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Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#28251: validation: fix coins disappearing mid-package evaluation
32c1dd1ad6[test] mempool coins disappearing mid-package evaluation (glozow)a67f460c3f[refactor] split setup in mempool_limit test (glozow)d08696120e[test framework] add ability to spend only confirmed utxos (glozow)3ea71feb11[validation] don't LimitMempoolSize in any subpackage submissions (glozow)d227b7234c[validation] return correct result when already-in-mempool tx gets evicted (glozow)9698b81828[refactor] back-fill results in AcceptPackage (glozow)8ad7ad3392[validation] make PackageMempoolAcceptResult members mutable (glozow)03b87c11ca[validation] add AcceptSubPackage to delegate Accept* calls and clean up m_view (glozow)3f01a3dab1[CCoinsViewMemPool] track non-base coins and allow Reset (glozow)7d7f7a1189[policy] check for duplicate txids in package (glozow) Pull request description: While we are evaluating a package, we split it into "subpackages" for evaluation (currently subpackages all have size 1 except the last one). If a subpackage has size 1, we may add a tx to mempool and call `LimitMempoolSize()`, which evicts transactions if the mempool gets full. We handle the case where the just-submitted transaction is evicted immediately, but we don't handle the case in which a transaction from a previous subpackage (either just submitted or already in mempool) is evicted. Mainly, since the coins created by the evicted transaction are cached in `m_view`, we don't realize the UTXO has disappeared until `CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache` asserts that they exist. Also, the returned `PackageMempoolAcceptResult` reports that the transaction is in mempool even though it isn't anymore. Fix this by not calling `LimitMempoolSize()` until the very end, and editing the results map with "mempool full" if things fall out. Pointed out by instagibbs infaeed687e5on top of the v3 PR. ACKs for top commit: instagibbs: reACK32c1dd1ad6Tree-SHA512: 61e7f69db4712e5e5bfa27d037ab66bdd97f1bf60a8d9ffb96adb1f0609af012c810d681102ee5c7baec7b5fe8cb7c304a60c63ccc445d00d86a2b7f0e7ddb90
This commit is contained in:
@@ -37,6 +37,13 @@ bool CheckPackage(const Package& txns, PackageValidationState& state)
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std::unordered_set<uint256, SaltedTxidHasher> later_txids;
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std::transform(txns.cbegin(), txns.cend(), std::inserter(later_txids, later_txids.end()),
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[](const auto& tx) { return tx->GetHash(); });
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// Package must not contain any duplicate transactions, which is checked by txid. This also
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// includes transactions with duplicate wtxids and same-txid-different-witness transactions.
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if (later_txids.size() != txns.size()) {
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return state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY, "package-contains-duplicates");
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}
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for (const auto& tx : txns) {
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for (const auto& input : tx->vin) {
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if (later_txids.find(input.prevout.hash) != later_txids.end()) {
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@@ -65,6 +65,17 @@ BOOST_FIXTURE_TEST_CASE(package_sanitization_tests, TestChain100Setup)
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BOOST_CHECK(!CheckPackage(package_too_large, state_too_large));
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BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(state_too_large.GetResult(), PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY);
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BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(state_too_large.GetRejectReason(), "package-too-large");
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// Packages can't contain transactions with the same txid.
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Package package_duplicate_txids_empty;
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for (auto i{0}; i < 3; ++i) {
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CMutableTransaction empty_tx;
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package_duplicate_txids_empty.emplace_back(MakeTransactionRef(empty_tx));
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}
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PackageValidationState state_duplicates;
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BOOST_CHECK(!CheckPackage(package_duplicate_txids_empty, state_duplicates));
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BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(state_duplicates.GetResult(), PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY);
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BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(state_duplicates.GetRejectReason(), "package-contains-duplicates");
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}
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BOOST_FIXTURE_TEST_CASE(package_validation_tests, TestChain100Setup)
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@@ -809,18 +820,20 @@ BOOST_FIXTURE_TEST_CASE(package_cpfp_tests, TestChain100Setup)
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expected_pool_size += 1;
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BOOST_CHECK_MESSAGE(submit_rich_parent.m_state.IsInvalid(), "Package validation unexpectedly succeeded");
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// The child would have been validated on its own and failed, then submitted as a "package" of 1.
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// The child would have been validated on its own and failed.
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BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(submit_rich_parent.m_state.GetResult(), PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX);
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BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(submit_rich_parent.m_state.GetRejectReason(), "transaction failed");
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auto it_parent = submit_rich_parent.m_tx_results.find(tx_parent_rich->GetWitnessHash());
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auto it_child = submit_rich_parent.m_tx_results.find(tx_child_poor->GetWitnessHash());
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BOOST_CHECK(it_parent != submit_rich_parent.m_tx_results.end());
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BOOST_CHECK(it_child != submit_rich_parent.m_tx_results.end());
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BOOST_CHECK(it_parent->second.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID);
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BOOST_CHECK(it_child->second.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::INVALID);
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BOOST_CHECK(it_parent->second.m_state.GetRejectReason() == "");
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BOOST_CHECK_MESSAGE(it_parent->second.m_base_fees.value() == high_parent_fee,
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strprintf("rich parent: expected fee %s, got %s", high_parent_fee, it_parent->second.m_base_fees.value()));
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BOOST_CHECK(it_parent->second.m_effective_feerate == CFeeRate(high_parent_fee, GetVirtualTransactionSize(*tx_parent_rich)));
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auto it_child = submit_rich_parent.m_tx_results.find(tx_child_poor->GetWitnessHash());
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BOOST_CHECK(it_child != submit_rich_parent.m_tx_results.end());
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BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(it_child->second.m_result_type, MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::INVALID);
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BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(it_child->second.m_state.GetResult(), TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY);
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@@ -993,6 +993,7 @@ bool CCoinsViewMemPool::GetCoin(const COutPoint &outpoint, Coin &coin) const {
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if (ptx) {
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if (outpoint.n < ptx->vout.size()) {
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coin = Coin(ptx->vout[outpoint.n], MEMPOOL_HEIGHT, false);
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m_non_base_coins.emplace(outpoint);
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return true;
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} else {
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return false;
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@@ -1005,8 +1006,14 @@ void CCoinsViewMemPool::PackageAddTransaction(const CTransactionRef& tx)
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{
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for (unsigned int n = 0; n < tx->vout.size(); ++n) {
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m_temp_added.emplace(COutPoint(tx->GetHash(), n), Coin(tx->vout[n], MEMPOOL_HEIGHT, false));
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m_non_base_coins.emplace(COutPoint(tx->GetHash(), n));
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}
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}
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void CCoinsViewMemPool::Reset()
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{
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m_temp_added.clear();
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m_non_base_coins.clear();
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}
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size_t CTxMemPool::DynamicMemoryUsage() const {
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LOCK(cs);
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@@ -826,15 +826,27 @@ class CCoinsViewMemPool : public CCoinsViewBacked
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* validation, since we can access transaction outputs without submitting them to mempool.
