Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#34931: validation: abort on DB unreadable coins instead of treating them as missing

75f64e50c6 test: exercise node abort on UTXO deserialization failure (furszy)
4652cd0d82 txdb: detect UTXO deserialization errors via CDBWrapper::TryRead() (furszy)
5dfbb91b6c dbwrapper: add TryRead() to distinguish errors from valid outcomes (furszy)
f78834fac9 test: add missing coverage for CDBWrapper::Read() errors (furszy)

Pull request description:

  Early note: the majority of this PR consists of test coverage. The changes per se are small.

  If a UTXO entry on disk can't be deserialized, the node currently treats it as if the coin
  wouldn't exist instead of aborting with an error. A non-existing coin has a very specific
  meaning for consensus: any block that spends it would be permanently rejected as invalid
  (`BLOCK_FAILED_VALID`), silently forking the node from the rest of the network. This can't
  currently be triggered in practice (details below), but it's still the wrong behavior.

  The root cause is that `CDBWrapper::Read()` returns `false` for both missing entries and
  deserialization failures, so `CCoinsViewDB::GetCoin()` has no way to tell them apart.
  `CCoinsViewErrorCatcher` was built to catch database read errors and abort, but it never
  fires during deserialization errors because `CDBWrapper::Read()` swallows the exception
  before it can propagate. This [comment](8a8edc8d88/src/coins.cpp (L398-L411)) in `ExecuteBackedWrapper()` spells out the code
  intent very clearly.

  As mentioned initially, this can't happen in practice today. It would require either a bug
  in the coin serialization path, or a memory corruption before the data reaches LevelDB
  (at which point we have bigger problems). Random disk-level bit flips are caught earlier
  by LevelDB's verification (`verify_checksums=true`, enabled by default), which already
  propagates correctly as `DB_INTERNAL_ERROR`. Regardless, a db read issue should
  never be silently misinterpreted as a consensus violation.

  This PR adds `CDBWrapper::TryRead()`, which returns a `ReadStatus` that lets callers
  discriminate between all possible outcomes. `CCoinsViewDB::GetCoin()` switches on the
  result and throws on any error, letting `ExecuteBackedWrapper()` do what it was designed
  to do. `CDBWrapper::Read()` becomes a thin wrapper over `TryRead()`, preserving backward
  compatibility for all other callers (so we don't have to change non-consensus code here).
  `PeekCoin()` is also covered, as it delegates to `CCoinsViewDB::GetCoin()` at the database
  level.

  The idea of the PR is to go slowly over the code changes, first commit locks-in the current
  `CDBWrapper::Read()` behavior . The second adds `TryRead()` with tests for all four
  status codes. The third is the `CCoinsViewDB::GetCoin()` fix. The fourth is a functional
  that ensures the node aborts correctly instead of silently diverging.

  Testing Notes:
  Cherry-picking the functional test commit on master demonstrates the consensus split
  when the coin entry fails to deserialize.

  Extra Note:
  `CDBIterator::GetValue()` has the same silent-swallow pattern. Not consensus-critical.
  Should be addressed in a follow-up.

ACKs for top commit:
  ajtowns:
    reACK 75f64e50c6
  sedited:
    ACK 75f64e50c6
  mzumsande:
    Code Review ACK [75f64e5](75f64e50c6)

Tree-SHA512: 51b0114ea443544a2f1fbb8e63be6e1dff94d6f287221d566dbc98d666784a2b4c486acfb87eea5392bc1d092fb6d6dc0ff6782bcdccdcf15939281c895e384d
This commit is contained in:
merge-script
2026-09-08 18:12:40 +02:00
6 changed files with 320 additions and 11 deletions

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@@ -9,8 +9,9 @@ export LC_ALL=C.UTF-8
export CONTAINER_NAME=ci_native_previous_releases
export CI_IMAGE_NAME_TAG="mirror.gcr.io/ubuntu:22.04"
# Use minimum supported python3.10 and gcc-12, see doc/dependencies.md
export PACKAGES="gcc-12 g++-12 python3-zmq"
export PACKAGES="gcc-12 g++-12 python3-zmq libleveldb-dev python3-pip"
export DEP_OPTS="CC=gcc-12 CXX=g++-12"
export PIP_PACKAGES="plyvel"
export TEST_RUNNER_EXTRA="--previous-releases --coverage --extended --exclude feature_dbcrash" # Run extended tests so that coverage does not fail, but exclude the very slow dbcrash
export GOAL="install"
export CI_LIMIT_STACK_SIZE=1

