mirror of
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin.git
synced 2026-01-30 03:46:45 +01:00
Compare commits
25 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
0b4aa31c34 | ||
|
|
cc0553d0d6 | ||
|
|
785242dd4c | ||
|
|
5f06dcf9c9 | ||
|
|
b53bf22c72 | ||
|
|
324e562399 | ||
|
|
c33e83a53a | ||
|
|
c68d4d0ac5 | ||
|
|
bd715bfb30 | ||
|
|
b6d006d2a2 | ||
|
|
fce992b38e | ||
|
|
40c56a4d13 | ||
|
|
7c82b2758c | ||
|
|
b5419ce6b6 | ||
|
|
0535c253fe | ||
|
|
8141498f3a | ||
|
|
0c5c5962cb | ||
|
|
24736350e9 | ||
|
|
50c0b61a9d | ||
|
|
aff368fa81 | ||
|
|
076c67c3aa | ||
|
|
97a1d0a459 | ||
|
|
4ac0eb543d | ||
|
|
a718bfafe7 | ||
|
|
1e956439eb |
5
.github/workflows/ci.yml
vendored
5
.github/workflows/ci.yml
vendored
@@ -96,7 +96,10 @@ jobs:
|
||||
- name: Install Homebrew packages
|
||||
env:
|
||||
HOMEBREW_NO_INSTALLED_DEPENDENTS_CHECK: 1
|
||||
run: brew install automake libtool pkg-config gnu-getopt ccache boost libevent miniupnpc libnatpmp zeromq qt@5 qrencode
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
# A workaround for "The `brew link` step did not complete successfully" error.
|
||||
brew install python@3 || brew link --overwrite python@3
|
||||
brew install automake libtool pkg-config gnu-getopt ccache boost libevent miniupnpc libnatpmp zeromq qt@5 qrencode
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Set Ccache directory
|
||||
run: echo "CCACHE_DIR=${RUNNER_TEMP}/ccache_dir" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,9 @@
|
||||
export LC_ALL=C.UTF-8
|
||||
|
||||
export HOST=x86_64-apple-darwin
|
||||
export PIP_PACKAGES="zmq"
|
||||
# Homebrew's python@3.12 is marked as externally managed (PEP 668).
|
||||
# Therefore, `--break-system-packages` is needed.
|
||||
export PIP_PACKAGES="--break-system-packages zmq"
|
||||
export GOAL="install"
|
||||
export BITCOIN_CONFIG="--with-gui --with-miniupnpc --with-natpmp --enable-reduce-exports"
|
||||
export CI_OS_NAME="macos"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ AC_PREREQ([2.69])
|
||||
define(_CLIENT_VERSION_MAJOR, 26)
|
||||
define(_CLIENT_VERSION_MINOR, 1)
|
||||
define(_CLIENT_VERSION_BUILD, 0)
|
||||
define(_CLIENT_VERSION_RC, 1)
|
||||
define(_CLIENT_VERSION_RC, 0)
|
||||
define(_CLIENT_VERSION_IS_RELEASE, true)
|
||||
define(_COPYRIGHT_YEAR, 2023)
|
||||
define(_COPYRIGHT_HOLDERS,[The %s developers])
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.49.1.
|
||||
.TH BITCOIN-CLI "1" "February 2024" "bitcoin-cli v26.1.0rc1" "User Commands"
|
||||
.TH BITCOIN-CLI "1" "March 2024" "bitcoin-cli v26.1.0" "User Commands"
|
||||
.SH NAME
|
||||
bitcoin-cli \- manual page for bitcoin-cli v26.1.0rc1
|
||||
bitcoin-cli \- manual page for bitcoin-cli v26.1.0
|
||||
.SH SYNOPSIS
|
||||
.B bitcoin-cli
|
||||
[\fI\,options\/\fR] \fI\,<command> \/\fR[\fI\,params\/\fR] \fI\,Send command to Bitcoin Core\/\fR
|
||||
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ bitcoin-cli \- manual page for bitcoin-cli v26.1.0rc1
|
||||
.B bitcoin-cli
|
||||
[\fI\,options\/\fR] \fI\,help <command> Get help for a command\/\fR
|
||||
.SH DESCRIPTION
|
||||
Bitcoin Core RPC client version v26.1.0rc1
|
||||
Bitcoin Core RPC client version v26.1.0
|
||||
.SH OPTIONS
|
||||
.HP
|
||||
\-?
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
|
||||
.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.49.1.
|
||||
.TH BITCOIN-QT "1" "February 2024" "bitcoin-qt v26.1.0rc1" "User Commands"
|
||||
.TH BITCOIN-QT "1" "March 2024" "bitcoin-qt v26.1.0" "User Commands"
|
||||
.SH NAME
|
||||
bitcoin-qt \- manual page for bitcoin-qt v26.1.0rc1
|
||||
bitcoin-qt \- manual page for bitcoin-qt v26.1.0
|
||||
.SH SYNOPSIS
|
||||
.B bitcoin-qt
|
||||
[\fI\,command-line options\/\fR]
|
||||
.SH DESCRIPTION
|
||||
Bitcoin Core version v26.1.0rc1
|
||||
Bitcoin Core version v26.1.0
|
||||
.SH OPTIONS
|
||||
.HP
|
||||
\-?
