mirror of
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin.git
synced 2025-04-09 20:59:38 +02:00
[validation] Remove useless ret parameter from Invalid()
ValidationState::Invalid() takes a parameter `ret` which is returned to the caller. All call sites set this to false. Remove the `ret` parameter and just return false always.
This commit is contained in:
John Newbery
parent
1a37de4b31
commit
7204c6434b
@ -11,24 +11,24 @@ bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state)
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Basic checks that don't depend on any context
|
||||
if (tx.vin.empty())
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-vin-empty");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-vin-empty");
|
||||
if (tx.vout.empty())
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-vout-empty");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-vout-empty");
|
||||
// Size limits (this doesn't take the witness into account, as that hasn't been checked for malleability)
|
||||
if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT)
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-oversize");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-oversize");
|
||||
|
||||
// Check for negative or overflow output values (see CVE-2010-5139)
|
||||
CAmount nValueOut = 0;
|
||||
for (const auto& txout : tx.vout)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (txout.nValue < 0)
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-vout-negative");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-vout-negative");
|
||||
if (txout.nValue > MAX_MONEY)
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-vout-toolarge");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-vout-toolarge");
|
||||
nValueOut += txout.nValue;
|
||||
if (!MoneyRange(nValueOut))
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-txouttotal-toolarge");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-txouttotal-toolarge");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check for duplicate inputs (see CVE-2018-17144)
|
||||
@ -39,19 +39,19 @@ bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state)
|
||||
std::set<COutPoint> vInOutPoints;
|
||||
for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) {
|
||||
if (!vInOutPoints.insert(txin.prevout).second)
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-inputs-duplicate");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-inputs-duplicate");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (tx.IsCoinBase())
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (tx.vin[0].scriptSig.size() < 2 || tx.vin[0].scriptSig.size() > 100)
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-length");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-length");
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
for (const auto& txin : tx.vin)
|
||||
if (txin.prevout.IsNull())
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-prevout-null");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-prevout-null");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ bool Consensus::CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state,
|
||||
{
|
||||
// are the actual inputs available?
|
||||
if (!inputs.HaveInputs(tx)) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS, false, "bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent",
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS, "bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent",
|
||||
strprintf("%s: inputs missing/spent", __func__));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -172,27 +172,27 @@ bool Consensus::CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state,
|
||||
|
||||
// If prev is coinbase, check that it's matured
|
||||
if (coin.IsCoinBase() && nSpendHeight - coin.nHeight < COINBASE_MATURITY) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, "bad-txns-premature-spend-of-coinbase",
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, "bad-txns-premature-spend-of-coinbase",
|
||||
strprintf("tried to spend coinbase at depth %d", nSpendHeight - coin.nHeight));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check for negative or overflow input values
|
||||
nValueIn += coin.out.nValue;
|
||||
if (!MoneyRange(coin.out.nValue) || !MoneyRange(nValueIn)) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-inputvalues-outofrange");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-inputvalues-outofrange");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const CAmount value_out = tx.GetValueOut();
|
||||
if (nValueIn < value_out) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-in-belowout",
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-in-belowout",
|
||||
strprintf("value in (%s) < value out (%s)", FormatMoney(nValueIn), FormatMoney(value_out)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Tally transaction fees
|
||||
const CAmount txfee_aux = nValueIn - value_out;
|
||||
if (!MoneyRange(txfee_aux)) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-fee-outofrange");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-fee-outofrange");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
txfee = txfee_aux;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -121,13 +121,13 @@ class TxValidationState : public ValidationState {
|
||||
private:
|
||||
TxValidationResult m_result;
|
||||
public:
|
||||
bool Invalid(TxValidationResult result, bool ret = false,
|
||||
bool Invalid(TxValidationResult result,
|
||||
const std::string &reject_reason="",
|
||||
const std::string &debug_message="")
|
||||
{
|
||||
m_result = result;
|
||||
ValidationState::Invalid(reject_reason, debug_message);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
TxValidationResult GetResult() const { return m_result; }
|
||||
};
|
||||
@ -136,12 +136,12 @@ class BlockValidationState : public ValidationState {
|
||||
private:
|
||||
BlockValidationResult m_result;
|
||||
public:
|
||||
bool Invalid(BlockValidationResult result, bool ret = false,
|
||||
bool Invalid(BlockValidationResult result,
|
||||
const std::string &reject_reason="",
|
||||
const std::string &debug_message="") {
|
||||
m_result = result;
|
||||
ValidationState::Invalid(reject_reason, debug_message);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
BlockValidationResult GetResult() const { return m_result; }
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@ -506,11 +506,11 @@ private:
|
||||
{
|
||||
CAmount mempoolRejectFee = m_pool.GetMinFee(gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFee(package_size);
|
||||
if (mempoolRejectFee > 0 && package_fee < mempoolRejectFee) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "mempool min fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, mempoolRejectFee));
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "mempool min fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, mempoolRejectFee));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (package_fee < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(package_size)) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "min relay fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(package_size)));
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "min relay fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(package_size)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -563,29 +563,29 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
||||
|
||||
// Coinbase is only valid in a block, not as a loose transaction
|
||||
if (tx.IsCoinBase())
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "coinbase");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "coinbase");
|
||||
|
||||
// Rather not work on nonstandard transactions (unless -testnet/-regtest)
|
||||
std::string reason;
|
||||
if (fRequireStandard && !IsStandardTx(tx, reason))
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, reason);
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, reason);
|
||||
|
||||
// Do not work on transactions that are too small.