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*/
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std::unordered_map<COutPoint, Coin, SaltedOutpointHasher> m_temp_added;
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/**
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* Set of all coins that have been fetched from mempool or created using PackageAddTransaction
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* (not base). Used to track the origin of a coin, see GetNonBaseCoins().
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*/
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mutable std::unordered_set<COutPoint, SaltedOutpointHasher> m_non_base_coins;
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protected:
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const CTxMemPool& mempool;
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public:
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CCoinsViewMemPool(CCoinsView* baseIn, const CTxMemPool& mempoolIn);
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/** GetCoin, returning whether it exists and is not spent. Also updates m_non_base_coins if the
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* coin is not fetched from base. */
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bool GetCoin(const COutPoint &outpoint, Coin &coin) const override;
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/** Add the coins created by this transaction. These coins are only temporarily stored in
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* m_temp_added and cannot be flushed to the back end. Only used for package validation. */
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void PackageAddTransaction(const CTransactionRef& tx);
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/** Get all coins in m_non_base_coins. */
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std::unordered_set<COutPoint, SaltedOutpointHasher> GetNonBaseCoins() const { return m_non_base_coins; }
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/** Clear m_temp_added and m_non_base_coins. */
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void Reset();
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};
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/**
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@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ public:
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* any transaction spending the same inputs as a transaction in the mempool is considered
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* a conflict. */
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const bool m_allow_replacement;
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/** When true, the mempool will not be trimmed when individual transactions are submitted in
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/** When true, the mempool will not be trimmed when any transactions are submitted in
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* Finalize(). Instead, limits should be enforced at the end to ensure the package is not
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* partially submitted.
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*/
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@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ public:
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/* m_coins_to_uncache */ package_args.m_coins_to_uncache,
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/* m_test_accept */ package_args.m_test_accept,
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/* m_allow_replacement */ true,
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/* m_package_submission */ false,
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/* m_package_submission */ true, // do not LimitMempoolSize in Finalize()
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/* m_package_feerates */ false, // only 1 transaction
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};
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}
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@@ -555,6 +555,19 @@ public:
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*/
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PackageMempoolAcceptResult AcceptMultipleTransactions(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& txns, ATMPArgs& args) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
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/**
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* Submission of a subpackage.
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* If subpackage size == 1, calls AcceptSingleTransaction() with adjusted ATMPArgs to avoid
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* package policy restrictions like no CPFP carve out (PackageMempoolChecks) and disabled RBF
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* (m_allow_replacement), and creates a PackageMempoolAcceptResult wrapping the result.
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*
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* If subpackage size > 1, calls AcceptMultipleTransactions() with the provided ATMPArgs.
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*
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* Also cleans up all non-chainstate coins from m_view at the end.
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*/
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PackageMempoolAcceptResult AcceptSubPackage(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& subpackage, ATMPArgs& args)
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EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
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/**
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* Package (more specific than just multiple transactions) acceptance. Package must be a child
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* with all of its unconfirmed parents, and topologically sorted.
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@@ -640,10 +653,9 @@ private:
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// Submit all transactions to the mempool and call ConsensusScriptChecks to add to the script
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// cache - should only be called after successful validation of all transactions in the package.
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// The package may end up partially-submitted after size limiting; returns true if all
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// transactions are successfully added to the mempool, false otherwise.
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// Does not call LimitMempoolSize(), so mempool max_size_bytes may be temporarily exceeded.
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bool SubmitPackage(const ATMPArgs& args, std::vector<Workspace>& workspaces, PackageValidationState& package_state,
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std::map<const uint256, const MempoolAcceptResult>& results)
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std::map<uint256, MempoolAcceptResult>& results)
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EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
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// Compare a package's feerate against minimum allowed.
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@@ -1125,7 +1137,7 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::Finalize(const ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
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bool MemPoolAccept::SubmitPackage(const ATMPArgs& args, std::vector<Workspace>& workspaces,
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PackageValidationState& package_state,
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std::map<const uint256, const MempoolAcceptResult>& results)
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std::map<uint256, MempoolAcceptResult>& results)
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{
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AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
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AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
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@@ -1180,32 +1192,21 @@ bool MemPoolAccept::SubmitPackage(const ATMPArgs& args, std::vector<Workspace>&
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}
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}
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// It may or may not be the case that all the transactions made it into the mempool. Regardless,
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// make sure we haven't exceeded max mempool size.
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LimitMempoolSize(m_pool, m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip());
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std::vector<uint256> all_package_wtxids;
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all_package_wtxids.reserve(workspaces.size());
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std::transform(workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(), std::back_inserter(all_package_wtxids),
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[](const auto& ws) { return ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(); });
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// Find the wtxids of the transactions that made it into the mempool. Allow partial submission,
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// but don't report success unless they all made it into the mempool.
