fa1d17d56c refactor: Use uint64_t over size_t for serialize corruption check in fees.dat (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Serialization should not behave differently on different architectures. See also the related commit 3789215f73.
However, on fees.dat file corruption, 32-bit builds may run into an unsigned integer overflow and report the wrong corruption reason, or may even silently continue after the corruption.
This is a bit hard to reproduce, because 32-bit platforms are rare and most of them don't support running the unsigned integer overflow sanitizer. So the possible options to reproduce are:
* Run on armhf and manually annotate the code to detect the overflow
* Run on i386 with the integer sanitizer (possibly via `podman run -it --rm --platform linux/i386 'debian:trixie'`)
* Run the integer sanitizer on any 64-bit platform and manually replace type in the affected line by `uint32_t`
Afterwards, the steps to reproduce are:
```
export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive && apt update && apt install curl wget htop git vim ccache -y && git clone https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin.git --depth=1 ./b-c && cd b-c && apt install build-essential cmake pkg-config python3-zmq libzmq3-dev libevent-dev libboost-dev libsqlite3-dev systemtap-sdt-dev libcapnp-dev capnproto libqrencode-dev qt6-tools-dev qt6-l10n-tools qt6-base-dev clang llvm libc++-dev libc++abi-dev -y
cmake -B ./bld-cmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug -DCMAKE_C_COMPILER='clang' -DCMAKE_CXX_COMPILER='clang++' -DSANITIZERS=undefined,integer,float-divide-by-zero --preset=dev-mode
cmake --build ./bld-cmake --parallel $(nproc)
curl -fLO '6074731370'
UBSAN_OPTIONS="suppressions=$(pwd)/test/sanitizer_suppressions/ubsan:print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1:report_error_type=1" FUZZ=policy_estimator_io ./bld-cmake/bin/fuzz ./607473137013139e3676e30ec4b29639e673fa9b
```
The output will be something like:
```
/b-c/src/policy/fees/block_policy_estimator.cpp:448:25: runtime error: unsigned integer overflow: 346685954 * 219 cannot be represented in type 'unsigned int'
#0 0x5b0b1bbe in TxConfirmStats::Read(AutoFile&, unsigned int) /b-c/bld-cmake/src/./policy/fees/block_policy_estimator.cpp:448:25
#1 0x5b0b7d3f in CBlockPolicyEstimator::Read(AutoFile&) /b-c/bld-cmake/src/./policy/fees/block_policy_estimator.cpp:1037:29
#2 0x592a9783 in policy_estimator_io_fuzz_target(std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>) /b-c/bld-cmake/src/test/fuzz/./test/fuzz/policy_estimator_io.cpp:32:32
#3 0x5896ba8e in void std::__invoke_impl<void, void (*&)(std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>), std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>>(std::__invoke_other, void (*&)(std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>), std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>&&) /usr/lib/gcc/i686-linux-gnu/14/../../../../include/c++/14/bits/invoke.h:61:14
#4 0x5896b8eb in std::enable_if<is_invocable_r_v<void, void (*&)(std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>), std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>>, void>::type std::__invoke_r<void, void (*&)(std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>), std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>>(void (*&)(std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>), std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>&&) /usr/lib/gcc/i686-linux-gnu/14/../../../../include/c++/14/bits/invoke.h:111:2
#5 0x5896b44b in std::_Function_handler<void (std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>), void (*)(std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>)>::_M_invoke(std::_Any_data const&, std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>&&) /usr/lib/gcc/i686-linux-gnu/14/../../../../include/c++/14/bits/std_function.h:290:9
#6 0x59845c95 in std::function<void (std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>)>::operator()(std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>) const /usr/lib/gcc/i686-linux-gnu/14/../../../../include/c++/14/bits/std_function.h:591:9
#7 0x5983a0da in test_one_input(std::span<unsigned char const, 4294967295u>) /b-c/bld-cmake/src/test/fuzz/util/./test/fuzz/fuzz.cpp:88:5
#8 0x5983cb80 in main /b-c/bld-cmake/src/test/fuzz/util/./test/fuzz/fuzz.cpp:271:13
#9 0xf75aecc2 (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24cc2) (BuildId: 2dc5f2945fad35c1b07d1a5a32520b3c41afaa75)
#10 0xf75aed87 in __libc_start_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x24d87) (BuildId: 2dc5f2945fad35c1b07d1a5a32520b3c41afaa75)
#11 0x58932db6 in _start (/b-c/bld-cmake/bin/fuzz+0x235ddb6) (BuildId: 7d8d83a77923f14e99c0de64acbc5f5bfc2cce9b)
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: unsigned-integer-overflow /b-c/src/policy/fees/block_policy_estimator.cpp:448:25
```
Note: This is marked a "refactor", because the code change does not affect 64-bit builds, and on the still remaining rare 32-bit builds today it is extremely unlikely to happen in production.
ACKs for top commit:
bensig:
ACK fa1d17d56c
ismaelsadeeq:
utACK fa1d17d56c
luke-jr:
Also, utACK fa1d17d56c as an improvement.