|
||||
// A transaction with 1 segwit input and 1 P2WPHK output has non-witness size of 82 bytes.
|
||||
// Transactions smaller than this are not relayed to mitigate CVE-2017-12842 by not relaying
|
||||
// 64-byte transactions.
|
||||
if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) < MIN_STANDARD_TX_NONWITNESS_SIZE)
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, "tx-size-small");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, "tx-size-small");
|
||||
|
||||
// Only accept nLockTime-using transactions that can be mined in the next
|
||||
// block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions that can't
|
||||
// be mined yet.
|
||||
if (!CheckFinalTx(tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS))
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, "non-final");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, "non-final");
|
||||
|
||||
// is it already in the memory pool?
|
||||
if (m_pool.exists(hash)) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, false, "txn-already-in-mempool");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, "txn-already-in-mempool");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check for conflicts with in-memory transactions
|
||||
@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (fReplacementOptOut) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "txn-mempool-conflict");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "txn-mempool-conflict");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
setConflicts.insert(ptxConflicting->GetHash());
|
||||
@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
||||
for (size_t out = 0; out < tx.vout.size(); out++) {
|
||||
// Optimistically just do efficient check of cache for outputs
|
||||
if (coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(hash, out))) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, false, "txn-already-known");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, "txn-already-known");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Otherwise assume this might be an orphan tx for which we just haven't seen parents yet
|
||||
@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
||||
// Must keep pool.cs for this unless we change CheckSequenceLocks to take a
|
||||
// CoinsViewCache instead of create its own
|
||||
if (!CheckSequenceLocks(m_pool, tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS, &lp))
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, false, "non-BIP68-final");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, "non-BIP68-final");
|
||||
|
||||
CAmount nFees = 0;
|
||||
if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, m_view, GetSpendHeight(m_view), nFees)) {
|
||||
@ -677,11 +677,11 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
||||
|
||||
// Check for non-standard pay-to-script-hash in inputs
|
||||
if (fRequireStandard && !AreInputsStandard(tx, m_view))
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs");
|
||||
|
||||
// Check for non-standard witness in P2WSH
|
||||
if (tx.HasWitness() && fRequireStandard && !IsWitnessStandard(tx, m_view))
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false, "bad-witness-nonstandard");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, "bad-witness-nonstandard");
|
||||
|
||||
int64_t nSigOpsCost = GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, m_view, STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
||||
unsigned int nSize = entry->GetTxSize();
|
||||
|
||||
if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS_COST)
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops",
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops",
|
||||
strprintf("%d", nSigOpsCost));
|
||||
|
||||
// No transactions are allowed below minRelayTxFee except from disconnected
|
||||
@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
||||
if (!bypass_limits && !CheckFeeRate(nSize, nModifiedFees, state)) return false;
|
||||
|
||||
if (nAbsurdFee && nFees > nAbsurdFee)
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false,
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD,
|
||||
"absurdly-high-fee", strprintf("%d > %d", nFees, nAbsurdFee));
|
||||
|
||||
const CTxMemPool::setEntries setIterConflicting = m_pool.GetIterSet(setConflicts);
|
||||
@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
||||
// this, see https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
|
||||
if (nSize > EXTRA_DESCENDANT_TX_SIZE_LIMIT ||
|
||||
!m_pool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(*entry, setAncestors, 2, m_limit_ancestor_size, m_limit_descendants + 1, m_limit_descendant_size + EXTRA_DESCENDANT_TX_SIZE_LIMIT, dummy_err_string)) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "too-long-mempool-chain", errString);
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "too-long-mempool-chain", errString);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
||||
const uint256 &hashAncestor = ancestorIt->GetTx().GetHash();
|
||||
if (setConflicts.count(hashAncestor))
|
||||
{
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx",
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx",
|
||||
strprintf("%s spends conflicting transaction %s",
|
||||
hash.ToString(),
|
||||
hashAncestor.ToString()));
|
||||
@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
||||
CFeeRate oldFeeRate(mi->GetModifiedFee(), mi->GetTxSize());
|
||||
if (newFeeRate <= oldFeeRate)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "insufficient fee",
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "insufficient fee",
|
||||
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; new feerate %s <= old feerate %s",
|
||||
hash.ToString(),
|
||||
newFeeRate.ToString(),
|
||||
@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
||||
nConflictingSize += it->GetTxSize();
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "too many potential replacements",
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "too many potential replacements",
|
||||
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s; too many potential replacements (%d > %d)\n",
|
||||
hash.ToString(),
|
||||
nConflictingCount,
|
||||
@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
||||
// it's cheaper to just check if the new input refers to a
|
||||
// tx that's in the mempool.