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
||||
.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.49.1.
|
||||
.TH BITCOIN-TX "1" "February 2024" "bitcoin-tx v26.1.0rc1" "User Commands"
|
||||
.TH BITCOIN-TX "1" "March 2024" "bitcoin-tx v26.1.0" "User Commands"
|
||||
.SH NAME
|
||||
bitcoin-tx \- manual page for bitcoin-tx v26.1.0rc1
|
||||
bitcoin-tx \- manual page for bitcoin-tx v26.1.0
|
||||
.SH SYNOPSIS
|
||||
.B bitcoin-tx
|
||||
[\fI\,options\/\fR] \fI\,<hex-tx> \/\fR[\fI\,commands\/\fR] \fI\,Update hex-encoded bitcoin transaction\/\fR
|
||||
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ bitcoin-tx \- manual page for bitcoin-tx v26.1.0rc1
|
||||
.B bitcoin-tx
|
||||
[\fI\,options\/\fR] \fI\,-create \/\fR[\fI\,commands\/\fR] \fI\,Create hex-encoded bitcoin transaction\/\fR
|
||||
.SH DESCRIPTION
|
||||
Bitcoin Core bitcoin\-tx utility version v26.1.0rc1
|
||||
Bitcoin Core bitcoin\-tx utility version v26.1.0
|
||||
.SH OPTIONS
|
||||
.HP
|
||||
\-?
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
|
||||
.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.49.1.
|
||||
.TH BITCOIN-UTIL "1" "February 2024" "bitcoin-util v26.1.0rc1" "User Commands"
|
||||
.TH BITCOIN-UTIL "1" "March 2024" "bitcoin-util v26.1.0" "User Commands"
|
||||
.SH NAME
|
||||
bitcoin-util \- manual page for bitcoin-util v26.1.0rc1
|
||||
bitcoin-util \- manual page for bitcoin-util v26.1.0
|
||||
.SH SYNOPSIS
|
||||
.B bitcoin-util
|
||||
[\fI\,options\/\fR] [\fI\,commands\/\fR] \fI\,Do stuff\/\fR
|
||||
.SH DESCRIPTION
|
||||
Bitcoin Core bitcoin\-util utility version v26.1.0rc1
|
||||
Bitcoin Core bitcoin\-util utility version v26.1.0
|
||||
.SH OPTIONS
|
||||
.HP
|
||||
\-?
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
|
||||
.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.49.1.
|
||||
.TH BITCOIN-WALLET "1" "February 2024" "bitcoin-wallet v26.1.0rc1" "User Commands"
|
||||
.TH BITCOIN-WALLET "1" "March 2024" "bitcoin-wallet v26.1.0" "User Commands"
|
||||
.SH NAME
|
||||
bitcoin-wallet \- manual page for bitcoin-wallet v26.1.0rc1
|
||||
bitcoin-wallet \- manual page for bitcoin-wallet v26.1.0
|
||||
.SH DESCRIPTION
|
||||
Bitcoin Core bitcoin\-wallet version v26.1.0rc1
|
||||
Bitcoin Core bitcoin\-wallet version v26.1.0
|
||||
.PP
|
||||
bitcoin\-wallet is an offline tool for creating and interacting with Bitcoin Core wallet files.
|
||||
By default bitcoin\-wallet will act on wallets in the default mainnet wallet directory in the datadir.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
|
||||
.\" DO NOT MODIFY THIS FILE! It was generated by help2man 1.49.1.
|
||||
.TH BITCOIND "1" "February 2024" "bitcoind v26.1.0rc1" "User Commands"
|
||||
.TH BITCOIND "1" "March 2024" "bitcoind v26.1.0" "User Commands"
|
||||
.SH NAME
|
||||
bitcoind \- manual page for bitcoind v26.1.0rc1
|
||||
bitcoind \- manual page for bitcoind v26.1.0
|
||||
.SH SYNOPSIS
|
||||
.B bitcoind
|
||||
[\fI\,options\/\fR] \fI\,Start Bitcoin Core\/\fR
|
||||
.SH DESCRIPTION
|
||||
Bitcoin Core version v26.1.0rc1
|
||||
Bitcoin Core version v26.1.0
|
||||
.SH OPTIONS
|
||||
.HP
|
||||
\-?
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
|
||||
26.1rc1 Release Notes
|
||||
26.1 Release Notes
|
||||
==================
|
||||
|
||||
Bitcoin Core version 26.1rc1 is now available from:
|
||||
Bitcoin Core version 26.1 is now available from:
|
||||
|
||||
<https://bitcoincore.org/bin/bitcoin-core-26.1/test.rc1/>
|
||||
<https://bitcoincore.org/bin/bitcoin-core-26.1/>
|
||||
|
||||
This release includes new features, various bug fixes and performance
|
||||
This release includes various bug fixes and performance
|
||||
improvements, as well as updated translations.