Tree-SHA512: 696bf8e0dbe4777c84cb90e313c7f8f9ee90d4b3e64de1222f8472b2d9d0f3a0f6f027fda743dd6ca8c6aab94f404db7a65bb562a76000d9c33a8a39de28d8d4
fa4cb13b52 test: [doc] Manually unify stale headers (MarcoFalke)
fa5f297748 scripted-diff: [doc] Unify stale copyright headers (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Historically, the upper year range in file headers was bumped manually
or with a script.
This has many issues:
* The script is causing churn. See for example commit 306ccd4, or
drive-by first-time contributions bumping them one-by-one. (A few from
this year: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/32008,
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/31642,
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/32963, ...)
* Some, or likely most, upper year values were wrong. Reasons for
incorrect dates could be code moves, cherry-picks, or simply bugs in
the script.
* The upper range is not needed for anything.
* Anyone who wants to find the initial file creation date, or file
history, can use `git log` or `git blame` to get more accurate
results.
* Many places are already using the `-present` suffix, with the meaning
that the upper range is omitted.
To fix all issues, this bumps the upper range of the copyright headers
to `-present`.
Further notes:
* Obviously, the yearly 4-line bump commit for the build system (c.f.
b537a2c02a) is fine and will remain.
* For new code, the date range can be fully omitted, as it is done
already by some developers. Obviously, developers are free to pick
whatever style they want. One can list the commits for each style.
* For example, to list all commits that use `-present`:
`git log --format='%an (%ae) [%h: %s]' -S 'present The Bitcoin'`.
* Alternatively, to list all commits that use no range at all:
`git log --format='%an (%ae) [%h: %s]' -S '(c) The Bitcoin'`.
<!--
* The lower range can be wrong as well, so it could be omitted as well,
but this is left for a follow-up. A previous attempt was in
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/26817.
ACKs for top commit:
l0rinc:
ACK fa4cb13b52
rkrux:
re-ACK fa4cb13b52
janb84:
ACK fa4cb13b52
Tree-SHA512: e5132781bdc4417d1e2922809b27ef4cf0abb37ffb68c65aab8a5391d3c917b61a18928ec2ec2c75ef5184cb79a5b8c8290d63e949220dbeab3bd2c0dfbdc4c5
The changes made here were:
| From | To |
|-------------------|------------------|
| `m.count(k)` | `m.contains(k)` |
| `!m.count(k)` | `!m.contains(k)` |
| `m.count(k) == 0` | `!m.contains(k)` |
| `m.count(k) != 0` | `m.contains(k)` |
| `m.count(k) > 0` | `m.contains(k)` |
The commit contains the trivial, mechanical refactors where it doesn't matter if the container can have multiple elements or not
Co-authored-by: Jan B <608446+janb84@users.noreply.github.com>
The changes made here were:
| From | To |
|------------------------|------------------|
| `m.find(k) == m.end()` | `!m.contains(k)` |
| `m.find(k) != m.end()` | `m.contains(k)` |
fa45a1503e log: Use LogWarning for non-critical logs (MarcoFalke)
fa0018d011 log: Use LogError for fatal errors (MarcoFalke)
22229de728 doc: Fix typo in init log (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Logging supports severity levels above info via the legacy `LogPrintf`. So use the more appropriate `LogError` or `LogWarning`, where it applies.
This has a few small benefits:
* It often allows to remove the manual and literal "error: ", "Warning:", ... prefixes. Instead the uniform log level formatting is used.
* It is easier to grep or glance for more severe logs, which indicate some kind of alert.
* `LogPrintf` didn't indicate any severity level, but it is an alias for `LogInfo`. So having the log level explicitly spelled out makes it easier to read the code.
* Also, remove the redundant trailing `\n` newline, while touching.
* Also, remove the `__func__` formatting in the log string, which is redundant with `-logsourcelocations`. Instead, use a unique log string for each location.
ACKs for top commit:
l0rinc:
Code review ACK fa45a1503e
stickies-v:
ACK fa45a1503e
rkrux:
crACK fa45a1503e
Tree-SHA512: 516d439c36716f969c6e82d00bcda03c92c8765a9e41593b90052c86f8fa3a3dacbb2c3dc98bfc862cefa54cae34842b488671a20dd86cf1d15fb94aa5563406
17cf9ff7ef Use cluster size limit for -maxmempool bound, and allow -maxmempool=0 in general (Suhas Daftuar)
315e43e5d8 Sanity check `GetFeerateDiagram()` in CTxMemPool::check() (Suhas Daftuar)
de2e9a24c4 test: extend package rbf functional test to larger clusters (Suhas Daftuar)
4ef4ddb504 doc: update policy/packages.md for new package acceptance logic (Suhas Daftuar)
79f73ad713 Add check that GetSortedScoreWithTopology() agrees with CompareMiningScoreWithTopology() (Suhas Daftuar)
a86ac11768 Update comments for CTxMemPool class (Suhas Daftuar)
9567eaa66d Invoke TxGraph::DoWork() at appropriate times (Suhas Daftuar)