|
||||
if (m_pool.exists(tx.vin[j].prevout.hash)) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed",
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "replacement-adds-unconfirmed",
|
||||
strprintf("replacement %s adds unconfirmed input, idx %d",
|
||||
hash.ToString(), j));
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -888,7 +888,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
||||
// transactions would not be paid for.
|
||||
if (nModifiedFees < nConflictingFees)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "insufficient fee",
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "insufficient fee",
|
||||
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, less fees than conflicting txs; %s < %s",
|
||||
hash.ToString(), FormatMoney(nModifiedFees), FormatMoney(nConflictingFees)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
||||
CAmount nDeltaFees = nModifiedFees - nConflictingFees;
|
||||
if (nDeltaFees < ::incrementalRelayFee.GetFee(nSize))
|
||||
{
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "insufficient fee",
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "insufficient fee",
|
||||
strprintf("rejecting replacement %s, not enough additional fees to relay; %s < %s",
|
||||
hash.ToString(),
|
||||
FormatMoney(nDeltaFees),
|
||||
@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::PolicyScriptChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws, Precompute
|
||||
if (!tx.HasWitness() && CheckInputs(tx, state_dummy, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~(SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK), true, false, txdata) &&
|
||||
!CheckInputs(tx, state_dummy, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK, true, false, txdata)) {
|
||||
// Only the witness is missing, so the transaction itself may be fine.
|
||||
state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, false,
|
||||
state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED,
|
||||
state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage());
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false; // state filled in by CheckInputs
|
||||
@ -1009,7 +1009,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::Finalize(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
||||
if (!bypass_limits) {
|
||||
LimitMempoolSize(m_pool, gArgs.GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000, std::chrono::hours{gArgs.GetArg("-mempoolexpiry", DEFAULT_MEMPOOL_EXPIRY)});
|
||||
if (!m_pool.exists(hash))
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, false, "mempool full");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "mempool full");
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1544,7 +1544,7 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState &state, const CCoinsV
|
||||
CScriptCheck check2(coin.out, tx, i,
|
||||
flags & ~STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS, cacheSigStore, &txdata);
|
||||
if (check2())
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, false, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
|
||||
}
|
||||
// MANDATORY flag failures correspond to
|
||||
// TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS. Because CONSENSUS
|
||||
@ -1555,7 +1555,7 @@ bool CheckInputs(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState &state, const CCoinsV
|
||||
// support, to avoid splitting the network (but this
|
||||
// depends on the details of how net_processing handles
|
||||
// such errors).
