo:
member-only public_to agent — admin submitting visibility:"private" + a
non-permission field → 200 with targets unchanged; admin submitting
visibility:"workspace" → 403.

Go handler/composio suites green; migration 130 applied; go vet clean.

Refs MUL-3963.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* feat(composio): brief agents on connected apps

* feat(composio): gate MCP apps behind feature flag

* fix(mobile): parse agent invocation permissions

* fix(tests): update agent fixtures for access fields

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: Multica Eve <eve@devv.ai>
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica.ai>
Co-authored-by: Eve <eve@multica-ai.local>
2026-07-03 14:18:43 +08:00

1125 lines
37 KiB
Go

// Code generated by sqlc. DO NOT EDIT.
// versions:
// sqlc v1.31.1
// source: runtime.sql
package db
import (
"context"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype"
)
const cancelAgentTasksByRuntimeOrAgent = `-- name: CancelAgentTasksByRuntimeOrAgent :many
UPDATE agent_task_queue
SET status = 'cancelled', completed_at = now()
WHERE (runtime_id = ANY($1::uuid[]) OR agent_id = ANY($2::uuid[]))
AND status IN ('queued', 'dispatched', 'running', 'waiting_local_directory')
RETURNING id, agent_id, issue_id, status, priority, dispatched_at, started_at, completed_at, result, error, created_at, context, runtime_id, session_id, work_dir, trigger_comment_id, chat_session_id, autopilot_run_id, attempt, max_attempts, parent_task_id, failure_reason, trigger_summary, force_fresh_session, is_leader_task, wait_reason, initiator_user_id, handoff_note, prepare_lease_expires_at, squad_id, runtime_mcp_overlay, escalation_for_task_id, fire_at, originator_user_id, runtime_connected_apps
`
type CancelAgentTasksByRuntimeOrAgentParams struct {
RuntimeIds []pgtype.UUID `json:"runtime_ids"`
AgentIds []pgtype.UUID `json:"agent_ids"`
}
// Cancels every active task that either lives on one of the given runtimes
// OR belongs to one of the given agents. Used by the member-revocation flow:
// the runtime-side covers tasks queued against the leaving member's runtimes;
// the agent-side covers tasks pinned to a different runtime that those agents
// left behind from a prior UpdateAgent (agent.runtime_id can change, but
// agent_task_queue.runtime_id does not get rewritten when it does, so a task
// queued on runtime A by agent X — later moved to runtime B — survives the
// runtime-only revoke and could still be claimed because ClaimAgentTask does
// not gate on agent.archived_at).
//
// We use 'cancelled' rather than 'failed' so the daemon's per-task status
// poller (watchTaskCancellation) interrupts the running agent gracefully.
// Returns the affected rows so the caller can broadcast task:cancelled and
// reconcile per-agent status.
func (q *Queries) CancelAgentTasksByRuntimeOrAgent(ctx context.Context, arg CancelAgentTasksByRuntimeOrAgentParams) ([]AgentTaskQueue, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, cancelAgentTasksByRuntimeOrAgent, arg.RuntimeIds, arg.AgentIds)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []AgentTaskQueue{}
for rows.Next() {
var i AgentTaskQueue
if err := rows.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.AgentID,
&i.IssueID,
&i.Status,
&i.Priority,
&i.DispatchedAt,
&i.StartedAt,
&i.CompletedAt,
&i.Result,
&i.Error,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.Context,
&i.RuntimeID,
&i.SessionID,
&i.WorkDir,
&i.TriggerCommentID,
&i.ChatSessionID,
&i.AutopilotRunID,
&i.Attempt,
&i.MaxAttempts,
&i.ParentTaskID,
&i.FailureReason,
&i.TriggerSummary,
&i.ForceFreshSession,
&i.IsLeaderTask,
&i.WaitReason,
&i.InitiatorUserID,
&i.HandoffNote,
&i.PrepareLeaseExpiresAt,
&i.SquadID,
&i.RuntimeMcpOverlay,
&i.EscalationForTaskID,
&i.FireAt,
&i.OriginatorUserID,
&i.RuntimeConnectedApps,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const countActiveAgentsByRuntime = `-- name: CountActiveAgentsByRuntime :one
SELECT count(*) FROM agent WHERE runtime_id = $1 AND archived_at IS NULL
`
func (q *Queries) CountActiveAgentsByRuntime(ctx context.Context, runtimeID pgtype.UUID) (int64, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, countActiveAgentsByRuntime, runtimeID)
