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cuckoocache: Check for uint32 overflow in setup_bytes
This fixes an potential overflow which existed prior to this patchset. If CuckooCache::cache<Element, Hash>::setup_bytes is called with a `size_t bytes` which, when divided by sizeof(Element), does not fit into an uint32_t, the implicit conversion to uint32_t in the call to setup will result in an overflow. At least on x86_64, this overflow is possible: static_assert(std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max() / 32 <= std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max()); static_assert(std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max() / 4 <= std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max()); This commit detects such cases and signals to callers that the `size_t bytes` input is too large.
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@@ -1669,8 +1669,9 @@ bool InitScriptExecutionCache() {
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size_t nMaxCacheSize = std::max((int64_t)0, gArgs.GetIntArg("-maxsigcachesize", DEFAULT_MAX_SIG_CACHE_SIZE) / 2) * ((size_t) 1 << 20);
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auto setup_results = g_scriptExecutionCache.setup_bytes(nMaxCacheSize);
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if (!setup_results) return false;
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const auto [num_elems, approx_size_bytes] = setup_results;
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const auto [num_elems, approx_size_bytes] = *setup_results;
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LogPrintf("Using %zu MiB out of %zu/2 requested for script execution cache, able to store %zu elements\n",
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approx_size_bytes >> 20, (nMaxCacheSize * 2) >> 20, num_elems);
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return true;
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