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Reset the global PRNG before the dirty-state reset in process_message and process_messages. This prepares the reset path for the following change, which rebuilds the reused mempool together with the chainman. The mempool construction path consumes PRNG-backed state, so the rebuild should start from a fixed seed rather than from the RNG state left by the fuzz input.
154 lines
5.6 KiB
C++
154 lines
5.6 KiB
C++
// Copyright (c) 2020-present The Bitcoin Core developers
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// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
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// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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#include <addrman.h>
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#include <banman.h>
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#include <consensus/consensus.h>
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#include <kernel/chainparams.h>
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#include <net.h>
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#include <net_processing.h>
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#include <node/mining_types.h>
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#include <primitives/block.h>
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#include <primitives/transaction.h>
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#include <protocol.h>
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#include <sync.h>
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#include <test/fuzz/FuzzedDataProvider.h>
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#include <test/fuzz/fuzz.h>
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#include <test/fuzz/util.h>
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#include <test/fuzz/util/net.h>
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#include <test/util/mining.h>
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#include <test/util/net.h>
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#include <test/util/random.h>
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#include <test/util/setup_common.h>
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#include <test/util/time.h>
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#include <test/util/validation.h>
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#include <uint256.h>
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#include <util/time.h>
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#include <validation.h>
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#include <validationinterface.h>
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#include <functional>
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#include <ios>
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#include <memory>
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#include <optional>
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#include <string>
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#include <utility>
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#include <vector>
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namespace {
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TestingSetup* g_setup;
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void ResetChainman(TestingSetup& setup)
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{
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GetFakeNodeClock().set(setup.m_node.chainman->GetParams().GenesisBlock().Time());
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setup.m_node.chainman.reset();
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setup.m_make_chainman();
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setup.LoadVerifyActivateChainstate();
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node::BlockCreateOptions options;
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for (int i = 0; i < 2 * COINBASE_MATURITY; i++) {
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MineBlock(setup.m_node, options);
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}
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}
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} // namespace
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extern void MakeRandDeterministicDANGEROUS(const uint256& seed) noexcept;
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void initialize_process_messages()
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{
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static const auto testing_setup{
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MakeNoLogFileContext<TestingSetup>(
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/*chain_type=*/ChainType::REGTEST,
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{}),
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};
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g_setup = testing_setup.get();
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ResetChainman(*g_setup);
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}
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FUZZ_TARGET(process_messages, .init = initialize_process_messages)
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{
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SeedRandomStateForTest(SeedRand::ZEROS);
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FuzzedDataProvider fuzzed_data_provider(buffer.data(), buffer.size());
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auto& node{g_setup->m_node};
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auto& connman{static_cast<ConnmanTestMsg&>(*node.connman)};
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connman.Reset();
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auto& chainman{static_cast<TestChainstateManager&>(*node.chainman)};
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const auto block_index_size{WITH_LOCK(chainman.GetMutex(), return chainman.BlockIndex().size())};
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GetFakeNodeClock().set(1610000000s); // 2021-01-07, arbitrary
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FakeSteadyClock steady_clock;
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chainman.ResetIbd();
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chainman.DisableNextWrite();
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// Reset, so that dangling pointers can be detected by sanitizers.
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node.banman.reset();
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node.addrman.reset();
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node.peerman.reset();
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node.addrman = std::make_unique<AddrMan>(*node.netgroupman, /*deterministic=*/true, /*consistency_check_ratio=*/0);
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node.peerman = PeerManager::make(connman, *node.addrman,
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/*banman=*/nullptr, chainman,
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*node.mempool, *node.warnings,
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PeerManager::Options{
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.reconcile_txs = true,
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.deterministic_rng = true,
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});
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connman.SetMsgProc(node.peerman.get());
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connman.SetAddrman(*node.addrman);
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node.validation_signals->RegisterValidationInterface(node.peerman.get());
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LOCK(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex);
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std::vector<CNode*> peers;
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const auto num_peers_to_add = fuzzed_data_provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange(1, 3);
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for (int i = 0; i < num_peers_to_add; ++i) {
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peers.push_back(ConsumeNodeAsUniquePtr(fuzzed_data_provider, steady_clock, i).release());
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CNode& p2p_node = *peers.back();
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FillNode(fuzzed_data_provider, connman, p2p_node);
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connman.AddTestNode(p2p_node);
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}
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// Toggle IBD from within the loop, so that some messages may be processed
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// under IBD and the rest after leaving it. JumpOutOfIbd() latches, so guard
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// it to call at most once.
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bool jump_out_of_ibd{false};
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LIMITED_WHILE (fuzzed_data_provider.ConsumeBool(), 30) {
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if (!jump_out_of_ibd) jump_out_of_ibd = fuzzed_data_provider.ConsumeBool();
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if (jump_out_of_ibd && chainman.IsInitialBlockDownload()) chainman.JumpOutOfIbd();
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const std::string random_message_type{fuzzed_data_provider.ConsumeBytesAsString(CMessageHeader::MESSAGE_TYPE_SIZE).c_str()};
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GetFakeNodeClock().set(ConsumeTime(fuzzed_data_provider));
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CSerializedNetMsg net_msg;
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net_msg.m_type = random_message_type;
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net_msg.data = ConsumeRandomLengthByteVector(fuzzed_data_provider, MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
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CNode& random_node = *PickValue(fuzzed_data_provider, peers);
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connman.FlushSendBuffer(random_node);
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(void)connman.ReceiveMsgFrom(random_node, std::move(net_msg));
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bool more_work{true};
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while (more_work) { // Ensure that every message is eventually processed in some way or another
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random_node.fPauseSend = false;
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try {
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more_work = connman.ProcessMessagesOnce(random_node);
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} catch (const std::ios_base::failure&) {
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}
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node.peerman->SendMessages(random_node);
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}
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}
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node.validation_signals->SyncWithValidationInterfaceQueue();
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node.validation_signals->UnregisterValidationInterface(node.peerman.get());
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node.connman->StopNodes();
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if (block_index_size != WITH_LOCK(chainman.GetMutex(), return chainman.BlockIndex().size())) {
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// Reuse the global chainman, but reset it when it is dirty. Reset the
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// rng first, so ResetChainman() consumes it from a fixed seed.
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MakeRandDeterministicDANGEROUS(uint256::ZERO);
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ResetChainman(*g_setup);
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}
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}
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