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// Add successful results. The returned results may change later if LimitMempoolSize() evicts them.
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for (Workspace& ws : workspaces) {
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const auto effective_feerate = args.m_package_feerates ? ws.m_package_feerate :
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CFeeRate{ws.m_modified_fees, static_cast<uint32_t>(ws.m_vsize)};
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const auto effective_feerate_wtxids = args.m_package_feerates ? all_package_wtxids :
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std::vector<uint256>({ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash()});
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if (m_pool.exists(GenTxid::Wtxid(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash()))) {
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results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(),
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MempoolAcceptResult::Success(std::move(ws.m_replaced_transactions), ws.m_vsize,
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ws.m_base_fees, effective_feerate, effective_feerate_wtxids));
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GetMainSignals().TransactionAddedToMempool(ws.m_ptx, m_pool.GetAndIncrementSequence());
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} else {
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all_submitted = false;
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ws.m_state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "mempool full");
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package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed");
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results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(), MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state));
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}
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results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(),
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MempoolAcceptResult::Success(std::move(ws.m_replaced_transactions), ws.m_vsize,
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ws.m_base_fees, effective_feerate, effective_feerate_wtxids));
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GetMainSignals().TransactionAddedToMempool(ws.m_ptx, m_pool.GetAndIncrementSequence());
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}
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return all_submitted;
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}
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@@ -1255,7 +1256,7 @@ PackageMempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptMultipleTransactions(const std::
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workspaces.reserve(txns.size());
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std::transform(txns.cbegin(), txns.cend(), std::back_inserter(workspaces),
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[](const auto& tx) { return Workspace(tx); });
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std::map<const uint256, const MempoolAcceptResult> results;
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std::map<uint256, MempoolAcceptResult> results;
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LOCK(m_pool.cs);
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@@ -1332,6 +1333,54 @@ PackageMempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptMultipleTransactions(const std::
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return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results));
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}
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PackageMempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptSubPackage(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& subpackage, ATMPArgs& args)
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{
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AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
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AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
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auto result = [&]() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main, m_pool.cs) {
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if (subpackage.size() > 1) {
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return AcceptMultipleTransactions(subpackage, args);
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}
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const auto& tx = subpackage.front();
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ATMPArgs single_args = ATMPArgs::SingleInPackageAccept(args);
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const auto single_res = AcceptSingleTransaction(tx, single_args);
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PackageValidationState package_state_wrapped;
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if (single_res.m_result_type != MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) {
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package_state_wrapped.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed");
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}
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return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_wrapped, {{tx->GetWitnessHash(), single_res}});
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}();
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// Clean up m_view and m_viewmempool so that other subpackage evaluations don't have access to
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// coins they shouldn't. Keep some coins in order to minimize re-fetching coins from the UTXO set.
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//
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// There are 3 kinds of coins in m_view:
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// (1) Temporary coins from the transactions in subpackage, constructed by m_viewmempool.
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// (2) Mempool coins from transactions in the mempool, constructed by m_viewmempool.
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// (3) Confirmed coins fetched from our current UTXO set.
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//
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// (1) Temporary coins need to be removed, regardless of whether the transaction was submitted.
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// If the transaction was submitted to the mempool, m_viewmempool will be able to fetch them from
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// there. If it wasn't submitted to mempool, it is incorrect to keep them - future calls may try
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// to spend those coins that don't actually exist.
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// (2) Mempool coins also need to be removed. If the mempool contents have changed as a result
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// of submitting or replacing transactions, coins previously fetched from mempool may now be
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// spent or nonexistent. Those coins need to be deleted from m_view.
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// (3) Confirmed coins don't need to be removed. The chainstate has not changed (we are
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// holding cs_main and no blocks have been processed) so the confirmed tx cannot disappear like
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// a mempool tx can. The coin may now be spent after we submitted a tx to mempool, but
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// we have already checked that the package does not have 2 transactions spending the same coin.
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// Keeping them in m_view is an optimization to not re-fetch confirmed coins if we later look up
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// inputs for this transaction again.
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for (const auto& outpoint : m_viewmempool.GetNonBaseCoins()) {
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// In addition to resetting m_viewmempool, we also need to manually delete these coins from
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// m_view because it caches copies of the coins it fetched from m_viewmempool previously.
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m_view.Uncache(outpoint);
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}
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// This deletes the temporary and mempool coins.
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m_viewmempool.Reset();
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return result;
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}
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PackageMempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptPackage(const Package& package, ATMPArgs& args)
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{
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AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
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@@ -1388,21 +1437,12 @@ PackageMempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptPackage(const Package& package,
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m_view.SetBackend(m_dummy);
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LOCK(m_pool.cs);
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// Stores final results that won't change
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std::map<const uint256, const MempoolAcceptResult> results_final;
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// Node operators are free to set their mempool policies however they please, nodes may receive
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// transactions in different orders, and malicious counterparties may try to take advantage of
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// policy differences to pin or delay propagation of transactions. As such, it's possible for
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// some package transaction(s) to already be in the mempool, and we don't want to reject the
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// entire package in that case (as that could be a censorship vector). De-duplicate the
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// transactions that are already in the mempool, and only call AcceptMultipleTransactions() with
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// the new transactions. This ensures we don't double-count transaction counts and sizes when
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// checking ancestor/descendant limits, or double-count transaction fees for fee-related policy.
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ATMPArgs single_args = ATMPArgs::SingleInPackageAccept(args);
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// Results from individual validation. "Nonfinal" because if a transaction fails by itself but
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// succeeds later (i.e. when evaluated with a fee-bumping child), the result changes (though not
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// reflected in this map). If a transaction fails more than once, we want to return the first
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// result, when it was considered on its own. So changes will only be from invalid -> valid.