|
||||
|
||||
Please report bugs using the issue tracker at GitHub:
|
||||
@@ -45,10 +45,12 @@ Notable changes
|
||||
- #28994 wallet: skip BnB when SFFO is enabled
|
||||
- #28920 wallet: birth time update during tx scanning
|
||||
- #29176 wallet: Fix use-after-free in WalletBatch::EraseRecords
|
||||
- #29510 wallet: getrawchangeaddress and getnewaddress failures should not affect keypools for descriptor wallets
|
||||
|
||||
### RPC
|
||||
|
||||
- #29003 rpc: fix getrawtransaction segfault
|
||||
- #28784 rpc: keep .cookie file if it was not generated
|
||||
|
||||
### Logs
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -57,6 +59,8 @@ Notable changes
|
||||
### P2P and network changes
|
||||
|
||||
- #29200 net: create I2P sessions using both ECIES-X25519 and ElGamal encryption
|
||||
- #29412 p2p: Don't process mutated blocks
|
||||
- #29524 p2p: Don't consider blocks mutated if they don't connect to known prev block
|
||||
|
||||
### Build
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -67,28 +71,35 @@ Notable changes
|
||||
|
||||
- #28992 ci: Use Ubuntu 24.04 Noble for asan,tsan,tidy,fuzz
|
||||
- #29080 ci: Set HOMEBREW_NO_INSTALLED_DEPENDENTS_CHECK to avoid unrelated failures
|
||||
- #29610 ci: Fix "macOS native" job
|
||||
|
||||
### Miscellaneous
|
||||
|
||||
- #28391 refactor: Simplify CTxMempool/BlockAssembler fields, remove some external mapTx access
|
||||
- #29179 test: wallet rescan with reorged parent + IsFromMe child in mempool
|
||||
- #28791 snapshots: don't core dump when running -checkblockindex after loadtxoutset
|
||||
- #29357 test: Drop x modifier in fsbridge::fopen call for MinGW builds
|
||||
- #29529 fuzz: restrict fopencookie usage to Linux & FreeBSD
|
||||
|
||||
Credits
|
||||
=======
|
||||
|
||||
Thanks to everyone who directly contributed to this release:
|
||||
|
||||
- dergoegge
|
||||
- fanquake
|
||||
- furszy
|
||||
- glozow
|
||||
- Greg Sanders
|
||||
- Hennadii Stepanov
|
||||
- Jon Atack
|
||||
- MarcoFalke
|
||||
- Mark Friedenbach
|
||||
- Martin Zumsande
|
||||
- Murch
|
||||
- Roman Zeyde
|
||||
- stickies-v
|
||||
- UdjinM6
|
||||
|
||||
As well as to everyone that helped with translations on
|
||||
[Transifex](https://www.transifex.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4689,6 +4689,17 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
|
||||
|
||||
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "received block %s peer=%d\n", pblock->GetHash().ToString(), pfrom.GetId());
|
||||
|
||||
const CBlockIndex* prev_block{WITH_LOCK(m_chainman.GetMutex(), return m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(pblock->hashPrevBlock))};
|
||||
|
||||
// Check for possible mutation if it connects to something we know so we can check for DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT being active
|
||||
if (prev_block && IsBlockMutated(/*block=*/*pblock,
|
||||
/*check_witness_root=*/DeploymentActiveAfter(prev_block, m_chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT))) {
|
||||
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Received mutated block from peer=%d\n", peer->m_id);
|
||||
Misbehaving(*peer, 100, "mutated block");
|
||||
WITH_LOCK(cs_main, RemoveBlockRequest(pblock->GetHash(), peer->m_id));
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool forceProcessing = false;
|
||||
const uint256 hash(pblock->GetHash());
|
||||
bool min_pow_checked = false;
|
||||
@@ -4704,7 +4715,6 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
|
||||
mapBlockSource.emplace(hash, std::make_pair(pfrom.GetId(), true));
|
||||
|
||||
// Check work on this block against our anti-dos thresholds.
|
||||
const CBlockIndex* prev_block = m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(pblock->hashPrevBlock);
|
||||
if (prev_block && prev_block->nChainWork + CalculateHeadersWork({pblock->GetBlockHeader()}) >= GetAntiDoSWorkThreshold()) {
|
||||
min_pow_checked = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -71,8 +71,10 @@ public:
|
||||
// network and disk
|
||||
std::vector<CTransactionRef> vtx;
|
||||
|
||||
// memory only
|
||||
mutable bool fChecked;
|
||||
// Memory-only flags for caching expensive checks
|
||||
mutable bool fChecked; // CheckBlock()
|
||||
mutable bool m_checked_witness_commitment{false}; // CheckWitnessCommitment()
|
||||
mutable bool m_checked_merkle_root{false}; // CheckMerkleRoot()
|
||||
|
||||
CBlock()
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -95,6 +97,8 @@ public:
|
||||
CBlockHeader::SetNull();
|
||||
vtx.clear();
|
||||
fChecked = false;
|
||||
m_checked_witness_commitment = false;
|
||||
m_checked_merkle_root = false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
CBlockHeader GetBlockHeader() const
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ static fs::path GetAuthCookieFile(bool temp=false)
|
||||
return AbsPathForConfigVal(gArgs, arg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static bool g_generated_cookie = false;
|
||||
|
||||
bool GenerateAuthCookie(std::string *cookie_out)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const size_t COOKIE_SIZE = 32;
|
||||
@@ -105,6 +107,7 @@ bool GenerateAuthCookie(std::string *cookie_out)
|
||||
LogPrintf("Unable to rename cookie authentication file %s to %s\n", fs::PathToString(filepath_tmp), fs::PathToString(filepath));
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
g_generated_cookie = true;
|
||||
LogPrintf("Generated RPC authentication cookie %s\n", fs::PathToString(filepath));
|
||||
|
||||
if (cookie_out)
|
||||
@@ -131,7 +134,10 @@ bool GetAuthCookie(std::string *cookie_out)
|
||||
void DeleteAuthCookie()
|
||||
{
|
||||
try {
|
||||
fs::remove(GetAuthCookieFile());
|
||||
if (g_generated_cookie) {
|
||||
// Delete the cookie file if it was generated by this process
|
||||
fs::remove(GetAuthCookieFile());
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (const fs::filesystem_error& e) {
|
||||
LogPrintf("%s: Unable to remove random auth cookie file: %s\n", __func__, fsbridge::get_filesystem_error_message(e));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ FILE* FuzzedFileProvider::open()
|
||||
[&] {
|
||||
mode = "a+";
|
||||
});
|
||||
#if defined _GNU_SOURCE && !defined __ANDROID__
|
||||
#if defined _GNU_SOURCE && (defined(__linux__) || defined(__FreeBSD__))
|
||||
const cookie_io_functions_t io_hooks = {
|
||||
FuzzedFileProvider::read,
|
||||
FuzzedFileProvider::write,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,7 +29,14 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(xor_file)
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK_EXCEPTION(xor_file.ignore(1), std::ios_base::failure, HasReason{"AutoFile::ignore: file handle is nullpt"});
|
||||
}
|
||||
{
|
||||
AutoFile xor_file{raw_file("wbx"), xor_pat};
|
||||
#ifdef __MINGW64__
|
||||
// Our usage of mingw-w64 and the msvcrt runtime does not support
|
||||
// the x modifier for the _wfopen().