var count int64
err := row.Scan(&count)
return count, err
}
const countActiveSquadsWithArchivedLeadersByRuntime = `-- name: CountActiveSquadsWithArchivedLeadersByRuntime :one
SELECT count(*)
FROM squad
WHERE archived_at IS NULL
AND leader_id IN (
SELECT id FROM agent WHERE runtime_id = $1 AND archived_at IS NOT NULL
)
`
func (q *Queries) CountActiveSquadsWithArchivedLeadersByRuntime(ctx context.Context, runtimeID pgtype.UUID) (int64, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, countActiveSquadsWithArchivedLeadersByRuntime, runtimeID)
var count int64
err := row.Scan(&count)
return count, err
}
const deleteAgentRuntime = `-- name: DeleteAgentRuntime :exec
DELETE FROM agent_runtime WHERE id = $1
`
func (q *Queries) DeleteAgentRuntime(ctx context.Context, id pgtype.UUID) error {
_, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, deleteAgentRuntime, id)
return err
}
const deleteArchivedAgentsByRuntime = `-- name: DeleteArchivedAgentsByRuntime :exec
DELETE FROM agent WHERE runtime_id = $1 AND archived_at IS NOT NULL
`
func (q *Queries) DeleteArchivedAgentsByRuntime(ctx context.Context, runtimeID pgtype.UUID) error {
_, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, deleteArchivedAgentsByRuntime, runtimeID)
return err
}
const deleteSquadsByArchivedAgentsOnRuntime = `-- name: DeleteSquadsByArchivedAgentsOnRuntime :exec
DELETE FROM squad
WHERE leader_id IN (
SELECT id FROM agent WHERE runtime_id = $1 AND archived_at IS NOT NULL
)
AND archived_at IS NOT NULL
`
// Removes archived squads whose leader_id references an archived agent on the
// given runtime. Must run before DeleteArchivedAgentsByRuntime so the RESTRICT
// FK on squad.leader_id does not block the agent deletion. Active squads are
// handled separately by CountActiveSquadsWithArchivedLeadersByRuntime, which
// returns a 409 until the caller archives them or assigns a new leader.
func (q *Queries) DeleteSquadsByArchivedAgentsOnRuntime(ctx context.Context, runtimeID pgtype.UUID) error {
_, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, deleteSquadsByArchivedAgentsOnRuntime, runtimeID)
return err
}
const deleteStaleOfflineRuntimes = `-- name: DeleteStaleOfflineRuntimes :many
DELETE FROM agent_runtime
WHERE status = 'offline'
AND last_seen_at < now() - make_interval(secs => $1::double precision)
AND id NOT IN (SELECT DISTINCT runtime_id FROM agent)
RETURNING id, workspace_id
`
type DeleteStaleOfflineRuntimesRow struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
}
// Deletes runtimes that have been offline for longer than the TTL and have
// no agents bound (active or archived). The FK constraint on agent.runtime_id
// is ON DELETE RESTRICT, so we must exclude all agent references.
func (q *Queries) DeleteStaleOfflineRuntimes(ctx context.Context, staleSeconds float64) ([]DeleteStaleOfflineRuntimesRow, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, deleteStaleOfflineRuntimes, staleSeconds)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []DeleteStaleOfflineRuntimesRow{}
for rows.Next() {
var i DeleteStaleOfflineRuntimesRow
if err := rows.Scan(&i.ID, &i.WorkspaceID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const failTasksForOfflineRuntimes = `-- name: FailTasksForOfflineRuntimes :many
UPDATE agent_task_queue
SET status = 'failed', completed_at = now(), error = 'runtime went offline',
failure_reason = 'runtime_offline',
wait_reason = NULL
WHERE status IN ('dispatched', 'running', 'waiting_local_directory')
AND runtime_id IN (
SELECT id FROM agent_runtime WHERE status = 'offline'
)
RETURNING id, agent_id, issue_id, status, priority, dispatched_at, started_at, completed_at, result, error, created_at, context, runtime_id, session_id, work_dir, trigger_comment_id, chat_session_id, autopilot_run_id, attempt, max_attempts, parent_task_id, failure_reason, trigger_summary, force_fresh_session, is_leader_task, wait_reason, initiator_user_id, handoff_note, prepare_lease_expires_at, squad_id, runtime_mcp_overlay, escalation_for_task_id, fire_at, originator_user_id, runtime_connected_apps
`
// Marks dispatched/running/waiting_local_directory tasks as failed when
// their runtime is offline. This cleans up orphaned tasks after a daemon
// crash or network partition.