6c5c44f774 test: add functional test for new cluster mempool RPCs (Suhas Daftuar)
72f60c877e doc: Update mempool_replacements.md to reflect feerate diagram checks (Suhas Daftuar)
21693f031a Expose cluster information via rpc (Suhas Daftuar)
72e74e0d42 fuzz: try to add more code coverage for mempool fuzzing (Suhas Daftuar)
f107417490 bench: add more mempool benchmarks (Suhas Daftuar)
7976eb1ae7 Avoid violating mempool policy limits in tests (Suhas Daftuar)
84de685cf7 Stop tracking parents/children outside of txgraph (Suhas Daftuar)
88672e205b Rewrite GatherClusters to use the txgraph implementation (Suhas Daftuar)
1ca4f01090 Fix miniminer_tests to work with cluster limits (Suhas Daftuar)
1902111e0f Eliminate CheckPackageLimits, which no longer does anything (Suhas Daftuar)
3a646ec462 Rework RBF and TRUC validation (Suhas Daftuar)
19b8479868 Make getting parents/children a function of the mempool, not a mempool entry (Suhas Daftuar)
5560913e51 Rework truc_policy to use descendants, not children (Suhas Daftuar)
a4458d6c40 Use txgraph to calculate descendants (Suhas Daftuar)
c8b6f70d64 Use txgraph to calculate ancestors (Suhas Daftuar)
241a3e666b Simplify ancestor calculation functions (Suhas Daftuar)
b9cec7f0a1 Make removeConflicts private (Suhas Daftuar)
0402e6c780 Remove unused limits from CalculateMemPoolAncestors (Suhas Daftuar)
08be765ac2 Remove mempool logic designed to maintain ancestor/descendant state (Suhas Daftuar)
fc4e3e6bc1 Remove unused members from CTxMemPoolEntry (Suhas Daftuar)
ff3b398d12 mempool: eliminate accessors to mempool entry ancestor/descendant cached state (Suhas Daftuar)
b9a2039f51 Eliminate use of cached ancestor data in miniminer_tests and truc_policy (Suhas Daftuar)
ba09fc9774 mempool: Remove unused function CalculateDescendantMaximum (Suhas Daftuar)
8e49477e86 wallet: Replace max descendant count with cluster_count (Suhas Daftuar)
e031085fd4 Eliminate Single-Conflict RBF Carve Out (Suhas Daftuar)
cf3ab8e1d0 Stop enforcing descendant size/count limits (Suhas Daftuar)
89ae38f489 test: remove rbf carveout test from mempool_limit.py (Suhas Daftuar)
c0bd04d18f Calculate descendant information for mempool RPC output on-the-fly (Suhas Daftuar)
bdcefb8a8b Use mempool/txgraph to determine if a tx has descendants (Suhas Daftuar)
69e1eaa6ed Add test case for cluster size limits to TRUC logic (Suhas Daftuar)
9cda64b86c Stop enforcing ancestor size/count limits (Suhas Daftuar)
1f93227a84 Remove dependency on cached ancestor data in mini-miner (Suhas Daftuar)
9fbe0a4ac2 rpc: Calculate ancestor data from scratch for mempool rpc calls (Suhas Daftuar)
7961496dda Reimplement GetTransactionAncestry() to not rely on cached data (Suhas Daftuar)
feceaa42e8 Remove CTxMemPool::GetSortedDepthAndScore (Suhas Daftuar)
21b5cea588 Use cluster linearization for transaction relay sort order (Suhas Daftuar)
6445aa7d97 Remove the ancestor and descendant indices from the mempool (Suhas Daftuar)
216e693729 Implement new RBF logic for cluster mempool (Suhas Daftuar)
ff8f115dec policy: Remove CPFP carveout rule (Suhas Daftuar)
c3f1afc934 test: rewrite PopulateMempool to not violate mempool policy (cluster size) limits (Suhas Daftuar)
47ab32fdb1 Select transactions for blocks based on chunk feerate (Suhas Daftuar)
dec138d1dd fuzz: remove comparison between mini_miner block construction and miner (Suhas Daftuar)
6c2bceb200 bench: rewrite ComplexMemPool to not create oversized clusters (Suhas Daftuar)
1ad4590f63 Limit mempool size based on chunk feerate (Suhas Daftuar)
b11c89cab2 Rework miner_tests to not require large cluster limit (Suhas Daftuar)
95a8297d48 Check cluster limits when using -walletrejectlongchains (Suhas Daftuar)
95762e6759 Do not allow mempool clusters to exceed configured limits (Suhas Daftuar)
edb3e7cdf6 [test] rework/delete feature_rbf tests requiring large clusters (glozow)
435fd56711 test: update feature_rbf.py replacement test (Suhas Daftuar)
34e32985e8 Add new (unused) limits for cluster size/count (Suhas Daftuar)
838d7e3553 Add transactions to txgraph, but without cluster dependencies (Suhas Daftuar)
d5ed9cb3eb Add accessor for sigops-adjusted weight (Suhas Daftuar)
1bf3b51396 Add sigops adjusted weight calculator (Suhas Daftuar)
c18c68a950 Create a txgraph inside CTxMemPool (Suhas Daftuar)
29a94d5b2f Make CTxMemPoolEntry derive from TxGraph::Ref (Suhas Daftuar)
92b0079fe3 Allow moving CTxMemPoolEntry objects, disallow copying (Suhas Daftuar)
6c73e47448 mempool: Store iterators into mapTx in mapNextTx (Suhas Daftuar)
51430680ec Allow moving an Epoch::Marker (Suhas Daftuar)
Pull request description:
[Reopening #28676 here as a new PR, because GitHub is slow to load the page making it hard to scroll through and see comments. Also, that PR was originally opened with a prototype implementation which has changed significantly with the introduction of `TxGraph`.]
