Files
multica/packages/core/permissions/rules.test.ts
Bohan Jiang 63d215e1c3 feat(runtime): visibility (public/private) gate on CreateAgent / UpdateAgent (#2419)
* feat(runtime): visibility (public/private) gate on CreateAgent / UpdateAgent

Closes the hole where a plain workspace member could pick another member's
runtime in the Create Agent dialog and bind an agent to it — the backend
wasn't checking runtime ownership, so the agent ran on someone else's
hardware / tokens. Reported on GH #1804.

Schema
- Migration 083 adds agent_runtime.visibility ('private' default, 'public')
  with a CHECK constraint. Existing rows default to private — same
  ownership semantics as before, no behavior change for legacy data.

Backend
- canUseRuntimeForAgent predicate: allow when caller is workspace
  owner/admin, the runtime owner, or the runtime is public.
- CreateAgent and UpdateAgent both gate on it: UpdateAgent matters because
  a plain member could otherwise create on their own runtime, then re-bind
  to a private one.
- PATCH /api/runtimes/:id accepts { visibility } — owner/admin only,
  validated against the same private/public allow-list.

Frontend
- Create-agent dialog renders other-owned private runtimes disabled with a
  Lock badge + tooltip explaining who to ask.
- Inspector runtime-picker disables the same set so re-binding fails
  the same way at the UI layer.
- Runtime detail diagnostics gains a Visibility editor (owner/admin) or
  read-only chip (everyone else).
- Runtime list shows a private/public chip next to the name.

Tests
- Go: canUseRuntimeForAgent truth table; CreateAgent / UpdateAgent
  end-to-end gate tests (admin / runtime owner / plain member);
  PATCH visibility owner / admin / member / invalid-value coverage.
- Vitest: create-agent dialog disabled state on private/public runtimes,
  default-runtime selection skips locked rows; runtime detail visibility
  editor → mutation, read-only fallback.

Migrating runtimes: existing rows default to private to preserve the
"owner only" status quo. Owners switch to public via the detail page
diagnostics card.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

* fix(runtime): apply timezone+visibility atomically; don't seed locked template runtime

Two issues surfaced in review of MUL-2062:

1. PATCH /api/runtimes/:id ran the timezone branch first, which:
   - returned early on a tz no-op, silently dropping a concurrent
     `visibility` patch in the same body;
   - committed the timezone mutation (+ usage rollup rebuild) before
     validating visibility, so an invalid visibility left the row
     half-updated.

   Validate every field first, then run the mutations in order. The
   no-op short-circuit now only triggers when nothing else is requested.

2. The Create Agent dialog in duplicate mode unconditionally seeded
   `template.runtime_id` as the selected runtime, even when that runtime
   is now private and owned by someone else — the user saw a selected
   row they couldn't submit (Create → backend 403). Fall back to the
   first usable runtime when the template's runtime is locked, and gate
   the Create button on `selectedRuntimeLocked` as defense in depth.

Tests:
- Go: TestUpdateAgentRuntime_CombinedPatchAppliesBoth (tz no-op +
  visibility flip), TestUpdateAgentRuntime_InvalidVisibilityDoesNotMutateTimezone
  (atomic-fail invariant).
- Vitest: duplicate template pointing at a locked runtime now seeds
  the first usable one; Create button stays disabled when no usable
  alternative exists.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <github@multica.ai>
2026-05-11 22:53:07 +08:00