func (q *Queries) FailTasksForOfflineRuntimes(ctx context.Context) ([]AgentTaskQueue, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, failTasksForOfflineRuntimes)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []AgentTaskQueue{}
for rows.Next() {
var i AgentTaskQueue
if err := rows.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.AgentID,
&i.IssueID,
&i.Status,
&i.Priority,
&i.DispatchedAt,
&i.StartedAt,
&i.CompletedAt,
&i.Result,
&i.Error,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.Context,
&i.RuntimeID,
&i.SessionID,
&i.WorkDir,
&i.TriggerCommentID,
&i.ChatSessionID,
&i.AutopilotRunID,
&i.Attempt,
&i.MaxAttempts,
&i.ParentTaskID,
&i.FailureReason,
&i.TriggerSummary,
&i.ForceFreshSession,
&i.IsLeaderTask,
&i.WaitReason,
&i.InitiatorUserID,
&i.HandoffNote,
&i.PrepareLeaseExpiresAt,
&i.SquadID,
&i.RuntimeMcpOverlay,
&i.EscalationForTaskID,
&i.FireAt,
&i.OriginatorUserID,
&i.RuntimeConnectedApps,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const findLegacyRuntimesByDaemonID = `-- name: FindLegacyRuntimesByDaemonID :many
SELECT id, workspace_id, daemon_id, name, runtime_mode, provider, status, device_info, metadata, last_seen_at, created_at, updated_at, owner_id, legacy_daemon_id, visibility, profile_id FROM agent_runtime
WHERE workspace_id = $1
AND provider = $2
AND LOWER(daemon_id) = LOWER($3)
`
type FindLegacyRuntimesByDaemonIDParams struct {
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
Provider string `json:"provider"`
DaemonID string `json:"daemon_id"`
}
// Looks up runtime rows keyed on a prior (hostname-derived) daemon_id. Used
// at register-time to find rows owned by the same machine under its old
// identity so agents/tasks can be re-pointed at the new UUID-keyed row.
//
// Comparison is case-insensitive because os.Hostname() has been observed to
// return different casings on the same machine (e.g. `Jiayuans-MacBook-Pro`
// vs `jiayuans-macbook-pro`) across reboots/mDNS state changes. A case-
// sensitive `=` would strand the old row; LOWER() on both sides handles drift
// without forcing the daemon to enumerate cased permutations.
//
// Returns many rather than one because case drift may have already minted
// duplicate rows historically (e.g. `Foo.local` AND `foo.local` under the
// same workspace+provider). A single-row lookup would consolidate only one
// of them and leave the rest orphaned. Callers must merge every returned
// row into the new UUID-keyed runtime.
func (q *Queries) FindLegacyRuntimesByDaemonID(ctx context.Context, arg FindLegacyRuntimesByDaemonIDParams) ([]AgentRuntime, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, findLegacyRuntimesByDaemonID, arg.WorkspaceID, arg.Provider, arg.DaemonID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []AgentRuntime{}
for rows.Next() {
var i AgentRuntime
if err := rows.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.DaemonID,
&i.Name,
&i.RuntimeMode,
&i.Provider,
&i.Status,
&i.DeviceInfo,
&i.Metadata,
&i.LastSeenAt,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.OwnerID,
&i.LegacyDaemonID,
&i.Visibility,
&i.ProfileID,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const forceOfflineRuntimesByIDs = `-- name: ForceOfflineRuntimesByIDs :many
UPDATE agent_runtime
SET status = 'offline', updated_at = now()
WHERE id = ANY($1::uuid[]) AND status = 'online'
RETURNING id, workspace_id, owner_id, daemon_id, provider
`
type ForceOfflineRuntimesByIDsRow struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
OwnerID pgtype.UUID `json:"owner_id"`
DaemonID pgtype.Text `json:"daemon_id"`
Provider string `json:"provider"`
}
// Unconditionally flips a known set of runtime IDs to offline. Distinct from
// MarkRuntimesOfflineByIDs (which keeps a stale-window predicate so the
// sweeper cannot demote a runtime that just heartbeated): this variant is
// used by intentional revocation paths — e.g. removing a workspace member —
// where the caller has already decided the runtime should be offline
// regardless of recent liveness.