This is an implementation of the [cluster mempool proposal](https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/an-overview-of-the-cluster-mempool-proposal/393).
This branch implements the following observable behavior changes:
- Maintains a partitioning of the mempool into connected clusters (via the `txgraph` class), which are limited in vsize to 101 kvB by default, and limited in count to 64 by default.
- Each cluster is sorted ("linearized") to try to optimize for selecting highest-feerate-subsets of a cluster first
- Transaction selection for mining is updated to use the cluster linearizations, selecting highest feerate "chunks" first for inclusion in a block template.
- Mempool eviction is updated to use the cluster linearizations, selecting lowest feerate "chunks" first for removal.
- The RBF rules are updated to: (a) drop the requirement that no new inputs are introduced; (b) change the feerate requirement to instead check that the feerate diagram of the mempool will strictly improve; (c) replace the direct conflicts limit with a directly-conflicting-clusters limit.
- The CPFP carveout rule is eliminated (it doesn't make sense in a cluster-limited mempool)
- The ancestor and descendant limits are no longer enforced.
- New cluster count/cluster vsize limits are now enforced instead.
- Transaction relay now uses chunk feerate comparisons to determine the order that newly received transactions are announced to peers.
Additionally, the cached ancestor and descendant data are dropped from the mempool, along with the multi_index indices that were maintained to sort the mempool by ancestor and descendant feerates. For compatibility (eg with wallet behavior or RPCs exposing this), this information is now calculated dynamically instead.
ACKs for top commit:
instagibbs:
reACK 17cf9ff7ef
glozow:
reACK 17cf9ff7ef
sipa:
ACK 17cf9ff7ef
Tree-SHA512: bbde46d913d56f8d9c0426cb0a6c4fa80b01b0a4c2299500769921f886082fb4f51f1694e0ee1bc318c52e1976d7ebed8134a64eda0b8044f3a708c04938eee7
Calculating mempool ancestors for a new transaction should not be done until
after cluster size limits have been enforced, to limit CPU DoS potential.
Achieve this by reworking TRUC and RBF validation logic:
- TRUC policy enforcement is now done using only mempool parents of
new transactions, not all mempool ancestors (note that it's fine to calculate
ancestors of in-mempool transactions, if the number of such calls is
reasonably bounded).
- RBF replacement checks are performed earlier (which allows for checking
cluster size limits earlier, because cluster size checks cannot happen until
after all conflicts are staged for removal).
- Verifying that a new transaction doesn't conflict with an ancestor now
happens later, in AcceptSingleTransaction() rather than in PreChecks(). This
means that the test is not performed at all in AcceptMultipleTransactions(),
but in package acceptance we already disallow RBF in situations where a
package transaction has in-mempool parents.
Also to ensure that all RBF validation logic is applied in both the single
transaction and multiple transaction cases, remove the optimization that skips
the PackageMempoolChecks() in the case of a single transaction being validated
in AcceptMultipleTransactions().
Now that ancestor calculation never fails (due to ancestor/descendant limits
being eliminated), we can eliminate the error handling from
CalculateMemPoolAncestors.
With a total ordering on mempool transactions, we are now able to calculate a
transaction's mining score at all times. Use this to improve the RBF logic:
- we no longer enforce a "no new unconfirmed parents" rule
- we now require that the mempool's feerate diagram must improve in order
to accept a replacement
- the topology restrictions for conflicts in the package rbf setting have been
eliminated
Revert the temporary change to mempool_ephemeral_dust.py that were previously
made due to RBF validation checks being reordered.
Co-authored-by: Gregory Sanders <gsanders87@gmail.com>, glozow <gloriajzhao@gmail.com>
fa6c0bedd3 refactor: Return uint64_t from GetSerializeSize (MarcoFalke)
fad0c8680e refactor: Use uint64_t over size_t for serialized-size values (MarcoFalke)
fa4f388fc9 refactor: Use fixed size ints over (un)signed ints for serialized values (MarcoFalke)
fa01f38e53 move-only: Move CBlockFileInfo to kernel namespace (MarcoFalke)
fa2bbc9e4c refactor: [rpc] Remove cast when reporting serialized size (MarcoFalke)
fa364af89b test: Remove outdated comment (MarcoFalke)
Pull request description:
Consensus code should arrive at the same conclusion, regardless of the architecture it runs on. Using architecture-specific types such as `size_t` can lead to issues, such as the low-severity [CVE-2025-46597](https://bitcoincore.org/en/2025/10/24/disclose-cve-2025-46597/).
The CVE was already worked around, but it may be good to still fix the underlying issue.
Fixes https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/33709 with a few refactors to use explicit fixed-sized integer types in serialization-size related code and concluding with a refactor to return `uint64_t` from `GetSerializeSize`. The refactors should not change any behavior, because the CVE was already worked around.
ACKs for top commit:
Crypt-iQ:
crACK fa6c0bedd3
l0rinc:
ACK fa6c0bedd3
laanwj:
Code review ACK fa6c0bedd3
Tree-SHA512: f45057bd86fb46011e4cb3edf0dc607057d72ed869fd6ad636562111ae80fea233b2fc45c34b02256331028359a9c3f4fa73e9b882b225bdc089d00becd0195e
The values are small enough to fit in size_t, but to avoid having to
think about it, just use uint64_t consistently for all architectures.