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// Stores results from which we will create the returned PackageMempoolAcceptResult.
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// A result may be changed if a mempool transaction is evicted later due to LimitMempoolSize().
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std::map<uint256, MempoolAcceptResult> results_final;
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// Results from individual validation which will be returned if no other result is available for
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// this transaction. "Nonfinal" because if a transaction fails by itself but succeeds later
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// (i.e. when evaluated with a fee-bumping child), the result in this map may be discarded.
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std::map<uint256, MempoolAcceptResult> individual_results_nonfinal;
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bool quit_early{false};
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std::vector<CTransactionRef> txns_package_eval;
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@@ -1414,6 +1454,14 @@ PackageMempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptPackage(const Package& package,
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// we know is that the inputs aren't available.
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if (m_pool.exists(GenTxid::Wtxid(wtxid))) {
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// Exact transaction already exists in the mempool.
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// Node operators are free to set their mempool policies however they please, nodes may receive
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// transactions in different orders, and malicious counterparties may try to take advantage of
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// policy differences to pin or delay propagation of transactions. As such, it's possible for
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// some package transaction(s) to already be in the mempool, and we don't want to reject the
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// entire package in that case (as that could be a censorship vector). De-duplicate the
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// transactions that are already in the mempool, and only call AcceptMultipleTransactions() with
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// the new transactions. This ensures we don't double-count transaction counts and sizes when
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// checking ancestor/descendant limits, or double-count transaction fees for fee-related policy.
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auto iter = m_pool.GetIter(txid);
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assert(iter != std::nullopt);
|
||||
results_final.emplace(wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult::MempoolTx(iter.value()->GetTxSize(), iter.value()->GetFee()));
|
||||
@@ -1432,7 +1480,8 @@ PackageMempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptPackage(const Package& package,
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Transaction does not already exist in the mempool.
|
||||
// Try submitting the transaction on its own.
|
||||
const auto single_res = AcceptSingleTransaction(tx, single_args);
|
||||
const auto single_package_res = AcceptSubPackage({tx}, args);
|
||||
const auto& single_res = single_package_res.m_tx_results.at(wtxid);
|
||||
if (single_res.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) {
|
||||
// The transaction succeeded on its own and is now in the mempool. Don't include it
|
||||
// in package validation, because its fees should only be "used" once.
|
||||
@@ -1459,32 +1508,52 @@ PackageMempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptPackage(const Package& package,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Quit early because package validation won't change the result or the entire package has
|
||||
// already been submitted.
|
||||
if (quit_early || txns_package_eval.empty()) {
|
||||
for (const auto& [wtxid, mempoolaccept_res] : individual_results_nonfinal) {
|
||||
Assume(results_final.emplace(wtxid, mempoolaccept_res).second);
|
||||
Assume(mempoolaccept_res.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::INVALID);
|
||||
auto multi_submission_result = quit_early || txns_package_eval.empty() ? PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_quit_early, {}) :
|
||||
AcceptSubPackage(txns_package_eval, args);
|
||||
PackageValidationState& package_state_final = multi_submission_result.m_state;
|
||||
|
||||
// Make sure we haven't exceeded max mempool size.
|
||||
// Package transactions that were submitted to mempool or already in mempool may be evicted.
|
||||
LimitMempoolSize(m_pool, m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip());
|
||||
|
||||
for (const auto& tx : package) {
|
||||
const auto& wtxid = tx->GetWitnessHash();
|
||||
if (multi_submission_result.m_tx_results.count(wtxid) > 0) {
|
||||
// We shouldn't have re-submitted if the tx result was already in results_final.
|
||||
Assume(results_final.count(wtxid) == 0);
|
||||
// If it was submitted, check to see if the tx is still in the mempool. It could have
|
||||
// been evicted due to LimitMempoolSize() above.
|
||||
const auto& txresult = multi_submission_result.m_tx_results.at(wtxid);
|
||||
if (txresult.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID && !m_pool.exists(GenTxid::Wtxid(wtxid))) {
|
||||
package_state_final.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed");
|
||||
TxValidationState mempool_full_state;
|
||||
mempool_full_state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "mempool full");
|
||||
results_final.emplace(wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(mempool_full_state));
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
results_final.emplace(wtxid, txresult);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if (const auto it{results_final.find(wtxid)}; it != results_final.end()) {
|
||||
// Already-in-mempool transaction. Check to see if it's still there, as it could have
|
||||
// been evicted when LimitMempoolSize() was called.
|
||||
Assume(it->second.m_result_type != MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::INVALID);
|
||||
Assume(individual_results_nonfinal.count(wtxid) == 0);
|
||||
// Query by txid to include the same-txid-different-witness ones.
|
||||
if (!m_pool.exists(GenTxid::Txid(tx->GetHash()))) {
|
||||
package_state_final.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed");
|
||||
TxValidationState mempool_full_state;
|
||||
mempool_full_state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "mempool full");
|
||||
// Replace the previous result.
|
||||
results_final.erase(wtxid);
|
||||
results_final.emplace(wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(mempool_full_state));
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if (const auto it{individual_results_nonfinal.find(wtxid)}; it != individual_results_nonfinal.end()) {
|
||||
Assume(it->second.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::INVALID);
|
||||
// Interesting result from previous processing.
|
||||
results_final.emplace(wtxid, it->second);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_quit_early, std::move(results_final));
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Validate the (deduplicated) transactions as a package. Note that submission_result has its
|
||||
// own PackageValidationState; package_state_quit_early is unused past this point.
|
||||
auto submission_result = AcceptMultipleTransactions(txns_package_eval, args);
|
||||
// Include already-in-mempool transaction results in the final result.