func (q *Queries) ForceOfflineRuntimesByIDs(ctx context.Context, runtimeIds []pgtype.UUID) ([]ForceOfflineRuntimesByIDsRow, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, forceOfflineRuntimesByIDs, runtimeIds)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []ForceOfflineRuntimesByIDsRow{}
for rows.Next() {
var i ForceOfflineRuntimesByIDsRow
if err := rows.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.OwnerID,
&i.DaemonID,
&i.Provider,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const getAgentRuntime = `-- name: GetAgentRuntime :one
SELECT id, workspace_id, daemon_id, name, runtime_mode, provider, status, device_info, metadata, last_seen_at, created_at, updated_at, owner_id, legacy_daemon_id, visibility, profile_id FROM agent_runtime
WHERE id = $1
`
func (q *Queries) GetAgentRuntime(ctx context.Context, id pgtype.UUID) (AgentRuntime, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, getAgentRuntime, id)
var i AgentRuntime
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.DaemonID,
&i.Name,
&i.RuntimeMode,
&i.Provider,
&i.Status,
&i.DeviceInfo,
&i.Metadata,
&i.LastSeenAt,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.OwnerID,
&i.LegacyDaemonID,
&i.Visibility,
&i.ProfileID,
)
return i, err
}
const getAgentRuntimeForWorkspace = `-- name: GetAgentRuntimeForWorkspace :one
SELECT id, workspace_id, daemon_id, name, runtime_mode, provider, status, device_info, metadata, last_seen_at, created_at, updated_at, owner_id, legacy_daemon_id, visibility, profile_id FROM agent_runtime
WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2
`
type GetAgentRuntimeForWorkspaceParams struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
}
func (q *Queries) GetAgentRuntimeForWorkspace(ctx context.Context, arg GetAgentRuntimeForWorkspaceParams) (AgentRuntime, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, getAgentRuntimeForWorkspace, arg.ID, arg.WorkspaceID)
var i AgentRuntime
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.DaemonID,
&i.Name,
&i.RuntimeMode,
&i.Provider,
&i.Status,
&i.DeviceInfo,
&i.Metadata,
&i.LastSeenAt,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.OwnerID,
&i.LegacyDaemonID,
&i.Visibility,
&i.ProfileID,
)
return i, err
}
const listAgentRuntimes = `-- name: ListAgentRuntimes :many
SELECT id, workspace_id, daemon_id, name, runtime_mode, provider, status, device_info, metadata, last_seen_at, created_at, updated_at, owner_id, legacy_daemon_id, visibility, profile_id FROM agent_runtime
WHERE workspace_id = $1
ORDER BY created_at ASC
`
func (q *Queries) ListAgentRuntimes(ctx context.Context, workspaceID pgtype.UUID) ([]AgentRuntime, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, listAgentRuntimes, workspaceID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []AgentRuntime{}
for rows.Next() {
var i AgentRuntime
if err := rows.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.DaemonID,
&i.Name,
&i.RuntimeMode,
&i.Provider,
&i.Status,
&i.DeviceInfo,
&i.Metadata,
&i.LastSeenAt,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.OwnerID,
&i.LegacyDaemonID,
&i.Visibility,
&i.ProfileID,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const listAgentRuntimesByOwner = `-- name: ListAgentRuntimesByOwner :many
SELECT id, workspace_id, daemon_id, name, runtime_mode, provider, status, device_info, metadata, last_seen_at, created_at, updated_at, owner_id, legacy_daemon_id, visibility, profile_id FROM agent_runtime
WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND owner_id = $2
ORDER BY created_at ASC
`
type ListAgentRuntimesByOwnerParams struct {
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
OwnerID pgtype.UUID `json:"owner_id"`
}
func (q *Queries) ListAgentRuntimesByOwner(ctx context.Context, arg ListAgentRuntimesByOwnerParams) ([]AgentRuntime, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, listAgentRuntimesByOwner, arg.WorkspaceID, arg.OwnerID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []AgentRuntime{}
for rows.Next() {
var i AgentRuntime
if err := rows.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.DaemonID,
&i.Name,
&i.RuntimeMode,
&i.Provider,
&i.Status,
&i.DeviceInfo,
&i.Metadata,
&i.LastSeenAt,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.OwnerID,
&i.LegacyDaemonID,
&i.Visibility,
&i.ProfileID,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const listArchivedAgentIDsByRuntime = `-- name: ListArchivedAgentIDsByRuntime :many
SELECT id FROM agent WHERE runtime_id = $1 AND archived_at IS NOT NULL
`
// Companion to DeleteArchivedAgentsByRuntime: enumerates the archived agents
// about to be hard-deleted so the runtime teardown can pause autopilots that
// still point at them. Returns ids only — the caller only needs the set.
func (q *Queries) ListArchivedAgentIDsByRuntime(ctx context.Context, runtimeID pgtype.UUID) ([]pgtype.UUID, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, listArchivedAgentIDsByRuntime, runtimeID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []pgtype.UUID{}
for rows.Next() {
var id pgtype.UUID
if err := rows.Scan(&id); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, id)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const lockAgentRuntime = `-- name: LockAgentRuntime :one
SELECT id, workspace_id, daemon_id, name, runtime_mode, provider, status, device_info, metadata, last_seen_at, created_at, updated_at, owner_id, legacy_daemon_id, visibility, profile_id FROM agent_runtime
WHERE id = $1
FOR UPDATE
`
// Acquires a row-level exclusive lock on the runtime row. Used at the
// top of the cascade-delete transaction so that:
// 1. PostgreSQL's FK validation on agent.runtime_id (FK ... ON DELETE
// RESTRICT) needs FOR KEY SHARE on the parent runtime row, which
// conflicts with FOR UPDATE — so any concurrent INSERT or UPDATE
// that would point a new/moved agent at this runtime blocks until
// our transaction finishes; and
// 2. concurrent UPDATE/DELETE of the runtime row itself (e.g. another
// delete attempt) waits for us to commit.