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@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <streams.h>
#include <util/byte_units.h>
#include <util/check.h>
#include <util/expected.h>
#include <util/fs.h>
#include <util/obfuscation.h>
@@ -216,26 +217,84 @@ public:
CDBWrapper(const CDBWrapper&) = delete;
CDBWrapper& operator=(const CDBWrapper&) = delete;
struct ReadFailure {
enum class Code {
DeserializationError, //!< Key exists but value could not be deserialized.
DatabaseError, //!< Unexpected internal DB error.
};
Code status;
std::string err_msg;
};
using ReadStatus = util::Expected<bool, ReadFailure>;
/**
* Read and deserialize a value from the database, with explicit error discrimination.
*
* Unlike Read(), this method distinguishes between a missing key, a deserialization
* failure (DeserializationError), and an internal DB error (DatabaseError),
* enabling callers to treat data corruption differently from an absent entry.
*
* @note Callers are expected to provide well-formed keys; key serialization
* is the only operation that may throw.
*
* @param[in] key The key to look up.
* @param[out] value Populated with the deserialized value when the returned
* Expected holds true; indeterminate otherwise.
* @return On success, true if the key was found (value populated) or false if
* the key was absent. On failure, a ReadFailure describing the error.
*/
template <typename K, typename V>
bool Read(const K& key, V& value) const
[[nodiscard]] ReadStatus TryRead(const K& key, V& value) const
{
DataStream ssKey{};
ssKey.reserve(DBWRAPPER_PREALLOC_KEY_SIZE);
// Key serialization is the only operation that may throw.
// Callers are expected to provide well-formed keys.
ssKey << key;
std::optional<std::string> strValue{ReadImpl(ssKey)};
if (!strValue) {
return false;
std::optional<std::string> strValue;
try {
strValue = ReadImpl(ssKey);
if (!strValue) {
return false; // not found
}
} catch (const std::exception& e) {
return util::Unexpected(ReadFailure{ReadFailure::Code::DatabaseError, e.what()});
}
try {
std::span ssValue{MakeWritableByteSpan(*strValue)};
m_obfuscation(ssValue);
SpanReader{ssValue} >> value;
} catch (const std::exception&) {
return false;
} catch (const std::exception& e) {
return util::Unexpected(ReadFailure{ReadFailure::Code::DeserializationError, e.what()});
}
return true;
}
/**
* Wrapper around TryRead() that preserves the original Read() semantics:
* returns true on success, false if the key is absent or deserialization
* fails, and throws dbwrapper_error on an internal DB error.
*
* Prefer TryRead() when the caller needs to distinguish between a missing
* key and a corrupt value.
*/
template <typename K, typename V>
bool Read(const K& key, V& value) const
{
const ReadStatus res = TryRead(key,value);
if (res.has_value()) return res.value();
switch (const auto& [err_code, err_msg] = res.error(); err_code) {
case ReadFailure::Code::DeserializationError: return false;
case ReadFailure::Code::DatabaseError: throw dbwrapper_error(err_msg);
} // no default case, so the compiler can warn about missing cases
std::abort(); // unreachable
}
template <typename K, typename V>
void Write(const K& key, const V& value, bool fSync = false)
{