|
||||
for (const auto& [wtxid, mempoolaccept_res] : results_final) {
|
||||
Assume(submission_result.m_tx_results.emplace(wtxid, mempoolaccept_res).second);
|
||||
Assume(mempoolaccept_res.m_result_type != MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::INVALID);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (submission_result.m_state.GetResult() == PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX) {
|
||||
// Package validation failed because one or more transactions failed. Provide a result for
|
||||
// each transaction; if AcceptMultipleTransactions() didn't return a result for a tx,
|
||||
// include the previous individual failure reason.
|
||||
submission_result.m_tx_results.insert(individual_results_nonfinal.cbegin(),
|
||||
individual_results_nonfinal.cend());
|
||||
Assume(submission_result.m_tx_results.size() == package.size());
|
||||
}
|
||||
return submission_result;
|
||||
Assume(results_final.size() == package.size());
|
||||
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_final, std::move(results_final));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
} // anon namespace
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -210,21 +210,21 @@ private:
|
||||
*/
|
||||
struct PackageMempoolAcceptResult
|
||||
{
|
||||
const PackageValidationState m_state;
|
||||
PackageValidationState m_state;
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Map from wtxid to finished MempoolAcceptResults. The client is responsible
|
||||
* for keeping track of the transaction objects themselves. If a result is not
|
||||
* present, it means validation was unfinished for that transaction. If there
|
||||
* was a package-wide error (see result in m_state), m_tx_results will be empty.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
std::map<const uint256, const MempoolAcceptResult> m_tx_results;
|
||||
std::map<uint256, MempoolAcceptResult> m_tx_results;
|
||||
|
||||
explicit PackageMempoolAcceptResult(PackageValidationState state,
|
||||
std::map<const uint256, const MempoolAcceptResult>&& results)
|
||||
std::map<uint256, MempoolAcceptResult>&& results)
|
||||
: m_state{state}, m_tx_results(std::move(results)) {}
|
||||
|
||||
explicit PackageMempoolAcceptResult(PackageValidationState state, CFeeRate feerate,
|
||||
std::map<const uint256, const MempoolAcceptResult>&& results)
|
||||
std::map<uint256, MempoolAcceptResult>&& results)
|
||||
: m_state{state}, m_tx_results(std::move(results)) {}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Constructor to create a PackageMempoolAcceptResult from a single MempoolAcceptResult */
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,29 +34,27 @@ class MempoolLimitTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
|
||||
]]
|
||||
self.supports_cli = False
|
||||
|
||||
def run_test(self):
|
||||
def fill_mempool(self):
|
||||
"""Fill mempool until eviction."""
|
||||
self.log.info("Fill the mempool until eviction is triggered and the mempoolminfee rises")
|
||||
txouts = gen_return_txouts()
|
||||
node = self.nodes[0]
|
||||
miniwallet = MiniWallet(node)
|
||||
miniwallet = self.wallet
|
||||
relayfee = node.getnetworkinfo()['relayfee']
|
||||
|
||||
self.log.info('Check that mempoolminfee is minrelaytxfee')
|
||||
assert_equal(node.getmempoolinfo()['minrelaytxfee'], Decimal('0.00001000'))
|
||||
assert_equal(node.getmempoolinfo()['mempoolminfee'], Decimal('0.00001000'))
|
||||
|
||||
tx_batch_size = 1
|
||||
num_of_batches = 75
|
||||
# Generate UTXOs to flood the mempool
|
||||
# 1 to create a tx initially that will be evicted from the mempool later
|
||||
# 3 batches of multiple transactions with a fee rate much higher than the previous UTXO
|
||||
# 75 transactions each with a fee rate higher than the previous one
|
||||
# And 1 more to verify that this tx does not get added to the mempool with a fee rate less than the mempoolminfee
|
||||
# And 2 more for the package cpfp test
|
||||
self.generate(miniwallet, 1 + (num_of_batches * tx_batch_size) + 1 + 2)
|
||||
self.generate(miniwallet, 1 + (num_of_batches * tx_batch_size))
|
||||
|
||||
# Mine 99 blocks so that the UTXOs are allowed to be spent
|
||||
self.generate(node, COINBASE_MATURITY - 1)
|
||||
|
||||
self.log.info('Create a mempool tx that will be evicted')
|
||||
self.log.debug("Create a mempool tx that will be evicted")
|
||||
tx_to_be_evicted_id = miniwallet.send_self_transfer(from_node=node, fee_rate=relayfee)["txid"]
|
||||
|
||||
# Increase the tx fee rate to give the subsequent transactions a higher priority in the mempool
|
||||
@@ -64,21 +62,196 @@ class MempoolLimitTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
|
||||
# by 130 should result in a fee that corresponds to 2x of that fee rate
|
||||
base_fee = relayfee * 130
|
||||
|
||||
self.log.info("Fill up the mempool with txs with higher fee rate")
|
||||
for batch_of_txid in range(num_of_batches):
|
||||
fee = (batch_of_txid + 1) * base_fee
|
||||
create_lots_of_big_transactions(miniwallet, node, fee, tx_batch_size, txouts)
|
||||
self.log.debug("Fill up the mempool with txs with higher fee rate")
|
||||
with node.assert_debug_log(["rolling minimum fee bumped"]):
|
||||
for batch_of_txid in range(num_of_batches):
|
||||
fee = (batch_of_txid + 1) * base_fee
|
||||
create_lots_of_big_transactions(miniwallet, node, fee, tx_batch_size, txouts)
|
||||
|
||||
self.log.info('The tx should be evicted by now')
|
||||
self.log.debug("The tx should be evicted by now")
|
||||
# The number of transactions created should be greater than the ones present in the mempool
|
||||
assert_greater_than(tx_batch_size * num_of_batches, len(node.getrawmempool()))
|
||||
# Initial tx created should not be present in the mempool anymore as it had a lower fee rate
|
||||
assert tx_to_be_evicted_id not in node.getrawmempool()
|
||||
|
||||
self.log.info('Check that mempoolminfee is larger than minrelaytxfee')
|
||||
self.log.debug("Check that mempoolminfee is larger than minrelaytxfee")
|
||||
assert_equal(node.getmempoolinfo()['minrelaytxfee'], Decimal('0.00001000'))
|
||||
assert_greater_than(node.getmempoolinfo()['mempoolminfee'], Decimal('0.00001000'))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mid_package_eviction(self):
|
||||
node = self.nodes[0]
|
||||
self.log.info("Check a package where each parent passes the current mempoolminfee but would cause eviction before package submission terminates")
|
||||
|
||||
self.restart_node(0, extra_args=self.extra_args[0])
|
||||
|
||||
# Restarting the node resets mempool minimum feerate
|
||||
assert_equal(node.getmempoolinfo()['minrelaytxfee'], Decimal('0.00001000'))
|
||||
assert_equal(node.getmempoolinfo()['mempoolminfee'], Decimal('0.00001000'))
|
||||
|
||||
self.fill_mempool()
|
||||
current_info = node.getmempoolinfo()
|
||||
mempoolmin_feerate = current_info["mempoolminfee"]
|
||||
|
||||
package_hex = []
|
||||
# UTXOs to be spent by the ultimate child transaction
|
||||
parent_utxos = []