//
// Combined with ListActiveAgentsByRuntimeForUpdate (which row-locks the
// existing active set) this closes the plan-compare → archive race that
// was possible at read-committed isolation between the snapshot and the
// bulk archive.
func (q *Queries) LockAgentRuntime(ctx context.Context, id pgtype.UUID) (AgentRuntime, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, lockAgentRuntime, id)
var i AgentRuntime
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.DaemonID,
&i.Name,
&i.RuntimeMode,
&i.Provider,
&i.Status,
&i.DeviceInfo,
&i.Metadata,
&i.LastSeenAt,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.OwnerID,
&i.LegacyDaemonID,
&i.Visibility,
&i.ProfileID,
)
return i, err
}
const markAgentRuntimeOnline = `-- name: MarkAgentRuntimeOnline :one
UPDATE agent_runtime
SET status = 'online', last_seen_at = now(), updated_at = now()
WHERE id = $1
RETURNING id, workspace_id, daemon_id, name, runtime_mode, provider, status, device_info, metadata, last_seen_at, created_at, updated_at, owner_id, legacy_daemon_id, visibility, profile_id
`
// Used on the offline→online transition (and on first heartbeat after
// registration). Writes status, last_seen_at, and updated_at because the
// status flip is a real state change and we want updated_at to reflect it.
func (q *Queries) MarkAgentRuntimeOnline(ctx context.Context, id pgtype.UUID) (AgentRuntime, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, markAgentRuntimeOnline, id)
var i AgentRuntime
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.DaemonID,
&i.Name,
&i.RuntimeMode,
&i.Provider,
&i.Status,
&i.DeviceInfo,
&i.Metadata,
&i.LastSeenAt,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.OwnerID,
&i.LegacyDaemonID,
&i.Visibility,
&i.ProfileID,
)
return i, err
}
const markRuntimesOfflineByIDs = `-- name: MarkRuntimesOfflineByIDs :many
UPDATE agent_runtime
SET status = 'offline', updated_at = now()
WHERE status = 'online'
AND id = ANY($1::uuid[])
AND last_seen_at < now() - make_interval(secs => $2::double precision)
RETURNING id, workspace_id, owner_id, daemon_id, provider
`
type MarkRuntimesOfflineByIDsParams struct {
Ids []pgtype.UUID `json:"ids"`
StaleSeconds float64 `json:"stale_seconds"`
}
type MarkRuntimesOfflineByIDsRow struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
OwnerID pgtype.UUID `json:"owner_id"`
DaemonID pgtype.Text `json:"daemon_id"`
Provider string `json:"provider"`
}
// Flips a known set of runtime IDs from online to offline. Paired with
// SelectStaleOnlineRuntimes in the sweeper so the candidate selection and
// the actual write are decoupled (the LivenessStore filter sits between).
//
// Re-checks the stale predicate inside the UPDATE so a concurrent heartbeat
// between the SELECT (candidate gather), the LivenessStore filter, and this
// UPDATE cannot demote a runtime that just refreshed last_seen_at. The
// legacy MarkStaleRuntimesOffline UPDATE had this property implicitly
// because the predicate and the write lived in one statement; here we
// carry it forward explicitly so the SELECT/filter/UPDATE pipeline retains
// the same race-freedom.
func (q *Queries) MarkRuntimesOfflineByIDs(ctx context.Context, arg MarkRuntimesOfflineByIDsParams) ([]MarkRuntimesOfflineByIDsRow, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, markRuntimesOfflineByIDs, arg.Ids, arg.StaleSeconds)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []MarkRuntimesOfflineByIDsRow{}
for rows.Next() {
var i MarkRuntimesOfflineByIDsRow
if err := rows.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.OwnerID,
&i.DaemonID,
&i.Provider,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const pauseAutopilotsByAgentAssignees = `-- name: PauseAutopilotsByAgentAssignees :exec
UPDATE autopilot
SET status = 'paused', updated_at = now()
WHERE status = 'active'
AND assignee_type = 'agent'
AND assignee_id = ANY($1::uuid[])
`
// Pauses every active autopilot whose agent assignee is in the supplied list.