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@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <util/byte_units.h>
#include <util/string.h>
#include <fstream>
#include <memory>
#include <ranges>
@@ -194,6 +195,110 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(dbwrapper_batch)
}
}
// Verify that Read() returns false (without throwing) when the stored value
// fails to be deserialized
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(dbwrapper_read_returns_false_on_deserialization_error)
{
for (const bool obfuscate : {false, true}) {
const fs::path path{m_args.GetDataDirBase() / (obfuscate ? "dbwrapper_deser_obf" : "dbwrapper_deser_noobf")};
CDBWrapper dbw({.path = path, .cache_bytes = 1 << 20, .wipe_data = true, .obfuscate = obfuscate});
constexpr uint8_t key{'X'};
// Write a single byte. uint256 requires 32 bytes, so reading this key
// as uint256 must trigger a deserialization error inside Read()
dbw.Write(key, uint8_t{0xFF});
BOOST_CHECK(dbw.Exists(key));
// Read() must catch the deserialization exception and return false,
// the same as if the key were absent
uint256 result;
BOOST_CHECK(!dbw.Read(key, result));
}
}
// Verify Read() throws dbwrapper_error due to an internal db error
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(dbwrapper_read_throws_on_db_error)
{
const fs::path path{m_args.GetDataDirBase() / "dbwrapper_db_error"};
constexpr uint8_t key{'Y'};
const auto make_db = [] (const fs::path& path, const bool force_compact) {
return CDBWrapper({.path = path, .cache_bytes = 1 << 20, .obfuscate = false,
.options = {.force_compact = force_compact}});
};
// Write a value and close the database
make_db(path, /*force_compact=*/false).Write(key, m_rng.rand256());
// Force compaction to ensure the data is written into the .ldb files
// rather than left in the WAL.
(void)make_db(path, /*force_compact=*/true);
// Corrupt every table so any subsequent Read() fails
for (const auto& entry : fs::directory_iterator(path)) {
if (entry.path().extension() == ".ldb") {
std::ofstream{entry.path(), std::ios::binary | std::ios::trunc}
.write("\xff", 1);
}
}
// Read() should detect the issue now and throw
const auto db{make_db(path, /*force_compact=*/false)};
uint256 result;
BOOST_CHECK_EXCEPTION(db.Read(key, result), dbwrapper_error, HasReason("Fatal LevelDB error"));
// TryRead() must return DatabaseError (without throwing).
CDBWrapper::ReadStatus status = db.TryRead(key, result);
BOOST_REQUIRE(!status);
BOOST_CHECK(status.error().status == CDBWrapper::ReadFailure::Code::DatabaseError);
BOOST_CHECK(status.error().err_msg.find("Fatal LevelDB error") != std::string::npos);
}
// Exercise TryRead() return values directly: found, absent and DeserializationError.
// DatabaseError is tested inside 'dbwrapper_read_throws_on_db_error' test
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(dbwrapper_tryread)
{
for (const bool obfuscate : {false, true}) {
const fs::path path{m_args.GetDataDirBase() / (obfuscate ? "dbwrapper_tryread_obf" : "dbwrapper_tryread_noobf")};
CDBWrapper dbw({.path = path, .cache_bytes = 1 << 20, .wipe_data = true, .obfuscate = obfuscate});
constexpr uint8_t key_ok{'A'};
constexpr uint8_t key_missing{'B'};
constexpr uint8_t key_bad{'C'};
uint256 written_value{m_rng.rand256()};
dbw.Write(key_ok, written_value);
dbw.Write(key_bad, uint8_t{0xFF});
// Found: key exists, value deserializes correctly
{
uint256 read_value;
CDBWrapper::ReadStatus status = dbw.TryRead(key_ok, read_value);
BOOST_REQUIRE(status);
BOOST_CHECK(status.value());
BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(read_value, written_value);
}
// Absent: key does not exist
{
uint256 read_value;
CDBWrapper::ReadStatus status = dbw.TryRead(key_missing, read_value);
BOOST_REQUIRE(status);
BOOST_CHECK(!status.value());
}
// DeserializationError: key exists but stored value is too short
{
uint256 read_value;
CDBWrapper::ReadStatus status = dbw.TryRead(key_bad, read_value);
BOOST_REQUIRE(!status);
BOOST_CHECK(status.error().status == CDBWrapper::ReadFailure::Code::DeserializationError);
BOOST_CHECK(!status.error().err_msg.empty());
}
}
}
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(dbwrapper_iterator)
{
// Perform tests both obfuscated and non-obfuscated.

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@@ -87,11 +87,24 @@ void CCoinsViewDB::ResizeCache(size_t new_cache_size)
std::optional<Coin> CCoinsViewDB::GetCoin(const COutPoint& outpoint) const
{
if (Coin coin; m_db->Read(CoinEntry(&outpoint), coin)) {
Assert(!coin.IsSpent()); // The UTXO database should never contain spent coins
return coin;
Coin coin;
const CDBWrapper::ReadStatus res = m_db->TryRead(CoinEntry(&outpoint), coin);
if (!res) {
// Propagate errors so CCoinsViewErrorCatcher triggers a clean shutdown.
switch (const auto& [err_code, err_msg] = res.error(); err_code) {
case CDBWrapper::ReadFailure::Code::DeserializationError:
throw dbwrapper_error{strprintf("Coin deserialization failure: %s", err_msg)};
case CDBWrapper::ReadFailure::Code::DatabaseError:
throw dbwrapper_error{strprintf("Coin DB read failure: %s", err_msg)};
} // no default case, so the compiler can warn about missing cases
std::abort(); // unreachable
}
return std::nullopt;
// Check whether the coin exists
if (!res.value()) return std::nullopt;
// Coin found, ensure UTXO database never contains spent coins
Assert(!coin.IsSpent());
return coin;
}
std::optional<Coin> CCoinsViewDB::PeekCoin(const COutPoint& outpoint) const