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, false, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
|
||||
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2058,7 +2058,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state,
|
||||
for (size_t o = 0; o < tx->vout.size(); o++) {
|
||||
if (view.HaveCoin(COutPoint(tx->GetHash(), o))) {
|
||||
LogPrintf("ERROR: ConnectBlock(): tried to overwrite transaction\n");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-BIP30");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-BIP30");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -2099,14 +2099,14 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state,
|
||||
TxValidationState tx_state;
|
||||
if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, tx_state, view, pindex->nHeight, txfee)) {
|
||||
// Any transaction validation failure in ConnectBlock is a block consensus failure
|
||||
state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false,
|
||||
state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
|
||||
tx_state.GetRejectReason(), tx_state.GetDebugMessage());
|
||||
return error("%s: Consensus::CheckTxInputs: %s, %s", __func__, tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
|
||||
}
|
||||
nFees += txfee;
|
||||
if (!MoneyRange(nFees)) {
|
||||
LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: accumulated fee in the block out of range.\n", __func__);
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-accumulated-fee-outofrange");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-accumulated-fee-outofrange");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check that transaction is BIP68 final
|
||||
@ -2119,7 +2119,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state,
|
||||
|
||||
if (!SequenceLocks(tx, nLockTimeFlags, &prevheights, *pindex)) {
|
||||
LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: contains a non-BIP68-final transaction\n", __func__);
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-nonfinal");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-nonfinal");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -2130,7 +2130,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state,
|
||||
nSigOpsCost += GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, view, flags);
|
||||
if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST) {
|
||||
LogPrintf("ERROR: ConnectBlock(): too many sigops\n");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-blk-sigops");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-sigops");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
txdata.emplace_back(tx);
|
||||
@ -2141,7 +2141,7 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state,
|
||||
TxValidationState tx_state;
|
||||
if (fScriptChecks && !CheckInputs(tx, tx_state, view, flags, fCacheResults, fCacheResults, txdata[i], nScriptCheckThreads ? &vChecks : nullptr)) {
|
||||
// Any transaction validation failure in ConnectBlock is a block consensus failure
|
||||
state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false,
|
||||
state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
|
||||
tx_state.GetRejectReason(), tx_state.GetDebugMessage());
|
||||
return error("ConnectBlock(): CheckInputs on %s failed with %s",
|
||||
tx.GetHash().ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
|
||||
@ -2161,12 +2161,12 @@ bool CChainState::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state,
|
||||
CAmount blockReward = nFees + GetBlockSubsidy(pindex->nHeight, chainparams.GetConsensus());
|
||||
if (block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut() > blockReward) {
|
||||
LogPrintf("ERROR: ConnectBlock(): coinbase pays too much (actual=%d vs limit=%d)\n", block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut(), blockReward);
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-amount");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-amount");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!control.Wait()) {
|
||||
LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: CheckQueue failed\n", __func__);
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "block-validation-failed");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "block-validation-failed");
|
||||
}
|
||||
int64_t nTime4 = GetTimeMicros(); nTimeVerify += nTime4 - nTime2;
|
||||
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Verify %u txins: %.2fms (%.3fms/txin) [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", nInputs - 1, MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2), nInputs <= 1 ? 0 : MILLI * (nTime4 - nTime2) / (nInputs-1), nTimeVerify * MICRO, nTimeVerify * MILLI / nBlocksTotal);
|
||||
@ -3244,7 +3244,7 @@ static bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationState& st
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Check proof of work matches claimed amount
|
||||
if (fCheckPOW && !CheckProofOfWork(block.GetHash(), block.nBits, consensusParams))
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, "high-hash", "proof of work failed");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, "high-hash", "proof of work failed");
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -3266,13 +3266,13 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensu
|
||||
bool mutated;
|
||||
uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated);
|
||||
if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2)
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
|
||||
|
||||
// Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences
|
||||
// of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block,
|
||||
// while still invalidating it.
|
||||
if (mutated)
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any
|
||||
@ -3283,14 +3283,14 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensu
|
||||
|
||||
// Size limits
|
||||
if (block.vtx.empty() || block.vtx.size() * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT || ::GetSerializeSize(block, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT)
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-blk-length", "size limits failed");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-length", "size limits failed");
|
||||
|
||||
// First transaction must be coinbase, the rest must not be
|
||||
if (block.vtx.empty() || !block.vtx[0]->IsCoinBase())
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-missing", "first tx is not coinbase");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-missing", "first tx is not coinbase");
|
||||
for (unsigned int i = 1; i < block.vtx.size(); i++)
|
||||
if (block.vtx[i]->IsCoinBase())
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-multiple", "more than one coinbase");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-multiple", "more than one coinbase");
|
||||
|
||||
// Check transactions
|
||||
// Must check for duplicate inputs (see CVE-2018-17144)
|
||||
@ -3300,7 +3300,7 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensu
|
||||
// CheckBlock() does context-free validation checks. The only
|
||||
// possible failures are consensus failures.