// Called before hard-deleting archived agents on runtime teardown so the rows
// do not become dangling (autopilot.assignee_id no longer has an agent FK
// since migration 096). Status='paused' makes the breakage visible in the UI
// — operators can re-point the autopilot at a live agent or delete it —
// rather than silently piling skipped runs.
func (q *Queries) PauseAutopilotsByAgentAssignees(ctx context.Context, assigneeIds []pgtype.UUID) error {
_, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, pauseAutopilotsByAgentAssignees, assigneeIds)
return err
}
const reassignAgentsToRuntime = `-- name: ReassignAgentsToRuntime :execrows
UPDATE agent
SET runtime_id = $1
WHERE runtime_id = $2
`
type ReassignAgentsToRuntimeParams struct {
NewRuntimeID pgtype.UUID `json:"new_runtime_id"`
OldRuntimeID pgtype.UUID `json:"old_runtime_id"`
}
// Re-points every agent referencing old_runtime_id at new_runtime_id.
func (q *Queries) ReassignAgentsToRuntime(ctx context.Context, arg ReassignAgentsToRuntimeParams) (int64, error) {
result, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, reassignAgentsToRuntime, arg.NewRuntimeID, arg.OldRuntimeID)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return result.RowsAffected(), nil
}
const reassignTasksToRuntime = `-- name: ReassignTasksToRuntime :execrows
UPDATE agent_task_queue
SET runtime_id = $1
WHERE runtime_id = $2
`
type ReassignTasksToRuntimeParams struct {
NewRuntimeID pgtype.UUID `json:"new_runtime_id"`
OldRuntimeID pgtype.UUID `json:"old_runtime_id"`
}
// Re-points every queued/running/completed task referencing old_runtime_id.
// Required before deleting the old runtime row because agent_task_queue has
// an ON DELETE CASCADE FK that would otherwise drop historical tasks.
func (q *Queries) ReassignTasksToRuntime(ctx context.Context, arg ReassignTasksToRuntimeParams) (int64, error) {
result, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, reassignTasksToRuntime, arg.NewRuntimeID, arg.OldRuntimeID)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return result.RowsAffected(), nil
}
const recordRuntimeLegacyDaemonID = `-- name: RecordRuntimeLegacyDaemonID :exec
UPDATE agent_runtime
SET legacy_daemon_id = COALESCE(legacy_daemon_id, $2)
WHERE id = $1
`
type RecordRuntimeLegacyDaemonIDParams struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
LegacyDaemonID pgtype.Text `json:"legacy_daemon_id"`
}
// Remembers the most recent hostname-derived daemon_id that was merged into
// this row. Useful for debugging when tracing back why a given runtime row
// subsumed an old one, and only overwrites NULL so the earliest merge is
// preserved.
func (q *Queries) RecordRuntimeLegacyDaemonID(ctx context.Context, arg RecordRuntimeLegacyDaemonIDParams) error {
_, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, recordRuntimeLegacyDaemonID, arg.ID, arg.LegacyDaemonID)
return err
}
const selectStaleOnlineRuntimes = `-- name: SelectStaleOnlineRuntimes :many
SELECT id, workspace_id, owner_id, daemon_id, provider FROM agent_runtime
WHERE status = 'online'
AND last_seen_at < now() - make_interval(secs => $1::double precision)
`
type SelectStaleOnlineRuntimesRow struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
OwnerID pgtype.UUID `json:"owner_id"`
DaemonID pgtype.Text `json:"daemon_id"`
Provider string `json:"provider"`
}
// Lists online runtimes whose last_seen_at exceeds the stale window. The
// sweeper uses this as a candidate set, then optionally filters via the
// LivenessStore before flipping rows to offline (a fresh Redis liveness
// record means the DB row is just lagging, not actually dead).
func (q *Queries) SelectStaleOnlineRuntimes(ctx context.Context, staleSeconds float64) ([]SelectStaleOnlineRuntimesRow, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, selectStaleOnlineRuntimes, staleSeconds)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []SelectStaleOnlineRuntimesRow{}
for rows.Next() {
var i SelectStaleOnlineRuntimesRow
if err := rows.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.OwnerID,
&i.DaemonID,
&i.Provider,
); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, i)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const setAgentRuntimeOffline = `-- name: SetAgentRuntimeOffline :exec
UPDATE agent_runtime
SET status = 'offline', updated_at = now()
WHERE id = $1
`
func (q *Queries) SetAgentRuntimeOffline(ctx context.Context, id pgtype.UUID) error {
_, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, setAgentRuntimeOffline, id)
return err
}
const touchAgentRuntimeLastSeen = `-- name: TouchAgentRuntimeLastSeen :execrows
UPDATE agent_runtime
SET last_seen_at = now()
WHERE id = $1 AND status = 'online'
`
// Bumps last_seen_at on an already-online runtime. Deliberately does NOT
// touch status or updated_at: status is unchanged on the hot heartbeat path,
// and avoiding updated_at keeps the row HOT-eligible (no index columns
// change) and avoids invalidating any downstream consumer that watches
// updated_at.
//
// The status='online' predicate is load-bearing: callers read rt.Status from
// a prior SELECT and may race with the sweeper, which can flip the row to
// offline between that SELECT and this UPDATE. Without the predicate this
// query would silently leave a freshly-heartbeated runtime stuck in offline.