|
||||
const char* mode = "wb";
|
||||
#else
|
||||
const char* mode = "wbx";
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
AutoFile xor_file{raw_file(mode), xor_pat};
|
||||
xor_file << test1 << test2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,12 +4,17 @@
|
||||
|
||||
#include <chainparams.h>
|
||||
#include <consensus/amount.h>
|
||||
#include <consensus/merkle.h>
|
||||
#include <core_io.h>
|
||||
#include <hash.h>
|
||||
#include <net.h>
|
||||
#include <signet.h>
|
||||
#include <uint256.h>
|
||||
#include <util/chaintype.h>
|
||||
#include <validation.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <string>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <test/util/setup_common.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <boost/test/unit_test.hpp>
|
||||
@@ -145,4 +150,215 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(test_assumeutxo)
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(out110_2.nChainTx, 111U);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(block_malleation)
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Test utilities that calls `IsBlockMutated` and then clears the validity
|
||||
// cache flags on `CBlock`.
|
||||
auto is_mutated = [](CBlock& block, bool check_witness_root) {
|
||||
bool mutated{IsBlockMutated(block, check_witness_root)};
|
||||
block.fChecked = false;
|
||||
block.m_checked_witness_commitment = false;
|
||||
block.m_checked_merkle_root = false;
|
||||
return mutated;
|
||||
};
|
||||
auto is_not_mutated = [&is_mutated](CBlock& block, bool check_witness_root) {
|
||||
return !is_mutated(block, check_witness_root);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Test utilities to create coinbase transactions and insert witness
|
||||
// commitments.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Note: this will not include the witness stack by default to avoid
|
||||
// triggering the "no witnesses allowed for blocks that don't commit to
|
||||
// witnesses" rule when testing other malleation vectors.
|
||||
auto create_coinbase_tx = [](bool include_witness = false) {
|
||||
CMutableTransaction coinbase;
|
||||
coinbase.vin.resize(1);
|
||||
if (include_witness) {
|
||||
coinbase.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.resize(1);
|
||||
coinbase.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0] = std::vector<unsigned char>(32, 0x00);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
coinbase.vout.resize(1);
|
||||
coinbase.vout[0].scriptPubKey.resize(MINIMUM_WITNESS_COMMITMENT);
|
||||
coinbase.vout[0].scriptPubKey[0] = OP_RETURN;
|
||||
coinbase.vout[0].scriptPubKey[1] = 0x24;
|
||||
coinbase.vout[0].scriptPubKey[2] = 0xaa;
|
||||
coinbase.vout[0].scriptPubKey[3] = 0x21;
|
||||
coinbase.vout[0].scriptPubKey[4] = 0xa9;
|
||||
coinbase.vout[0].scriptPubKey[5] = 0xed;
|
||||
|
||||
auto tx = MakeTransactionRef(coinbase);
|
||||
assert(tx->IsCoinBase());
|
||||
return tx;
|
||||
};
|
||||
auto insert_witness_commitment = [](CBlock& block, uint256 commitment) {
|
||||
assert(!block.vtx.empty() && block.vtx[0]->IsCoinBase() && !block.vtx[0]->vout.empty());
|
||||
|
||||
CMutableTransaction mtx{*block.vtx[0]};
|
||||
CHash256().Write(commitment).Write(std::vector<unsigned char>(32, 0x00)).Finalize(commitment);
|
||||
memcpy(&mtx.vout[0].scriptPubKey[6], commitment.begin(), 32);
|
||||
block.vtx[0] = MakeTransactionRef(mtx);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
CBlock block;
|
||||
|
||||
// Empty block is expected to have merkle root of 0x0.
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(block.vtx.empty());
|
||||
block.hashMerkleRoot = uint256{1};
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
|
||||
block.hashMerkleRoot = uint256{};
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_not_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
|
||||
|
||||
// Block with a single coinbase tx is mutated if the merkle root is not
|
||||
// equal to the coinbase tx's hash.
|
||||
block.vtx.push_back(create_coinbase_tx());
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(block.vtx[0]->GetHash() != block.hashMerkleRoot);
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
|
||||
block.hashMerkleRoot = block.vtx[0]->GetHash();
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_not_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
|
||||
|
||||
// Block with two transactions is mutated if the merkle root does not
|
||||
// match the double sha256 of the concatenation of the two transaction
|
||||
// hashes.
|
||||
block.vtx.push_back(MakeTransactionRef(CMutableTransaction{}));
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
|
||||
HashWriter hasher;
|
||||
hasher.write(Span(reinterpret_cast<const std::byte*>(block.vtx[0]->GetHash().data()), 32));
|
||||
hasher.write(Span(reinterpret_cast<const std::byte*>(block.vtx[1]->GetHash().data()), 32));
|
||||
block.hashMerkleRoot = hasher.GetHash();
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_not_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
|
||||
|
||||
// Block with two transactions is mutated if any node is duplicate.