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@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Copyright (c) The Bitcoin Core developers
# Distributed under the MIT software license.
"""
Ensures that UTXO unserialization errors abort the node, and does not
cause a consensus divergence.
A valid UTXO is created and shared between two nodes. The raw database
entry is then deliberately modified on one node so it can no longer be
deserialized. When the other node spends that UTXO and mines a block,
the node with the unserializable entry must abort during block connection
rather than silently treating the coin as absent and marking the block
BLOCK_FAILED_VALID, which would cause it to permanently diverge from the
network's best chain.
"""
try:
import plyvel # type: ignore[import]
except ImportError:
plyvel = None
from test_framework.blocktools import COINBASE_MATURITY
from test_framework.test_framework import BitcoinTestFramework, SkipTest
from test_framework.util import assert_equal
from test_framework.wallet import MiniWallet
class UTXOAbortOnErrorTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
def set_test_params(self):
self.setup_clean_chain = True
self.num_nodes = 2
def skip_test_if_missing_module(self):
if plyvel is None:
raise SkipTest("plyvel not available (pip install plyvel)")
def setup_network(self):
self.setup_nodes() # Start with nodes disconnected
def run_test(self):
node0, node1 = self.nodes
self.log.info("Mining mature coinbase on node0")
wallet0 = MiniWallet(node0)
self.generate(wallet0, COINBASE_MATURITY + 1, sync_fun=self.no_op)
assert_equal(node0.getblockcount(), COINBASE_MATURITY + 1)
# The coinbase of block 1 is now mature. This is the UTXO we will
# make unserializable on node0 and spend on node1.
coinbase_txid = node0.getblock(node0.getblockhash(1))['tx'][0]
assert node0.gettxout(coinbase_txid, 0) is not None, f"Expected UTXO {coinbase_txid}:0 to exist in UTXO set"
self.log.info("Preparing a spend of the mature coinbase UTXO (not broadcast)")
utxo = wallet0.get_utxo(txid=coinbase_txid, vout=0, mark_as_spent=False)
spend_tx_hex = wallet0.create_self_transfer(utxo_to_spend=utxo)['hex']
self.log.info("Sync node1 up to the tip, then isolate nodes")
self.connect_nodes(0, 1)
self.sync_blocks()
assert_equal(node1.getblockcount(), COINBASE_MATURITY + 1)
self.disconnect_nodes(0, 1)
self.log.info("Make UTXO unserializable in node0 database")
self.stop_node(0)
# LevelDB key for the CoinEntry serialization:
# key = DB_COIN (0x43='C') || txid (32 bytes) || VARINT(vout=0)
coin_key = b'\x43' + bytes.fromhex(coinbase_txid)[::-1] + b'\x00'
chainstate_path = str(node0.chain_path / "chainstate")
# Update entry to mimic an incompatible serialization format
with plyvel.DB(chainstate_path, create_if_missing=False, compression=None) as db:
existing_value = db.get(coin_key)
assert existing_value is not None, f"UTXO {coinbase_txid}:0 not found in db"
# Write a single-byte value. After XOR deobfuscation this is still just one
# byte, far too short for a valid Coin (which needs height VARINT + amount
# VARINT + script at minimum). Deserialization will throw "end of data" when
# trying to read beyond the first field.
db.put(coin_key, b'\x00')
self.log.info("Restart node0 — the unserializable entry is only visible during block validation, not at startup")
self.start_node(0)
# Individual coin values are not read at startup; only block validation
# touches them. The node starts cleanly regardless of the tampered entry.
assert_equal(node0.getblockcount(), COINBASE_MATURITY + 1)
# Now spend the corrupted UTXO
self.log.info("node1 broadcasts the spend and mines a block")
node1.sendrawtransaction(spend_tx_hex)
spending_block_hash = self.generate(node1, 1, sync_fun=self.no_op)[0]
assert_equal(node1.getblockcount(), COINBASE_MATURITY + 2)
self.log.info("Connect node0 to node1 — node0 must abort when it tries to connect the spending block")
# Verify that the unserializable entry triggers the expected error and is
# never silently misreported as a missing input (bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent),
# which would indicate the previous silent-divergence behaviour.
with node0.assert_debug_log(expected_msgs=["Error reading from database: Coin deserialization failure"],
unexpected_msgs=["bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent"]):
try:
self.connect_nodes(0, 1)
except Exception:
pass # node0 may validly abort before connect_nodes returns
# Confirm node0 aborted with SIGABRT
self.wait_until(lambda: self.nodes[0].is_node_stopped(
expected_ret_code=-6,
expected_stderr="Error: Error reading from database, shutting down.",
))
self.log.info("node0 aborted cleanly — no silent divergence occurred")
self.log.info("Restart node0 and verify the spending block was not permanently marked invalid")
self.start_node(0)
assert_equal(node0.getblockcount(), COINBASE_MATURITY + 1)
# If BLOCK_FAILED_VALID had been written to disk, the node would be
# permanently stuck on a stale tip even after the tampered entry is resolved.
tips = node0.getchaintips()
permanently_invalid = [
t for t in tips
if t['hash'] == spending_block_hash and t['status'] == 'invalid'
]
assert len(permanently_invalid) == 0, f"Spending block {spending_block_hash} must not be marked BLOCK_FAILED_VALID"
if __name__ == '__main__':
UTXOAbortOnErrorTest(__file__).main()

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@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ EXTENDED_SCRIPTS = [
'feature_pruning.py',
'feature_dbcrash.py',
'feature_index_prune.py',
'feature_utxo_abort_on_error.py',
]
# Special script to run each bench sanity check