335 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import type { Agent, Comment, Member, RuntimeDevice, Skill } from "../types";
import {
canAssignAgentToIssue,
canChangeMemberRole,
canDeleteComment,
canDeleteRuntime,
canDeleteSkill,
canDeleteWorkspace,
canEditAgent,
canEditComment,
canEditSkill,
canManageMembers,
canUpdateWorkspaceSettings,
} from "./rules";
const ALICE = "user-alice";
const BOB = "user-bob";
function makeAgent(overrides: Partial<Agent> = {}): Agent {
return {
id: "agt_1",
workspace_id: "ws_1",
runtime_id: "rt_1",
name: "agent",
description: "",
instructions: "",
avatar_url: null,
runtime_mode: "local",
runtime_config: {},
custom_env: {},
custom_args: [],
custom_env_redacted: false,
visibility: "workspace",
status: "idle",
max_concurrent_tasks: 1,
model: "default",
owner_id: ALICE,
skills: [],
created_at: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
updated_at: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
archived_at: null,
archived_by: null,
...overrides,
};
}
function makeSkill(createdBy: string | null): Skill {
return {
id: "skl_1",
workspace_id: "ws_1",
name: "skill",
description: "",
content: "",
config: {},
files: [],
created_by: createdBy,
created_at: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
updated_at: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
};
}
function makeComment(overrides: Partial<Comment> = {}): Comment {
return {
id: "cmt_1",
issue_id: "iss_1",
author_type: "member",
author_id: ALICE,
content: "hi",
type: "comment",
parent_id: null,
reactions: [],
attachments: [],
created_at: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
updated_at: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
resolved_at: null,
resolved_by_type: null,
resolved_by_id: null,
...overrides,
};
}
function makeRuntime(ownerId: string | null): RuntimeDevice {
return {
id: "rt_1",
workspace_id: "ws_1",
daemon_id: null,
name: "runtime",
runtime_mode: "local",
provider: "anthropic",
launch_header: "",
status: "online",
device_info: "",
metadata: {},
owner_id: ownerId,
visibility: "private",
timezone: "UTC",
last_seen_at: null,
created_at: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
updated_at: "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z",
};
}
describe("canEditAgent", () => {
const agent = makeAgent({ owner_id: ALICE });
it("allows the owner", () => {
expect(canEditAgent(agent, { userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed).toBe(
true,
);
});
it("allows workspace owner", () => {
expect(canEditAgent(agent, { userId: BOB, role: "owner" }).allowed).toBe(
true,
);
});
it("allows workspace admin", () => {
expect(canEditAgent(agent, { userId: BOB, role: "admin" }).allowed).toBe(
true,
);
});
it("denies non-owner member", () => {
const d = canEditAgent(agent, { userId: BOB, role: "member" });
expect(d.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(d.reason).toBe("not_resource_owner");
});
it("denies when userId is null", () => {
const d = canEditAgent(agent, { userId: null, role: null });
expect(d.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(d.reason).toBe("not_authenticated");
});
it("denies when agent owner_id is null and user is plain member", () => {
const orphan = makeAgent({ owner_id: null });
expect(
canEditAgent(orphan, { userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed,
).toBe(false);
});
it("admin can still edit an orphan (owner_id null) agent", () => {
const orphan = makeAgent({ owner_id: null });
expect(canEditAgent(orphan, { userId: BOB, role: "admin" }).allowed).toBe(
true,
);
});
});
describe("canAssignAgentToIssue", () => {
it("allows any member to assign workspace-visibility agents", () => {
const a = makeAgent({ visibility: "workspace", owner_id: ALICE });
expect(
canAssignAgentToIssue(a, { userId: BOB, role: "member" }).allowed,
).toBe(true);
});
it("denies non-members from assigning workspace agents", () => {
const a = makeAgent({ visibility: "workspace", owner_id: ALICE });
const d = canAssignAgentToIssue(a, { userId: BOB, role: null });
expect(d.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(d.reason).toBe("not_member");
});
it("allows the owner to assign their private agent", () => {
const a = makeAgent({ visibility: "private", owner_id: ALICE });
expect(
canAssignAgentToIssue(a, { userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed,
).toBe(true);
});
it("allows workspace admin to assign someone else's private agent", () => {
const a = makeAgent({ visibility: "private", owner_id: ALICE });
expect(
canAssignAgentToIssue(a, { userId: BOB, role: "admin" }).allowed,
).toBe(true);
});
it("denies a plain member from assigning someone else's private agent", () => {
const a = makeAgent({ visibility: "private", owner_id: ALICE });
const d = canAssignAgentToIssue(a, { userId: BOB, role: "member" });
expect(d.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(d.reason).toBe("private_visibility");
});
it("denies logged-out users", () => {
const a = makeAgent({ visibility: "workspace" });
const d = canAssignAgentToIssue(a, { userId: null, role: null });
expect(d.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(d.reason).toBe("not_authenticated");