|
||||
{
|
||||
block.vtx[1] = block.vtx[0];
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
|
||||
HashWriter hasher;
|
||||
hasher.write(Span(reinterpret_cast<const std::byte*>(block.vtx[0]->GetHash().data()), 32));
|
||||
hasher.write(Span(reinterpret_cast<const std::byte*>(block.vtx[1]->GetHash().data()), 32));
|
||||
block.hashMerkleRoot = hasher.GetHash();
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Blocks with 64-byte coinbase transactions are not considered mutated
|
||||
block.vtx.clear();
|
||||
{
|
||||
CMutableTransaction mtx;
|
||||
mtx.vin.resize(1);
|
||||
mtx.vout.resize(1);
|
||||
mtx.vout[0].scriptPubKey.resize(4);
|
||||
block.vtx.push_back(MakeTransactionRef(mtx));
|
||||
block.hashMerkleRoot = block.vtx.back()->GetHash();
|
||||
assert(block.vtx.back()->IsCoinBase());
|
||||
assert(GetSerializeSize(block.vtx.back(), PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) == 64);
|
||||
}
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_not_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Test merkle root malleation
|
||||
|
||||
// Pseudo code to mine transactions tx{1,2,3}:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// ```
|
||||
// loop {
|
||||
// tx1 = random_tx()
|
||||
// tx2 = random_tx()
|
||||
// tx3 = deserialize_tx(txid(tx1) || txid(tx2));
|
||||
// if serialized_size_without_witness(tx3) == 64 {
|
||||
// print(hex(tx3))
|
||||
// break
|
||||
// }
|
||||
// }
|
||||
// ```
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The `random_tx` function used to mine the txs below simply created
|
||||
// empty transactions with a random version field.
|
||||
CMutableTransaction tx1;
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(DecodeHexTx(tx1, "ff204bd0000000000000", /*try_no_witness=*/true, /*try_witness=*/false));
|
||||
CMutableTransaction tx2;
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(DecodeHexTx(tx2, "8ae53c92000000000000", /*try_no_witness=*/true, /*try_witness=*/false));
|
||||
CMutableTransaction tx3;
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(DecodeHexTx(tx3, "cdaf22d00002c6a7f848f8ae4d30054e61dcf3303d6fe01d282163341f06feecc10032b3160fcab87bdfe3ecfb769206ef2d991b92f8a268e423a6ef4d485f06", /*try_no_witness=*/true, /*try_witness=*/false));
|
||||
{
|
||||
// Verify that double_sha256(txid1||txid2) == txid3
|
||||
HashWriter hasher;
|
||||
hasher.write(Span(reinterpret_cast<const std::byte*>(tx1.GetHash().data()), 32));
|
||||
hasher.write(Span(reinterpret_cast<const std::byte*>(tx2.GetHash().data()), 32));
|
||||
assert(hasher.GetHash() == tx3.GetHash());
|
||||
// Verify that tx3 is 64 bytes in size (without witness).
|
||||
assert(GetSerializeSize(tx3, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) == 64);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
CBlock block;
|
||||
block.vtx.push_back(MakeTransactionRef(tx1));
|
||||
block.vtx.push_back(MakeTransactionRef(tx2));
|
||||
uint256 merkle_root = block.hashMerkleRoot = BlockMerkleRoot(block);
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_not_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
|
||||
|
||||
// Mutate the block by replacing the two transactions with one 64-byte
|
||||
// transaction that serializes into the concatenation of the txids of
|
||||
// the transactions in the unmutated block.
|
||||
block.vtx.clear();
|
||||
block.vtx.push_back(MakeTransactionRef(tx3));
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(!block.vtx.back()->IsCoinBase());
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(BlockMerkleRoot(block) == merkle_root);
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
CBlock block;
|
||||
block.vtx.push_back(create_coinbase_tx(/*include_witness=*/true));
|
||||
{
|
||||
CMutableTransaction mtx;
|
||||
mtx.vin.resize(1);
|
||||
mtx.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.resize(1);
|
||||
mtx.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0] = {0};
|
||||
block.vtx.push_back(MakeTransactionRef(mtx));
|
||||
}
|
||||
block.hashMerkleRoot = BlockMerkleRoot(block);
|
||||
// Block with witnesses is considered mutated if the witness commitment
|
||||
// is not validated.
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/false));
|
||||
// Block with invalid witness commitment is considered mutated.
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/true));
|
||||
|
||||
// Block with valid commitment is not mutated
|
||||
{
|
||||
auto commitment{BlockWitnessMerkleRoot(block)};
|
||||
insert_witness_commitment(block, commitment);
|
||||
block.hashMerkleRoot = BlockMerkleRoot(block);
|
||||
}
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_not_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/true));
|
||||
|
||||
// Malleating witnesses should be caught by `IsBlockMutated`.
|
||||
{
|
||||
CMutableTransaction mtx{*block.vtx[1]};
|
||||
assert(!mtx.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0].empty());
|
||||
++mtx.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0][0];
|
||||
block.vtx[1] = MakeTransactionRef(mtx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Without also updating the witness commitment, the merkle root should
|
||||
// not change when changing one of the witnesses.
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(block.hashMerkleRoot == BlockMerkleRoot(block));
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/true));
|
||||
{
|
||||
auto commitment{BlockWitnessMerkleRoot(block)};
|
||||
insert_witness_commitment(block, commitment);
|
||||
block.hashMerkleRoot = BlockMerkleRoot(block);
|
||||
}
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_not_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/true));
|
||||
|
||||
// Test malleating the coinbase witness reserved value
|
||||
{
|
||||
CMutableTransaction mtx{*block.vtx[0]};
|
||||
mtx.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.resize(0);
|
||||
block.vtx[0] = MakeTransactionRef(mtx);
|
||||
block.hashMerkleRoot = BlockMerkleRoot(block);
|
||||
}
|
||||
BOOST_CHECK(is_mutated(block, /*check_witness_root=*/true));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE_END()
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3621,6 +3621,87 @@ static bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationState& st
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static bool CheckMerkleRoot(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (block.m_checked_merkle_root) return true;
|
||||
|
||||
bool mutated;
|
||||
uint256 merkle_root = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated);
|
||||
if (block.hashMerkleRoot != merkle_root) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(
|
||||
/*result=*/BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED,
|
||||
/*reject_reason=*/"bad-txnmrklroot",
|
||||
/*debug_message=*/"hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences
|
||||
// of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block,
|
||||
// while still invalidating it.