On 64-bit systems, this refactor is a no-op. On 32-bit systems, it could
avoid bugs in the theoretical and unexpected case where a 32-bit size_t
is too small and overflows.
- Also move them to policy/fees/ and update includes
- Note: the block_policy_estimator_args.h include in block_policy_estimator_args.cpp was done manually.
5ded99a7f0 fuzz: MockMempoolMinFee in wallet_fees (brunoerg)
c9a7a198d9 test: move MockMempoolMinFee to util/txmempool (brunoerg)
adf67eb21b fuzz: create FeeEstimatorTestingSetup to set fee_estimator (brunoerg)
ff10a37e99 fuzz: mock CBlockPolicyEstimator in wallet_fuzz (brunoerg)
f591c3beca fees: make estimateSmartFee/HighestTargetTracked virtual for mocking (brunoerg)
19273d0705 fuzz: set mempool options in wallet_fees (brunoerg)
Pull request description:
Some functions in `wallet/fees.cpp` (fuzzed by the wallet_fees target) depends on some mempool stuff - e.g. relay current min fee, smart fee and max blocks estimation, relay dust fee and other ones. For better fuzzing of it, it would be great to have these values/interactions. That said, this PR enhances the `wallet_fees` target by:
- Setting mempool options - `min_relay_feerate`, `dust_relay_feerate` and `incremental_relay_feerate` - when creating the `CTxMemPool`.
- Creates a `ConsumeMempoolMinFee` function which is used to have a mempool min fee (similar approach from `MockMempoolMinFee` from unit test).
- Mock `CBlockPolicyEstimator` - estimateSmartFee/HighestTagretTracket functions, especifically. It's better to mock it then trying to interact to CBlockPolicyEstimator in order to have some effective values due to performance.
Note that I created `FeeEstimatorTestingSetup` because we cannot set `m_node.fee_estimator` in `ChainTestingSetup` since fae8c73d9e.
ACKs for top commit:
maflcko:
re-ACK 5ded99a7f0🎯
ismaelsadeeq:
Code review ACK 5ded99a7f0
Tree-SHA512: 13d2af042098afd237ef349437021ea841069d93d4c3e3a32e1b562c027d00c727f375426709d34421092993398caf7ba8ff19077982cb6f470f8938a44e7754
652424ad16 test: additional test coverage for script_verify_flags (Anthony Towns)
417437eb01 script/verify_flags: extend script_verify_flags to 64 bits (Anthony Towns)
3cbbcb66ef script/interpreter: make script_verify_flag_name an ordinary enum (Anthony Towns)
bddcadee82 script/verify_flags: make script_verify_flags type safe (Anthony Towns)
a5ead122fe script/interpreter: introduce script_verify_flags typename (Anthony Towns)
4577fb2b1e rpc: have getdeploymentinfo report script verify flags (Anthony Towns)
a3986935f0 validation: export GetBlockScriptFlags() (Anthony Towns)
5db8cd2d37 Move mapFlagNames and FormatScriptFlags logic to script/interpreter.h (Anthony Towns)
Pull request description:
We currently use 21 of 32 possible bits for `SCRIPT_VERIFY_*` flags, with open PRs that may use 8 more (#29247, #31989, #32247, #32453). The mutinynet fork that has included many experimental soft fork features is [already reusing bits here](d4a86277ed/src/script/interpreter.h (L175-L195)). Therefore, bump this to 64 bits.
In order to make it easier to update this logic in future, this PR also introduces a dedicated type for the script flags, and disables implicit conversion between that type and the underlying integer type. To make verifying that this change doesn't cause flags to disappear, this PR also resurrects the changes from #28806 so that the script flags that are consensus enforced on each block can be queried via getdeploymentinfo.
ACKs for top commit:
instagibbs:
reACK 652424ad16
achow101:
ACK 652424ad16
darosior:
ACK 652424ad16
theStack:
Code-review ACK 652424ad16🎏
Tree-SHA512: 7b30152196cdfdef8b9700b571b7d7d4e94d28fbc5c26ea7532788037efc02e4b1d8de392b0b20507badfdc26f5c125f8356a479604a9149b8aae23a7cf5549f
ba84a25dee [doc] update mempool-replacements.md for incremental relay feerate change (glozow)
18720bc5d5 [doc] release note for min feerate changes (glozow)
6da5de58ca [policy] lower default minrelaytxfee and incrementalrelayfee to 100sat/kvB (glozow)
2e515d2897 [prep/test] make wallet_fundrawtransaction's minrelaytxfee assumption explicit (glozow)
457cfb61b5 [prep/util] help MockMempoolMinFee handle more precise feerates (glozow)
3eab8b7240 [prep/test] replace magic number 1000 with respective feerate vars (glozow)
5f2df0ef78 [miner] lower default -blockmintxfee to 1sat/kvB (glozow)
d6213d6aa1 [doc] assert that default min relay feerate and incremental are the same (glozow)
1fbee5d7b6 [test] explicitly check default -minrelaytxfee and -incrementalrelayfee (glozow)
72dc18467d [test] RBF rule 4 for various incrementalrelayfee settings (glozow)
85f498893f [test] check bypass of minrelay for various minrelaytxfee settings (glozow)
e5f896bb1f [test] check miner doesn't select 0fee transactions (glozow)
Pull request description:
ML post for discussion about the general concept, how this impacts the wider ecosystem, philosophy about minimum feerates, etc: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/changing-the-minimum-relay-feerate/1886
This PR is inspired by #13922 and #32959 to lower the minimum relay feerate in response to bitcoin's exchange rate changes in the last ~10 years. It lowers the default `-minrelaytxfee` and `-incrementalrelayfee`, and knocks `-blockmintxfee` down to the minimum nonzero setting. Also adds some tests for the settings and pulls in #32750.