|
||||
|
||||
evicted_weight = 8000
|
||||
# Mempool transaction which is evicted due to being at the "bottom" of the mempool when the
|
||||
# mempool overflows and evicts by descendant score. It's important that the eviction doesn't
|
||||
# happen in the middle of package evaluation, as it can invalidate the coins cache.
|
||||
mempool_evicted_tx = self.wallet.send_self_transfer(
|
||||
from_node=node,
|
||||
fee=(mempoolmin_feerate / 1000) * (evicted_weight // 4) + Decimal('0.000001'),
|
||||
target_weight=evicted_weight,
|
||||
confirmed_only=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Already in mempool when package is submitted.
|
||||
assert mempool_evicted_tx["txid"] in node.getrawmempool()
|
||||
|
||||
# This parent spends the above mempool transaction that exists when its inputs are first
|
||||
# looked up, but disappears later. It is rejected for being too low fee (but eligible for
|
||||
# reconsideration), and its inputs are cached. When the mempool transaction is evicted, its
|
||||
# coin is no longer available, but the cache could still contains the tx.
|
||||
cpfp_parent = self.wallet.create_self_transfer(
|
||||
utxo_to_spend=mempool_evicted_tx["new_utxo"],
|
||||
fee_rate=mempoolmin_feerate - Decimal('0.00001'),
|
||||
confirmed_only=True)
|
||||
package_hex.append(cpfp_parent["hex"])
|
||||
parent_utxos.append(cpfp_parent["new_utxo"])
|
||||
assert_equal(node.testmempoolaccept([cpfp_parent["hex"]])[0]["reject-reason"], "mempool min fee not met")
|
||||
|
||||
self.wallet.rescan_utxos()
|
||||
|
||||
# Series of parents that don't need CPFP and are submitted individually. Each one is large and
|
||||
# high feerate, which means they should trigger eviction but not be evicted.
|
||||
parent_weight = 100000
|
||||
num_big_parents = 3
|
||||
assert_greater_than(parent_weight * num_big_parents, current_info["maxmempool"] - current_info["bytes"])
|
||||
parent_fee = (100 * mempoolmin_feerate / 1000) * (parent_weight // 4)
|
||||
|
||||
big_parent_txids = []
|
||||
for i in range(num_big_parents):
|
||||
parent = self.wallet.create_self_transfer(fee=parent_fee, target_weight=parent_weight, confirmed_only=True)
|
||||
parent_utxos.append(parent["new_utxo"])
|
||||
package_hex.append(parent["hex"])
|
||||
big_parent_txids.append(parent["txid"])
|
||||
# There is room for each of these transactions independently
|
||||
assert node.testmempoolaccept([parent["hex"]])[0]["allowed"]
|
||||
|
||||
# Create a child spending everything, bumping cpfp_parent just above mempool minimum
|
||||
# feerate. It's important not to bump too much as otherwise mempool_evicted_tx would not be
|
||||
# evicted, making this test much less meaningful.
|
||||
approx_child_vsize = self.wallet.create_self_transfer_multi(utxos_to_spend=parent_utxos)["tx"].get_vsize()
|
||||
cpfp_fee = (mempoolmin_feerate / 1000) * (cpfp_parent["tx"].get_vsize() + approx_child_vsize) - cpfp_parent["fee"]
|
||||
# Specific number of satoshis to fit within a small window. The parent_cpfp + child package needs to be
|
||||
# - When there is mid-package eviction, high enough feerate to meet the new mempoolminfee
|
||||
# - When there is no mid-package eviction, low enough feerate to be evicted immediately after submission.
|
||||
magic_satoshis = 1200
|
||||
cpfp_satoshis = int(cpfp_fee * COIN) + magic_satoshis
|
||||
|
||||
child = self.wallet.create_self_transfer_multi(utxos_to_spend=parent_utxos, fee_per_output=cpfp_satoshis)
|
||||
package_hex.append(child["hex"])
|
||||
|
||||
# Package should be submitted, temporarily exceeding maxmempool, and then evicted.
|
||||
with node.assert_debug_log(expected_msgs=["rolling minimum fee bumped"]):
|
||||
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "mempool full", node.submitpackage, package_hex)
|
||||
|
||||
# Maximum size must never be exceeded.
|
||||
assert_greater_than(node.getmempoolinfo()["maxmempool"], node.getmempoolinfo()["bytes"])