|
||||
if (mutated) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(
|
||||
/*result=*/BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED,
|
||||
/*reject_reason=*/"bad-txns-duplicate",
|
||||
/*debug_message=*/"duplicate transaction");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
block.m_checked_merkle_root = true;
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** CheckWitnessMalleation performs checks for block malleation with regard to
|
||||
* its witnesses.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Note: If the witness commitment is expected (i.e. `expect_witness_commitment
|
||||
* = true`), then the block is required to have at least one transaction and the
|
||||
* first transaction needs to have at least one input. */
|
||||
static bool CheckWitnessMalleation(const CBlock& block, bool expect_witness_commitment, BlockValidationState& state)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (expect_witness_commitment) {
|
||||
if (block.m_checked_witness_commitment) return true;
|
||||
|
||||
int commitpos = GetWitnessCommitmentIndex(block);
|
||||
if (commitpos != NO_WITNESS_COMMITMENT) {
|
||||
assert(!block.vtx.empty() && !block.vtx[0]->vin.empty());
|
||||
const auto& witness_stack{block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack};
|
||||
|
||||
if (witness_stack.size() != 1 || witness_stack[0].size() != 32) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(
|
||||
/*result=*/BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED,
|
||||
/*reject_reason=*/"bad-witness-nonce-size",
|
||||
/*debug_message=*/strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The malleation check is ignored; as the transaction tree itself
|
||||
// already does not permit it, it is impossible to trigger in the
|
||||
// witness tree.
|
||||
uint256 hash_witness = BlockWitnessMerkleRoot(block, /*mutated=*/nullptr);
|
||||
|
||||
CHash256().Write(hash_witness).Write(witness_stack[0]).Finalize(hash_witness);
|
||||
if (memcmp(hash_witness.begin(), &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], 32)) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(
|
||||
/*result=*/BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED,
|
||||
/*reject_reason=*/"bad-witness-merkle-match",
|
||||
/*debug_message=*/strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
block.m_checked_witness_commitment = true;
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// No witness data is allowed in blocks that don't commit to witness data, as this would otherwise leave room for spam
|
||||
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
|
||||
if (tx->HasWitness()) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(
|
||||
/*result=*/BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED,
|
||||
/*reject_reason=*/"unexpected-witness",
|
||||
/*debug_message=*/strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams, bool fCheckPOW, bool fCheckMerkleRoot)
|
||||
{
|
||||
// These are checks that are independent of context.
|
||||
@@ -3639,17 +3720,8 @@ bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensu
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check the merkle root.
|
||||
if (fCheckMerkleRoot) {
|
||||
bool mutated;
|
||||
uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated);
|
||||
if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2)
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
|
||||
|
||||
// Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences
|
||||
// of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block,
|
||||
// while still invalidating it.
|
||||
if (mutated)
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction");
|
||||
if (fCheckMerkleRoot && !CheckMerkleRoot(block, state)) {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any
|
||||
@@ -3740,6 +3812,37 @@ bool HasValidProofOfWork(const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers, const Consens
|
||||
[&](const auto& header) { return CheckProofOfWork(header.GetHash(), header.nBits, consensusParams);});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
bool IsBlockMutated(const CBlock& block, bool check_witness_root)
|
||||
{
|
||||
BlockValidationState state;
|
||||
if (!CheckMerkleRoot(block, state)) {
|
||||
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION, "Block mutated: %s\n", state.ToString());
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (block.vtx.empty() || !block.vtx[0]->IsCoinBase()) {
|
||||
// Consider the block mutated if any transaction is 64 bytes in size (see 3.1
|
||||
// in "Weaknesses in Bitcoin’s Merkle Root Construction":
|
||||
// https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20190225/a27d8837/attachment-0001.pdf).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Note: This is not a consensus change as this only applies to blocks that
|
||||
// don't have a coinbase transaction and would therefore already be invalid.
|
||||
return std::any_of(block.vtx.begin(), block.vtx.end(),
|
||||
[](auto& tx) { return ::GetSerializeSize(tx, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) == 64; });
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Theoretically it is still possible for a block with a 64 byte
|
||||
// coinbase transaction to be mutated but we neglect that possibility
|
||||
// here as it requires at least 224 bits of work.
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!CheckWitnessMalleation(block, check_witness_root, state)) {
|
||||
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION, "Block mutated: %s\n", state.ToString());
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
arith_uint256 CalculateHeadersWork(const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers)
|
||||
{
|
||||
arith_uint256 total_work{0};
|
||||
@@ -3848,33 +3951,8 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& stat
|
||||
// * There must be at least one output whose scriptPubKey is a single 36-byte push, the first 4 bytes of which are
|
||||
// {0xaa, 0x21, 0xa9, 0xed}, and the following 32 bytes are SHA256^2(witness root, witness reserved value). In case there are
|
||||
// multiple, the last one is used.
|
||||
bool fHaveWitness = false;
|
||||
if (DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) {
|
||||
int commitpos = GetWitnessCommitmentIndex(block);
|
||||
if (commitpos != NO_WITNESS_COMMITMENT) {
|
||||
bool malleated = false;
|
||||
uint256 hashWitness = BlockWitnessMerkleRoot(block, &malleated);
|
||||
// The malleation check is ignored; as the transaction tree itself
|
||||
// already does not permit it, it is impossible to trigger in the
|
||||
// witness tree.