The minimum relay feerate is a DoS protection rule, representing a price on the network bandwidth used to relay transactions that have no PoW. While relay nodes don't all collect fees, the assumption is that if nodes on the network use their resources to relay this transaction, it will reach a miner and the attacker's money will be spent once it is mined. The incremental relay feerate is similar: it's used to price the relay of replacement transactions (the additional fees need to cover the new transactions at this feerate) and evicted transactions (following a trim, the new mempool minimum feerate is the package feerate of what was removed + incremental).
Also note that many nodes on the network have elected to relay/mine lower feerate transactions. Miners (some say up to 85%) are choosing to mine these low feerate transactions instead of leaving block space unfilled, but these blocks have extremely poor compact block reconstruction rates with nodes that rejected or didn't hear about those transactions earlier.
- https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/33106#issuecomment-3155627414
- https://x.com/caesrcd/status/1947022514267230302
- https://mempool.space/block/00000000000000000001305770e0aa279dcd8ba8be18c3d5cf736a26f77e06fd
- https://mempool.space/block/00000000000000000001b491649ec030aa8e003e1f4f9d3b24bb99ba16f91e97
- https://x.com/mononautical/status/1949452586391855121
While it wouldn't make sense to loosen DoS restrictions recklessly in response to these events, I think the current price is higher than necessary, and this motivates us changing the default soon. Since the minimum relay feerate defines an amount as too small based on what it costs the attacker, it makes sense to consider BTC's conversion rate to what resources you can buy in the "real world."
Going off of [this comment](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/32959#issuecomment-3095260286) and [this comment](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/33106#issuecomment-3142444090)
- Let's say an attacker wants to use/exhaust the network's bandwidth, and has the choice between renting resources from a commercial provider and getting the network to "spam" itself it by sending unconfirmed transactions. We'd like the latter to be more expensive than the former.
- The bandwidth for relaying a transaction across the network is roughly its serialized size (plus relay overhead) x number of nodes. A 1000vB transaction is 1000-4000B serialized. With 100k nodes, that's 0.1-0.4GB
- If the going rate for ec2 bandwidth is 10c/GB, that's like 1-4c per kvB of transaction data
- Then a 1000vB transaction should pay at least 4c
- $0.04 USD is 40 satoshis at 100k USD/BTC
- Baking in some margin for changes in USD/BTC conversion rate, number of nodes (and thus bandwidth), and commercial service costs, I think 50-100 satoshis is on the conservative end but in the right ballpark
- At least 97% of the recent sub-1sat/vB transactions would be accepted with a new threshold of 0.1sat/vB: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/33106#issuecomment-3156213089
List of feerates that are changed and why:
- min relay feerate: significant conversion rate changes, see above
- incremental relay feerate: should follow min relay feerate, see above
- block minimum feerate: shouldn’t be above min relay feerate, otherwise the node accepts transactions it will never mine. I've knocked it down to the bare minimum of 1sat/kvB. Now that we no longer have coin age priority (removed in v0.15), I think we can leave it to the `CheckFeeRate` policy rule to enforce a minimum entry price, and the block assembly code should just fill up the block with whatever it finds in mempool.
List of feerates that are not changed and why:
- dust feerate: this feerate cannot be changed as flexibly as the minrelay feerate. A much longer record of low feerate transactions being mined is needed to motivate a decrease there.
- maxfeerate (RPC, wallet): I think the conversion rate is relevant as well, but out of scope for this PR
- minimum feerate returned by fee estimator: should be done later. In the past, we've excluded new policy defaults from fee estimation until we feel confident they represent miner policy (e.g. #9519). Also, the fee estimator itself doesn't have support for sub-1sat/vB yet.
- all wallet feerates (mintxfee, fallbackfee, discardfee, consolidatefeerate, WALLET_INCREMENTAL_RELAY_FEE, etc.): should be done later. Our standard procedure is to do wallet changes at least 1 release after policy changes.