|
||||
|
||||
# Evicted transaction and its descendants must not be in mempool.
|
||||
resulting_mempool_txids = node.getrawmempool()
|
||||
assert mempool_evicted_tx["txid"] not in resulting_mempool_txids
|
||||
assert cpfp_parent["txid"] not in resulting_mempool_txids
|
||||
assert child["txid"] not in resulting_mempool_txids
|
||||
for txid in big_parent_txids:
|
||||
assert txid in resulting_mempool_txids
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mid_package_replacement(self):
|
||||
node = self.nodes[0]
|
||||
self.log.info("Check a package where an early tx depends on a later-replaced mempool tx")
|
||||
|
||||
self.restart_node(0, extra_args=self.extra_args[0])
|
||||
|
||||
# Restarting the node resets mempool minimum feerate
|
||||
assert_equal(node.getmempoolinfo()['minrelaytxfee'], Decimal('0.00001000'))
|
||||
assert_equal(node.getmempoolinfo()['mempoolminfee'], Decimal('0.00001000'))
|
||||
|
||||
self.fill_mempool()
|
||||
current_info = node.getmempoolinfo()
|
||||
mempoolmin_feerate = current_info["mempoolminfee"]
|
||||
|
||||
# Mempool transaction which is evicted due to being at the "bottom" of the mempool when the
|
||||
# mempool overflows and evicts by descendant score. It's important that the eviction doesn't
|
||||
# happen in the middle of package evaluation, as it can invalidate the coins cache.
|
||||
double_spent_utxo = self.wallet.get_utxo(confirmed_only=True)
|
||||
replaced_tx = self.wallet.send_self_transfer(
|
||||
from_node=node,
|
||||
utxo_to_spend=double_spent_utxo,
|
||||
fee_rate=mempoolmin_feerate,
|
||||
confirmed_only=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Already in mempool when package is submitted.
|
||||
assert replaced_tx["txid"] in node.getrawmempool()
|
||||
|
||||
# This parent spends the above mempool transaction that exists when its inputs are first
|
||||
# looked up, but disappears later. It is rejected for being too low fee (but eligible for
|
||||
# reconsideration), and its inputs are cached. When the mempool transaction is evicted, its
|
||||
# coin is no longer available, but the cache could still contain the tx.
|
||||
cpfp_parent = self.wallet.create_self_transfer(
|
||||
utxo_to_spend=replaced_tx["new_utxo"],
|
||||
fee_rate=mempoolmin_feerate - Decimal('0.00001'),
|
||||
confirmed_only=True)
|
||||
|
||||
self.wallet.rescan_utxos()
|
||||
|
||||
# Parent that replaces the parent of cpfp_parent.
|
||||
replacement_tx = self.wallet.create_self_transfer(
|
||||
utxo_to_spend=double_spent_utxo,
|
||||
fee_rate=10*mempoolmin_feerate,
|
||||
confirmed_only=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
parent_utxos = [cpfp_parent["new_utxo"], replacement_tx["new_utxo"]]
|
||||
|
||||
# Create a child spending everything, CPFPing the low-feerate parent.
|
||||
approx_child_vsize = self.wallet.create_self_transfer_multi(utxos_to_spend=parent_utxos)["tx"].get_vsize()
|
||||
cpfp_fee = (2 * mempoolmin_feerate / 1000) * (cpfp_parent["tx"].get_vsize() + approx_child_vsize) - cpfp_parent["fee"]
|
||||
child = self.wallet.create_self_transfer_multi(utxos_to_spend=parent_utxos, fee_per_output=int(cpfp_fee * COIN))
|
||||
# It's very important that the cpfp_parent is before replacement_tx so that its input (from
|
||||
# replaced_tx) is first looked up *before* replacement_tx is submitted.
|
||||
package_hex = [cpfp_parent["hex"], replacement_tx["hex"], child["hex"]]
|
||||
|
||||
# Package should be submitted, temporarily exceeding maxmempool, and then evicted.
|
||||
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent", node.submitpackage, package_hex)
|
||||
|
||||
# Maximum size must never be exceeded.
|
||||
assert_greater_than(node.getmempoolinfo()["maxmempool"], node.getmempoolinfo()["bytes"])
|
||||
|
||||
resulting_mempool_txids = node.getrawmempool()
|
||||
# The replacement should be successful.
|
||||
assert replacement_tx["txid"] in resulting_mempool_txids
|
||||
# The replaced tx and all of its descendants must not be in mempool.
|
||||
assert replaced_tx["txid"] not in resulting_mempool_txids
|
||||
assert cpfp_parent["txid"] not in resulting_mempool_txids
|
||||
assert child["txid"] not in resulting_mempool_txids
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def run_test(self):
|
||||
node = self.nodes[0]
|
||||
self.wallet = MiniWallet(node)