|
||||
if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.size() != 1 || block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0].size() != 32) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-nonce-size", strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__));
|
||||
}
|
||||
CHash256().Write(hashWitness).Write(block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0]).Finalize(hashWitness);
|
||||
if (memcmp(hashWitness.begin(), &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], 32)) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-merkle-match", strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__));
|
||||
}
|
||||
fHaveWitness = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// No witness data is allowed in blocks that don't commit to witness data, as this would otherwise leave room for spam
|
||||
if (!fHaveWitness) {
|
||||
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
|
||||
if (tx->HasWitness()) {
|
||||
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "unexpected-witness", strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!CheckWitnessMalleation(block, DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT), state)) {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// After the coinbase witness reserved value and commitment are verified,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -360,6 +360,9 @@ bool TestBlockValidity(BlockValidationState& state,
|
||||
/** Check with the proof of work on each blockheader matches the value in nBits */
|
||||
bool HasValidProofOfWork(const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams);
|
||||
|
||||
/** Check if a block has been mutated (with respect to its merkle root and witness commitments). */
|
||||
bool IsBlockMutated(const CBlock& block, bool check_witness_root);
|
||||
|
||||
/** Return the sum of the work on a given set of headers */
|
||||
arith_uint256 CalculateHeadersWork(const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2561,8 +2561,10 @@ util::Result<CTxDestination> ReserveDestination::GetReservedDestination(bool int
|
||||
|
||||
if (nIndex == -1) {
|
||||
CKeyPool keypool;
|
||||
auto op_address = m_spk_man->GetReservedDestination(type, internal, nIndex, keypool);
|
||||
int64_t index;
|
||||
auto op_address = m_spk_man->GetReservedDestination(type, internal, index, keypool);
|
||||
if (!op_address) return op_address;
|
||||
nIndex = index;
|
||||
address = *op_address;
|
||||
fInternal = keypool.fInternal;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ class FilelockTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
|
||||
expected_msg = f"Error: Cannot obtain a lock on data directory {datadir}. {self.config['environment']['PACKAGE_NAME']} is probably already running."
|
||||
self.nodes[1].assert_start_raises_init_error(extra_args=[f'-datadir={self.nodes[0].datadir_path}', '-noserver'], expected_msg=expected_msg)
|
||||
|
||||
cookie_file = datadir / ".cookie"
|
||||
assert cookie_file.exists() # should not be deleted during the second bitcoind instance shutdown
|
||||
|
||||
if self.is_wallet_compiled():
|
||||
def check_wallet_filelock(descriptors):
|
||||
wallet_name = ''.join([random.choice(string.ascii_lowercase) for _ in range(6)])
|
||||
|
||||
116
test/functional/p2p_mutated_blocks.py
Executable file
116
test/functional/p2p_mutated_blocks.py
Executable file
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
||||
# Copyright (c) The Bitcoin Core developers
|
||||
# Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
|
||||
# file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
|
||||
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Test that an attacker can't degrade compact block relay by sending unsolicited
|
||||
mutated blocks to clear in-flight blocktxn requests from other honest peers.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from test_framework.p2p import P2PInterface
|
||||
from test_framework.messages import (
|
||||
BlockTransactions,
|
||||
msg_cmpctblock,
|
||||
msg_block,
|
||||
msg_blocktxn,
|
||||
HeaderAndShortIDs,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from test_framework.test_framework import BitcoinTestFramework
|
||||
from test_framework.blocktools import (
|
||||
COINBASE_MATURITY,
|
||||
create_block,
|
||||
add_witness_commitment,
|
||||
NORMAL_GBT_REQUEST_PARAMS,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from test_framework.util import assert_equal
|
||||
from test_framework.wallet import MiniWallet
|
||||
import copy
|
||||
|
||||
class MutatedBlocksTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
|
||||
def set_test_params(self):
|
||||
self.setup_clean_chain = True
|
||||
self.num_nodes = 1
|
||||
self.extra_args = [
|
||||
[
|
||||
"-testactivationheight=segwit@1", # causes unconnected headers/blocks to not have segwit considered deployed
|
||||
],
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
def run_test(self):
|
||||
self.wallet = MiniWallet(self.nodes[0])
|
||||
self.generate(self.wallet, COINBASE_MATURITY)
|
||||
|
||||
honest_relayer = self.nodes[0].add_outbound_p2p_connection(P2PInterface(), p2p_idx=0, connection_type="outbound-full-relay")
|
||||
attacker = self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
|
||||
|
||||
# Create new block with two transactions (coinbase + 1 self-transfer).
|
||||
# The self-transfer transaction is needed to trigger a compact block
|
||||
# `getblocktxn` roundtrip.
|
||||
tx = self.wallet.create_self_transfer()["tx"]
|
||||
block = create_block(tmpl=self.nodes[0].getblocktemplate(NORMAL_GBT_REQUEST_PARAMS), txlist=[tx])
|
||||
add_witness_commitment(block)
|
||||
block.solve()