// Returning affected rows lets callers detect that race and fall back to
// MarkAgentRuntimeOnline to flip the row back online.
func (q *Queries) TouchAgentRuntimeLastSeen(ctx context.Context, id pgtype.UUID) (int64, error) {
result, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, touchAgentRuntimeLastSeen, id)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return result.RowsAffected(), nil
}
const touchAgentRuntimesLastSeenBatch = `-- name: TouchAgentRuntimesLastSeenBatch :execrows
UPDATE agent_runtime
SET last_seen_at = now()
WHERE id = ANY($1::uuid[]) AND status = 'online'
`
// Bulk variant of TouchAgentRuntimeLastSeen used by the BatchedHeartbeatScheduler:
// coalesces N per-runtime "bump last_seen_at" requests into a single UPDATE so a
// fleet beating every 15s costs ~1 DB transaction per batch tick instead of N.
//
// Same load-bearing predicate as the single-id form: status='online' avoids
// silently un-deleting a sweeper-flipped offline row, and we deliberately do
// NOT touch updated_at so the rows stay HOT-eligible. Affected-rows < len(ids)
// means some IDs raced to offline between Schedule and flush; their next beat
// will fall through the recordHeartbeat sync path and call MarkAgentRuntimeOnline.
func (q *Queries) TouchAgentRuntimesLastSeenBatch(ctx context.Context, ids []pgtype.UUID) (int64, error) {
result, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, touchAgentRuntimesLastSeenBatch, ids)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return result.RowsAffected(), nil
}
const updateAgentRuntimeVisibility = `-- name: UpdateAgentRuntimeVisibility :one
UPDATE agent_runtime
SET visibility = $1, updated_at = now()
WHERE id = $2
RETURNING id, workspace_id, daemon_id, name, runtime_mode, provider, status, device_info, metadata, last_seen_at, created_at, updated_at, owner_id, legacy_daemon_id, visibility, profile_id
`
type UpdateAgentRuntimeVisibilityParams struct {
Visibility string `json:"visibility"`
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
}
// Toggles a runtime between 'private' (only owner can bind agents) and
// 'public' (any workspace member can). Default for new rows is 'private'
// (see migration 083). Gated at the handler layer to owner / workspace
// admin only.
func (q *Queries) UpdateAgentRuntimeVisibility(ctx context.Context, arg UpdateAgentRuntimeVisibilityParams) (AgentRuntime, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, updateAgentRuntimeVisibility, arg.Visibility, arg.ID)
var i AgentRuntime
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.DaemonID,
&i.Name,
&i.RuntimeMode,
&i.Provider,
&i.Status,
&i.DeviceInfo,
&i.Metadata,
&i.LastSeenAt,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.OwnerID,
&i.LegacyDaemonID,
&i.Visibility,
&i.ProfileID,
)
return i, err
}
const upsertAgentRuntime = `-- name: UpsertAgentRuntime :one
INSERT INTO agent_runtime (
workspace_id,
daemon_id,
name,
runtime_mode,
provider,
status,
device_info,
metadata,
owner_id,
last_seen_at
) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, now())
ON CONFLICT (workspace_id, daemon_id, provider) WHERE profile_id IS NULL
DO UPDATE SET
name = EXCLUDED.name,
runtime_mode = EXCLUDED.runtime_mode,
status = EXCLUDED.status,
device_info = EXCLUDED.device_info,
metadata = EXCLUDED.metadata,
owner_id = COALESCE(EXCLUDED.owner_id, agent_runtime.owner_id),
last_seen_at = now(),
updated_at = now()
RETURNING id, workspace_id, daemon_id, name, runtime_mode, provider, status, device_info, metadata, last_seen_at, created_at, updated_at, owner_id, legacy_daemon_id, visibility, profile_id, (xmax = 0) AS inserted
`
type UpsertAgentRuntimeParams struct {
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
DaemonID pgtype.Text `json:"daemon_id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
RuntimeMode string `json:"runtime_mode"`
Provider string `json:"provider"`
Status string `json:"status"`
DeviceInfo string `json:"device_info"`
Metadata []byte `json:"metadata"`
OwnerID pgtype.UUID `json:"owner_id"`
}
type UpsertAgentRuntimeRow struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
DaemonID pgtype.Text `json:"daemon_id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
RuntimeMode string `json:"runtime_mode"`
Provider string `json:"provider"`
Status string `json:"status"`
DeviceInfo string `json:"device_info"`
Metadata []byte `json:"metadata"`
LastSeenAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"last_seen_at"`
CreatedAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"updated_at"`
OwnerID pgtype.UUID `json:"owner_id"`
LegacyDaemonID pgtype.Text `json:"legacy_daemon_id"`
Visibility string `json:"visibility"`
ProfileID pgtype.UUID `json:"profile_id"`
Inserted bool `json:"inserted"`
}
// (xmax = 0) AS inserted distinguishes a fresh insert (true) from an upsert
// that updated an existing row (false). Analytics reads this to fire
// runtime_registered/runtime_ready only on first-time registration.
