Files
bitcoin/src
merge-script 59fd053dac Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#34931: validation: abort on DB unreadable coins instead of treating them as missing
75f64e50c6 test: exercise node abort on UTXO deserialization failure (furszy)
4652cd0d82 txdb: detect UTXO deserialization errors via CDBWrapper::TryRead() (furszy)
5dfbb91b6c dbwrapper: add TryRead() to distinguish errors from valid outcomes (furszy)
f78834fac9 test: add missing coverage for CDBWrapper::Read() errors (furszy)

Pull request description:

  Early note: the majority of this PR consists of test coverage. The changes per se are small.

  If a UTXO entry on disk can't be deserialized, the node currently treats it as if the coin
  wouldn't exist instead of aborting with an error. A non-existing coin has a very specific
  meaning for consensus: any block that spends it would be permanently rejected as invalid
  (`BLOCK_FAILED_VALID`), silently forking the node from the rest of the network. This can't
  currently be triggered in practice (details below), but it's still the wrong behavior.

  The root cause is that `CDBWrapper::Read()` returns `false` for both missing entries and
  deserialization failures, so `CCoinsViewDB::GetCoin()` has no way to tell them apart.
  `CCoinsViewErrorCatcher` was built to catch database read errors and abort, but it never
  fires during deserialization errors because `CDBWrapper::Read()` swallows the exception
  before it can propagate. This [comment](8a8edc8d88/src/coins.cpp (L398-L411)) in `ExecuteBackedWrapper()` spells out the code
  intent very clearly.

  As mentioned initially, this can't happen in practice today. It would require either a bug
  in the coin serialization path, or a memory corruption before the data reaches LevelDB
  (at which point we have bigger problems). Random disk-level bit flips are caught earlier
  by LevelDB's verification (`verify_checksums=true`, enabled by default), which already
  propagates correctly as `DB_INTERNAL_ERROR`. Regardless, a db read issue should
  never be silently misinterpreted as a consensus violation.

  This PR adds `CDBWrapper::TryRead()`, which returns a `ReadStatus` that lets callers
  discriminate between all possible outcomes. `CCoinsViewDB::GetCoin()` switches on the
  result and throws on any error, letting `ExecuteBackedWrapper()` do what it was designed
  to do. `CDBWrapper::Read()` becomes a thin wrapper over `TryRead()`, preserving backward
  compatibility for all other callers (so we don't have to change non-consensus code here).
  `PeekCoin()` is also covered, as it delegates to `CCoinsViewDB::GetCoin()` at the database
  level.

  The idea of the PR is to go slowly over the code changes, first commit locks-in the current
  `CDBWrapper::Read()` behavior . The second adds `TryRead()` with tests for all four
  status codes. The third is the `CCoinsViewDB::GetCoin()` fix. The fourth is a functional
  that ensures the node aborts correctly instead of silently diverging.

  Testing Notes:
  Cherry-picking the functional test commit on master demonstrates the consensus split
  when the coin entry fails to deserialize.

  Extra Note:
  `CDBIterator::GetValue()` has the same silent-swallow pattern. Not consensus-critical.
  Should be addressed in a follow-up.

ACKs for top commit:
  ajtowns:
    reACK 75f64e50c6
  sedited:
    ACK 75f64e50c6
  mzumsande:
    Code Review ACK [75f64e5](75f64e50c6)

Tree-SHA512: 51b0114ea443544a2f1fbb8e63be6e1dff94d6f287221d566dbc98d666784a2b4c486acfb87eea5392bc1d092fb6d6dc0ff6782bcdccdcf15939281c895e384d
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