|
||||
|
||||
# Create mutated version of the block by changing the transaction
|
||||
# version on the self-transfer.
|
||||
mutated_block = copy.deepcopy(block)
|
||||
mutated_block.vtx[1].nVersion = 4
|
||||
|
||||
# Announce the new block via a compact block through the honest relayer
|
||||
cmpctblock = HeaderAndShortIDs()
|
||||
cmpctblock.initialize_from_block(block, use_witness=True)
|
||||
honest_relayer.send_message(msg_cmpctblock(cmpctblock.to_p2p()))
|
||||
|
||||
# Wait for a `getblocktxn` that attempts to fetch the self-transfer
|
||||
def self_transfer_requested():
|
||||
if not honest_relayer.last_message.get('getblocktxn'):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
get_block_txn = honest_relayer.last_message['getblocktxn']
|
||||
return get_block_txn.block_txn_request.blockhash == block.sha256 and \
|
||||
get_block_txn.block_txn_request.indexes == [1]
|
||||
honest_relayer.wait_until(self_transfer_requested, timeout=5)
|
||||
|
||||
# Block at height 101 should be the only one in flight from peer 0
|
||||
peer_info_prior_to_attack = self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()
|
||||
assert_equal(peer_info_prior_to_attack[0]['id'], 0)
|
||||
assert_equal([101], peer_info_prior_to_attack[0]["inflight"])
|
||||
|
||||
# Attempt to clear the honest relayer's download request by sending the
|
||||
# mutated block (as the attacker).
|
||||
with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(expected_msgs=["Block mutated: bad-txnmrklroot, hashMerkleRoot mismatch"]):
|
||||
attacker.send_message(msg_block(mutated_block))
|
||||
# Attacker should get disconnected for sending a mutated block
|
||||
attacker.wait_for_disconnect(timeout=5)
|
||||
|
||||
# Block at height 101 should *still* be the only block in-flight from
|
||||
# peer 0
|
||||
peer_info_after_attack = self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()
|
||||
assert_equal(peer_info_after_attack[0]['id'], 0)
|
||||
assert_equal([101], peer_info_after_attack[0]["inflight"])
|
||||
|
||||
# The honest relayer should be able to complete relaying the block by
|
||||
# sending the blocktxn that was requested.
|
||||
block_txn = msg_blocktxn()
|
||||
block_txn.block_transactions = BlockTransactions(blockhash=block.sha256, transactions=[tx])
|
||||
honest_relayer.send_and_ping(block_txn)
|
||||
assert_equal(self.nodes[0].getbestblockhash(), block.hash)
|
||||
|
||||
# Check that unexpected-witness mutation check doesn't trigger on a header that doesn't connect to anything
|
||||
assert_equal(len(self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()), 1)
|
||||
attacker = self.nodes[0].add_p2p_connection(P2PInterface())
|
||||
block_missing_prev = copy.deepcopy(block)
|
||||
block_missing_prev.hashPrevBlock = 123
|
||||
block_missing_prev.solve()
|
||||
|
||||
# Attacker gets a DoS score of 10, not immediately disconnected, so we do it 10 times to get to 100
|
||||
for _ in range(10):
|
||||
assert_equal(len(self.nodes[0].getpeerinfo()), 2)
|
||||
with self.nodes[0].assert_debug_log(expected_msgs=["AcceptBlock FAILED (prev-blk-not-found)"]):
|
||||
attacker.send_message(msg_block(block_missing_prev))
|
||||
attacker.wait_for_disconnect(timeout=5)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == '__main__':
|
||||
MutatedBlocksTest().main()
|
||||
@@ -298,6 +298,7 @@ BASE_SCRIPTS = [
|
||||
'wallet_crosschain.py',
|
||||
'mining_basic.py',
|
||||
'feature_signet.py',
|
||||
'p2p_mutated_blocks.py',
|
||||
'wallet_implicitsegwit.py --legacy-wallet',
|
||||
'rpc_named_arguments.py',
|
||||
'feature_startupnotify.py',
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -103,11 +103,18 @@ class KeyPoolTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
|
||||
nodes[0].getrawchangeaddress()
|
||||
nodes[0].getrawchangeaddress()
|
||||
nodes[0].getrawchangeaddress()
|
||||
addr = set()
|
||||
# remember keypool sizes
|
||||
wi = nodes[0].getwalletinfo()
|
||||
kp_size_before = [wi['keypoolsize_hd_internal'], wi['keypoolsize']]
|
||||
# the next one should fail
|
||||
assert_raises_rpc_error(-12, "Keypool ran out", nodes[0].getrawchangeaddress)
|
||||
# check that keypool sizes did not change
|
||||
wi = nodes[0].getwalletinfo()
|
||||
kp_size_after = [wi['keypoolsize_hd_internal'], wi['keypoolsize']]
|
||||
assert_equal(kp_size_before, kp_size_after)
|
||||
|
||||
# drain the external keys
|
||||
addr = set()
|
||||
addr.add(nodes[0].getnewaddress(address_type="bech32"))
|
||||
addr.add(nodes[0].getnewaddress(address_type="bech32"))
|
||||
addr.add(nodes[0].getnewaddress(address_type="bech32"))
|
||||
@@ -115,8 +122,15 @@ class KeyPoolTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
|
||||
addr.add(nodes[0].getnewaddress(address_type="bech32"))
|
||||
addr.add(nodes[0].getnewaddress(address_type="bech32"))
|
||||
assert len(addr) == 6
|
||||
# remember keypool sizes
|
||||
wi = nodes[0].getwalletinfo()
|
||||
kp_size_before = [wi['keypoolsize_hd_internal'], wi['keypoolsize']]
|
||||
# the next one should fail
|
||||
assert_raises_rpc_error(-12, "Error: Keypool ran out, please call keypoolrefill first", nodes[0].getnewaddress)
|
||||
# check that keypool sizes did not change
|
||||
wi = nodes[0].getwalletinfo()
|
||||
kp_size_after = [wi['keypoolsize_hd_internal'], wi['keypoolsize']]
|
||||
assert_equal(kp_size_before, kp_size_after)
|
||||
|
||||
# refill keypool with three new addresses
|
||||
nodes[0].walletpassphrase('test', 1)
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user