|
||||
assert(tx_state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS);
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, tx_state.GetRejectReason(),
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, tx_state.GetRejectReason(),
|
||||
strprintf("Transaction check failed (tx hash %s) %s", tx->GetHash().ToString(), tx_state.GetDebugMessage()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -3310,7 +3310,7 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensu
|
||||
nSigOps += GetLegacySigOpCount(*tx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (nSigOps * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST)
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-blk-sigops", "out-of-bounds SigOpCount");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-sigops", "out-of-bounds SigOpCount");
|
||||
|
||||
if (fCheckPOW && fCheckMerkleRoot)
|
||||
block.fChecked = true;
|
||||
@ -3411,7 +3411,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidatio
|
||||
// Check proof of work
|
||||
const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = params.GetConsensus();
|
||||
if (block.nBits != GetNextWorkRequired(pindexPrev, &block, consensusParams))
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, "bad-diffbits", "incorrect proof of work");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, "bad-diffbits", "incorrect proof of work");
|
||||
|
||||
// Check against checkpoints
|
||||
if (fCheckpointsEnabled) {
|
||||
@ -3421,24 +3421,24 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidatio
|
||||
CBlockIndex* pcheckpoint = GetLastCheckpoint(params.Checkpoints());
|
||||
if (pcheckpoint && nHeight < pcheckpoint->nHeight) {
|
||||
LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: forked chain older than last checkpoint (height %d)\n", __func__, nHeight);
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT, false, "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT, "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check timestamp against prev
|
||||
if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast())
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early");
|
||||
|
||||
// Check timestamp
|
||||
if (block.GetBlockTime() > nAdjustedTime + MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME)
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE, false, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future");
|
||||
|
||||
// Reject outdated version blocks when 95% (75% on testnet) of the network has upgraded:
|
||||
// check for version 2, 3 and 4 upgrades
|
||||
if((block.nVersion < 2 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP34Height) ||
|
||||
(block.nVersion < 3 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP66Height) ||
|
||||
(block.nVersion < 4 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP65Height))
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, false, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion),
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion),
|
||||
strprintf("rejected nVersion=0x%08x block", block.nVersion));
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
@ -3468,7 +3468,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat
|
||||
// Check that all transactions are finalized
|
||||
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
|
||||
if (!IsFinalTx(*tx, nHeight, nLockTimeCutoff)) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-txns-nonfinal", "non-final transaction");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-nonfinal", "non-final transaction");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3478,7 +3478,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat
|
||||
CScript expect = CScript() << nHeight;
|
||||
if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.size() < expect.size() ||
|
||||
!std::equal(expect.begin(), expect.end(), block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.begin())) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-cb-height", "block height mismatch in coinbase");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-height", "block height mismatch in coinbase");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -3500,11 +3500,11 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat
|
||||
// already does not permit it, it is impossible to trigger in the
|
||||
// witness tree.
|
||||
if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.size() != 1 || block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0].size() != 32) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "bad-witness-nonce-size", strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__));
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-nonce-size", strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__));
|
||||
}
|
||||
CHash256().Write(hashWitness.begin(), 32).Write(&block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0][0], 32).Finalize(hashWitness.begin());
|
||||
if (memcmp(hashWitness.begin(), &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], 32)) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "bad-witness-merkle-match", strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__));
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-merkle-match", strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__));
|
||||
}
|
||||
fHaveWitness = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -3514,7 +3514,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat
|
||||
if (!fHaveWitness) {
|
||||
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
|
||||
if (tx->HasWitness()) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, false, "unexpected-witness", strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__));
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "unexpected-witness", strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -3526,7 +3526,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat
|
||||
// the block hash, so we couldn't mark the block as permanently
|
||||
// failed).
|
||||
if (GetBlockWeight(block) > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, false, "bad-blk-weight", strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__));
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-weight", strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
@ -3547,7 +3547,7 @@ bool BlockManager::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationS
|
||||
*ppindex = pindex;
|
||||
if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK) {
|
||||
LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: block %s is marked invalid\n", __func__, hash.ToString());
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CACHED_INVALID, false, "duplicate");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CACHED_INVALID, "duplicate");
|
||||
}
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -3560,12 +3560,12 @@ bool BlockManager::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationS
|
||||
BlockMap::iterator mi = m_block_index.find(block.hashPrevBlock);
|
||||
if (mi == m_block_index.end()) {
|
||||
LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: prev block not found\n", __func__);
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV, false, "prev-blk-not-found");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV, "prev-blk-not-found");
|
||||
}
|
||||
pindexPrev = (*mi).second;
|
||||
if (pindexPrev->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK) {
|
||||
LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: prev block invalid\n", __func__);
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, false, "bad-prevblk");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, "bad-prevblk");
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, chainparams, pindexPrev, GetAdjustedTime()))
|
||||
return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s, %s", __func__, hash.ToString(), FormatStateMessage(state));
|
||||
@ -3604,7 +3604,7 @@ bool BlockManager::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationS
|
||||
invalid_walk = invalid_walk->pprev;
|
||||
}
|
||||
LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: prev block invalid\n", __func__);
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, false, "bad-prevblk");
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, "bad-prevblk");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user