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docs: clarify RPC credentials security boundary
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@@ -124,6 +124,22 @@ RPC interface will be abused.
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security-sensitive operations on a computer whose other programs you
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trust.
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- **RPC Credentials Security Boundary:** Any client with valid RPC credentials
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should be treated as having significant control over both the Bitcoin Core node
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and the filesystem resources accessible by the `bitcoind` process. RPC commands
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can load wallet files from paths that the `bitcoind` process has permission to
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access, specify file paths for operations, and potentially gain broader access
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than intended. This means that someone with RPC access can potentially compromise
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not only the Bitcoin Core node, but also the machine it is running on. Bitcoin Core
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provides the `-rpcwhitelist` option to restrict which RPC commands specific users
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can access, and `-rpcwhitelistdefault` to control the default behavior for users
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without explicit whitelists. However, when using multiple wallets or sharing access
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with different users, these should not be considered robust security boundaries, as
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users with access to certain commands may still be able to exploit functionality in
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unexpected ways. For security-sensitive operations, implement proper system-level
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isolation (containers, virtualization, separate user accounts with restricted
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permissions) rather than relying solely on RPC access controls.
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- **Securing remote network access:** You may optionally allow other
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computers to remotely control Bitcoin Core by setting the `rpcallowip`
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and `rpcbind` configuration parameters. These settings are only meant
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