// Built-in runtimes carry no profile_id. The arbiter is the partial unique
// index from migration 121 (WHERE profile_id IS NULL); the predicate must be
// spelled out so Postgres selects that partial index, not the custom-runtime
// one on (workspace_id, daemon_id, profile_id).
func (q *Queries) UpsertAgentRuntime(ctx context.Context, arg UpsertAgentRuntimeParams) (UpsertAgentRuntimeRow, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, upsertAgentRuntime,
arg.WorkspaceID,
arg.DaemonID,
arg.Name,
arg.RuntimeMode,
arg.Provider,
arg.Status,
arg.DeviceInfo,
arg.Metadata,
arg.OwnerID,
)
var i UpsertAgentRuntimeRow
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.DaemonID,
&i.Name,
&i.RuntimeMode,
&i.Provider,
&i.Status,
&i.DeviceInfo,
&i.Metadata,
&i.LastSeenAt,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.OwnerID,
&i.LegacyDaemonID,
&i.Visibility,
&i.ProfileID,
&i.Inserted,
)
return i, err
}
const upsertAgentRuntimeWithProfile = `-- name: UpsertAgentRuntimeWithProfile :one
INSERT INTO agent_runtime (
workspace_id,
daemon_id,
name,
runtime_mode,
provider,
status,
device_info,
metadata,
owner_id,
profile_id,
last_seen_at
) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, now())
ON CONFLICT (workspace_id, daemon_id, profile_id) WHERE profile_id IS NOT NULL
DO UPDATE SET
name = EXCLUDED.name,
runtime_mode = EXCLUDED.runtime_mode,
provider = EXCLUDED.provider,
status = EXCLUDED.status,
device_info = EXCLUDED.device_info,
metadata = EXCLUDED.metadata,
owner_id = COALESCE(EXCLUDED.owner_id, agent_runtime.owner_id),
last_seen_at = now(),
updated_at = now()
RETURNING id, workspace_id, daemon_id, name, runtime_mode, provider, status, device_info, metadata, last_seen_at, created_at, updated_at, owner_id, legacy_daemon_id, visibility, profile_id, (xmax = 0) AS inserted
`
type UpsertAgentRuntimeWithProfileParams struct {
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
DaemonID pgtype.Text `json:"daemon_id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
RuntimeMode string `json:"runtime_mode"`
Provider string `json:"provider"`
Status string `json:"status"`
DeviceInfo string `json:"device_info"`
Metadata []byte `json:"metadata"`
OwnerID pgtype.UUID `json:"owner_id"`
ProfileID pgtype.UUID `json:"profile_id"`
}
type UpsertAgentRuntimeWithProfileRow struct {
ID pgtype.UUID `json:"id"`
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
DaemonID pgtype.Text `json:"daemon_id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
RuntimeMode string `json:"runtime_mode"`
Provider string `json:"provider"`
Status string `json:"status"`
DeviceInfo string `json:"device_info"`
Metadata []byte `json:"metadata"`
LastSeenAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"last_seen_at"`
CreatedAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"updated_at"`
OwnerID pgtype.UUID `json:"owner_id"`
LegacyDaemonID pgtype.Text `json:"legacy_daemon_id"`
Visibility string `json:"visibility"`
ProfileID pgtype.UUID `json:"profile_id"`
Inserted bool `json:"inserted"`
}
// Custom-runtime registration: a daemon resolved a workspace runtime_profile's
// command_name on PATH and is registering an instance of it. The arbiter is the
// partial unique index from migration 120 (WHERE profile_id IS NOT NULL), so a
// single daemon can host the built-in provider AND any number of custom
// profiles of the same protocol family. provider stays the protocol family so
// task routing (agent.New(provider)) is unchanged; profile_id is the stable
// identity. (xmax = 0) AS inserted mirrors UpsertAgentRuntime.
func (q *Queries) UpsertAgentRuntimeWithProfile(ctx context.Context, arg UpsertAgentRuntimeWithProfileParams) (UpsertAgentRuntimeWithProfileRow, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, upsertAgentRuntimeWithProfile,
arg.WorkspaceID,
arg.DaemonID,
arg.Name,
arg.RuntimeMode,
arg.Provider,
arg.Status,
arg.DeviceInfo,
arg.Metadata,
arg.OwnerID,
arg.ProfileID,
)
var i UpsertAgentRuntimeWithProfileRow
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.DaemonID,
&i.Name,
&i.RuntimeMode,
&i.Provider,
&i.Status,
&i.DeviceInfo,
&i.Metadata,
&i.LastSeenAt,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.UpdatedAt,
&i.OwnerID,
&i.LegacyDaemonID,
&i.Visibility,
&i.ProfileID,
&i.Inserted,
)
return i, err
}