|
||||
miniwallet = self.wallet
|
||||
|
||||
# Generate coins needed to create transactions in the subtests (excluding coins used in fill_mempool).
|
||||
self.generate(miniwallet, 20)
|
||||
|
||||
relayfee = node.getnetworkinfo()['relayfee']
|
||||
self.log.info('Check that mempoolminfee is minrelaytxfee')
|
||||
assert_equal(node.getmempoolinfo()['minrelaytxfee'], Decimal('0.00001000'))
|
||||
assert_equal(node.getmempoolinfo()['mempoolminfee'], Decimal('0.00001000'))
|
||||
|
||||
self.fill_mempool()
|
||||
|
||||
# Deliberately try to create a tx with a fee less than the minimum mempool fee to assert that it does not get added to the mempool
|
||||
self.log.info('Create a mempool tx that will not pass mempoolminfee')
|
||||
assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "mempool min fee not met", miniwallet.send_self_transfer, from_node=node, fee_rate=relayfee)
|
||||
@@ -149,6 +322,9 @@ class MempoolLimitTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
|
||||
self.stop_node(0)
|
||||
self.nodes[0].assert_start_raises_init_error(["-maxmempool=4"], "Error: -maxmempool must be at least 5 MB")
|
||||
|
||||
self.test_mid_package_replacement()
|
||||
self.test_mid_package_eviction()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == '__main__':
|
||||
MempoolLimitTest().main()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -212,8 +212,8 @@ class RPCPackagesTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
|
||||
coin = self.wallet.get_utxo()
|
||||
|
||||
# tx1 and tx2 share the same inputs
|
||||
tx1 = self.wallet.create_self_transfer(utxo_to_spend=coin)
|
||||
tx2 = self.wallet.create_self_transfer(utxo_to_spend=coin)
|
||||
tx1 = self.wallet.create_self_transfer(utxo_to_spend=coin, fee_rate=DEFAULT_FEE)
|
||||
tx2 = self.wallet.create_self_transfer(utxo_to_spend=coin, fee_rate=2*DEFAULT_FEE)
|
||||
|
||||
# Ensure tx1 and tx2 are valid by themselves
|
||||
assert node.testmempoolaccept([tx1["hex"]])[0]["allowed"]
|
||||
@@ -222,8 +222,8 @@ class RPCPackagesTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
|
||||
self.log.info("Test duplicate transactions in the same package")
|
||||
testres = node.testmempoolaccept([tx1["hex"], tx1["hex"]])
|
||||
assert_equal(testres, [
|
||||
{"txid": tx1["txid"], "wtxid": tx1["wtxid"], "package-error": "conflict-in-package"},
|
||||
{"txid": tx1["txid"], "wtxid": tx1["wtxid"], "package-error": "conflict-in-package"}
|
||||
{"txid": tx1["txid"], "wtxid": tx1["wtxid"], "package-error": "package-contains-duplicates"},
|
||||
{"txid": tx1["txid"], "wtxid": tx1["wtxid"], "package-error": "package-contains-duplicates"}
|
||||
])
|
||||
|
||||
self.log.info("Test conflicting transactions in the same package")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ class MiniWallet:
|
||||
assert_equal(self._mode, MiniWalletMode.ADDRESS_OP_TRUE)
|
||||
return self._address
|
||||
|
||||
def get_utxo(self, *, txid: str = '', vout: Optional[int] = None, mark_as_spent=True) -> dict:
|
||||
def get_utxo(self, *, txid: str = '', vout: Optional[int] = None, mark_as_spent=True, confirmed_only=False) -> dict:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Returns a utxo and marks it as spent (pops it from the internal list)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -224,19 +224,23 @@ class MiniWallet:
|
||||
utxo_filter = reversed(mature_coins) # By default the largest utxo
|
||||
if vout is not None:
|
||||
utxo_filter = filter(lambda utxo: vout == utxo['vout'], utxo_filter)
|
||||
if confirmed_only:
|
||||
utxo_filter = filter(lambda utxo: utxo['confirmations'] > 0, utxo_filter)
|
||||
index = self._utxos.index(next(utxo_filter))
|
||||
if mark_as_spent:
|
||||
return self._utxos.pop(index)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
return self._utxos[index]
|
||||
|
||||
def get_utxos(self, *, include_immature_coinbase=False, mark_as_spent=True):
|
||||
def get_utxos(self, *, include_immature_coinbase=False, mark_as_spent=True, confirmed_only=False):
|
||||
"""Returns the list of all utxos and optionally mark them as spent"""
|
||||
if not include_immature_coinbase:
|
||||
blocks_height = self._test_node.getblockchaininfo()['blocks']
|
||||
utxo_filter = filter(lambda utxo: not utxo['coinbase'] or COINBASE_MATURITY - 1 <= blocks_height - utxo['height'], self._utxos)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
utxo_filter = self._utxos
|
||||
if confirmed_only:
|
||||
utxo_filter = filter(lambda utxo: utxo['confirmations'] > 0, utxo_filter)
|
||||
utxos = deepcopy(list(utxo_filter))
|
||||
if mark_as_spent:
|
||||
self._utxos = []
|
||||
@@ -286,14 +290,15 @@ class MiniWallet:
|
||||
locktime=0,
|
||||
sequence=0,
|
||||
fee_per_output=1000,
|
||||
target_weight=0
|
||||
target_weight=0,
|
||||
confirmed_only=False
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Create and return a transaction that spends the given UTXOs and creates a
|
||||
certain number of outputs with equal amounts. The output amounts can be
|
||||
set by amount_per_output or automatically calculated with a fee_per_output.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
utxos_to_spend = utxos_to_spend or [self.get_utxo()]
|
||||
utxos_to_spend = utxos_to_spend or [self.get_utxo(confirmed_only=confirmed_only)]
|
||||
sequence = [sequence] * len(utxos_to_spend) if type(sequence) is int else sequence
|
||||
assert_equal(len(utxos_to_spend), len(sequence))
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -333,9 +338,17 @@ class MiniWallet:
|
||||
"tx": tx,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
def create_self_transfer(self, *, fee_rate=Decimal("0.003"), fee=Decimal("0"), utxo_to_spend=None, locktime=0, sequence=0, target_weight=0):
|
||||
def create_self_transfer(self, *,
|
||||
fee_rate=Decimal("0.003"),
|
||||
fee=Decimal("0"),
|
||||
utxo_to_spend=None,
|
||||
locktime=0,
|
||||
sequence=0,
|
||||
target_weight=0,
|
||||
confirmed_only=False
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""Create and return a tx with the specified fee. If fee is 0, use fee_rate, where the resulting fee may be exact or at most one satoshi higher than needed."""
|
||||
utxo_to_spend = utxo_to_spend or self.get_utxo()
|
||||
utxo_to_spend = utxo_to_spend or self.get_utxo(confirmed_only=confirmed_only)
|
||||
assert fee_rate >= 0
|
||||
assert fee >= 0
|
||||
# calculate fee
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user