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
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jsarenik:
Tested ACK ba84a25dee
darosior:
ACK ba84a25dee
ajtowns:
ACK ba84a25dee
davidgumberg:
crACK ba84a25dee
w0xlt:
ACK ba84a25dee
caesrcd:
reACK ba84a25dee
ismaelsadeeq:
re-ACK ba84a25dee
Tree-SHA512: b4c35e8b506b1184db466551a7e2e48bb1e535972a8dbcaa145ce3a8bfdcc70a8807dc129460f129a9d31024174d34077154a387c32f1a3e6831f6fa5e9c399e
Previously the SCRIPT_VERIFY_* flags were specified as either uint32_t,
unsigned int, or unsigned. This converts them to a common type alias in
preparation for changing the underlying type.
de0675f9de refactor: Move `transaction_identifier.h` to primitives (marcofleon)
6f068f65de Remove implicit uint256 conversion and comparison (marcofleon)
9c24cda72e refactor: Convert remaining instances from uint256 to Txid (marcofleon)
d2ecd6815d policy, refactor: Convert uint256 to Txid (marcofleon)
f6c0d1d231 mempool, refactor: Convert uint256 to Txid (marcofleon)
aeb0f78330 refactor: Convert `mini_miner` from uint256 to Txid (marcofleon)
326f244724 refactor: Convert RPCs and `merkleblock` from uint256 to Txid (marcofleon)
49b3d3a92a Clean up `FindTxForGetData` (marcofleon)
Pull request description:
This is the final leg of the [type safety refactor](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/32189).
All of these changes are straightforward `uint256` --> `Txid` along with any necessary explicit conversions. Also, `transaction_identifier.h` is moved to primitives in the last commit, as `Txid` and `Wtxid` become fundamental types after this PR.
ACKs for top commit:
stickies-v:
re-ACK de0675f9de, no changes since a20724d926d5844168c6a13fa8293df8c8927efe except address review nits.
janb84:
re ACK de0675f9de
dergoegge:
re-ACK de0675f9de
theStack:
Code-review ACK de0675f9de
Tree-SHA512: 2413160fca7ab146a8d79d18ce3afcf7384cacc73c513d41928904aa453b4dd7a350064cee71e9c5d015da5904c7c81ac17603e50a47441ebc5b0c653235dd08
Let's say an attacker wants to use/exhaust the network's bandwidth, and
has the choice between renting resources from a commercial provider and
getting the network to "spam" itself it by sending unconfirmed
transactions. We'd like the latter to be more expensive than the former.
The bandwidth for relaying a transaction across the network is roughly
its serialized size (plus relay overhead) x number of nodes. A 1000vB
transaction is 1000-4000B serialized. With 100k nodes, that's 0.1-0.4GB
If the going rate for commercial services is 10c/GB, that's like 1-4c per kvB
of transaction data, so a 1000vB transaction should pay at least $0.04.
At a price of 120k USD/BTC, 100sat is about $0.12. This price allows us
to tolerate a large decrease in the conversion rate or increase in the
number of nodes.
Back when we implemented coin age priority as a miner policy, miners
mempools might admit transactions paying very low fees, but then want to
set a higher fee for block inclusion. However, since coin age priority
was removed in v0.15, the block assembly policy is solely based on fees,
so we do not need to apply minimum feerate rules in multiple places. In
fact, the block assembly policy ignoring transactions that are added to
the mempool is likely undesirable as we waste resources accepting and
storing this transaction.
Instead, rely on mempool policy to enforce a minimum entry feerate to
the mempool (minrelaytxfee). Set the minimum block feerate to the
minimum non-zero amount (1sat/kvB) so it collects everything it finds in
mempool into the block.
d3b8a54a81 Refactor CFeeRate to use FeeFrac internally (Pol Espinasa)
Pull request description:
The `FeeFrac` type represents a fraction, intended to be used for `sats/vbyte` or `sats/WU`. It was added to improve accuracy when evaluating fee rates in cluster mempool. [1]
But it can also be used to fix the precision issues that the current `CFeeRate` class has now.
At the moment, `CFeeRate` handles the fee rate as satoshis per kilovirtualbyte: `CAmount / kvB` using an integer.
This PR fix `CFeeRate` precision issues by encapsulating `FeeFrac` internally keeping backwards compatibility.
This PR can also be used as a based to use multiple units on RPC calls as detailed in this issue [2].
Some previous discussions:
[1] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/30535
[2] https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/32093
ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK d3b8a54a81
murchandamus:
code review, lightly tested ACK d3b8a54a81
ismaelsadeeq:
re-ACK d3b8a54a81📦
theStack:
Code-review ACK d3b8a54a81
Tree-SHA512: 5a8149d81e82ad4e60a0e76ff6a82a5b1c4e212cf5156c1cdd16bf9acbb351e7be458eac3f0a2ae89107f331062b299c1d9ca649d3b820ad0b68e6d1a14292e5
27aefac425 validation: detect witness stripping without re-running Script checks (Antoine Poinsot)
2907b58834 policy: introduce a helper to detect whether a transaction spends Segwit outputs (Antoine Poinsot)
eb073209db qa: test witness stripping in p2p_segwit (Antoine Poinsot)
Pull request description:
Since it was introduced in 4eb515574e (#18044), the detection of a stripped witness relies on running the Script checks 3 times. In the worst case, this consists in running Script validation for every single input 3 times.
Detection of a stripped witness is necessary because in this case wtxid==txid, and the transaction's wtxid must not be added to the reject filter or it could allow a malicious peer to interfere with txid-based orphan resolution as used in 1p1c package relay.
However it is not necessary to run Script validation to detect a stripped witness (much less so doing it 3 times in a row). There are 3 types of witness program: defined program types (Taproot, P2WPKH and P2WSH), undefined types, and the Pay-to-anchor carve-out.