});
});
describe("canEditSkill / canDeleteSkill", () => {
const skill = makeSkill(ALICE);
it("allows admins", () => {
expect(canEditSkill(skill, { userId: BOB, role: "admin" }).allowed).toBe(
true,
);
});
it("allows the creator", () => {
expect(canEditSkill(skill, { userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed)
.toBe(true);
});
it("denies non-creator member", () => {
expect(canEditSkill(skill, { userId: BOB, role: "member" }).allowed)
.toBe(false);
});
it("denies when created_by is null and user is plain member", () => {
expect(
canEditSkill(makeSkill(null), { userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed,
).toBe(false);
});
it("canDeleteSkill mirrors canEditSkill", () => {
expect(canDeleteSkill(skill, { userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed)
.toBe(true);
expect(canDeleteSkill(skill, { userId: BOB, role: "member" }).allowed)
.toBe(false);
});
});
describe("canEditComment / canDeleteComment", () => {
it("allows the author to edit their own comment", () => {
const c = makeComment({ author_id: ALICE });
expect(canEditComment(c, { userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed).toBe(
true,
);
});
it("allows workspace admin to edit someone else's comment", () => {
const c = makeComment({ author_id: ALICE });
expect(canEditComment(c, { userId: BOB, role: "admin" }).allowed).toBe(
true,
);
});
it("denies non-author non-admin", () => {
const c = makeComment({ author_id: ALICE });
expect(canEditComment(c, { userId: BOB, role: "member" }).allowed).toBe(
false,
);
});
it("denies edit on agent-authored comments", () => {
const c = makeComment({ author_type: "agent", author_id: "agt_1" });
const d = canEditComment(c, { userId: BOB, role: "owner" });
expect(d.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(d.reason).toBe("not_resource_owner");
});
it("admin CAN delete an agent-authored comment", () => {
// delete is broader than edit — admins moderate any comment regardless of
// author type. Mirrors backend `comment.go:507-512`.
const c = makeComment({ author_type: "agent", author_id: "agt_1" });
expect(canDeleteComment(c, { userId: BOB, role: "admin" }).allowed).toBe(
true,
);
});
it("denies plain member from deleting agent-authored comment", () => {
const c = makeComment({ author_type: "agent", author_id: "agt_1" });
expect(
canDeleteComment(c, { userId: BOB, role: "member" }).allowed,
).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("canDeleteRuntime", () => {
it("allows the owner", () => {
const r = makeRuntime(ALICE);
expect(canDeleteRuntime(r, { userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed)
.toBe(true);
});
it("allows workspace admin", () => {
const r = makeRuntime(ALICE);
expect(canDeleteRuntime(r, { userId: BOB, role: "admin" }).allowed).toBe(
true,
);
});
it("denies non-owner non-admin", () => {
const r = makeRuntime(ALICE);
expect(canDeleteRuntime(r, { userId: BOB, role: "member" }).allowed)
.toBe(false);
});
});
describe("workspace-level rules", () => {
it("only owner can delete workspace", () => {
expect(canDeleteWorkspace({ userId: ALICE, role: "owner" }).allowed).toBe(
true,
);
expect(canDeleteWorkspace({ userId: ALICE, role: "admin" }).allowed).toBe(
false,
);
expect(canDeleteWorkspace({ userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed)
.toBe(false);
});
it("owner+admin can update settings, member cannot", () => {
expect(
canUpdateWorkspaceSettings({ userId: ALICE, role: "owner" }).allowed,
).toBe(true);
expect(
canUpdateWorkspaceSettings({ userId: ALICE, role: "admin" }).allowed,
).toBe(true);
expect(
canUpdateWorkspaceSettings({ userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed,
).toBe(false);
});
it("manage members same gate as settings", () => {
expect(canManageMembers({ userId: ALICE, role: "admin" }).allowed).toBe(
true,
);
expect(canManageMembers({ userId: ALICE, role: "member" }).allowed).toBe(
false,
);
});
});
describe("canChangeMemberRole", () => {
const ctxOwner = { userId: ALICE, role: "owner" as const };
const ctxAdmin = { userId: ALICE, role: "admin" as const };
const ctxMember = { userId: ALICE, role: "member" as const };
const targetOwner: Pick<Member, "role"> = { role: "owner" };
const targetAdmin: Pick<Member, "role"> = { role: "admin" };
const targetMember: Pick<Member, "role"> = { role: "member" };
it("non-managers cannot change roles", () => {
expect(canChangeMemberRole(targetMember, 2, ctxMember).allowed).toBe(false);
});
it("admin cannot change owner's role", () => {
const d = canChangeMemberRole(targetOwner, 2, ctxAdmin);
expect(d.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(d.reason).toBe("not_owner_role");
});
it("admin can change admin/member roles", () => {
expect(canChangeMemberRole(targetAdmin, 1, ctxAdmin).allowed).toBe(true);
expect(canChangeMemberRole(targetMember, 1, ctxAdmin).allowed).toBe(true);
});
it("owner cannot demote the last owner", () => {
const d = canChangeMemberRole(targetOwner, 1, ctxOwner);
expect(d.allowed).toBe(false);
expect(d.reason).toBe("last_owner");
});
it("owner can change owner role when 2+ owners exist", () => {
expect(canChangeMemberRole(targetOwner, 2, ctxOwner).allowed).toBe(true);
});
});