For defined program types, Script validation with an empty witness will always fail (by consensus). For undefined program types, Script validation is always going to fail regardless of the witness (by standardness). For P2A, an empty witness is never going to lead to a failure.
Therefore it holds that we can always detect a stripped witness without re-running Script validation. However this might lead to more "false positives" (cases where we return witness stripping for an otherwise invalid transaction) than the existing implementation. For instance a transaction with one P2PKH input with an invalid signature and one P2WPKH input with its witness stripped. The existing implementation would treat it as consensus invalid while the implementation in this PR would always consider it witness stripped.
h/t AJ: this essentially implements a variant of https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/33066#issuecomment-3135258539.
ACKs for top commit:
sipa:
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Crypt-iQ:
re-ACK 27aefac425
glozow:
reACK 27aefac425
Tree-SHA512: 70cf76b655b52bc8fa2759133315a3f11140844b6b80d9de3c95f592050978cc01a87bd2446e3a9c25cc872efea7659d6da3337b1a709511771fece206e9f149
ea17a9423f [doc] release note for relaxing requirement of all unconfirmed parents present (glozow)
12f48d5ed3 test: add chained 1p1c propagation test (Greg Sanders)
525be56741 [unit test] package submission 2p1c with 1 parent missing (glozow)
f24771af05 relax child-with-unconfirmed-parents rule (glozow)
Pull request description:
Broadens the package validation interface, see #27463 for wider context.
On master, package rules include that (1) the package topology must be child-wth-parents (2) all of the child's unconfirmed parents must be present. This PR relaxes the second rule, leaving the first rule untouched (there are plans to change that as well, but not here).
Original motivation for this rule was based on the idea that we would have a child-with-unconfirmed-parents package relay protocol, and this would verify that the peer provided the "correct" package. For various reasons, we're not planning on doing this. We could potentially do this for ancestor packages (with a similar definition that all UTXOs to make the tx valid are available in this package), but it's also questionable whether it's useful to enforce this.
This rule gets in the way of certain usage of 1p1c package relay currently. If a transaction has multiple parents, of which only 1 requires a package CPFP, this rule blocks the package from relaying. Even if all the non-low-feerate parents are already in mempool, when the p2p logic submits the 1p1c package, it gets rejected for not meeting this rule.
ACKs for top commit:
ishaanam:
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instagibbs:
ACK ea17a9423f
Tree-SHA512: c2231761ae7b2acea10a96735e7a36c646f517964d0acb59bacbae1c5a1950e0223458b84c6d5ce008f0c1d53c1605df0fb3cd0064ee535ead006eb7c0fa625b
This rule was originally introduced along with a very early proposal for
package relay as a way to verify that the "correct"
child-with-unconfirmed-parents package was provided for a transaction,
where correctness was defined as all of the transactions unconfirmed
parents. However, we are not planning to introduce a protocol where
peers would be asked to send these packages.
This rule has downsides: if a transaction has multiple parents but only
1 that requires package CPFP to be accepted, the current rule prevents
us from accepting that package. Even if the other parents are already in
mempool, the p2p logic will only submit the 1p1c package, which fails
this check. See the test in p2p_1p1c_network.py
96da68a38f qa: functional test a transaction running into the legacy sigop limit (Antoine Poinsot)
367147954d qa: unit test standardness of inputs packed with legacy sigops (Antoine Poinsot)
5863315e33 policy: make pathological transactions packed with legacy sigops non-standard. (Antoine Poinsot)
Pull request description:
The Consensus Cleanup soft fork proposal includes a limit on the number of legacy signature
operations potentially executed when validating a transaction. If this change is to be implemented
here and activated by Bitcoin users in the future, we should make transactions that are not valid
according to the new rules non-standard first because it would otherwise be a trivial DoS to
potentially unupgraded miners after the soft fork activates.
ML post: https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/49dyqqkf5NqGlGdinp6SELIoxzE_ONh3UIj6-EB8S804Id5yROq-b1uGK8DUru66eIlWuhb5R3nhRRutwuYjemiuOOBS2FQ4KWDnEh0wLuA=@protonmail.com/T/#u
ACKs for top commit:
instagibbs:
reACK 96da68a38f
maflcko:
review ACK 96da68a38f🚋
achow101:
ACK 96da68a38f
glozow:
light code review ACK 96da68a38f, looks correct to me
Tree-SHA512: 106ffe62e48952affa31c5894a404a17a3b4ea8971815828166fba89069f757366129f7807205e8c6558beb75c6f67d8f9a41000be2f8cf95be3b1a02d87bfe9
The Consensus Cleanup soft fork proposal includes a limit on the number of legacy signature
operations potentially executed when validating a transaction. If this change is to be implemented
here and activated by Bitcoin users in the future, we should prevent the ability for someone to
broadcast a transaction through the p2p network that is not valid according to the new rules. This
is because if it was possible it would be a trivial DoS to potentially unupgraded miners after the
soft fork activates.
We do not know for sure whether users will activate the Consensus Cleanup. However if they do such
transactions must have been made non-standard long in advance, due to the time it takes for most
nodes on the network to upgrade. In addition this limit may only be run into by pathological
transactions which pad the Script with sigops but do not use actual signatures when spending, as
otherwise they would run into the standard transaction size limit.
